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Preface
Since its founding in 1977, the world history journal Itinerario has 
published extensive conversations with prominent world historians. In 
1996, an anthology was published under the title Pilgrims to the Past. 
Edited by Leonard Blussé, Frans-Paul van der Putten and Hans Vogel 
and published by the CNWS (the Leiden School of Asian, African and 
Amerindian Studies, now the Leiden Institute for Area Studies), Pilgrims 
to the Past chronicled these conversations from the journal’s fi rst 1977 issue 
up to the retirement of Henk Wesseling in 1995. It was a fi tting moment 
for an anniversary anthology: Wesseling had established the Centre for 
the History of European Expansion at Leiden in 1974, and Itinerario was 
founded under his watch by the fi rst generation of the Centre’s staff .
Why would an academic journal publish interviews? According to 
journal co-founder Leonard Blussé, the journal was initially intended for 
an audience of both historians and afi cionados, and as a way to bridge 
the gap between a newsletter and the ‘existing, somewhat staid, academic 
journals.’1 Th e name Itinerario was chosen in reference to Jan Huygen 
van Linschoten’s famous 1596 travelogue of the same name. Th ere were 
very few thoughts at the time as to how the journal should be fi nanced 
or who would publish it. Th ese and other questions have long ago been 
resolved. Th e interview with Leonard Blussé in this present volume gives 
a good insight into the various incarnations Itinerario has undergone over 
the years. Today the journal is very much part of the world of established 
history journals, and it transferred to Cambridge University Press in 2010. 
Other things have remained the same. Th e name is still a tongue 
twister for some readers, and the journal’s issues still open with long 
conversations with leading world historians, recorded in various settings 
and by various colleagues in the journal’s network. It was a small leap, 
therefore, to decide that the journal’s fortieth anniversary would be a 
good occasion on which to publish a selection of the most interesting 
interviews from the past twenty years. Th is means that this book deals 
with a new generation or two of historians in several ways, and the 
diff erences manifest themselves on both the personal and methodological 
levels. More comments on this will follow below, but it is clear that ‘the 
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world historian’, if such a generalisation can be made, is a diff erent person 
in the twenty-fi rst century from the one (s)he (formerly he!) had been in 
the closing decades of the twentieth. 
Th e fi rst volume interviewed a generation that had not only studied 
colonial history, but had often also been a part of it. In one review, Jurrien 
van Goor sighed, ‘summarizing these 27 interviews is a hopeless task. . . . 
Some are ex-colonial administrators, but there are also people from former 
colonies . . . others are former missionaries and priests who developed the 
study of a particular diocese or pioneered the recording of oral history.’2 
Many of the fi rst volume’s historians had come to history as a discipline 
through a series of coincidences, often an unexpected intersection of the 
personal and the academic. Reviewing Pilgrims to the Past, Jeremy Black 
went so far as to say that ‘this is a fascinating volume that is full of interest 
and, in some of the cases, imbued with a powerful melancholia that stems 
from a sense of personal loss over the ebb of empire.’3 Th at nostalgia is 
fortunately largely absent from the interviews collected here.
James Tracy, for his part, hinted that Itinerario as a journal had actually 
helped shape this generation and its historiographical lens: ‘[w]hat one can 
see from these essays is how Itinerario itself has promoted the evolution of 
the European Expansion approach, which began as a project conceived in 
the late colonial era . . . and has now become a means of using European 
documents to study the local history of diff erent parts of the world. But 
Itinerario’s biases seem evident in the fact that senior scholars working 
from a Marxist perspective, like Immanuel Wallerstein and authors of 
the “development of underdevelopment” school, are occasionally referred 
to, but not included.’ What was missing, according to Tracy, was an 
‘extended discussion of the various historical approaches to a world that is 
tied together by European colonialism and its historical sequels.’4 
Th is second volume of interviews is skewed in a similar way: both 
the interviewers and the interviewed are part of the journal’s extended 
network. Yet, in the introduction that follows we off er our own take on 
what these interviews can tell us about this ‘second’ generation, their 
backgrounds and their approaches. Th is includes an interrogation of the 
various historical approaches to a world bound by colonial regimes and 
their historical successors. 
Finally, the reviews of Pilgrims to the Past made it clear that a bibliography 
of the most important works by the interviewees would have been helpful 
to readers and would have increased the volume’s use to instructors. 5 Th us 
prompted, we have added a bibliography referencing these works, but also 
the world historical texts that appeared in the conversations themselves. 
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We hope this provides further insight into the genealogy of world history, 
and the ways in which it has been shaped by personal connections and 
serendipitous encounters, as well as academic affi  nities. We make no 
grand claims to a greater validity for our fi ndings: our sample—interviews 
published in Itinerario over the last twenty years—favours connections 
to Leiden and the journal itself. Nevertheless, every interviewee in this 
volume has contributed a body of work that has shaped the discipline 
of world history in several ways, and we believe an introduction to their 
intellectual life stories to be absolutely worthwhile.
Notes
We thank all those who have carried out interviews for Itinerario over 
the years: in order of appearance Doug Munro, Herman Roozenbeek, 
Jurriën de Jong, Leonard Blussé, Maurits Ebben, Jaap de Moor, Peer 
Vries, Peter Hoppenbrouwers, Martha Chaiklin, Jos Gommans, Carl 
Feddersen, Henk Niemeijer, Ghulam Nadri, Frans-Paul van der Putten, 
Damian Pargas, Binu John Mailaparambil, Bede Moore, Suzanne de 
Graaf, Lincoln Paine, Andreas Weber, Martine van Ittersum, Jaap Jacobs, 
Iva Pesa, Karwan Fatah Black, Jessica Roitman, Rachel Koroloff , Jan Bart 
Gewald, Amrit Dev Kaur Khalsa, and Sanne Ravensbergen.
1 L. Blussé, F. van der Putten and H. Vogel, eds., Pilgrims to the Past: Private 
Conversations with Historians of European Expansion (Leiden: CNWS, 1996), 
2.
2 Review by Jurrien van Goor, Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 
[Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences of Southeast Asia] 156:4 
(2000): 827–28.
3 Review by Jeremy Black, Journal of World History 9:2 (1998): 286–88. 





Facing World History: inspirations, 
institutions, networks
Carolien Stolte and Alicia Schrikker
‘A historian is before anything else, a person, a living human being’. —
Om Prakash
Th e twenty-fi ve historians who give face to this book, from Brij Lal to Ann 
Stoler, come from diff erent regional and disciplinary backgrounds.1 What 
they have in common is that they are world historians, even if they might 
be surprised to fi nd themselves in each other’s company here. Admittedly, 
world history is a wide-ranging fi eld of study, and the boundaries with 
related fi elds such as global history, universal history, or the more recent 
fi elds of big history, planetary history and deep history, are porous and 
much debated. Th is volume is not about those boundaries and debates. 
For those we refer to the excellent historiographies that have come out over 
the past decade.2 Rather, this book is about what world historians do, how 
they work and how they have contributed to the development of the fi eld 
through their publications, as well as through their teaching, academic 
entrepreneurship and travels. What these historians have in common is 
that they question the nation state-oriented, Eurocentric approaches that 
for so long dominated historical scholarship, and that they aim at critical, 
inclusive scholarship. We might follow Jerry Bentley’s understanding 
of the fi eld of world history, which refers ‘to historical scholarship that 
explicitly compares experiences across the boundary lines of societies, 
or that examines interactions between peoples of diff erent societies, or 
that analyses large-scale historical patterns and processes that transcend 
individual societies.’3 
Th e type of world historian that appears in these interviews—if a type 
can be divined at all—is one who travels the world to unearth data and 
stories from the archives and to view, feel and experience the areas about 
which they write. World history, they show us, is something you do. Th eir 
research takes them from Fiji to Zanzibar and from Allahabad to Arnhem, 
and along the way they meet other historians and exchange their fi ndings 
and ideas. Historians, as Om Prakash points out in his interview, make 
critical choices about which questions to ask, which answers to give, and 
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which material to study. After all, he says, they are human beings. More 
than anything else, this collection of interviews gives us an insight into 
the way that historians work and think. And as most of the historians 
interviewed were at the end of their careers, this means that their refl ections 
reach back as far as the 1950s. Reading the interviews as a set, therefore, 
makes it possible to evaluate the role of career-making and academic 
networking in the development of scholarship over a considerable period.
Th is introduction is an attempt to analyse what drives these historians, 
and we have sought to link their stories to larger trends and developments 
in the fi eld. We do this in full awareness that this collection has a strong 
bias, as most interviews took place in and around Leiden University for 
the journal Itinerario, and the interviewers were largely scholars with a 
connection to Leiden and the journal. Neither is the collection complete—
many more of these interviews were held in the two decades covered by 
this book than can be published in a single volume, and more continue 
to be held every year. World history, like any discipline, is a collection of 
overlapping and intersecting networks, and this collection pertains to one 
such network within the larger whole. 
Th is limits our claims to one branch of the family tree, but this has 
advantages too: as a by-product of this selection bias, this introduction 
also shows the way historians in Leiden participated in world historical 
debates, and highlights specifi c institutional preoccupations and blind 
spots. Th e result is an impression of how world historians work, based 
on specifi c individuals and institutions. We off er a layered analysis of 
the interviews that evolves around the following four questions: What 
inspired them? How did their training inform their research? What role 
did collaborations, institutions and personal networks play in their work? 
And to what extent was and is their work shaped by personal experiences 
on the one hand and the global context in which they operate on the 
other? Th is, we hope, will off er fresh insights to students who are new to 
the fi eld as well as to our colleagues.
Old boys and new networks
‘A man becomes part of history only when he is part of the society’. —
Ashin Das Gupta
We teach our students that historians operate within historiographic 
trends and relate to the work of others in their writing. Th e interviews 
demonstrate that, invisible as it sometimes may be to their readers, 
such trends and debates are very much part of the lived experiences of 
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historians, and not merely of their work on paper. If one thing about the 
way historians work is apparent from the interviews, it is that they operate 
within networks, and that they tend to set up institutions and societies to 
facilitate exchange and debate. Th e interviews enable us to map out the 
lasting infl uence of such scholarly networks, tracing them back via the 
mentors of the interviewees into the interwar period, long before Itinerario 
was established. 
Many of these mentors, however, were no strangers to the journal 
themselves. Several of the historians interviewed in the fi rst collection of 
interviews, which covered the fi rst two decades of Itinerario, infl uenced, 
taught and mentored those interviewed in this second volume. Ronald 
Robinson, interviewed in the fi rst collection, here appears in the interviews 
with Leonard Blussé, Jürgen Osterhammel and Robert Ross. Philip 
Curtin and Jan Vansina play a role in the interview with Patricia Seed in 
this collection. Dharma Kumar worked with closely with Om Prakash, 
collaborated with Chris Bayly and Leonard Blussé, and was eventually 
interviewed for Itinerario by Robert Ross. John Elliot, interviewed by a 
crowd of Leiden scholars in 1995, had his work discussed by Geoff rey 
Parker when the latter was interviewed at the exact same spot by the 
same people a few years later. His work also makes an appearance in the 
interview with David Armitage, held some fi fteen years after that. But 
the interviews are equally informative about the connections they do not 
mention explicitly: Peter Reeves, whom Michael Pearson credits as his fi rst 
teacher of Indian history in Michigan, collaborated intensively with Brij 
Lal, whose interview opens this volume.4 And although Itinerario never 
published interviews with them, Charles Boxer and Holden Furber are 
also never far away, connecting Jack Wills to Leonard Blussé in Taiwan, 
or Om Prakash to Michael Pearson in Philadelphia. 
Mentors are crucial nodes in the networks that make up the discipline, 
and invaluable resources in navigating them. It is hard to overstate how 
much this applied to Professor M. A. P. Meilink-Roelofsz. No single 
historian is mentioned in this collection as often as she is. Ashin Das 
Gupta calls her his ‘guru’; Leonard Blussé refers to her as the ‘iron lady’. 
She advised Om Prakash, Adrian Lapian and Jack Wills in the archives, 
and co-supervised Cees Brouwer’s dissertation. If the connections between 
the interviewed in this volume had to be revealed through a single person, 
it would be Meilink-Roelofsz, and if they had to be revealed through a 
single site it would be the place where she spent most of her career: the 
National Archives in Th e Hague.
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For most of the people interviewed it was neither the scholars at 
Leiden nor Itinerario that fi rst brought them to the Netherlands; it was 
the archives. And here they stand in a long tradition. For historians 
working on particular regions and eras in American, African and Asian 
history, the Dutch colonial and Company—VOC and WIC—archives 
are extremely rich repositories. Om Prakash recounts his fi rst encounter 
with the VOC archives in the 1960s which were then hidden in the old 
Rijksarchief. He tells us about his struggle to read Dutch in seventeenth-
century handwriting, and how it literally took him months to get a grip 
on the material. In the 1960s, studying Dutch sources for local Ghanaian, 
Indian, Sri Lankan and Chinese political and economic history gained 
momentum. Prakash, Wills and Das Gupta each speak with nostalgia 
about the mid-1960s when they, as young historians, formed the now (in)-
famous ‘coff ee gang’ in the Algemeen Rijksarchief. For others, like Cees 
Brouwer, the reconstruction of local history through the VOC records 
became their lives’ work. In his case, this local history was the history 
of al-Mukhā, more popularly known as the coff ee marketplace Mocha 
on the Red Sea coast of Yemen. Later, other scholars of Africa and Asia 
such as Robert Ross and Leonard Blussé made their mark by taking this 
approach—local history supplemented by Dutch records—further in 
their social histories. 
Reading historical sources can become intense, we learn from Robert 
Ross, who attributes his slightly angry writing style in his Cape of Torments 
to the experience of reading court cases in which extremely violent 
punishments and treatment of slaves dominated. In other ways, too, doing 
archival research is a physical experience. Tony Reid refers to the cold and 
lonely journey to the colonial archives when they were still located near 
Arnhem in the 1950s and 1960s. Many of the interviewees see archives as 
much more than repositories of documents. Th e archive is also made up 
of its location, its mode of operation, its staff  and its organisational logic; 
and just as important are the archival canteens as social habitats and the 
personal connections made over long waits for documents, over off  hours 
and closing days. Th e collective experience of archival frustrations and 
the opportunity to share one’s new-found gems (ranging from turtles to 
shipping data) with others are part of the historian’s job. In that sense, 
the interviewed refer to ‘horizontal inspiration’ from their peers as much 
as to connections with more senior scholars. It is in the archive, doing 
fi eldwork, that academic networks are created. Jack Wills speaks of the 
importance of local archives for getting a feel for places, something also 
emphasised in the conversations with Fred Cooper and Robert Ross. For 
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both, travelling in Africa and working in the archives contributed to their 
understanding of the peoples and societies whose past they studied. ‘Th e 
landscape,’ says Robert Ross, ‘is my favorite source.’ 
It is also in the travelling and archival research that historians develop 
new ideas and directions. For Natalie Zemon Davis the archive is central 
to piecing together individual lives in the past in the fullest and most 
sensitive way possible. Sometimes it is years after her ‘fi rst encounter’ with 
a historical fi gure in the archives that she fi nds new traces, and picks them 
up to reconstruct their lives. Allison Blakely’s study of Dutch racism was 
triggered by his unexpected fi rst-hand experience with racism in what 
he had thought was a tolerant Dutch society. He was doing fi eldwork in 
the Netherlands in the late 1970s, not long after the decolonisation of 
Suriname. As a Dutch-speaking person of colour, he was mistaken for a 
post-colonial migrant and suddenly treated with shocking disdain in the 
public sphere, something that had not happened to him on previous visits 
to the country.
For Ann Stoler, being in the Netherlands, interacting with Dutch 
academia and working in the colonial archives made her understand 
better the questions about Dutch colonialism that historians in the 
Netherlands had neglected or hesitated to ask. She notes, ‘Th ere were 
already two trajectories to my work: one was about “subaltern” politics 
and our knowledge practices; the other one, deeply historical, that kept 
me traveling back and forth to Th e Hague and Amsterdam and Leiden 
from Paris to work at the KIT, to the KITLV in Leiden, and to the 
archives in Th e Hague. I was frustrated by what I couldn’t fi nd, but utterly 
taken by what was there, and more than ever amazed by what Dutch 
historians seemed to so assiduously circumvent and dismiss—but could 
not have missed.’ Explaining why she thinks her critical studies of Dutch 
colonialism and colonial society were not picked up in the Netherlands 
at the time, she describes the Dutch scholars in her fi eld as a particular 
species, ‘homo hierarchicus’. She is implicitly referring to prominent male 
academics, some with colonial roots, who neglected or preferred to look 
the other way from colonial atrocities and tensions of the past. Stoler 
reminds us that scholarly interaction and experience shape schisms and 
debates as much as they do trends and networks. 
Leiden through the lens of world historians 
‘I was somewhat of an ugly duckling in the History Department’. —
Leonard Blussé
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Th e interviews with Om Prakash, Jack Wills and Ashin Das Gupta in 
a way narrate the prehistory of the Leiden-based IGEER (Institute for 
the History of European Expansion) and its journal Itinerario. Th eir 
generation met in the archives in the 1960s and continued to meet in the 
United States and elsewhere. It was only in the late 1970s that they started 
to frequent Leiden. By that time, Henk Wesseling, as the newly appointed 
professor of general history, had the idea of establishing an institute for 
the study of European expansion and global interaction. Working amidst 
historians of Europe, he decided to pull into the department historians 
working on the world beyond Europe. Th e interviews with three of his 
‘vassals’, Piet Emmer (Th e Atlantic), Robert Ross (Africa) and Leonard 
Blussé (China and Southeast Asia) were selected for inclusion in this 
volume. Each advanced their respective fi elds during their careers, albeit 
in very diff erent ways: Piet Emmer dominated the debates about slavery 
in the Netherlands, and was well-connected to many American scholars of 
slavery who excelled in reconstructing numbers and life stories of African 
slaves in the Americas. Robert Ross has had an enormous output on the 
history of South Africa and remains a pre-eminent authority in the fi eld 
today. Leonard Blussé’s work covered early modern East and Southeast 
Asia, with a focus on overseas Chinese communities and political and 
diplomatic history. Each speaks with a diff erent degree of nostalgia of the 
early years of IGEER, when the networks were built up and Itinerario was 
fi rst published. 
IGEER was a success, and it placed Leiden on the world history map. 
What emerges is a picture of an energetic group of young men, who 
sincerely tried to do something diff erent from what their predecessors 
had done. Th ey sought cooperation with Area Studies, and they gradually 
edged out from their respective regional specialties into the fi eld of world 
history. Ross remembers cooperation across disciplines as a diffi  cult 
exercise, in which institutional boundaries continued to stand in the way 
and where characters and egos clashed. Quite a few of the interviewees 
remember the apparently legendary ‘Delhi–Yogya–Cambridge–Leiden 
conferences,’ in which experts in the fi eld of South and Southeast Asian 
studies met to compare various aspects of South and Southeast Asia—
focusing principally, though not exclusively, on the colonial experience. Th e 
conference proceedings were co-published in three issues of Itinerario, and 
are still popular among scholars and students.5 From the introductions to 
the volumes we learn that more happened face to face than mere scholarly 
exchange: excursions and dance fl oors were part of the package, and the 
shared experience certainly strengthened the network and exchange of 
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ideas. As Chris Bayly notes, ‘Some of the published work that came out 
of these meetings was very interesting. But it was the long-term eff ects of 
informal contacts and discussions with scholars in diff erent fi elds, who 
were working in diff erent ways, that really mattered.’
Th e tradition of co-organising conferences with colleagues in Asia and 
Africa persists in Leiden to this day and does much to strengthen ties 
and foster debate with local historians. Some of the interview locations 
are a by-product of this. Adrian Lapian was interviewed in Jakarta, 
Brij V. Lal in Fiji. Th e world-historical orientation that emerged out of 
the comparative history-oriented scholarship of IGEER and, later, the 
American professional organisation FEEGI (Forum on the History of 
European Expansion and Global Interaction, with which Itinerario is 
affi  liated) still carries a strong focus on local and vernacular histories. 
Although IGEER director Henk Wesseling retained a strong political 
focus in his work, others, in particular Emmer and Ross, shifted their 
focus to socio-economic approaches. Th e energetic activities of the 
Centre and the talents for networking and fundraising displayed by 
some members also resulted in a continuing tradition of workshop and 
conference organisation in Leiden, Th e Hague and Wassenaar, where 
the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Studies (NIAS) is located. From 
the mid-1990s, the history department’s Crayenborgh honours class, 
co-founded by Blussé, became another such hosting institution. Th e 
twelve-session Crayenborgh course was organised annually around a big 
world historical theme, for which a variety of speakers were invited from 
abroad, many of whom were interviewed by Peer Vries, Leonard Blussé or 
Frans Paul van der Putten.
In the post-Cold War era, world history was much occupied with 
the debate around ‘the rise of the west’ and ‘the great divergence’. Th is 
diversifi ed the archivally-focused group of regular visitors somewhat. 
Th rough the Crayenborgh class and the activities of Peer Vries, Wim 
Blockmans and others, world historians came to Leiden who were not 
working on Dutch archival collections per se. Scholars like Patrick O’Brien 
and Mark Elvin were interviewed in this way, and graduate students from 
the history department at large, and not merely IGEER, became part of 
the conversation. Th e ‘rise of the west’ debate is one instance in which 
particular preoccupations and blind spots of the Leiden Institute were 
made visible. Th e debate, after all, is very much ongoing, and currently 
carried out in books ranging from Why Nations Fail and Why the West 
Rules—For Now, to Empire of Cotton.6 Th e great divergence debate has 
not so much ceased to be a research theme as become a focus of economic 
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historians. Books on the history of capitalism and global inequality appear 
every year. However, this branch of economic history has always been 
relatively underrepresented in Leiden generally, and specifi cally Itinerario, 
whose focus on ‘the human factor’ has only grown stronger over the years.
In the meantime, Blussé’s endeavours to publish and translate VOC 
sources further strengthened the centre’s expertise in the early modern 
history of maritime Asia. Th is brought in new visiting scholars and Ph.D. 
students from abroad, who were quickly pulled into the Itinerario network, 
as is witnessed by the participation in the interviews by scholars such as 
Martha Chaiklin.7 And so the interviews represent a loose but global 
community of scholars that, one way or the other, were connected to 
activities in Leiden or of Leiden scholars. With the TANAP project, which 
was essentially a training, research and conservation programme for the 
VOC archives in the Netherlands and abroad, these activities reached a 
new high. TANAP stands for Towards a New age of Partnership, a riff  on 
the title of Holden Furber’s seminal work, Th e Age of Partnership: Europeans 
in Asia before Dominion. Th is was a project that secured cooperation with 
a wide variety of universities and archives in Asia, and resulted in around 
twenty Ph.D. dissertations focusing on regional political, economic and 
social history. Jack Wills, who was invited as a visiting scholar while the 
project was running, talks with great enthusiasm about working with 
this diverse set of students. Th e parallel with his own experience, meeting 
scholars from all over the world in the Rijksarchief in the 1960s, is easily 
drawn. And again, several TANAP laureates like Ghulam Nadri and 
Binu John were involved in the interviews. TANAP was embedded in 
Leiden’s Institute of Area Studies (then called CNWS, or Centre for Non-
Western Studies), which reinforced the idea that collaboration between 
historians and regional specialists had become common practice. TANAP 
was succeeded by the Encompass (2006–11) and Cosmopolis (2012–17) 
programmes, which have secured transnational cooperation and language 
and archival training for the next generation of scholars.
Midway through the 1990s, ties were also strengthened with scholars 
in the US when FEEGI adopted Itinerario as its offi  cial journal. FEEGI 
was born out of concerns similar to those that had given rise to IGEER 
some years earlier: the need to study European interaction with the rest 
of the world in a comparative way. It was highly empirically focused 
and strove to promote the study of early modern Portuguese-, Dutch-, 
French-, and Spanish-language materials. Th is opened up new avenues 
for the journal and has led to a strengthening of submissions from FEEGI 
members on the early modern Atlantic in particular. After twenty years, 
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ties with FEEGI are still strong, and on several occasions FEEGI members 
were interviewed or conducted interviews themselves. As an organisation, 
FEEGI features regularly in the conversations. Patricia Seed, a former 
president of FEEGI, suggests in her 2003 interview that a FEEGI 
conference could be organised in cooperation with IGEER every three 
years or so. She will be happy to know that this actually materialised in 
2015 with the fi rst FEEGI-in-Europe conference, thanks to the initiative 
of Catía Antunes in collaboration with Carla Pestana, Linda Rupert and 
Phil Stern. 
But among the fond memories of IGEER there are also critical voices. 
IGEER was a typical exponent of the Leiden liberal tradition, which tended 
to exclude the more critical Marxist-oriented scholarship that held sway in 
the 1980s and early 1990s. As far as academic reputations go, the theory-
aversion of some of Leiden’s historians has become a bit of a truism. But 
it is here that the interviews are especially informative, shedding light on 
how such disciplinary boundaries (or perceptions thereof) were actually 
created. On closer examination, several of the historians interviewed in 
this volume place themselves squarely in the Marxist historiographic 
tradition, or at least position their work with respect to it. What stood in 
the way of a more inclusive approach were informal personal networks and 
clashes of personality, as Robert Ross explains. IGEER in its early days 
was—as was much of the academic world at the time—a monkeys’ rock 
where alpha males reigned. Th is greatly infl uenced the centre’s reputation, 
something that lingers even today, as the recent interview with Ann Stoler 
demonstrates.
But Leiden has changed with the retirement of the old boys and 
the emergence of new girls like Catía Antunes, Nira Wickramasinghe 
and Marieke Bloembergen. And this has allowed for a more critical 
engagement with the Dutch, and global, colonial and Company past. 
Th e interdisciplinary ‘global interactions’ platform, in which historians, 
archaeologists, area specialists and anthropologists are stimulated to work 
together, has provided Itinerario with interviewees such as Fred Cooper and 
Ann Stoler. Yet, colleagues like Jos Gommans, Michiel van Groesen, Gert 
Oostindie and Jan Bart Gewald, who have in a way taken up the IGEER 
banner, continue the strong tradition of local and regional cooperation 
and interdisciplinary approaches. Anthropology, art and literature have 
become more central to the historical studies they propagate, and this 
trend is refl ected, too, in the orientation of the journal and the scholars 
interviewed. Th e interviews with Jürgen Osterhammel, Natalie Zemon 
Davis and Kären Wigen are good examples. Trained by the old school 
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and working with the new, we as editors have always found ourselves in 
dynamic company. 
Th e institutions have changed over time. Personal networks have 
possibly become a little less central. Robert Ross sees this as a positive 
development: ‘Leiden has professionalized,’ he says. But the legacy of 
the activities of the ‘old boys’ is still present in many ways. Th e practice 
of world history in Leiden continues to be marked by a strong local 
and regional focus. Empirical research in multiple source languages is 
treasured, and visiting scholars are still caught by the Itinerario crew for a 
good conversation. 
Inspirations
‘I began to divide the Indonesian seas in the Braudellian way: the Java Sea, 
the Banda Sea, the Sulawesi Sea, et cetera’. —Adrian Lapian
Th e historians interviewed are connected by more than archival serendipities 
and institutional entrepreneurship. Conducted over the course of twenty-
plus years, the interviews are evidence of particular shifts in approaches, 
as Brij Lal’s sensitive evaluation of the work on indentured labour of his 
predecessors makes clear. He explains his eff orts to connect the Indo-Fijian 
experience of indenture to experiences elsewhere, broadening his horizons 
from the locally focused work of others. He also locates his work in a larger 
‘human turn’, in attempts to represent the lived experience of indenture. 
Th is includes exploding certain myths around indentured labourers—in 
the case of Fiji, the ‘immoral character’ of girmitiya women. In this way, 
Lal’s interview sets the scene for a set of shifts that unites many of those 
interviewed: a focus on connected history, a focus on lived experience, and 
the deconstruction of colonial stereotypes and colonially-rooted tropes. It 
should go without saying that these historiographical shifts started long 
before this interview took place in 1997, but they resonate through many 
of the conversations.
By contrast, what slowly fades from view over the course of this volume 
is a preoccupation with the ‘rise of the west’ debate. It is still very much 
present in the interviews with Geoff rey Parker, Jack Goody and Patrick 
O’Brien in the late 1990s, but gradually disappears from the ‘must-ask’ 
list of interview questions. Th e selection of interviewers and interviewed is 
also a factor here, but we believe it is indicative of a large and noteworthy 
shift. Jack Goody fought Eurocentrism for much of his career. His work on 
family life demonstrated precisely how much the distinction between the 
‘western’ nuclear family and the ‘non-western’ extended family has been 
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overstated in historiography. Moreover, his Th e East in the West centred on 
the argument that there are no structural, long-term diff erences between 
East and West.8 It is this argument that ends up deciding the course of the 
interview, and the echoes of older historical preoccupations are still very 
much present as the terms under which the debate takes place. Likewise, 
the interview with Geoff rey Parker devotes considerable space to applying 
his work on military history to the role of military factors in the expansion 
of the West.
Th e ‘rise of the west’ debate is most immediately present in the interview 
with Patrick O’Brien, whose research to that point had been concerned 
primarily with the study of industrialisation. His work in the 1980s was 
written in part as a response to Wallerstein’s 1974 explanation of why 
Europe industrialised fi rst, and so naturally had to deal with foreign trade 
and imperialism as contributing factors.9 By the time the interview was 
held in 1999, Kenneth Pomeranz’s infl uential book Th e Great Divergence 
was about to be published and his argument was already making waves.10 
Much as the Annales historians had set the terms of reference for many of 
the interviews in Pilgrims to the Past, the rise of the west debate shaped the 
fi rst interviews in the present volume. Th is matches the historiographical 
progression perfectly, as the rise of the west debate is in many ways a 
continuation of issues fi rst raised by the Annales school. In books like 
Th e Great Divergence the infl uence of Annales historians is very much 
present. But nowhere is this continuation of themes more visible than in 
the continued importance of Fernand Braudel and Marc Bloch. 
As the interviews show, these two Annales scholars continue to inspire 
historians and draw students to the study of history to this day. Fully 
a third of the scholars interviewed in this volume refer to one or both 
of them. Th is appears somewhat counterintuitive, as the institutional 
framework of area studies has largely hardened regional boundaries in 
the academy, but the fact that the European focus of Bloch and Braudel’s 
work is no impediment for their continuing global impact is a testament 
to their timelessness. It should also be noted that engagement with their 
work transcends gratuitous reference or the general admiration that 
Braudel’s La Mediterranée habitually receives. Th e work inspired maritime 
historians such as Adrian Lapian, Michael Pearson and Anthony Reid, in 
all of whose work Braudel’s infl uence is immediately obvious.11 Likewise, 
Braudel’s assertion that there is no single Mediterranean Sea but in fact 
many diff erent seas on multiple spatial and temporal levels was attractive 
to scholars seeking to de-Europeanise the history of the Indian Ocean 
and the South China Sea. And in an even wider sense, La Méditerranée 
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inspires as a successful integration of methods from the social sciences 
in historiography, which is particularly attractive to scholars working on 
regions where primary sources may be other than written records. Finally, 
the word itself has become part of the academic idiom: Kären Wigen, who 
was based at Duke University when it became a hotbed of social theory 
and of questioning received notions, speaks of a ‘mediterraneanizing’ of 
the academy, when talking about connecting existing disciplines and 
areas in new ways. 
Th e possibilities for mixed-method research that Braudel, Bloch and 
other Annales historians pioneered were also poignant for the project of 
decolonising historiography. Michel Foucault is referred to in this context, 
although Ann Stoler rightly notes in her interview how little Foucault 
actually refers to colonialism and empire in his own writing, even if he 
inspired many others to do so. It is interesting to note, further, how rarely 
the Subaltern School actually makes an appearance in these interviews. As 
noted above, it would be too easy to dismiss this as a lack of engagement 
with Marxist historiography or the post-colonial turn. Several of the 
interviewees presented here consider themselves Marxists. Neither is 
it an unwillingness to engage with the nature of the archive and what 
it can and cannot tell the historian. Rather, it seems to be a refusal to 
believe, as per many of the scholars in the subaltern studies collective, 
that the subaltern strata of colonial society are unknowable.12 Robert Ross 
says this in so many words: ‘you have to think about how collections of 
written sources, which are fi ltered, which came into existence through 
the colonial society, through the colonial government, can tell you things 
about what is going on among non-colonial people. . . . Th e idea that you 
can’t actually say something about the subaltern classes of colonial society 
because the sources are colonial is of course a mistake. It is one-sided, but 
I have not found any better way out of it than anyone else.’ Th is echoes 
Ranajit Guha’s deconstruction of what can and cannot be found in the 
colonial archive in his famous essay, ‘Th e Prose of Counter-Insurgency’, 
although Ross is slightly more optimistic. Guha still concludes by stating 
that even historians seeking to write from the subaltern’s point of view are 
distanced from colonial discourse ‘only by a declaration of sentiment.’13 
Conversely, Ashin Das Gupta acknowledges the impact of the subaltern 
studies group but does not actually buy into their image of academic 
revolutionaries. He calls it ‘more a brand name than a new way of doing 
history,’ positing that the approaches the subalterns pioneered are not all 
new: 
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To some extent one can’t help but be infl uenced by them. But I 
suspect that the postmodernist emphasis on ‘fragments’ or the 
subaltern school’s emphasis on resistance is actually a continuation 
of earlier trends in historical writing. Th e French Annales School 
made the real breakthrough long ago. Th e emphasis on the history 
of experience and on the autonomy of localities or individual actors 
goes right back to Marc Bloch in the 1930s. Again, subaltern history 
was anticipated by the writing of E. P. Th ompson or Christopher Hill 
in their emphasis on resistance and the ‘world turned upside down’.14 
It is here, in Ashin Das Gupta’s remarks, that we see the lasting infl uence 
of the Annales school once more. Although Th ompson can indeed be 
credited with popularising the term ‘history from below’, the term was 
arguably fi rst used by Annales historian Lucien Febvre, when he spoke of 
‘histoire vue d’en bas et non d’en haut.’15
Colonial knowledge practices and colonial knowledge complexes are 
most directly interrogated in the interviews with Ann Stoler and Frederick 
Cooper. Stoler, in particular, talks at some length about the activist 
aspects of her work. But even so, Cooper cautions against jumping off  
a ‘theoretical deep end’, taking abstractions so far that they exist only in 
relation to other abstractions. But there is also an ‘empirical shallow end’ 
where facts speak for themselves, which, according to Cooper, they should 
not. It is the interplay between the two—the abstract and the concrete—
that is productive, a position with which most of the historians in this 
volume would agree. And the internalisation of the idea that sources 
produced by trading companies or colonial states cannot be taken at face 
value—so much so that it is now a truism—can in itself be considered one 
of the subaltern collective’s major successes. 
Finally, there is a practical side to academic decolonisation, most 
directly present in the interview with Adrian Lapian, who organised 
Southeast Asian conferences for MIPI (now LIPI), which, he notes, ‘was 
the fi rst time when Southeast Asian scholars had worked together. Before 
independence, each of them was oriented towards their respective colonial 
metropoles.’16 His regional engagement, moreover, was rooted in one of 
the most famous moments of the history of decolonisation: the Bandung 
Conference, which he witnessed as a reporter for the Indonesian Observer. 
Th is unusual starting point marked much of his career. He enrolled at the 
Universitas Indonesia and attended courses given by the fi rst generation 
of post-independence scholars, among them Husein Djajadiningrat, who 
taught the history of Islam and the Middle East, and Tjan Tjoe Som, a 
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Sinologist who taught the long story of China’s past as well as Chinese 
historiography. His being a product of the late-colonial Dutch school 
system likewise contributed to a ‘regional turn’ in Lapian’s thinking. 
Towards World History?
‘Th e idea that you do world history for an American audience doesn’t 
mean you’re doing it for the rest of the world, because other people are 
going to have diff erent visions as to what constitutes the world’. —Patricia 
Seed
What world history is and what it is not is still hotly debated. Th is 
discussion is arguably best traced through the archive of H-World, the 
H-Net space where the issue has been discussed since 1994.17 World 
history as an academic fi eld of enquiry emerged just as the Cold War was 
ending. All interviews in the present volume, therefore, were conducted 
when world history as a discipline was no longer a new and emerging 
fi eld, but one with a professional organisation, although even today its 
institutional infrastructure remains limited. Whether one’s work is 
or is not world history does not really come up in the interviews, as a 
few of the interviewees would object to the label, though some, such 
as Felipe Fernández-Armesto, advocate for it enthusiastically. But their 
understandings of the term do diff er.
Th e World History Association (WHA) itself, established in 1988, has 
an inclusive defi nition of the fi eld. It states that ‘as long as one focuses 
on the big picture of cultural interchange and/or comparative history, 
one is a practicing world historian.’ In this it sets itself apart from global 
history, which it considers to be limited to the ‘the study of globalization 
after 1492.’18 Th is specifi c date would suggest that global history grew 
out of the historiography of European expansion, whereas world history 
did not. Th is is not a tenable viewpoint, and many scholars who self-
identify as global historians, especially those who concentrate on the land-
based trading routes of Eurasia, would strongly disagree. And, in fact, the 
mission statement of the Journal of Global History is not very diff erent from 
that of the WHA. It seeks to clarify global change over time, ‘to transcend 
the dichotomy between “the West and the rest”, straddle traditional 
regional boundaries, relate material to cultural and political history, and 
overcome thematic fragmentation in historiography.’19 Patrick O’Brien’s 
prolegomenon for the Journal of Global History frames it as a mission even 
more than a methodology: to construct disciplined, cosmopolitan, and 
trustworthy narratives of our universal heritage.’20
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Indeed, if there is a separation to be drawn between world and global 
history, it can certainly not be drawn from these interviews.21 Especially 
in the earlier interviews, the economic focus sometimes attributed to 
global history was still very much ‘world history.’ Jack Goody cites Max 
Weber as a world historian, though he does so primarily to attack the 
Eurocentrist hypotheses that he sees as dominating the fi eld.22 In the 
interview with Patrick O’Brien that economic focus is at the forefront. 
O’Brien is sympathetic to the mission of Andre Gunder Frank’s ReOrient: 
Global Economy in the Asian Age, which is to prove that things happening 
in China fed back into world trade through India and via the Indian 
Ocean back to Europe.23 But he does not believe in such integration on 
any meaningful level, in the sense that it actually infl uenced regional 
economic trajectories. He notes that Frank ‘wants to say, and I do not 
agree with him, that there was already an economic world system way back 
in time. He has edited a book with Barry Gills with the title Th e World 
System: Five Hundred Years or Five Th ousand? . . . Th ere may be 5000 
years of long distance trade, but there was no world system or anything a 
modern economist would recognise as globalisation.’24 
Th e interview with Patricia Seed is interesting because it talks 
specifi cally about the practice of world history in the United States. Asked 
whether World History in US academia is ideologically motivated, she 
notes that ‘world history is a ground-up phenomenon, which is why there 
are no world historians at the Ivy League. . . . Th e course usually replaces 
the Western Civilization course—the one that began with Greece and 
Rome and ended with post-World War II United States. Th at course 
originated at a few elite universities early in the twentieth century, but 
never became popular until after the Second World War.’ She goes on 
to explain some of the motivations behind the original ‘Western Civ’ 
course—to show that all European immigrants belonged in the US, and 
that this migration had been a positive development. As this migration 
itself globalised, the narrative had to follow suit and include the pasts of 
new immigrant groups as well. Th is development of world history as a 
bottom-up teacher’s response to world events is not quite as true of Europe 
as it is in the United States, to which the strong world history tradition at 
Cambridge University and other places may attest. But, given the ubiquity 
of US-made academic textbooks, these origins are felt worldwide. 
Seed claims that for a long time world history was not much more 
than ‘Western Europe plus China’. Nonetheless, Chinese history does 
indeed inform several of the interviewees’ thinking about world history. 
Th is is not limited to the discussion of ReOrient outlined above. Jack 
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Wills, for instance, ‘can’t think of a better starting point than China for 
thinking about the transformations of our own times and contributing to 
this strange new trend we call “world history”.’ In that connection, it is 
interesting to note that Wills’s confrontation with the world history/global 
history question was a very direct one: his 1688: A World History was 
published as 1688: A Global History at the request of his publisher. Natalie 
Zemon Davis would sympathise: in her interview, she notes that ‘global is 
becoming a publisher’s cliché.’ 
As a visiting professor at Leiden in 2004, Wills taught a course called 
‘Big Books in World History.’ He notes that the students ‘were particularly 
taken with John R. McNeill’s Something New Under the Sun. . . . Clearly 
they see these big environmental problems as the policy challenges of 
their adult lives.’ It is interesting to see how often the environment comes 
up in the interviews in a world historical sense. Current preoccupations 
with climate change can feel very recent, and the interviews serve as a 
reminder of how intimately environmental history has been connected 
to the world historical project. When Wills was interviewed, Mark 
Elvin’s Th e Retreat of the Elephants: An Environmental History of China 
had just appeared, although Elvin explains in his interview that he had 
been interested in environmental history much longer.25 Elvin’s view 
on the importance of the environment to world history is explicit: ‘you 
can’t put the economy out in a world of its own.’ Th is is seconded by 
Felipe Fernández-Armesto, who notes that ‘history is unintelligible except 
in the context of the environment that surrounds us and the ecosystem 
that sustains us. I don’t think you can make sense of what humans do 
unless you locate them in their ecological context.’ Fernández-Armesto 
also reminds us that Toynbee was a pioneer of environmental history.26 
Toynbee put stock in both climate regimes and climate change, and his 
work on environmental history dates back to the fi rst volume of Th e Study 
of History.27 Of course, given the sheer volume of Toynbee’s work and the 
fact that he is simultaneously reviled and revered means that he can be 
many things to many historians, but he was a world historian with an eye 
for environmental factors. 
New Frontiers
‘Th e Pacifi c is still in the process of being discovered’. —Kären Wigen 
Collectively, the twenty-fi ve interviews collected here provide as many 
perspectives on the future of the fi eld. If the fi eld of world history has many 
pasts, as Patrick Manning reminds us, it also has many futures.28 Not 
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all of these possible futures can be outlined here, but two developments 
deserve highlighting: the new approaches to the history of the sea, and the 
new possibilities off ered by the expanding ‘digital sea’.
Seen from the larger network of IGEER, the interviews collectively 
make clear that world history as it is practised today has developed far 
beyond the history of maritime trading companies that once made up 
the bulk of one of its branches, the ‘history of European expansion.’ Th e 
historiography of those trading companies themselves has transformed as 
well, and the same material is now being used to ask new and innovative 
questions, as FEEGI conference programmes continually demonstrate.29 
Seen in this light, it is interesting that this development has also included 
a ‘return to the sea’. Oceans are popular again as spaces that connect, 
transform and hybridise people, goods and ideas. Today, however, this 
includes the privileging of non-European agency, before as well as during 
the age of empire. Important works in this regard range from Lincoln 
Paine’s Th e Sea and Civilization, which is a rare example of a truly decentred 
maritime history of the world, to Enseng Ho’s Indian Ocean-centred 
Graves of Tarim and Seema Alavi’s recent Muslim Cosmopolitanism.30
Th is new oceanic approach was pioneered by some of the historians 
interviewed in this volume, like Ashin Das Gupta and Michael Pearson. 
Building partly on their work, Indian Ocean studies has grown 
exponentially from the 1990s onwards. Centres and endowed chairs have 
emerged the world over. But old focal points remain: many of the Indian 
Ocean initiatives, for instance, centre on South Asia. Th is is no surprise, 
as historians of South Asia are over-represented among the pioneers of 
Indian Ocean history. Das Gupta and Pearson are cases in point. But 
the same focus is visible in centres such as Tufts University’s South Asian 
and Indian Ocean Studies Center, or in books such as Sugata Bose’s A 
Hundred Horizons.31
One exception remains, on which Kären Wigen dwells in some 
detail in her interview: the Pacifi c Ocean. Wigen co-directed a Ford 
Foundation-funded project the premise of which was that a reshuffl  ing 
of area studies scholars into ocean-centric working groups would yield 
new insights. Th e Pacifi c working group was the hardest to hold together. 
As she notes in her interview, the Pacifi c is still in the process of being 
discovered: there is no consensus of the ‘what, where, and when’ of Pacifi c 
history. David Armitage, in his interview, clearly agrees when he states: ‘I 
am also convinced the next frontier for oceanic history is Pacifi c History.’ 
His Pacifi c Histories project, fi rst convened at Harvard in 2012, likewise 
sought to create a pan-Pacifi c perspective.
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If it is possible to point to ‘new directions’, then this is one. Recent 
years have seen a proliferation of studies on the Pacifi c.32 Rather than 
emphasising the North Pacifi c’s role in an Asian Century, many of these 
new studies underscore small islands, large seas and multiple transits. As 
Pacifi c historian Matt Matsuda notes, the point is ‘not to concentrate 
on the continental and economic “Rim” powers of East and Southeast 
Asia and the Americas to defi ne the Pacifi c, but to propose an oceanic 
history much more located in thinking outward from Islanders and local 
cultures.’33
If the Pacifi c Ocean is one of the major geographical frontiers for the 
discipline, the one most transforming the practice of doing history is 
digitisation generally, and the rise of digital humanities in particular. Th e 
2003 interview with Patricia Seed, an award-winning pioneer of digital 
mapping who identifi ed the educational potential of digital resources 
early on, provides an interesting baseline for this volume. More than a 
decade ago, she saw opportunities that would still be considered out-of-
the-box today. ‘I use computer, board, and role-playing games as vehicles 
for teaching an introduction to history,’ she explains, ‘because by the time 
they reach university, undergraduates have spent a good part of their life 
playing games, dissecting, and criticising them. In short, they arrive with 
an existing critical apparatus that can be sharpened and refi ned by showing 
how narratives, plots, and arguments infl uence the way you re-tell history.’ 
Still, it is astounding to see the strides made between the interview 
with Seed and the one with David Armitage only eight years later. By that 
time, he and his interlocutors are speaking of digital libraries and massive 
online open courses (MOOCs) as staples of academic life—exciting ones 
whose potential has not nearly been reached, but staples nevertheless. Th is 
interview takes Seed’s quest to embed digitisation in historical practice 
and turns it outward. As Armitage asks in reference to the low retention 
rates in open online courses: ‘what are the university’s responsibilities 
towards a wider audience beyond its gates? How can faculty members 
reach out, under what circumstances, with what kind of encouragements?’ 
Armitage is not afraid to voice a prediction: he is ‘absolutely certain that 
we are in the midst of the single most transformative moment in academic 
life since the modern research university was created at the end of the 
nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century. In fi ve years’ time, 
the landscape is going to be unrecognizable.’ Th is is a safe bet in one sense 
at least: it is a given that in less than a decade the digital frontiers discussed 
in his interview will also appear quaint. 
facing world history: inspirations, institutions, networks 29
While huge strides have been made in the democratisation of the 
archive, there are downsides as well. A looming digital divide creates new 
inequalities both between and within countries. It is not a given that open-
access journals and source digitisation eff orts will in fact create universal 
access to the world’s knowledge or democratise the writing of history. As 
a vision, it will require the sustained eff ort of a critical mass of committed 
advocates. But the interview with Armitage does aff ord a glimpse of a 
potential world in which it is possible to work productively with classes of 
tens of thousands of students. 
Given the indisputable potential of digital humanities, it is interesting 
that several of the historians interviewed here point to the mixed blessing 
that is digitisation: the era of spending months on end in reading rooms 
with the same researchers, while not fully dead, is over for many people 
in many places. Funding concerns, programme rigidity and pressure 
to produce Ph.D.s at ever-increasing speed do play a role, but many of 
those interviewed caution against what one misses in the ‘point-and-click’ 
approach to visiting archives.
Many of these historians have important messages for their early career 
counterparts in other areas of life as well. If there is one single thread that 
runs through all the interviews, it is this: do not be afraid of choosing your 
own path. Learn from your mentors, but decide how, and when, and why, 
and where, to apply that information. Frederick Cooper uses the most vivid 
metaphor: ‘being infl uenced by what other people are doing is perfectly 
fi ne, the question is what one does next—whether you want to jump on 
a bandwagon because it’s a bandwagon, or to see where it takes you and 
to jump off  when the time has come to jump off  it.’ Armitage likewise 
urges young scholars to stop and think about why they take a particular 
approach to history: ‘we need to be more refl exive about exactly why we 
choose those things, rather than the path-dependency of historiographical 
activity.’ Finally, Wills is vocal about the perverse incentives in the way 
academic funding is structured: it actively punishes risk-taking, making 
the discipline less diverse. He notes that ‘one of the reasons I’m glad to be 
retired is . . . that I was fed up with the status anxiety that is so prevalent 
in American academia. About a hundred American universities aspire to 
be in the inner circle, the top twenty. A few do improve their relative 
standing, but at the cost of not doing anything diff erent from those who 
already are in the circle.’ Leonard Blussé expresses a similar sentiment 
not at the institutional but at the personal level when he laments that the 
current output-focused climate rewards the unimaginative.
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Adventures of History, History as Adventure 
‘I am sorry that I do not have the standard stories of how I spent six 
months on a banana boat, chatting to the Indonesian crew. . . . I am 
sorry I do not have more glamorous or romantic stories for you!’ —David 
Armitage
Above, David Armitage eloquently apologises for his lack of maritime 
adventures, and presents himself as an exception to the ‘standard 
adventurous historians’ that grace Itinerario’s pages. Yet he does emphasise 
the wanderlust of some of his family members as the possible source of his 
own wanderings in global academia. But the question remains whether, 
when read as a collection, it is indeed possible to identify character traits of 
this ‘generation’ of world historians. Th e interviews provide an opportunity 
for self-fashioning, so how do the interviewed tend to represent their lives, 
their work and the choices they made? We might rephrase this question 
in the words of Herman Paul, a student of the scholarly persona: What 
kind of talents, skills and virtues do these historians cultivate?34 Has this 
changed over time and, if so, how? And does it diff er between, say, China-
oriented scholars and those focused on the history of colonialism? Some 
generalisations have already been made above. All, however, have their 
exceptions—most of the historians interviewed are men, but not all. Most 
had received an elite education before entering academia, yet some, such 
as Brij Lal (being of girmitiya background), came a long way and worked 
their way up by their innate talent and with the help of mentors. 
Th e reason that some thoughts on the world historical scholarly 
persona can be off ered here at all is due entirely to the fact that the 
‘personal’ was folded into the ‘professional’ from the very fi rst interviews. 
Th e standard was set by Blussé and George Winius, who were interested 
not only in the scholarly trajectory of their interviewees, but also in the 
personal experiences of doing history and the motivations behind it. Real 
revelations about the latter two required a comfortable setting, a nice 
dinner and the right conversation partners. Th e aim was, as Blussé puts it, 
‘to speak with prominent people active in the fi eld. . . . George and I loved 
to ask colleagues about their backgrounds, their personal interests and 
their approaches to teaching and research.’ A number of the conversations 
recorded in this volume were led by Blussé in this way. But he was also 
‘put on the rack’ himself, and excels in presenting a personal history that 
combines ‘accidental scholarship’ with maritime adventure. 
Felipe Fernández-Armesto plays down the historian’s craft by stating 
that ‘everyone can be a historian.’ In his view, there is nothing particular 
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about historians as a group. And indeed, the image of the ‘accidental 
historian’ that dominated the fi rst volume of interviews has not disappeared 
in the second. It is still present in several stories: Blussé wonders whether 
he should not have continued in shipping, which would have been a good 
outlet for his entrepreneurial talents and lust for adventure. Th e Indonesian 
historian Adrian Lapian was bound for journalism and converted fully 
to the writing and teaching of history only late in his career. Pearson’s 
adventurous stories of his exploration of the history of the Indian Ocean 
are thrilling and one would have loved to be part of his crew when he was 
sailing. Bayly tells us that his fascination for Indian history really started 
during his travels, especially the time he lived in Allahabad as a young 
student. It was then that he gained a sense of Indian urban history, and 
that he could decentre the Raj as organising principle. Robert Ross’s tale 
of being chased by the police during his fi eldwork in Tswana in 1970s 
apartheid South Africa likewise speaks to the imagination. 
Inspiration was found not only in location, but also in politics. Both the 
Vietnam War and the anti-apartheid movement appear in the interviews as 
moments that decisively shaped the choices historians made in their fi eld. 
Cooper explains how the Vietnam War actually motivated him to study 
African history. Th e fact that Africa was in the process of decolonising gave 
the young anti-imperialist a sense of hope. Many historians interviewed 
reveal a great degree of societal and political engagement, which one way 
or the other infl uenced their work. On one side of the spectrum is Piet 
Emmer, who actively voiced his liberal views on slavery and migration in 
public debates about immigration in the Netherlands. On the other end 
of the spectrum we fi nd Nathalie Zemon Davis’s personal confrontation 
with McCarthyism in the United States. It brought her to Paris, and it was 
in French history that she made her fi rst incursions into the micro-history 
for which she has become famous. Brij Lal, when interviewed, had just 
started as a member of Fiji’s constitutional committee, which enabled him 
to infl uence the future of his country. 
For Ann Stoler, political activism and research are intertwined, and 
she talks about her career mainly in terms of battles—struggles against 
dominant views (particularly those of Cliff ord Geertz) and politics 
(especially ideologies of neo-imperialism). Her adventures go beyond 
the political, though. Like many of the others interviewed, her work 
is characterised by the crossing of disciplinary boundaries, merging 
anthropological and historical approaches. Perhaps the real champion in 
this respect was Jack Goody, who moved from anthropology in Africa to 
the fi eld of European mediaeval demography. 
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Perhaps the adventurous element is exactly what characterises this group 
of historians. Th ey are enterprising in the way they feed their curiosity, 
through travelling the globe and through crossing methodological 
demarcations, eras and areas of expertise. Th e societal engagement of 
many of those interviewed, whether in terms of inspiration or in terms 
of practice, is remarkable. Th e scholars whose lives are recorded in this 
volume are anything but ivory-tower academics, and that is what makes 
these conversations such exciting reads.
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Inte rview with Brij V. Lal, Historian of 
Indenture and of Contemporary Fiji
Born in 1952 and raised in a small village outside the Fijian sugar town of 
Labasa, Brij Vilash Lal received his fi rst degree at the University of the South 
Pacifi c and then went on to graduate studies in Canada and Australia. After 
completing his Ph.D. at the Australian National University, Lal received his 
fi rst academic appointment at his alma mater where he published his fi rst 
book, Girmitiyas: Th e Origins of the Fiji Indians, in 1983. Since then, 
he has written extensively on twentieth-century Fijian history. In 1984, 
Lal moved to the University of Hawaii where he taught both World and 
Pacifi c Islands History. While there he also became the editor of the prize-
winning journal Th e Contemporary Pacifi c. Returning to the Australian 
National University in 1989 as a Senior Research Fellow, Lal began to work 
on his biography of the Indo-Fijian leader A.D. Patel, which is now nearing 
completion. Currently, Lal is one of three members of Fiji’s Constitutional 
Review Commission, a committee set up to review the contested 1990 
constitution in this ethnically divided society. His present assignment precludes 
him from making statements about the Commission during his lifetime. Doug 
Munro conducted the following interview with Lal on 9 October 1995 at the 
University of the South Pacifi c.
I would like to start off  by noting that you are the grandson of one of the 
60,000 Indian indentured labourers on Fiji. How would you describe your 
background?
My grandfather came to Fiji in 1906. After serving his fi ve-year term of 
indenture he leased some native land and started his family there. My 
parents grew up in Labasa and I was born in Tabia village where the 
family farm still exists. Like most Indian people of that generation, my 
parents were illiterate, although my mother somehow learned how to 
sign her name. But always at the back of their minds was the memory of 
indenture—the poverty, the petty humiliations—and my parents did not 
want to see their children go through a similar experience. Moreover there 
was the insecurity of land tenure. We could only lease land for a short 
period; we could not own land. We were a large family of eight so there 
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was no way in which our parents could provide for all of us with a future 
on the land, so economic insecurity played a part. Also education was 
culturally valued by our community. Most primary schools were started 
by our parents and grandparents amidst great diffi  culties. I went to the 
local primary school (which in fact is celebrating its fi ftieth anniversary 
this year) and then to Labasa College for my high school education and 
from there to university here and elsewhere. But it was that experience of 
growing up on the farm that I think has been very important in shaping 
my imagination, helping me understand certain things. My interest in 
history really starts there. 
It is fair enough to say that you come from an improving class that was intent 
on upward social and economic mobility for subsequent generations. But 
you come from a fairly disadvantaged background and also an improbable 
background for someone who has since become one of the two foremost 
historians of Fiji and also an authority on the history of indentured servitude. 
So, interest aside, what made you become a historian and not something else? 
You did say that your background gave you a sense of a past that had to be 
rectifi ed. But what about the opportunities that came your way and the people 
who helped to make it possible?
Growing up on a small farm in an isolated part of Fiji where a week-
old Fiji Times or Shanti Dut was the only interesting reading material 
available, I felt the need to know about the outside world beyond the 
village. My grandfather was alive when I was a child. I used to sleep in his 
bed and he used to tell me stories about India, about his growing up in a 
village, about why he came. When I was a child I used to see these funny 
looking people, the surviving girmitiyas [Indian indentured labourers], 
wearing turbans and dhoti, congregating in the evenings under a mango 
tree or in a small shed, smoking hukka and talking in a strange language. 
Th ey used to sing bhajan together. Th is intrigued me, and I suppose it is 
not altogether surprising that my fi rst book deals with the background 
and identity of these people, a kind of collective biography.1 My high 
school teachers played an important role, too. I wanted to do English 
Literature and History. Both these subjects really interested me and I had 
some fantastic teachers who asked us to read writers like W.B. Yeats, T.S. 
Eliot, Tolstoy, Dostoyevsky, the Bronte sisters, Shakespeare, the American 
classics of John Steinbeck and F. Scott Fitzgerald, and Australian authors 
like Patrick White. We read many of the great classics of English literature. 
And we had a history teacher—who later became a labour politician—
who one day turned up for class with a placard around his neck bearing 
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the opening words of Th e Communist Manifesto. Th ey were people who 
took their profession seriously, were interested and interesting, and who 
encouraged us to go on. I got the sense when I was at high school that 
knowledge was fun and that passion to understand has continued. I chose 
history but to this day I have an abiding love of good literature.
As you said earlier, you found your niche, initially, in the history of the 
girmitiyas. I take it that your own background provided you with some 
advantage, if only a sense of commitment.
Yes, it was a project in which the heart and the head came together. I was 
writing about my own people, about myself really. So there was a sense of 
immediacy, emotional attachment. I had the language, I had contacts. I was 
making discoveries which had a direct social and personal interest. I have 
since discovered—no doubt my early exposure to great literature played a 
part here—that I am not very good at things abstract, remote. A subject 
has to appeal to me emotionally, has to have some personal relevance, for 
me to be intellectually engaged with it. Th e great Australian historian, 
Ken Inglis, once said that history is largely concealed autobiography.2 I 
think there is much truth in that. Take my eventual choice of a thesis 
topic. At fi rst I wrote to the Australian National University saying that 
I wanted to do a Ph.D. in historical demography. But they had no one 
to supervise me and also thought that I had insuffi  cient background in 
Mathematics. So they shifted me into History, and there was Ken Gillion, 
the distinguished scholar of Indian migration and of indenture.3 Ken told 
me that there was the topic of the Fiji Indians and he also mentioned that 
I could work on Sikhs on Fiji, because my Master’s thesis was on Sikhs 
in Vancouver. Th ere was this larger Sikh diaspora which Ken thought I 
could explore. But I found after a month or so of reading that I could not 
become enthused with the subject, so Ken said: the Fiji aspect of indenture 
is covered (and there might have been a territorial element there) so why 
not look at the background of these people in India—why they came, who 
they were, and the whole process of recruitment and migration. He had 
in mind the idea that I might be able to provide some insights into the 
whole process of migration and social change in one part of India. So that 
is how I started.
Soon after we fi rst met as postgraduate students in 1979 you presented a 
seminar paper on your Ph.D. work that challenged the notion that girmitiyas 
were deceived into signing on for service on Fiji. It struck me at the time as 
rather too assiduous an application of the type of history that was around the 
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Department of Pacifi c History at ANU at the time—the Davidson tradition, 
if you like—where Pacifi c Islanders (and indentured Asians for that matter) 
were accorded a proactive role in the shaping of events and their outcomes.4 
Afterwards, by contrast, when you followed the girmitiyas onto the plantations, 
and published a series of articles in the mid-1980s, a very indignant tone 
enters your writing, and you stress the exploitative and oppressive lives led by 
the girmitiyas.5 Put it this way: I noticed the contrast.
I am not sure that when I went to do my Ph.D. I had read what 
Davidson had written about agency and the role Pacifi c Islanders 
themselves had played in the making of their own histories. Th e book on 
Pacifi c history that most impressed me initially was Peter Corris’ work 
on the Solomon Island labour recruitment and migration.6 Also, a highly 
infl uential work came out in 1974 and that was Hugh Tinker’s A New 
System of Slavery—a very emotional work whose thesis is explicit in the 
title.7 I began to wonder as I read more about the tremendous changes 
taking part in nineteenth century India, and the enormous migration 
from the Indo-Gangetic plain to diff erent parts of the world, whether it 
could be that millions of people would leave their homes because they were 
deceived. It just did not sound right to me. Also, I realised that people over 
a forty-year period, even more in some cases, were leaving India for other 
colonies, coming back, and so there were communication links. So I was 
not convinced that deception was as important a factor in inducing people 
to leave. I do not discount that fraud and deceit were important factors 
in inducing people to move. But their extent seemed to be exaggerated. 
After all, migration to Fiji and other colonies was but a very small part of 
a larger process of migration to, say, the Assam gardens, to the Calcutta 
jute mills, to the coal mines in Bihar, to the Bombay textile mills—and 
there was a very lively debate going on at that time about the role that the 
British had played in undermining the handicraft industry and to what 
extent poverty in India was caused by British colonial policies.8 Given the 
context of what was taking place in India at the time, my emphasis was 
on agency and participation by the subjects themselves. Now, if there is 
a shift in tone when I write about indenture on Fiji, I would say that it 
is not as marked as you suggest. It is all a matter of perspective. I do not 
discount the oppressive consequences of the plantation system, and the 
terrible conditions under which girmitiyas lived and worked and survived. 
But I have also emphasised the role of individuals themselves in making 
their own history. You will note the emphasis I have placed on sirdars 
or Indian foremen—their collaborative role with the overseers and the 
plantation management. In my article on women and suicide—the social 
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history of indenture—I look at the role of sexism and racism.9 I look at 
the role that the patriarchal values played in marginalising women from 
the social processes.10 So there is some continuity. I look at the role of 
individuals in making their own history. When I talk about recruitment 
I look at the reasons why they left. And when I look at the experience on 
plantations, I try to understand why things happened the way they did, 
and in that context I emphasise individual agency.
Th ose articles in the mid-1980s were highly revisionary. Where do you think 
that your work goes beyond your predecessors’? I mean, Ken Gillion must have 
been a hard act to follow.
Ken Gillion’s book Fiji’s Indian Migrants is still a standard starting point, 
but it is a product of its time. I think what Gillion was trying to do was 
to maintain ‘balance’. I have looked at the same records that he looked at, 
and many more. I have the sense that he did not mine as much out of the 
historical evidence as he might have. He was loath to upset the balance 
of perspective, so everyone gets their share of his attention. As a historian 
Ken was making an evaluation of the total system and he attempts to 
provide a complete picture of the entire experience. I admire his work to 
that extent. It is what helps to make it an invaluable point of reference. 
But when you go beyond that framework, I think you begin to realise that 
things are more complex.
Such as the question of women and suicide?
Exactly. Not only Gillion but others who have written about the very high 
suicide rate among the girmitiyas always held out the ‘immoral character’ 
of women as the major factor. But I cannot expect them to anticipate the 
thinking and research of a generation later. I respect and admire the work 
that has been accomplished and I am mindful of the context in which it 
was written, the paradigms used. But I think that we have moved on in 
pushing the frontiers of indenture historiography.
In what ways do you feel, then, that your work has advanced on your 
predecessors’?
I suppose my contribution would be in enlarging our understanding of 
the everyday life on plantations—through the exploration of specifi c 
issues, such as the treatment of women, such as social problems of suicide, 
such as workers’ actual experiences on plantations, and the methods that 
they used to accommodate and resist the demands made on them. Th at 
is where I have tried to link the Indo-Fijian experience with experiences 
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elsewhere. I have tried to be broader than the very Fiji-focussed work of my 
predecessors and relate it not only to the Indians’ indenture experiences 
elsewhere but to work into Pacifi c Islands history generally. I think, if I can 
be so bold as to say so, that my contribution is to locate Fiji Indian history 
in the indenture experience in this larger context. I think I have also used 
more cultural evidence, such as in my work on Totaram Sanadhaya,11 and 
the kind of work I now propose to do, looking at representing the human 
reality of the experience.
Both of us take an explicitly comparative perspective. Where we broadly diff er 
is that I am concerned with the more conventional questions of power relations 
in the plantations, resistance and accommodation. You are concerned with 
that too but go further because you are interested in the hidden world of the 
worker—on questions of evolving identity, individual and group.
Well I think that the work that you have done on power relations is vital. 
Th at sets the framework and the parameters. Without that groundbreaking 
work it would be very diffi  cult to do the work that we are thinking of 
doing now. I do not think that one is necessarily better than the other. 
I think it is very important—and this is in line with developments in 
historiography—to look at the experience of workers, the unwritten 
history of people, deciphering their texts. Th at is interesting, that is useful. 
I believe I have access to certain sources and that I have certain skills 
by virtue of who I am—a member of the community that I am writing 
about—access to information, and to that extent I am privileged. I fi nd it 
interesting, this history of the subaltern strata. It fascinates me and how 
to incorporate their experiences, their vision, their hopes into the larger 
text is what historians have done for other parts of the world for slavery, 
indenture, peasants. So this approach is informed by developments 
elsewhere, which try to represent the experience of the ordinary people.
If you had to make a statement on the nature of indenture, at least with respect 
to the Indian diaspora, what would it be?
Leaving aside the questions of exploitation, racism and the institutional 
aspects of indenture, I think that the indenture experience is an extremely 
important, formative and defi ning period in the history of overseas Indian 
communities, particularly in the Caribbean, Mauritius, South Africa 
and Fiji, because that is the site of the initial social transformation. It 
is fundamental. When the Old World meets the New, then old ways of 
doing things, old values, institutions and practices start to change. We 
begin to confront the reality of a completely diff erent order when former 
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ways of doing things, the world view, seem to lose their relevance. Th e 
caste system breaks down, and along with that a host of social conventions 
and practices. Everyone is a ‘coolie’, huddled together on estate lines in 
cramped quarters. In that sense, everyone is equal in the denial of their 
individual humanity. Th e indenture experience was a great leveller of 
hierarchy and status. So I see the indenture process as the death of one 
world and the beginning of another. Th e details vary from colony to 
colony, but the process is the same everywhere.
A feature of your work is that you have moved purposefully through the 
major divisions of not just indenture history but Fiji history—from your 
Master’s thesis on the Sikhs through to the origins and plantation experiences 
of Indo-Fijians. Th at done you have written extensively on contemporary 
Fijian political history, most recently a biography of the great Indian leader 
A.D. Patel. Now you are looking at indenture in a far more comparative 
perspective. Th ere does seem to be a rhythm and a pattern that your work has 
gone through. Was this planned or semi-planned, or was it the way that things 
simply panned out?
Simply the way things panned out. I had absolutely no idea when I fi nished 
my Ph.D. that I would go on and do work on Fijian indenture. When I 
went to Hawaii I thought I had done enough on indenture on Fiji and I 
expected to move on to other things. For a while I contemplated writing a 
history of indenture on Hawaii.
But that was exactly the time that you were writing all those articles on 
indenture on Fiji.
If in hindsight there is a pattern, it was not carefully designed. My journey 
into various things has basically come from the quest to understand 
myself. Indenture provided an understanding of my origins, my social 
identity, my beginnings. Th en I wanted to look at my place in the wider 
society of Fiji and that is why I began to think more systematically about 
the larger social environment which also informed my identity and where 
I was. As for contemporary political history, I have certainly had a very 
keen desire to understand the present. For me history provides a tool and a 
method to understand the contemporary world. And I have always found 
myself, as one reviewer put it, an interested spectator of the history of 
Fiji. My work, when I was here [at the University of the South Pacifi c] 
and then on Hawaii, deals with contemporary issues—beginning with 
my research into the 1982 Fiji elections12—partly because I was living in 
separate environments where I was constantly called upon to comment 
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on social problems and social issues—and more so on Fiji as a member 
of a small educated elite. I could not have neglected that responsibility, 
and the more I was asked to comment about politics, about contemporary 
developments, the more I began to move closer to the recent period. Th e 
past and present, to me, are not discrete entities, they are two sides of the 
same coin, and I enjoy living and working at the interface between the 
two. 
And then, I guess, Fijian history thrust itself upon you with the coups in 1987, 
and that was something you could not have avoided even if you had wanted to. 
You have made the point that your approach to political history, and especially 
writing the contemporary history of this country, is one of ‘[c]ritical attachment 
rather than cool detachment.’13 Could you elaborate?
Yes, I was here during that critical period in 1987. I care deeply about this 
country, about its people, about its future. I cannot be indiff erent to it. 
Cool detachment, in my view, comes from someone who assumes an air 
of dispassionate objectivity, distance and a certain coolness—the sense 
that one can stand outside time and space and history and judge things 
impartially, which is certainly not for me. One cannot be neutral about 
the coup. One can try and understand but one cannot claim complete 
detachment. So in that sense when I talk about critical attachment I write 
with aff ection, I write with a certain concern and commitment. I just 
cannot be indiff erent to what happens in this country where I was born.
I remember you telling me that you wrote your book on the Fiji coups in a 
matter of weeks, this outpouring of words with papers and research notes lying 
all over the living room fl oor, totally absorbed in your work, your family life on 
hold.14 I was under the impression that this writing performance was a matter 
of release, almost as though the exorcist had walked through the door. What is 
it like, to work under that sort of impetus?
A month after the coup I went back to Honolulu where I was teaching 
and where I had my regular job. I had just experienced a major event in 
the life of one Pacifi c island nation, but on Hawaii, except for very brief 
and rather ill-informed commentary, there was absolutely no awareness of 
the depth of the tragedy and its implications for the Pacifi c islands region 
as a whole. Th ere were colleagues who were sympathetic but they lacked 
even the most basic understanding of Fijian politics and social dynamics. I 
found myself talking to myself. I could not communicate my experiences 
to people under these circumstances, so I turned to writing. I found 
that words just came tumbling out. I sat there and wrote and wrote and 
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wrote, and at the end of it I felt exhausted and relieved. I also desperately 
wanted to contribute an alternative explanation about the causes of 
the coup, contrary to what was portrayed in the media. Th ere was that 
additional pressure, self-imposed I suppose. You see, there is something 
fundamentally wrong and immoral about deposing a duly democratically 
elected government through a military coup, a government that had been 
in offi  ce less than a month. Most people in this country regret that the 
Labour government was not given suffi  cient time to prove itself. Given its 
inexperience and the nature of the coalition agreement it may or may not 
have succeeded. But I think that denying it the opportunity was wrong. 
Fiji faced the fi rst test of democracy—respecting the electorate’s verdict on 
a change of government—and it failed the test.
I guess that you fi nd writing about recent events a very diff erent type of exercise 
from writing about the more distant past.
No.
Could you comment, then, upon the possibility and the desirability of writing 
about the very recent past, particularly when you do not know what is going 
to happen next, such as a coup just around the corner?
I would disagree with you about the diff erences between writing about 
the distant past and more recent times. I would argue that the processes 
of investigation are the same. Th e critical approach to one’s sources, the 
evaluation of evidence, rigour, rules of verifi cation—all these apply as 
much to ancient history as to modern history. I think there are distinct 
advantages in writing about more recent times, in terms of evidence 
and more varied opportunities to cross-check it. Oral evidence has an 
extremely vital role to play. It is a source, when properly used, that can 
enrich and deepen a study in ways that archival documents cannot. So I 
feel that in that sense there are opportunities.
But there are certain opportunities that you will not get in dealing with the 
more distant past, apart from the advantage of oral evidence, and of course 
there is more evidence as time moves on. I am not questioning the points you 
made about the need for the critical approach, methodology and rigour. But 
often the documents are not available to you, and in your book Broken Waves 
you could only use documents up to 1959. And also perhaps the constraints 
of common decency will not allow you to talk about certain things within 
the lifetime of individuals, in much the same way as Jim Davidson, when 
writing his book on Samoa, imposed a self-denying ordinance by declining to 
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identify those people, especially close colleagues, when he had something wholly 
derogatory to say about them.15
Yes, certainly the points you make about the unavailability of certain kinds 
of documents can be a problem. But when I researched the more recent 
period, from the 1960s, I found that a lot of confi dential material had 
found its way into the media, into the Hansard of the Legislative Council 
and the House of Representatives, private papers and tapes of the meetings 
in the possession of individuals. Information is available in diff erent ways 
and I think that I was not unduly disadvantaged. And then of course 
you have the vernacular and English-language newspapers which report 
meetings, issues and events of substance. While you do not know exactly 
what the governors said to London, for example, you do know broadly 
speaking what happened. For a historian it is not so much these facts but 
explaining them and providing the context that is important. Th e other 
point you raised, about people taking to you into their confi dence, is one 
we have to grapple with. It does raise the ethical problem of how to use 
that evidence. Th e approach that I have taken is not to mention names, 
who said what to whom, but if I found the evidence credible, and was 
able to verify it independently, I would state the substance of their view 
without breaching confi dentially, real or implied. I am not being dishonest 
with the evidence given to me but at the same time I am concerned not to 
divulge the source, unless the person said otherwise. Of course, when you 
talk to people and get to know them, socialise with them, it does become 
rather diffi  cult to write critically about them and there is always the risk 
of compromising yourself. For that reason I have deliberately kept myself 
away from the powers that be. I always want to maintain my distance 
and my independence. Th ere is nothing more satisfying than writing the 
truth as you see it, unaff ected by social obligations and unfettered by the 
potential consequences of your work.
Writers of contemporary history, more so than so-called ‘conventional’ 
historians, are at risk of being overtaken by events. If you had to write your 
book on the Fiji coup now, rather than in 1989, in what ways would it be the 
same or diff erent?
Th is is a very important question. Since writing the book I have read 
what other people have written, I have talked to many people very close 
to the action, and I can say truthfully that nothing I have heard since I 
wrote my account causes me to change my mind. On the contrary, if I 
can say so, I am comforted, reassured by what has happened since the 
coups, that my analysis is correct. A few details here and there may vary, 
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but the foundations remain unshaken. I argued then, and I believe even 
more strongly now, that the coup was not so much about race as it was a 
deliberate act of contrivance by vested interests bent on recapturing power 
they had lost at the polls. Th ere was nothing inevitable about the coup. 
Coups do not solve problems, they compound them.
In what ways do you apply your training as a historian to your work on 
the Constitutional Review Commission? Does it give access to insights and 
understandings that would not be possible otherwise?
Yes. I think I have a fairly good understanding of the dynamics of Fijian 
history. I am aware of previous attempts at constitution making, and I 
have read very carefully and closely the Hansard; the transcripts of the 
constitutional conferences in 1965 and 1970; the records of the Street 
commission in 1975; and the various commissions in and attempts at 
constitution-making since 1987. When you see the kinds of issues that 
were raised, the kinds of solutions that were devised or proposed, you 
notice that the basic issues have not changed very much. Th e same issues 
are repeated in various forms at various times. So it is an awareness of the 
historical dimension that I bring to my present work on the Commission. 
I suppose I also bring the ability and the training of the historian to read 
critically, to make an evaluation of an enormous amount of evidence 
that comes your way through public submissions. Reading, analysis, 
synthesis: these are part and parcel of our trade. Also, a certain humanistic 
perspective, as I believe that constitution making is not simply a legal task; 
it involves people, it involves the hopes and aspirations of people, and in 
that sense the background and broadening experience in the humanities 
helps me understand better the large issues.
You have written prolifi cally but you have also confi ned yourself largely to Fiji 
and the Indian diaspora. I make this observation in the light of Oskar Spate’s 
call back in the late 1970s that historians from the Pacifi c Islands should 
tackle European themes ‘ in their own right’, and that we should have as ‘our 
ideal, a community of scholars drawn from both cultures, each of whom can 
move in either with reasonable, even if not quite equal, assurance.’16 Even 
after all these years it has not reached the stage where historians indigenous to 
the region have moved outside their own cultures and backgrounds. Do you 
have any comment on this state of aff airs?
Yes, it is a pattern; but I am not sure that it is a bad one, actually, because we 
are able to off er a particular perspective, born out of life-long experience. 
We have access to certain resources—language, people, data, evidence—
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that may not be easily available to others. And once you begin writing you 
tend to stick to a particular course, and unless there is a major shift in your 
life from one university to another, or some other circumstance, you tend 
to keep generally in the same broad fi eld. It is natural and pretty universal, 
I think. Th e other thing that is important for me is the commitment I 
talked about earlier. I have a commitment to my discipline and profession, 
but my greater commitment is to the subjects that I write about. I am very 
deeply committed to the history and politics of the country of my birth, 
as I am also to the broader Indian diaspora of which I am a fragment. 
I have not ventured further afi eld because there is so much that keeps 
me occupied. Unlike international relations experts, sociologists and 
such, for whom the concepts and theories matter more than particular 
geographic regions or topics as such, historians tend to learn the language, 
immerse themselves in the culture, and that gives their work a certain 
depth and enduring quality. Th ey make a longer-term commitment to 
their particular subject.
Th ere is also another point and that is the Pacifi c Islands of the 1990s reminds 
me very much of New Zealand in the 1950s. I grew up in a place where there 
were very limited opportunities for artists and writers, many of whom took 
off  for greener overseas pastures. Is it not necessary, in much the same way, for 
historians from within the region to get out in order to get on, and often just 
to do worthwhile things?
I think that is absolutely vital. I do not at all accept the idea that to write 
sympathetically and knowledgably about the Islands you have to live in the 
Islands. Certainly you have to immerse yourself in the culture and learn 
the language, but the place where you work and write is irrelevant. In fact, 
it is very important for Island scholars to spend time outside the region, 
to reacquaint themselves with the latest developments in their fi elds. I 
would take Oskar Spate’s point further and say that it is invaluable for 
Island scholars to spend time at metropolitan universities, and for people 
from those areas to spend time in the Islands. I am a strong believer in 
collaboration, in doing things together, helping each other out and sharing 
information, experiences, and in the process enriching ourselves and our 
discipline as well.
Finally, could you provide a preview of your forthcoming book on A.D. Patel?
A.D. Patel was politically active on Fiji from the late 1930s to the late 
1960s. Fine mind, fi ne intellect, who believed in democracy, liberty, 
equality, justice; who fought against colonialism and the mighty Colonial 
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Sugar Refi ning Company on behalf of the cane growers. He was a man 
of wide reading and great learning. Edmund Burke was regular fare, 
Tolstoy, Th omas Hardy, Gerald Manly Hopkins, great Indian classics of 
Kalidas and Kautilya and, most important of all, Bhagvat Gita. He spoke 
several languages and was the leading criminal lawyer in this country. 
Lord Denning, the Master of the Rolls, described him as one of the most 
outstanding advocates he had ever met. So I found him fascinating. I 
empathise with his vision of Fiji as an inclusive, democratic, non-racial 
society. Th ese are things I fi nd attractive, but I feel that he has not been 
given enough credit in the history of Fiji. He was the one, more than 
anyone else, who agitated for independence, and was responsible for the 
departure of the CSR Company [in 1973], three years after independence. 
But you fi nd his name omitted from the gallery of people who have 
had a hand in making the history of the country. I have never written 
a biography before and what I am trying to do in this work is to present 
an alternative vision for Fiji, and I have let Patel speak as much as I can. 
I am not being judgmental. I just say: this is what he was saying, and the 
context in which he was saying these things. I place on record his thoughts, 
ideas and experiences, and create a text that others will hopefully fi nd 
interesting and useful.
And after Patel?
Let me fi nish this constitutional work fi rst.
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‘I end up with the question “why”, but I 
don’t start with it’: Interview with Geoff rey 
Parker
Herman Roozenbeek, Jurriën de Jong, Leonard Blussé, Maurits Ebben and 
Jaap de Moor had a conversation with Geoff rey Parker at the seaside resort of 
Noordwijk, at exactly the same place where we interviewed Sir John Elliott 
two years ago. While we were driving up to the beach, Professor Parker tried 
to fi nd out what questions we were going to ask, but we just asked him what 
kind of ice cream he liked. Here are his spontaneous answers to spontaneous 
questions as they were selected and noted down by Jurriën De Jong. 
Th is morning in your lecture you talked about the style of government in the 
Spain of Philip II. Spain in the sixteenth century is always seen as a very 
centralised state. Is this a reliable picture?
We really have to get away from the idea of a unifi ed Spain; until the 
eighteenth century that just doesn’t exist. What we do have is a remarkably 
unifi ed Castile. And within Castile by the sixteenth century the authority 
of the crown is remarkably powerful. Th ere are very few institutions 
that can stand up to the monarchy in Castile. Th e other parts of the 
peninsula—Aragon, Navarre, Catalonia—are areas in which the king’s 
authority is mediated through institutions. It’s not a unique division; you 
fi nd the same in France with the pays d’ état and the pays d’ élection. Just 
so in Spain: the polities that have strong representative institutions tend 
to be on the periphery.
Th is creates what H. Koeningsberger has called ‘composite 
monarchies,’ and he has argued that they were the norm for the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries.1 What I think he understates is that within the 
composite monarchy you can have a core which is extremely powerful, 
which is able to mobilise resources in an unusually eff ective way. And 
although Castile, for example, is much less populous than France, it 
actually can mobilise more eff ectively because there are very few obstacles 
to royal power. So it seems to me that in Castile you do have perhaps 
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the most absolute government of Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries. 
Generally, the decline of Spain in the seventeenth century is seen as a result 
of economic and social problems. Th is morning in your lecture you ventured 
another possible factor, concerning the management of information and the 
style of government under the Habsburgs. 
Th is is the result of trying to apply modern techniques of analysis and 
modern strategic concerns to early modern problems on the assumption 
that there are probably some underlying similarities. It is clear that one 
of the great problems of today, especially in war, is the temptation that 
extraordinary good communications give to the central authority to 
interfere and micro-manage. And it seemed to me that when I considered 
this and looked at the evidence from the reign of Philip II, exactly the same 
happened: he created a remarkably eff ective and comprehensive system of 
information-gathering that gave him access to data from all over the world 
and led him to believe, I think falsely, that he knew everything. And 
with that knowledge, he became more and more prepared to overrule the 
theatre commanders on the grounds that, although they might understand 
the local situation, he had the big picture, he knew best. And that seems 
to me the fatal miscalculation then, just as it is a fatal miscalculation now. 
But is this system linked only to the reign of Philip II, or does it extend further 
into the seventeenth century?
It’s diffi  cult to see whether it begins with him, because in 1559, on the 
journey between the Netherlands and Spain, the ship containing most 
of the government archives was lost at sea, and so we don’t entirely 
understand the governmental system of Charles V. One reason why there 
is no fi rst class biography of the emperor is because of the loss of those 
papers. Th e system is certainly there in the early years of the reign of Philip 
II but probably in order to get that degree of sophistication in information 
gathering you need a stable centre, and Charles V never provided that. 
Instead he toured around all the time. He also delegated a great deal, 
whereas Philip did not delegate. Sitting at the centre he was able to build 
up the networks with a degree of permanence which had not been there 
before.
It certainly survives his death. Philip III and Lerma and more notably, 
as John Elliott has shown, Philip IV and Olivares clearly have the same 
sort of structure, which gathers enormous amounts of information and 
channels it to the centre where all the decisions are taken. A great process 
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of consultation takes places while policies are being formulated, but 
once they’re formulated it is almost impossible to change them for two 
reasons. Number one: the government will not delegate to the theatre 
commanders. Number two: there is a tendency to accept only that 
information which coincides with the policy already chosen. Th at’s called 
‘irrational consistency’: you stick to the policy even when it is clear that 
the data don’t fi t. Th omas Kuhn talked about this in his Th e Structure of 
Scientifi c Revolutions.2 He called it the ‘paradigm’. It is extremely diffi  cult 
for scientists to recognise that the paradigm no longer works, and I think 
that is equally true of statesmen.
Olivares’ domination of Spanish policy is no less complete than that 
of Philip II. So I see that system continue until it’s clear that Spain has 
collapsed as a great power in the 1640s, 1650s and 1660s. Th e problem 
is that in certain phases, I believe, information technology creates a surge 
of knowledge that leads to the illusion that it is safe to intervene and 
micromanage. We saw that in the 1970s, when for the fi rst time satellite 
communications provided an almost instantaneous link up between 
theatre commanders, area commanders and the supreme commander in 
the White House. You had it in 1914 when the telephone and the telegraph 
gave almost instantaneous communications between diplomats and their 
governments in a way that had not existed before. And I think you had it 
in the sixteenth century, in the reign of Philip II in particular, when the 
increased sophistication of the diplomatic, the espionage and the postal 
systems suddenly channelled in further knowledge which had not been 
there before. 
It takes time for statesmen and soldiers alike to adjust to the fact that, 
although they have exponentially more knowledge than before, it is still 
not enough to justify changing the rules. It’s as if there’s a new horizon. 
Th ere is a quantum leap and it allows people—especially politicians and 
statesmen—to delude themselves that the rules have changed. Indeed, 
with the telephone you can do lots of things. In World War II every tank 
had its own radio-telephone. Guderian, in 1940 in the fall of France, only 
avoids that problem by turning off  his radio. He wants to go right ahead, so 
he doesn’t want to hear his commander say: ‘Come back’. Th e temptation 
to micro-manage when you have a new technological toy is very hard to 
resist, and avoiding the perils of micro-management is harder still. 
What interests me are those moments at which things change. Let me 
give you what I think is a very sophisticated and very attractive theory 
of military revolution. It’s called the ‘punctuated equilibrium model.’ It 
derives from a model for the evolution of the species devised by Niles E. 
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Aldridge and Stephen Gould.3 Th eir idea is that the basic tendency in 
evolution is balance, but that something sometimes happens which causes 
a very dramatic change. Th at change destroys the whole balance within 
the evolution of the species: a number of other things have to change to 
compensate and then you get a new equilibrium. If you apply that model 
to military aff airs, then, for example, the invention of really powerful 
artillery in the West, and only in the West, in the mid-fi fteenth century 
creates a totally new situation which requires everything in warfare to 
change. Th e evolution of the artillery fortress—the Trace Italienne—is 
another such revolution which causes everything around it to change. Th e 
creation of the ship of the line, also in the sixteenth century, is a third.
I like to study those punctuations. Th at’s why I don’t spend as much 
time as I should on the philosophers, who are trying to fi nd general rules. 
I am not convinced that there are universal rules. Look at Alfred Mahan, 
who argued that there were certain universal rules of war at sea.4 He never 
considered the impact of changes in sail plans, the creation of steam 
power, new technology, new gunnery or new techniques of using guns at 
sea. Th ese for him are irrelevant: for Mahan, the rules of warfare at sea 
remain the same. I just don’t buy it; I don’t think these theories recognise 
the specifi city of situations, that things do change over time.
I believe if you look at how things happened you will fi nd the cause. 
I end up with the question ‘why’, but I don’t start with it, whereas most 
historians, I think, start with a ‘why,’ and only then look at ‘how’. I am 
a historical technician, and that’s the methodology that I have evolved. 
Although in the end I try to explain why the Trace Italienne works, I 
have never found a treatise which says: ‘Th is is how we do it, because...’ 
All I found is people saying: ‘Jesus Christ! Th e French are doing this. If 
we don’t do this too we’re going to lose out’. So it seems to me that this 
was very much the way things happened. As Ranke said, what we really 
have to do is to ‘tell things how they really were.’ And I don’t think on the 
whole people start out by asking why. By defi nition, it is an anachronistic 
question.
Th is brings us to the idea of the ‘Military Revolution’. In your writings on this 
subject you concentrate on the sixteenth century, while Jeremy Black points 
to the eighteenth.5 Are there, in your opinion, any moments of punctuated 
equilibrium in the eighteenth century? And if so, why are these less important 
than those in the sixteenth century?
I do think so. Th ere is a major punctuation in the 1790s with the Levée 
en masse and the ability for the fi rst time to mobilise so many troops that 
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armies don’t have to take fortresses. Also the creation of a road network 
that enables armies to move quickly in many diff erent directions and 
then concentrate, which is the genius of Napoleon. Th ere is a major 
disequilibrium there. I don’t see that much between then and the sixteenth 
century. If Maurice of Nassau had come back to fi ght for Frederick the 
Great, he would have known what to do; but he would have been lost 
at Waterloo. Likewise, if a general from the Crimean war had been 
parachuted into 1914, he would have understood exactly what was going 
on. But if he’d been parachuted into 1918, he wouldn’t have understood a 
thing, with airpower, mechanisation, the tanks and stormtroopers. Th ings 
can change very, very quickly after a long period of equilibrium.
Let me tell you why I think the sixteenth century is important. Four 
diff erent developments took place, each of them signifi cant. First of all 
you have the artillery fortress, which evolves in Italy in the 1520s and 
1530s. Second, you have the ship of the line. I’m not absolutely certain 
of the date at which this happens, but one of the fi rst was a Scottish 
ship, the Great Michael, built in 1511 with really big guns on its lower 
decks. Th ird, you have the development of controlled fi repower on the 
battlefi eld. If you like, it’s like the line of battle at sea, transposed to land. 
And the pioneer there was, of course, Maurice of Nassau. Again the date 
at which that happened is very diffi  cult to pinpoint. I had hoped to fi nd it 
at Nieuwpoort. Th e problem is: nobody mentions it. Th ere’s a nice map in 
the Dutch version of the Nassausche Lauren-crans that does show ranks of 
men fi ring at each other in sequence.6 Th e description explicitly refers to 
this. And yet, Francis Vere, who was there, says that ‘[w]e were not able to 
use our exercises, which we thought would give us a decisive advantage.’ 
Th ere’s no question when it’s invented: it is both illustrated and described 
in 1594, in a letter from Wilhelm Ludwig of Nassau to his cousin Maurice. 
But when it’s put into eff ect is not so clear. Th e fi rst use in battle may in 
fact have been at Breitenfeld in 1632. Th e fourth element is the growth 
in manpower, which you can pinpoint to the 1530s and 1540s. Now if 
you take these four things together, you have changed the equilibrium of 
warfare on sea and on land. And I think that’s revolutionary. 
All these developments seem rather closely connected to the process of state 
formation. How do you think that process relates to the Military Revolution? 
Does one cause the other?
My ‘Military Revolution’ argues that it is the growth of the army which 
forces the state to grow, but Jeremy Black has argued in his book that 
it’s the other way round.7 Th e image I like is that of the double helix, 
56 world history – a genealogy
the DNA molecule, which consists of two interlocking spirals. I believe 
that at diff erent stages you have military expansion, military change, 
forcing alterations in the structure of government, and at certain points 
the structure of government forcing or permitting or encouraging the 
expansion of armies and innovation. But I see these as being very closely 
related: it’s a symbiotic relationship. I don’t think that one causes the other 
all the time; at certain points you get that interlock. Th e data, to me, 
don’t seem to be so equivocal. Once you have the big armies you simply 
have to expand the state. You’ll have management problems and the army 
develops an impetus of its own. Armies grow almost by themselves. And 
certainly there is the element of competition. Th e Habsburgs, because 
they ruled such an enormous area, were capable of putting together a 
larger army than anybody else. So France simply had to fi eld an army of 
equivalent size. And that forced administrative change. 
Th ere’s another controversy here. It seems to me that the key period 
for military expansion was the 1520s and 1530s. In those two decades 
the size of standing armies increased very rapidly. Th e same two decades 
saw a proliferation of a new sort of fortifi cation, the Trace Italienne, and 
I believe that there is a connection between those two. It has been hotly 
contested, but I believe it’s true. I think that the proliferation of new-style 
fortifi cations increased army size in two ways: fi rst, if you had twenty 
to thirty new-style fortifi cations, you had to garrison them all. And that 
automatically increased army size, because the total of garrisons could 
be 20,000 to 50,000 men. By the end of the seventeenth century Louis 
XIV had half of his army in garrisons. On the other hand, to take one of 
these fortresses you needed a very large army indeed, because you can only 
blockade it by cutting it off  from the outside world. And to do that took 
50,000 to 60,000 men. Th ese are very large fi gures, and I believe that this 
is why army size went up. Furthermore, the increase in expenditure on the 
fortifi cations and garrisons and on the larger armies for off ensive purposes 
forced the state to increase its taxation, forced the state to intrude more 
into the lives of subjects and therefore represented a major infl uence on the 
rise of the modern state.
But I think there was more than that: fortresses came to be laid out 
in layered lines, a defence in depth. Th e fortifi cations built by Vauban in 
France resembled a giant bastion. You had various lines, ending in the 
‘Ne plus ultra’ lines. Th e best piece of luck Louis XIV ever had was that 
eighteen-month period between 1700 and 1702 when all the fortresses in 
Belgium were delivered to his forces. It was just an extraordinary stroke 
of luck, and Vauban was able to fortify them. So that when, eventually, 
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William III declared war and the Grand Alliance went to war against 
Louis XFV, France enjoyed the terrifi c advantage of possessing these 
advance fortifi cations. In other words, they’d already gone far beyond 
their frontiers and the war would end when they had lost them. But it was 
not French territory that was being lost; it was just the new acquisitions. 
France had devised a defence in depth which made it almost impossible 
to invade. It was almost impossible to get close to Paris. It could be done, 
but in the end the problems were such that, unless you took a signifi cant 
number of fortresses, you couldn’t go any further because your own 
lines of communication became vulnerable. And you couldn’t take more 
than two or three of these artillery fortresses in a single campaign. So 
war just stagnated. Battles were no longer signifi cant and generals found 
themselves tied down in sieges.
Now that’s very interesting in Europe, and it creates a pattern, but 
I’m also very interested in what happens when you export that aspect 
of the military revolution abroad. Because it creates a bridgehead 
which is almost impregnable. Th ere are very few examples of western-
style fortifi cations being taken by non-western forces. Th e Dutch took 
Portuguese fortifi cations in Sri Lanka, but the king of Kandy did not.
Do you think there were other advantages that Europeans had over their 
opponents?
It has always struck me that one of the big diff erences between Europe and 
other centres of power is the existence of a plurality of states, which means 
that e.g. Columbus is rejected by England, by France and by Portugal, 
but there’s still Castile. In China this is not so. If you’re rejected by the 
emperor, you’re fi nished. Likewise with technological innovation, it seems 
to me that there is a competition among the European states which does 
not exist in China.
I believe that there are fi ve diff erent elements in what I would call the 
‘western way of war,’ which distinguish it from other regions. Not all of 
them are unique, but the combination, I think, is. First of all, it’s clear that 
western society has always put a very heavy premium on technology. It has 
always favoured capital-intensive solutions over labour-intensive solutions, 
no doubt since it has usually been at a numerical disadvantage. Secondly, 
it has always exalted discipline. Right through from the hoplites and the 
legionaries down to the Gulf war, discipline has been a key ingredient of 
western warfare. Th irdly, there is a very aggressive tradition: the idea that 
you go for the big battle which will exterminate your enemy; that you 
go for unconditional surrender, total victory. Now the Chinese also like 
58 world history – a genealogy
total victories, the Chinese also favour technology, the Chinese also have 
discipline. But I think there are two other elements which are not found 
in other societies.
Fourth then, there is what I call the ‘challenge and response dynamic’: 
the idea that if one part of this pluralistic society has an innovation, the 
others have to match it. Because in war, if you don’t adapt, you go under 
very quickly. So, when e.g. the Flemish at Kortrijk in 1302 use pikemen 
off ensively and stop the charge of the French, it’s noticed. And in 1314 
at Bannockburn in Scotland, the Scots do the same. In 1356, at Poitiers, 
the French even start trying it. According to one account, a Scottish 
nobleman tells the French: ‘If you want to win this battle against the 
English, you get off  your horses and you fi ght on foot. Th at’s what we 
Scots did.’ So you actually have a clear learning process. I don’t think you 
fi nd that in many other societies, one army learning from another. Th e 
pace of this ‘replication’, to use an ugly word, diff ers over history. In some 
periods when the various competing states are disorganised and weak, 
so the process of challenge and response is very slow. But at other times, 
such as the sixteenth century with that same Trace Italienne, the learning 
process is very fast indeed—because if your enemy has the Trace Italienne 
and you don’t, you won’t last very long. Look at Siena. Siena invests in 
one fortress, Siena itself, and when that falls it’s the end of the war. So you 
have to do it right, you have to replicate, but you have to do it in the right 
way. Th e fi nal element, which I see as the West’s secret weapon, is fi nance: 
the ability to fi nance prolonged war through credit. It is something which 
is not present throughout western warfare. Th e Romans didn’t need it; 
the Middle Ages hadn’t got it; but around the sixteenth century you fi nd 
that ability, starting right here in the Netherlands and spreading from 
here as the ‘Financial Revolution’: the ability to borrow very large sums 
of money at very low interest rates. When Britain had fi nished with 
the North American Revolution, it had lost the American colonies and 
borrowed well over two hundred million pounds, equivalent to twenty 
years’ revenue, at 3 per cent. Okay, they didn’t win in the Americas, but 
the fi nancial ability to survive a defeat as big as that represents the fi fth 
element in the ‘western way of war’. And the combination is unbeatable. 
Th at is the major reason why the West expands, even before the Industrial 
Revolution. It has a method of fi ghting on both land and sea that, I think, 
is simply superior.
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But can you explain the expansion of the West just from military factors? Isn’t 
there room for other explanations?
It seems to me that we can no longer explain the rise of the West before the 
Industrial Revolution in the traditional terms of the moral superiority of 
the white man or superior trading organisation. Th e Europeans certainly 
possessed some advantages and one of them is their extraordinary ability 
to maximise their resources: they’re really good on the ‘economy of 
force’—whether in their trading companies or in missionary activities or 
in military activities, the West seems remarkably good at doing a great 
deal with very little. And I accept that. But I don’t think it’s quite enough. 
I prefer the formulation of Anthony Reid in his new book on the lands 
below the wind.8 He says there is really a sort of trilogy, three factors 
which explain the rise of the West in Indonesia. One is the artillery 
fortress, another is the ship of the line and the third is the ability of the 
Europeans to fi nd local alliances and exploit local rivalries, so that they 
are in fact always allied with a powerful local coalition. I like that formula 
and I would like to test it. Reid throws it out when he is considering the 
western power in the Indonesian archipelago, but could it not be equally 
true in the Spanish conquest of Mexico and Peru?
Ross Hassig, after all, off ers very similar explanations for the triumph 
of Hernan Cortes and a small number of Spaniards in 1519–1521.9 He 
sees the entire episode as a battle for power in the valley of Mexico, in 
which the Spanish serve as mercenaries on the anti-Aztec side. And when 
the Mexicans have been defeated, the Spaniards then turn round and 
blackmail their allies, thereby exploiting the victory; thereafter disease 
does the rest. So it would seem to me that Cortes doesn’t need either the 
ship of the line or the artillery fortress. Alliances are enough to explain 
his success, because in the Americas, but only in the Americas, the 
Europeans possess another secret weapon, which is biological warfare. Th e 
enormous mortality takes out large numbers of the indigenous population 
and destabilises the rest. Th e actual numbers we can dispute forever; the 
fact is that it was a catastrophe so great that, just like the Black Death 
in Europe, it made people wonder if there was a God. So the collapse 
of the demographic structures in the New World seems to have totally 
disorientated the native population. Outside the Americas that did not 
happen.
I therefore fi nd Reid’s formula, for Africa, India and Indonesia, very 
attractive. It’s the combination of the ship of the line, which enables the 
Europeans to project their power abroad; the artillery fortress, which 
enables them to maintain that power on land as a bridgehead; and their 
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remarkable skill in exploiting divisive situations, picking out allies from 
one side or another and playing them off  against each other, just waiting 
until the situation develops when they can penetrate the interior. Th at’s 
why the West expands before the Industrial Revolution. I have no problem 
with the rise of the West after the Industrial Revolution; it is very clear 
that, once you harness steam power and electrical power to industry, you 
have something which cannot be replicated outside Europe. But before 
that, I’m struggling with an explanation.
Does the ability of the Europeans to intervene in local politics also stem from 
the long-term stability in the policies of the trading companies?
Of course, some changes of policy occur within the various companies, 
but compared with the fl uidity of Asia they preserve an extraordinary 
stability. It is this ability to wait and see, and to wait and exploit, that 
seems to me so important. E.g. when Bengal gets out of hand in the 1750s 
the British are there just waiting to expand their power.
But maybe they didn’t want to project their power and take on the extra 
responsibility.
Who are we talking about here: the people at the periphery or the people 
back home, in the metropolis? Th e fi rst time I came across this paradox 
was in the book of your illustrious colleague George Winius, Th e Fatal 
History of Ceylon, which made a very good case for saying that there was a 
subcolonial elite in Goa which really wanted a ‘forward’ policy in Ceylon 
and got it, but unfortunately at a time when the central government could 
no longer back it up. Th e policy was being made on the periphery with 
the expectation that it would be supported by the centre, and I think that 
was a norm. People like Jan Pieterszoon Coen were also making policy 
on the periphery while counting on endorsement from the centre, and 
usually getting it even though the central government did not really want 
the creation of a territorial empire in Asia. It wanted the trade, but it did 
not want the high defence costs, whereas the people on the periphery, 
of course, want security. So they want the fortifi ed bases, and what’s 
the point in having a fortifi ed base unless you have a hinterland which 
protects it? And when you have a hinterland, then you settle it, and then 
you need another line of defences to protect your investments there, and 
pretty soon you’re dragged in. I see here a permanent tension or, as Winius 
says, the ‘Colonial paradox.’
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But how do you fi t the conquest of the Americas into this picture? Why does 
Spain go through all this eff ort to establish an overseas empire?
Because it’s presented to them. What is Charles going to do? Who could 
have predicted the success of Cortes and Pizarro? And once they’ve 
conquered New Spain, they cannot allow areas like that to escape from 
government control. So it has to create a structure to cope with the new 
conquests. It must, it cannot aff ord not to. Surely, the Dutch East India 
Company in the end allows a very high proportion of expenditure on 
fortresses and factories because it doesn’t really want to give these things 
up. How many fortresses are abandoned? Very few.
Because of inter-state competition?
Yes.
But as soon as these countries like India are taken over, apart from the 
replacement of several Indians nothing changes, except that much of the money 
now goes out of India.
Well, some of it does. What interests me is that the new money gives the 
British the ability to maintain a huge military presence on the continent, 
with which they can intervene anywhere. By 1780 there are over 100,000 
troops in British employment. Th at’s unprecedented. With that you 
can intervene eff ectively almost anywhere. I would say that the Bengal 
settlement is the turning point: it provides solid, regular, reliable income. 
A lot of it goes back to England, but a lot of it is kept on the spot to fi nance 
huge armies and build enormous fortifi cations. Fort William at Calcutta 
cost a million pounds. It’s inconceivable that a British government would 
have paid that. But if your income is two million a year from the Bengal 
Settlement...
You say that a lot of revenue came from India, but was it not that the individuals 
were sending money back, while the companies were going bankrupt?
True before 1765; but again, there’s a Dutch precedent for that. Th e VOC 
made what I believe you call these days ‘negative profi t’, because in its fi rst 
twenty or thirty years it was spending so much on fortresses and ships.
Th roughout this interview you have stressed the importance of naval 
development, e.g. in the military revolution and the expansion of European 
power in the rest of the world. Do you fi nd that other historians are equally 
aware of these infl uences?
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It seems to me that a disparity exists between the study of naval history 
and military history. Naval history, especially overseas, has not really 
advanced very far in the last twenty or thirty years. Th e questions that are 
being asked are much the same; not many new people have entered the 
debate. Th e diff erence between how the Dutch fi ght and Chinese fi ght at 
sea is not a subject that has attracted any attention, and yet it’s absolutely 
critical. We do have studies on the diff erences between the military 
eff ectiveness of Asian trained troops, European trained troops, but that 
has not been paralleled in naval history. I really don’t know why. Whether 
naval historians are just more traditional or whether it’s a problem of the 
languages. Furthermore it’s much more diffi  cult to create a navy, isn’t it? 
You can create an army in a matter of weeks or months. But if you want 
a fi rst class navy, you should have thought of it four, fi ve years ago. It’s 
like asparagus: if you want fi rst class asparagus, you should have planted a 
bed fi ve years ago. You can’t just snap your fi ngers and expect it to come. 
And so much more investment is required for a warship; a much more 
extensive and sophisticated infrastructure is required. And perhaps that 
has discouraged such study, because the study of navies requires the study 
of much longer periods and therefore much more data.
Is it true that navies took so much more time to build up? Th e Turks were able 
to put a new fl eet to sea in the year after they suff ered a tremendous defeat at 
Lepanto. Also the Dutch were at some times able to build ships in a matter of 
months.
What you’re talking about is a galley. And I think that there is a diff erence 
from galley warfare, which depends primarily on very highly trained 
marines. It’s true that the Turks recover after Lepanto in that they create 
a galley fl eet. What they cannot replace is the experienced troops they lost 
at Lepanto, and this the Christian powers recognise, because they kill all 
experienced personnel after Lepanto. But I’m interested to hear you say 
that you can build a Dutch man-of-war in a few months.
Th ese were East Indiamen and some other, smaller types of ships.
Th at’s extraordinary, because I know of no example in the Royal Navy 
where that was the case. It takes about a year from the beginning to the 
end. And dockyard capacity is limited; although it is the largest employer, 
die largest industrial enterprise in Britain by a long way, it still cannot 
turn out more than three or four ships a year. In a battle fl eet you need 
twenty or thirty of them, so, by defi nition, you can’t do it overnight, you 
can’t do it this year, you can’t do it next year: it’s a process. You need a 
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programme, and of course, as you build new ships the old ships will need 
repair. Th e only way to have a fi rst class navy in wartime is to maintain 
a fi rst class navy in peacetime, and that’s not true of armies. You can 
cover up your inadequacies by having large numbers of men and a certain 
number of NCOs who will train them. You cannot short-circuit that in 
a ship. Remember that a man-of-war is larger than a country house and 
that it has more artillery aboard than a fortress. Each of the ships that 
defeated the Spanish Armada had forty or forty-fi ve guns. Not many 
castles boasted forty or forty-fi ve guns, so this is a major investment; you 
can’t simply snap your fi ngers. Th ere’s opportunity costs too. And again 
the Armada demonstrates this to the hilt; it is not possible to convert a 
merchantman into an eff ective ship of the line, because the problem is not 
just cutting more gun ports in the side, it’s strengthening the structure to 
resist the recoil of the gun.
Although the Dutch did use converted merchantmen up to the 1650s.
I was reading the Journaal of David Pietersz de Vries, a really fi rst class 
account of early colonisation in New Netherlands.10 Before he goes to New 
Netherland he makes a number of other trips: he goes to the Mediterranean, 
then goes to Africa, and everywhere he goes he has to fi ght, and this is in 
the 1620s. Everywhere that man sails there’s an occasion for fi ghting and I 
think that’s one of the reasons why the diff erence between a merchantman 
and a warship is not quite as great as you would expect, because if your 
merchantman was not quite heavily gunned it would be lost. However, 
as security at sea in peacetime increases, one can scale down a bit the 
armament of merchantmen, but at the same time warships get bigger and 
bigger, with more and more decks, so you can’t just substitute. In the end 
all warships look alike. One of the standard pieces of equipment of any 
man-of-war by the eighteenth century was a complete set of enemy fl ags, 
because you couldn’t tell them apart by the silhouette. So if they ran up 
French colours, English colours or Dutch colours, it was the only thing 
that really distinguished them and it was a standard ruse de guerre to run 
up the wrong set of colours until you got really close and then haul them 
down to run up your own colours, because the silhouettes of these vessels 
were so alike. Th at’s why I’ve stressed the challenge and response dynamic: 
in the end it creates the perfect tools of empire.
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Th e Importance of Knowledge-Systems: 
Interview with John Rankine Goody
John ‘Jack’ Rankine Goody (b. 1919) is one of the most distinguished social 
anthropologists of post-war Britain. He received his education in pre-war 
Oxford and Cambridge, then the home ports of some of the intellectual giants 
of this century, such as Bertrand Russel, John Maynard Keynes and Ludwig 
Wittgenstein. As a fi eld anthropologist, Goody spent many years in Africa and 
India. His main fi elds of interest were: family structure, oral versus written 
culture and the impact of westernisation on traditional societies; on all of these 
big themes he has written important books. His interest in family and kinship 
systems has brought him in close contact with Peter Laslett, initiator of the 
famous Cambridge Group for the History of Population and Social Structure, 
and, through Laslett, with the history of pre-industrial Europe. Th is association 
has resulted in, among others, a remarkable book on family and marriage in 
medieval Europe (Cambridge 1983). Subsequently Goody’s interest shifted to 
the historical confrontations between ‘the East’ and ‘the West’ on which he 
wrote the book that is the main subject of this interview. At present Jack Goody 
is a fellow of St John’s College, Cambridge. Th e interview—by Peer Vries and 
Peter Hoppenbrouwers—took place on 6 February 1998 when Goody was in 
Leiden as guest speaker at the Crayenborgh Honours class, organised by the 
Historical Institute of Leiden University.
Could you explain what has been the motivating theme of your latest book, 
Th e East in the West?1
Th e motivating theme is a dissatisfaction with the explanation of the rise 
of the West given by social scientists and historians who seemed to me 
not to be taking a comparative enough view of the situation. Even those 
who go for what they call ‘world history,’ like Max Weber, do so from 
very Eurocentrist hypotheses. Th e data from China or India for example 
are very much interpreted from that standpoint. My interest really comes 
from working with historians, particularly in the area of the family. It has 
always worried me that people like Lawrence Stone, Alan MacFarlane—
who is a historian and an anthropologist—and Peter Laslett of the 
Cambridge Group, with all of whom I worked quite closely, take a view 
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for example of the role of the family in the development of capitalism, 
modernisation or industrialisation which seemed to me to be unrealistic. 
I wrote an article—in a deliberately provocative way—in the fi rst volume 
of papers that were published by the Cambridge Group in 1972 which I 
called ‘Th e Evolution of the Family,’ and my contention was that relatively 
small households were common not only in Western Europe but in many 
other parts of the world as production units as well as reproduction units.2 
It is true that there were some examples of large ones. But by and large 
the diff erences were relatively small and could not account for the kind of 
eff ects that the other authors claimed that they were having.
But don’t you see signs of these interpretations changing? Th e authors you refer 
to wrote their most important studies quite some time ago. Are you not, as 
some people suggest, fl ogging dead horses?
I do see their work as still being very infl uential in many ways. Of course 
there are changes. I think Lawrence Stone has modifi ed some of his earlier 
views and I see some changes in the work of John Hajnal and Peter Laslett. 
But there are many continuities too. I think the continuities really require 
looking at again. I fi nd people working for example in the development 
fi eld in Africa using their—that is Hajnal’s and Laslett’s—work in order 
to predict the future. I see it for example in a fairly recent volume on Asian 
populations using the Hajnal and Laslett hypotheses on the diff erences 
between what they see as the grand families in China as against the small 
families of Japan. But if you look at the statistical diff erences they are very 
small.
How did you become fascinated by the comparison between Asia and Europe? 
Your earlier work was about Africa.
It was about Africa, but I didn’t go to Africa to study Africa. I would have 
done European work in Europe if after the war there had been funds to do 
so, in Italy or somewhere like that, or indeed in Western Europe. I would 
have worked more on the sociological side, if you want to put it that way. 
But at the time the only social science funds in Britain were directed to 
work abroad, to colonial work. Th ere was a colonial social science research 
council in London while there was no British social science council, and I 
got money from that. I was interested in Africa because I spent some time 
there during the war, but it was not in fact my prime focus.
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Th en how would you describe your prime aim or interest? Is there a basic 
theme in your intellectual life?
I went to university to study English literature. After the war I came 
back having spent some time in the Middle East, some time in a 
Kriegsgefangenenlager in Italy and Germany and some time with peasants 
in Italy in the Abruzzi. I became interested in land tenure and peasant 
life in a general way. I didn’t have any formal instruction in any of those 
areas and I did not work with anybody who was interested in them. My 
collaboration at that time was with my friend Ian Watt, who wrote a 
book about the rise of the novel. Together we wrote on literacy. I had 
become interested in literacy because I was deprived of books when I was 
a prisoner during the war. I wondered how people operate without books. 
Watt and I became interested in the diff erence between oral cultures 
and written cultures. I had done some anthropology by that time and 
he had done some work with Talcott Parsons in Harvard. We wanted to 
know what it was that constituted the Greek advantage. We wondered 
whether there was an adequate explanation in the spirit and genius of 
the ancient Greeks. We looked for an explanation that had to do with 
the advent of writing systems, the development of alphabetic literacy, 
the spread of writing and the ease of learning to write in Greek. I had 
also been interested in European history in a general way earlier on and 
I was fascinated by the work of a Dutch trader who came down to West 
Africa at the beginning of the eighteenth century and who commented—I 
thought very intelligently—on the diff erence between inheritance systems 
in Europe and Africa and on the fact that in Africa you did not have 
bilateral systems of inheritance. Th at struck me as being very signifi cant. 
I began wondering how this fi tted in with wider socio-economic systems. 
What, for example, were the predisposing factors that led people to try and 
maintain the status of daughters as well as of sons? Th at always seemed to 
be critical in stratifi ed systems, whereas in Africa it didn’t really matter. 
Th e ruling class married commoners or anybody else. Th ere was no 
tendency for it to marry in circles, as Marc Bloch noted Europeans tended 
to do. Th ere was a tendency to spread your bets rather than to concentrate 
them. Th at interested me in the relationship between inheritance systems 
and systems of stratifi cation.
You are mostly referred to as an anthropologist, but you know quite a lot about 
early modern and medieval history and are very interested in that period. 
Most anthropologists do not have the kinds of interests you have. Don’t you see 
basic diff erences between social science and history?
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I think there are diff erences of emphasis but not of principle. Th ere 
are some people practising my subject, and more often sociology, who 
could well do with a greater dose of history. One of the things that you 
constantly fi nd is that sociologists never look back very far—that’s a broad 
generalisation—so they think everything is new. On the other hand, some 
of my historian friends stop at the end of the nineteenth century and 
never see how things carried through. Lawrence Stone talked about the 
importance of the modern nuclear family, not taking into account that 50 
per cent of the dwelling units in Paris now are inhabited by one person, 
not by nuclear families at all.
How for instance did you come to study marriage in the Middle Ages? Th e 
book you wrote on this subject is quite a remarkable one, an eye-opener for 
European medievalists.3
I came on that out of this interest in inheritance systems and my unease 
about what had been said about them. Most anthropologists don’t care 
about medieval Europe, except to make a few analogies. Th e training I 
had in anthropology had some advantages. It did get me to read Marc 
Bloch for example, whom we regarded as an anthropologist, at least in 
those days, as well as George Homans, whose book on life in a medieval 
village impressed me very much.4
You already hinted at your interest in literacy. Th at is part of a fi eld of study 
that defi nitely appears to be one of your favourite subjects, knowledge systems. 
A theme you also discuss in your Th e East in the West. Do you think there 
are basic diff erences between knowledge systems in the West and those in other 
parts of the world?
Th ere did emerge diff erences with the new learning and with the 
Renaissance. It’s perhaps because there was a kind of breakthrough in 
secular knowledge. You got this great demand for diff erent kinds of proof 
and knowledge. In comparison with family life, the secularisation of 
knowledge came much earlier. I think the secularisation of knowledge 
systems was of fundamental importance for the disenchantment of the 
world.
Th at’s a concept you believe in?
Actually I do. It was not a total disenchantment of the world but...
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So you would claim the West was more disenchanted than the rest?
Not necessarily. To some extent China was partly disenchanted all the 
time. Th e disenchantment was built into Chinese culture much more than 
into Christianity. In China you had an interesting discussion between 
church and state in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Th e advisors to 
the emperor were saying: if you let this Buddhist church get any stronger 
with all those gifts and donations of the faithful, it will rule the country. 
Th ey made actual provisions against the ‘dead hand,’ against mortmain. 
Th ey stopped the handing over of wealth to the ‘Church.’ To some extent 
the encouragement of Confucianism and of ancestor worship seems to 
me not some primaeval, primitive move but almost a deliberate eff ort to 
counterbalance the state vis-à-vis the Buddhist church. Th ey brought in 
various rules such as that no Buddhist monk could ever train more than 
one other acolyte to take his place. So the system could never extend. 
Th ere was certainly a great deal of encouragement of local religion, non-
hegemonic religion in order to preserve the power of the state. Th at 
becomes very clear in China. Th ey always had more secular elements 
involved in learning and writing.
In the book you wrote on the Middle Ages you picture the Church as a very 
potent and driving ideological force. Do you think this is an explanatory factor 
for moving the West in a certain direction as compared to the East?
Yes I do, but I do not see it as moving it altogether in a forward direction. 
Sideways perhaps, investing a great deal in religious artefacts, beautiful 
buildings like cathedrals, but taking away from other features. One of 
the important lessons to me, looking back, was the fact that in the town 
I grew up in—it was a Roman town—the Roman theatres and baths 
were dismembered brick by brick in order to build a cathedral. After that 
we had no bath or theatre in our town for the next thousand years. In 
early Christianity there was this shift from the municipal elite leaving 
money to the town for the maintenance of baths and theatres to leaving 
it entirely to the church. And that seemed to me absolutely remarkable in 
its consequences. Th is desecularisation was very important. People have 
not paid enough attention to it. It was when I came to look at kinship 
systems that I was struck by this. I am thinking especially about a letter 
of Augustine of Canterbury, missionary of the Anglo-Saxons, to pope 
Gregory the Great (590–604) about how you should treat the natives 
and how you should stop them marrying their dead brothers’ wives. Th is 
leviratic marriage was widespread in Africa, in Judaism, in Asia. It was 
there in the Old Testament as well. And here you had it forbidden. How 
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is it that missionaries with the background of the Old Testament forbade 
any close marriage? Where did they get the idea? Not from their Scriptures 
or their Roman background. It had to come from somewhere else. It had 
to be some kind of invention of the early Christian Church.
So after all there is a diff erence between the way families are arranged in the 
West and elsewhere?
Yes, at this level there certainly is. But I don’t think this has anything to 
do with the coming of capitalism or modernisation. In fact, when you 
look at the course of the history of the family in the modern period, these 
features get set aside with secularisation. Whether it is in Protestantism, 
where Luther gets rid of dispensations, or whether it is the Catholic 
Church in France in 1917, which reduces the ranges of prohibited 
marriages. With secularisation these disappeared. Th ere were important 
distinctions in family life, but I don’t think they aff ected productivity or 
even modernisation.
Th e main thesis of your Th e East in the West is that there are no structural, 
long-term diff erences between East and West. Suppose we were to agree on 
that. It would nevertheless be hard to deny that in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries there is a gap. Th at must have arisen some time somewhere.
Th ere is a gap and I think it did arise in Europe, but only in the fi fteenth 
and sixteenth centuries, or perhaps even later. When you look at Jesuit 
writings on China in the eighteenth century for example, they considered 
China as much more advanced in some ways. It is in the nineteenth 
century that you get this idea of stagnant oriental societies coming in. 
Th en it is true, in so far as our productivity and knowledge systems had 
increased so much, fundamental distinctions appear.
What are the distinctions you are referring to?
Th ere were distinctions in educational systems. One feature that was 
seized upon in the nineteenth century in China was the development of 
higher educational systems. Not that these educational systems or learning 
were widespread in Europe. Th ere is an obvious diff erence—although I 
do think one can make too much of it—between the kind of writing 
system that you have in China and the one you have in the West. Th ere, 
before you go to university you have to have learned 3,000 diff erent signs, 
whereas in Europe you learn 25 or 26. We know how diffi  cult it is to learn 
those few, but to learn 3,000 does present a learning problem. It’s a very 
complicated task and it takes a lot of time.
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But a critic might say that this was the case for ages. Th en, why at a certain 
moment in time would it help the West to make a kind of quantum leap? You 
use a structural factor to explain an ‘ événement’.
Well, people have used the diff erence to explain the Greek achievement. 
Th e development of the alphabet in Ancient Greece was signifi cant, 
particularly the ease of learning it. Many people used Greece to explain 
the quantum leap forward of the West. And the alphabet was in a sense 
part of the process. It did not create the democratic system—universal 
education did not become compulsory until the 1870s–1880s—but it 
did make it possible. Which I think is very diffi  cult to accomplish in 
China. It is not that diffi  cult to learn a few signs, but to memorise a 
great number is very complicated. Th ere are many complexities in, for 
example, the Japanese educational systems. Th ey get round them, but 
only with diffi  culty. It is a factor of diff erence, but I think the diff erence 
has been much exaggerated. In fact, the Chinese and the Japanese have 
accomplished a lot, dealing with very diff erent forms of scripts. I think 
you can argue their educational systems have been slightly more complex 
than ours are. But that is the level at which I would want to discuss this 
question. I would not say they cannot as a result develop x or y, because it 
is quite clear they developed a lot of things in their own way.
Th ese remarks on literacy and educational systems are something of an 
extension of your interpretation of the diff erence between oral and literate 
culture. According to you an oral culture cannot stand up against a literate 
culture, because sooner or later you have to make notes. Why should that be the 
case? Is not the memorising potential much bigger in an oral culture?
I have done more systematic work on that than anybody else. When I 
started working on this question, I recorded a long recitation in Africa. It 
took me eight days to write it down. When I went there, I was convinced—
because that was what people told me—that the reciters remembered 
everything exactly, in a verbatim fashion. Many anthropologists make 
this claim. When I actually got hold, in the 1960s, of a portable tape 
recorder, I had fi fteen diff erent versions of the recitations. Th e diff erence 
between these was enormous in length, content and ideas. I do believe 
certain people do remember very well, but when you look at the actual 
techniques they use, visual representation and so on, you are not dealing 
with people repeating in an exact fashion from memory alone. What these 
people learn is a technique of recitation: they remember certain points 
along a line. It is true that one person, once he has got to know his own 
version, will tend to do something quite close the next time he recites. But 
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his version will be very diff erent from the next man’s version. I worked 
with an African friend. We recorded and translated the versions together. 
He was just amazed that there was this discrepancy between the versions 
and the written text. He thought there would be one version. But their 
notion of identity is very diff erent from yours and mine. Th ey cannot put 
the versions side by side. It is completely diff erent with written texts.
Is that not the diff erence that is referred to by Koyre, the French historian of 
science, between knowing more or less and knowing precisely? According to 
him the transition to knowing precisely is the basic element of the scientifi c 
revolution in the West.5
I think that is absolutely true. It is measurement and having instruments 
of measurement. If you have not got them the problem of diff erence is 
very diffi  cult.
But then how about sacred texts, for instance the Koran, which is recited...
But then, like with the learning of the Bible, you always have a written 
text to check on. A memory and a mnemonic are personal. I can give 
you a book but not my memory. Th e same applies to the arithmetic that 
comes from written tables that you learn exactly. We can always go back 
to a table. It’s a purely automatic thing. You can’t work on this from basic 
principles, but once you have learned it, it gives you command of a great 
deal of mathematical operations that you could do quickly. 
You have become sceptical about the possibilities of memory because of your 
own experience? 
Yes. But not only because of that. Th ere was an important Cambridge 
psychologist, Bartlett, who wrote a book after the First World War on 
remembering.6 He did experiments with memorising tasks, in particular 
with people whom he sat round a table and then passed a message, in 
whispers. In the end you get extraordinary results. People could not 
remember word for word. If you think of memorising a book, that’s very 
diff erent. Th e other thing you have got to take into account: if you can be 
satisfi ed with more or less, why should you worry about whether you can 
memorise precisely?
But then immediately the next question arises: is there a specifi c reason 
that people in the West could no longer be satisfi ed with more or less? Th e 
Europeans, after all, were not the fi rst nor the only people who were able to 
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measure exactly. Th ere have been cultures other than the European that had 
the capacity for mathematical exactness. For instance, the people in India.
Oh yes, the Indians. But they had a literate culture. A lot of their 
manipulation of numbers was related to literacy. Th ere may be problems of 
cognition as well. One group could have a higher effi  ciency with numbers 
than others or with science. My brother, who has been teaching a scientifi c 
subject at Harvard for many years, says that over the last ten years his 
advanced classes were full of people from Asia. Caucasian students have 
become a small minority. Does that mean that they are less good at 
mathematics than others?
I think nobody would say that it is a matter of some people being inherently 
more or less bright, but there can be social institutions that encourage you 
to develop certain capacities. Th is morning you suggested one of the basic 
problems in the development of Africa was exactly this.
Yes, in Africa they don’t have those institutions. Th ey don’t have the kind 
of what I call the ‘technologies of the intellect’ that we developed early on.
But then the basic problem would become: why has science or rational thinking 
become institutionalised? Floris Cohen in his book on the scientifi c revolution 
says one of the most fascinating things about it is that in Europe people thought 
science was eff ective before it actually was. Science became institutionalised 
before it was an empirical success. People like Francis Bacon made all kinds of 
promises they never fulfi lled, but science nevertheless received societal backing.7 
Th ere is an American historian, Edward Grant, who makes a similar point 
and he relates it to a specifi c Western institution, one you only had in the West: 
the university.8
I do not think that only in the West do you fi nd institutions of higher 
learning, but you did get them more developed there. Th at was important, 
but much science developed outside the universities.
But is not the university specifi c in the sense that it is an institution in which 
you can have quite an autonomous search for truth?
It became autonomous. My own college refused to admit anybody who 
was not of the Anglican faith until about 1870. If you were a Jew, a 
nonconformist or a Calvinist you could not go there.
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In the Middle Ages Cambridge was quite liberal, as compared to, for example, 
Paris.
Yes, you are right in a way. Th ere certainly were some diff erences within 
those institutions. If you invent an institution which you think you can 
control, it always spreads outside the original boundaries. You can’t really 
control learning in the end. It always has a tendency to move outside 
the boundaries and into other spheres. But I don’t think the universities 
were terribly signifi cant until the fi fteenth or the sixteenth century. 
I would argue that they were mostly for training priests. It’s quite true 
that there was some knowledge coming out of them, but no more than 
there was coming out of educational systems in China, which were not as 
well organised. For example, it took the universities quite some time to 
secularise.
Th e largest output of medieval universities was secular masters. Th ey 
were clerics, but not priests. As in China they formed the personnel of the 
administration and the bureaucracy.
Th at is true. It is also true that you had a canonisation of texts in China 
just as you had in Europe. On the other hand a lot of these bureaucrats 
were not priests. And one should not forget, in China there was a gradual 
increase of knowledge too, for example mechanical knowledge. I’m 
thinking of the encyclopaedias of the Song, in which one encyclopaedia 
followed another a few years later and corrected what they thought was 
wrong. Th ere was a defi nite accumulation of knowledge. It is true that 
they didn’t develop experimental systems as did the West. But that was 
very late...
But extremely important. In empirical science the ability to experiment is 
fundamental. Th at idea of experimental science is post-mediaeval.
Th at’s absolutely right. But there are many diff erent forms of experiment. 
Historians and social scientists cannot experiment at all. We have to use 
other techniques.
Many people are convinced that sheer power, violence and aggressiveness are 
very important in explaining the rise of the West. Th ey seem to play a minor 
role in your work. Is that because they are not the elements of societal life you 
are interested in, or do you think they are not that important? Guns and sails, 
so to say, are not as important as ideas and knowledge systems?
interview with john rankine goody 75
Well, I have written about both. What I call diff erences in the means 
of destruction or coercion, diff erences in weaponry, they were absolutely 
crucial in the European expansion.
But is not aggressiveness a core characteristic of any human society?
I think it is, but it depends on what you are going to be aggressive with. 
You can be aggressive with an atomic bomb, with an aircraft carrier or 
with a sword. You can do much more with the bomb or the aircraft. What 
impressed me was the attempt by, for example, the Portuguese, supported 
by the pope, to prevent the infi del from getting guns. When some 
renegade Portuguese did sell guns to the coastal people, these stopped 
the weapons from getting to the interior. Th e locals were doing the same 
as the Portuguese. What impressed me even more was that Africa lacked 
the metal technology to copy European inventions. In Asia they could 
make muskets, and of course they knew gunpowder. Africa never had 
the technology. Th ey could never get ovens to the right temperature. 
Th ey had iron, but they could never produce the steel to make the barrels 
for guns. Th ey could only repair them. To this day there is no bicycle 
made in Africa. Every barrel, like every wheel, has to be imported. Th e 
Japanese were ambivalent about guns, but they did make use of them. 
Th eir presence had important eff ects just as they had in India and in 
Arabia where they manufactured their guns. Africa could never do this. 
What is also of fundamental importance: there were no carts, everything 
was head-loaded in Africa. Th e wheel, at least the principle of it, was not 
adopted in Africa. Now they are using them, but they don’t make them. 
Education has gone a long way, but technology has lagged drastically 
behind, despite the fact that there have been enormous eff orts, especially 
since independence.
Geoff rey Parker has argued Western people had not only a special technology, 
but also a specifi c aggressiveness, a specifi c way of waging war in which the 
destruction of your adversary is very important. In other cultures, according 
to him, the goal is not destroying your adversary, it is showing him his place.9
I think that if you are turning back to psychological dispositions, you have 
a problem. Th ese change quite rapidly over time. A culture that may have 
been very aggressive at one particular period can become remarkably less 
so in a relatively short period of time. Or vice versa, as in Israel.
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I agree, in the knightly culture of the Middle Ages battles were still aimed at 
showing your adversary his place, not at killing him.
Yes. However, I think it is more diffi  cult to change technologies, for example 
weapon systems or farming systems, than it is to change dispositions.
What would you think would be the subject to study for somebody who would 
like to resolve the riddle of the rise of the West? Is there one specifi c research 
agenda that you would suggest?
Knowledge systems, their impact and the relationship between them 
and technology are very important. Th at is the problem with Africa. You 
have got knowledge systems coming in from outside, you have got the 
universities. But they are not aff ecting, or aff ecting only marginally or 
even in negative ways (they are taking people off  the land and not getting 
them to go back there) what is happening in production. Th e relationship 
between the development of knowledge systems and their application to 
production processes that seems to me of vital importance. What we have 
done in Africa is give people knowledge systems without the means to 
apply them. We can tell them that mechanical farming enables you to 
farm a lot more than you can do with the hoe, but every tractor has to 
be imported from Europe and it costs enormous amounts of money. Th e 
productivity just is not there to pay for this. So they are very dependent 
on aid. We are producing societies more dependent on the outsider than 
they have ever been under colonial regimes. Th eir problem is not so 
much, I would argue, neo-colonialism, as this gap between education and 
technology.
Th is problem is not something you should look at in psychological 
terms, or in deep cultural terms. If you do so you miss the point: that is 
that there is a great deal of intellectual borrowing taking place between 
cultures. Th ere were diff erences and, at a particular moment in time, 
maybe for some centuries, the Europeans were ahead. But if destructive 
systems, navigation, sails and guns, were critical in the advancement 
of the West, where did gunpowder or the compass come from? Yes, we 
developed timekeeping in a certain way and then we brought that form 
of timekeeping back to China. When gunpowder came from the East, we 
did something with it that was diff erent. Th ere is a lot of interdependence 
of knowledge systems. People develop a feature at a particular moment in 
time, and you have to look quite precisely at the changes over time.
But people could say: it’s all very nice that there is always interdependence, 
borrowing and lending, but the Europeans went to Asia, to America. Th ey 
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went everywhere. Whatever for example the Chinese did, they did not go to 
Europe.
Let us make clear that the Chinese did voyage. It is true that they didn’t 
go as far. But they were not living in a bog like the people in the West of 
Europe. Th ey had a very big country to trade with and explore.
Th ey didn’t need to go?
Th ey voyaged internally. Th ey were colonising their ‘own’ country and, for 
example, parts of Indo-China.
But still, why did they not go elsewhere?
Th ey did go elsewhere. We have Chinese pottery on the coast of Kenya. 
It’s true that they didn’t establish colonies, but they did go there and to 
Malacca for example.
But the Europeans went to North America, South America, Africa, Asia. 
Th ere is an English pub on every shore.
I think the explanations for that are rather specifi c. Partly they are doing 
it through developments in guns and sails.10 In Europe there were certain 
revolutions in navigation and map-making. It’s not that we were the fi rst 
people to make maps, but we did develop the techniques. Map-making 
was very important. For example, maps were one of the most important 
items the Dutch got hold of from the Portuguese.
Th e Chinese had very detailed maps. Th ere is a recent book by P.D.A. Harvey. 
It shows that the Chinese were the fi rst to draw grid-based maps to exact 
rules.11
I don’t know much about Chinese map-making. It would not surprise 
me. One has to remember that long before we were crossing the Atlantic, 
the Indian Ocean was a world-system of its own. Th e Chinese were going 
down to Indonesia. Th ey were going to Malacca, came down occupying 
parts of Vietnam, and so forth. We do not call that region Indochina for 
nothing. Th e same goes for the Indians. Who was it that led the Portuguese 
to Gujarat? Asia was where people wanted to trade and travel and Europe 
was not. Europeans were not anywhere then. We were traders up and 
down the coast. Th ey were doing the big voyages at that time. When 
you think of the extension of Europe and the big voyages at the time of 
European expansion, you forget that earlier on there was Zheng Ho. He 
was possibly going to Mecca. He was a Muslim incidentally, following 
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Muslim connections and trade routes in the thirteenth and fourteenth 
centuries.
You could as well refer to the Mongols who dominated Eurasia up to the Polish 
border until the beginning of the fi fteenth century. But still, the dominance of 
the Westerners in the world was of a diff erent kind.
Well, it has been a diff erent kind, because, to put it in terms you would 
recognise, the modes of production changed in the West...
You think we are Marxists...
No, I was not implying that. In any case, I have no quarrel with my friends 
like Eric Hobsbawm, whom I have known for a long time and from whom 
I learned a lot. At the end of the 1930s, when I went to university, the mass 
party in Cambridge was the communist party. Most of us belonged to it 
at that time and that gave us a historical perspective. In a way that linked 
me to Eric Hobsbawm, E.P. Th ompson and Raymond Williams.
But I suppose Hobsbawm as a Marxist would say: ‘Why did not you start by 
studying modes of production?’
Well, I did, but I also looked at modes of communication and of 
destruction: the impact of the gun and gunpowder in West Africa. And 
the impact of the horse. I was very interested in the fact that tribal people 
didn’t have horses, but state systems did.
Hobsbawm has been called a Eurocentrist, while you fi ercely attack what you 
see as ‘Eurocentrism’.
He is not as much a Eurocentrist as others are and he is not something 
which is worse than being a Eurocentrists, which is being an Anglocentrist, 
as are too many English historians.
You have been a Marxist yourself!
I still regard myself, in a way, as heavily infl uenced by Marx. But if 
you follow Marx, there is a single line in history and you have to go to 
feudalism in order to get anywhere. Th at is a problem, not only for him, 
but for a lot of other intelligent people. Th ey try to save the old Marxist 
scheme while they should be looking more freely and openly.
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Th e kind of anthropology you are practising, is it held in high esteem in the 
Anglo-Saxon world?
I don’t have a school or a following. I myself never followed anybody. I just 
have students, some very good students.
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Th e Best of Two Worlds: Interview with Om 
Prakash
In 1995–1996 Professor Om Prakash spent some time as a senior visiting 
fellow at the International Institute for Asian Studies at Leiden, where he 
also gave the annual lecture. Th e subject of the lecture (which was published 
by the Institute) was ‘Asia and the Premodern World Economy’. When he was 
interviewed in 1997 at the Center for the History of European Expansion 
by Jos Gommans, Carl Feddersen and Leonard Blusse, he had just returned 
from England where he had handed in the proofs of his latest book European 
Commercial Enterprise in Pre-Colonial India (Cambridge 1998), a volume 
which appeared last spring as part II.5 of Th e New Cambridge History of 
India series. Th e tapes of the interview were transcribed and edited by Martha 
Chaiklin, who did not have to wait long to meet Dr Prakash and update the 
interview, since he is presently at Leiden University as a visiting scholar before 
moving to the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Studies (NIAS) in January 
1999 for three months as a guest of the rector. It would seem that while all 
other Indians are visiting the hill stations, Professor Prakash has found his 
own alternative for a breath of fresh air in the Netherlands.
Let us briefl y review how you came to the Netherlands to work on the VOC 
material many years ago.
I had all my education, both school as well as University, in Delhi. I 
received my MA in Economics from the Delhi School of Economics in 
1961, with specialisation in economic history. While I was still doing 
my MA Tapan Raychaudhuri, who was then in the faculty, told me that 
if I wanted an academic career in economic history, one of the major 
repositories of an important body of source material on seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century Indian economic history was in the Netherlands. Th at 
was about the time that some kind of a plan had been put together by the 
Dutch government to invite young Asian scholars to use those archives. 
So if I was interested, Raychaudhuri told me, a fellowship to enable me to 
work at the Algemeen Rijksarchief [General State Archive, Th e Hague—
ARA] could be arranged. Soon after I gave my consent, I received a nice 
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letter from the fi rst secretary at the Dutch embassy in New Delhi inviting 
me to spend a year at the Algemeen Rijksarchief.
Was that in the 1960s?
Th at was in 1961. I arrived in Th e Hague in September of that year. I 
had just done my MA and I was 21 years old. Tapan Raychaudhuri was 
spending that year in the SOAS in London as a Visiting Research Associate. 
So he came over to Th e Hague for a week to introduce me to the VOC 
documentation at the Algemeen Rijksarchief which at that time, as you 
know, used to be in Bleyenburg in a very diff erent kind of building from 
the one that now houses the Rijksarchief. I had learnt some Dutch in Delhi 
from one Mr. Schaap. He was the cultural secretary of the Dutch embassy 
and was interested in this kind of thing. I used to go to him twice a week 
in the afternoons and we spent an hour or so together going over the basics 
of the language. On my arrival in Th e Hague, Raychaudhuri introduced 
me to Mrs. Meilink-Roelofsz, the keeper of the VOC archives, and Mr. 
Avelingh, the person in charge of the Reading Room at the Algemeen 
Rijksarchief. When I fi rst looked at a VOC volume, then carrying 
K.A. numbers, I said to myself: ‘Th is is not Dutch, this is something 
else.’ I spent about a week or ten days trying to get some sense out of the 
documents with the help of a dictionary, but to no avail. I persevered for 
another two weeks or so and then went to see Miss Talsma at the Ministry 
of Education who was in charge of my fellowship programme. I explained 
my problem to her and said I was seriously thinking of going back home. 
She counselled patience and agreed to fi nance a private tutor for me. Th at 
gentleman was a teacher of English in a school. He lived somewhere near 
Scheveningen. So I would go to him twice a week and we started, at his 
suggestion, by translating bits from Het Beste.
Th e Best of Reader’s Digest?
Yes, Reader’s Digest. Th en he got so interested in the project that once 
in a while he would come with me to the Rijksarchief, but he confessed 
that he couldn’t read the diffi  cult handwriting either. But by that time, I 
had begun to get the hang of the documents. From that point on it went 
quite well. By the time the fi rst three months or so were over, I was quite 
comfortable with the documents.
Your fi rst connection with Dutch Universities, was that Professor Coolhaas?
Th e connection with Leiden University at that time was quite marginal, in 
the sense that there was really nobody here who was particularly interested 
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in that kind of thing. Professor Heesterman came to Leiden only after I 
had left the Netherlands. Th e only person who was really into the fi eld was 
W.Ph. Coolhaas of Utrecht University, and he was far too big for me to go 
and bother. Th at was one of the problems. I really had nobody to turn to 
for academic guidance.
You were a pioneer at that time. Even in Holland at that time nobody was 
working on this?
Absolutely. But at the Algemeen Rijksarchief there was an active group 
of foreign researchers working. Diaku from Ghana, for instance, who 
later wrote an excellent book on the West India Company. Th ere was 
also an archivist from Ghana whose name I unfortunately cannot recall. 
Th en there was Jack Wills from the United States, Karl Goonewardena 
from Sri Lanka and one or two others. All these were ever willing to help 
each other and also interacted socially. We would once in a while go out 
for dinner and that kind of thing. But there really was nobody from the 
Netherlands who was particularly interested in this kind of research. I 
had initially come for only a year but at the end of the year I was not even 
halfway through the work. But my fellowship was extended for another 
year so I stayed here for a total of about two years. In the meantime, I also 
went to London for three or four months to look at the English East India 
Company documentation. Th e bulk of my documentation, however, came 
from the Rijksarchief.
So was it more or less a coincidence that you started here? Was there no special 
attraction to the Dutch material?
No, I didn’t really know about it. I learnt about it only through a course 
I was doing with Tapan Raychaudhuri. Th ere were only two students 
taking this course. Th e other one was not particularly interested, so in a 
sense I was the student and Raychaudhuri would once in a while deviate 
from the regular lecture and talk about a whole lot of things which were 
not part of the lecture, but which were taken from the material here. Th ere 
already was a tradition of Indian scholars using the VOC material—
Tapan Raychaudhuri himself and Ashin Das Gupta who, as you know, 
sadly passed away recently. Raychaudhuri would talk about how rich this 
material was and in one meeting he simply came up saying: ‘look we are 
thinking of this and if you are interested in making an academic career, 
this would be a good opening.’ Frankly speaking, my father, a civil servant 
himself, wanted me to go into the civil service. But to be fair to him, he 
said: ‘this is what I would want, the family would want, but if you do this 
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at my asking and if you are not happy with it, it is not worth it.’ And he 
added: ‘try this Dutch option, if it doesn’t work, you can always come 
back.’ It was in fact in that context that at the end of the fi rst few weeks 
I had seriously thought of returning to India. In retrospect, of course, I 
have no regrets whatsoever that I decided to stay on and try and write a 
Ph.D. thesis.
You were working through the Dutch material, which was slowly becoming 
something of your own; you were beginning to feel comfortable with that 
material. But to what extent did you have the feeling that it was about India?
One of the things that Tapan Raychaudhuri had done all along was to 
emphasise that these documents were really like turnips, in the sense that 
if you wanted to squeeze material relevant to specifi c aspects of Indian 
history out of them, then you really had to squeeze them hard. It was 
there, but unless you were consciously and deliberately looking for it, you 
would not get very much. So what I did was to have a large number of 
subtopics in my notes system. And I had cards for each and every one 
of them, and even if I got no more than a few sentences on one of those 
subtopics, I would take them down. So I tried from the very beginning 
and very consciously to extract all that was possible from the documents. 
And there were some very interesting things that I have probably not used 
in my work. Let me give some examples. Th ere was some trouble between 
the Dutch and the local people somewhere in Orissa about the Muslim 
Muharram procession. And in the documents there was this very detailed 
description of what the procession was all about. Th e Dutch factors there 
were complaining that this was always a problem area between the Hindus 
and the Muslims, and this time they had been the unintended victims. 
Th e factors who wrote the report were indeed quite knowledgeable and 
provided fascinating details. So I took all of it down because this kind 
of detailed description one wouldn’t fi nd often. Another example was 
the minutes of a meeting between the head of the Dutch factory and a 
senior government offi  cial. Serious disagreement arose between the two 
on some point, making the offi  cial angry enough to use swear words in 
Urdu, which are still the same 300 years later. Th e transliteration was in 
Dutch but the words were unmistakably recognisable. I also found a list 
in the documentation that contained fascinating details of the structure 
of bureaucratic corruption in Mughal Bengal. Starting with the top, it 
indicated in great detail how much had to be paid to offi  cials at various 
levels to get a particular job done. Th is sounds so familiar in relation 
to the Indian bureaucracy today, particularly at the lower levels. In fact 
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I think this entire notion that we, as a people, as a society, were very 
diff erent 300 years ago is something which needs to be looked at again. 
Many of the essentials, you see, are very much the same.
But now you haven’t told us what your subject was when you started out then.
Yes, the subject was also a bit of a problem. We had agreed that I would 
work on Gujarat. Ashin Das Gupta had worked on Malabar, Raychaudhuri 
himself had worked on Coromandel, but on this major region, Gujarat, 
there was no work yet. So I started out on Gujarat and began to look at 
the Surat documentation. But after about two months or so, I decided 
to try something else, partly because I had expected a lot more from the 
documents than I was actually getting. From Glamann’s work, which was 
still a new work at that time, I knew that in terms of the volume and value 
of trade Bengal was an immensely important area.1 So I decided to move 
to the Bengal documentation and somehow, partly because my capacity 
to get things out of that documentation had in the meantime improved 
somewhat, I felt more comfortable with the Bengal documentation and I 
decided to stay with it.
I remember you saying that there is not such a big diff erence in the early 
modern age between Asia and Europe if you take a look at the East India 
Company material.
Yes. Coming back to that, let me put it this way. It was always a struggle 
to get anything out of this documentation as far as the Indian economy 
or Indian society was concerned. Once in a while you would get things on 
religion, on society, on this and that, but that’s limited. But, when it got 
to the real subject of my dissertation, which was the functioning of the 
VOC, there was so much material that you really had to make a decision 
early on regarding the kind of information that you would want. And one 
particular kind that fascinated me was that concerning the relationship 
between the local ruling authority and the Company, and between the 
central authorities of the empire and the Company. It was quite clear 
from the very beginning that both sides were interested in getting things 
sorted out, rather than in confrontation. And that meant that whenever 
there was a problem they would talk it over and almost always sort it 
out eventually. But on actual matters of trade and the kind of problems 
they were facing in procurement etc., one could immediately see that the 
factors were often overstating their case. Th is was done usually for the 
benefi t of the Heeren XVII or Batavia so that they themselves would not 
be called ineffi  cient or corrupt or whatever. Th e general picture, however, 
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that comes through from the documentation loud and clear is that of a 
very vibrant economy, a very vibrant system, where the VOC was just 
one of many operators in the market with no qualitative advantage over 
anybody else. Th ere, however, was a distinct advantage available to it in 
quantitative terms. Th is followed from the substantially larger body of 
resources available to it than to almost any other entity operating in the 
market. But this was a very diff erent picture from that, say, in Indonesia 
or Ceylon where the Company enjoyed extraterritorial authority and was 
in a position to coerce producers and suppliers into submitting to terms 
considerably below the market.
Is the economist Prakash speaking here? I mean how do you see yourself, as a 
historian, as an economic historian?
When I started out I really had no formal training as a historian. My 
degree was in Economics. Economic history was my elective paper. So I 
was more interested indeed in the economic part of it. But from whatever I 
had been talking over with Raychaudhuri over a long period of time, I was 
very keen to get whatever else I could get out of these documents. So while 
I was looking at this documentation primarily as an economist to begin 
with, it was quite clear that they were rich in many other respects as well.
So how long did it take you before you fi nished your thesis?
I arrived here in September of 1961 and left for home in December of 1963. 
I took a boat for Bombay from Marseilles. It was an extremely enjoyable 
trip and I spent Christmas and New Year on the boat. On arrival in Delhi, 
I learnt that since the Department of Economics at the Delhi School 
of Economics had recently been recognised by the University Grants 
Commission as an Advanced Centre for research in economic history and 
economic development, new faculty positions had been sanctioned and 
that I stood a good chance of getting one of them. But there was some 
administrative problem whereby the interviews for the positions could not 
be held for a while. So for that stopgap period I joined St Stephen’s College 
as a lecturer in economics. Th at is the best college in Delhi University and 
probably in the country. Initially my idea was that I would stay there for 
only a few months, but then the Principal persuaded me to stay on for a 
little over a year. It was only in August 1865 that I joined the Economics 
Department at the Delhi School of Economics where I have been ever 
since, now thirty-three years.
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So you were at St Stephen’s for just one year. But you haven’t yet answered the 
question, when did you fi nish your thesis?
Th e one year I spent at the St Stephen’s College was a most pleasant 
experience in many ways. One came into contact with the best 
undergraduate students in the country. But from the point of view of 
my research and writing the year was a complete washout. It was only 
after joining the Delhi School of Economics in August 1965 that I 
began writing. I submitted the thesis in January or February of 1967. In 
our system, the thesis has to be referred for approval to three external 
examiners. My examiners were Arun Das Gupta of Calcutta University, 
Kristof Glamann of Copenhagen University and Holden Furber of the 
University of Pennsylvania at Philadelphia. All three were kind enough to 
recommend the award of the degree.
You were at NIAS as well later on.
My connection with the Netherlands was resumed in 1976. It was around 
that time that you people were just starting to set up the shop here in the 
form of the Center for the History of European Expansion and Reactions 
thereto. Th e fi rst time I was at NIAS was in 1982–83.
At that time was there still nobody working on this?
Well, some work had started but not very much. In fact in the old 
Algemeen Rijksarchief building at Bleyenburg there were not yet very 
many researchers working on the VOC documentation.
Well, the whole VOC project had started then.
It had started yes, but it was still in its initial stages. I shall tell you about 
an interesting experience I had in 1976–77 in the Rijksarchief building. In 
the old building at Bleyenburg, the Reading Room had a capacity of only 
about thirty people and if you did not reach there by about ten past nine in 
the morning, all the seats would be taken. You would then have no option 
but to return home. So I would always be there at nine o’clock. Th en, of 
course, you can go out for coff ee or whatever but you have reserved your 
seat. And then since you are among the fi rst, you always get the seat of 
your choice. And then you get used to a particular seat and go back to it 
every day as a matter of routine. A kind old gentleman who probably was 
in his eighties always took the seat opposite me. Every morning we would 
religiously nod to each other. He stopped coming after about two months 
or so and it was only about eight or nine months later that he reappeared. 
I was still there struggling with the fat VOC volumes. And then he comes 
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up to me one day and says: ‘Mijnheer, ik moet met U praten.’ [Sir, I need 
to talk to you.] So we went down for coff ee. He said: ‘You have been here 
all these eight months that I have been away and reading these big books?’ 
When I said ‘yes,’ a look of utter sympathy came on his face and in a low 
voice he said: ‘young man, I admire your tenacity, but tell me, do you 
really expect to fi nd your name in these books?’ I hardly need to add that 
he was one of the large band of genealogists regularly using the Algemeen 
Rijksarchief. Th e researchers using the VOC documentation at that time 
could perhaps be counted on the fi ngers of one hand.
But VOC research was starting up again.
Yes, it was just starting. But things were already very diff erent in the 1970s 
from what they had been in the 1960s. You know the fi eld had opened up 
at Leiden. And that was very helpful.
And Mrs. Meilink-Roelofz of course had taught as an extraordinary professor 
from ‘70 to ‘75, but that was too short a time for her to produce a school of 
her own. Still there were new people, I mean Femme Gaastra, Frank Lequin, 
Els van Eijck and, of course, Jaap Bruijn who were continuing some of her 
courses. A lot had changed, but India was not yet in the picture.
In fact, Sri Lanka was more in the picture at that time than India was.
Yes, Jur van Goor, who was working with Coolhaas at Utrecht, was doing 
research on Ceylon.
Yes, Van Goor, Goonewardena, Arasaratnam. And later another Sri 
Lankan scholar, Kotalevele. But of course it was at that point that I came 
into contact with people like yourself, Dirk Kolff , Henk Wesseling and 
others. Since then the contact has been unbroken.
But to what extent did this research on maritime trade also link to what was 
happening in the economy of mainland India? We have already discussed this 
distinction between what was happening on the coast and in the mainland 
during the NIAS meeting of June 1993.
You are absolutely right, and this is a gulf that has persisted. It is only in 
the last several years, the last few years actually, that conscious attempts 
have been made in the direction of bridging that gulf. As you said, many 
of the questions asked are the same, but the approaches have been so very 
diff erent. And even amongst the little group of those of us who have been 
using this material I think the approaches have been quite diff erent. Let 
me talk for a moment about the work of Ashin Das Gupta, for example. 
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Das Gupta used the VOC material not really to talk about the VOC itself, 
or about international trade, or the movement of precious metals, or from 
the point of view of the export of textiles, but almost exclusively from the 
point of view of what this material could tell you about Indian merchants 
and their functioning. Of course in a way he was lucky to have worked on 
Gujarat, because if he had taken that sort of approach in relation to, say, 
Bengal, the amount of information he would have obtained on that front, 
even with that very conscious bias, would have been quite small. So as it 
happened Gujarat was a good choice for Das Gupta, because you have all 
these major merchants in Surat who are not rivalled anywhere else and 
you have in fact a great body of material available around them.
Anyhow, the great divide between the coast and the interior needed 
to be bridged; one of the fi rst people to talk about these things was Jan 
Heesterman. Increasingly, it was realised that the coast could not exist 
except on the basis of a strong support structure operating in the interior. 
And by the same token, the interior could do with support from the 
coast. But the nature of that relationship, except at this very obvious 
and in some ways very superfi cial level, somehow never came through. 
And unfortunately the research on the interior came to be concentrated 
more and more on the agrarian sector. Th at was the other big divide. Th e 
agrarian school would not touch anything that was not concerned with 
the land revenue system, the agrarian structure and whatever.
Are you referring to Irfan Habib’s school?
You see Habib himself is a great scholar. Th at kind of range of mind is 
not very common. In his own work, Habib does deal a little bit with 
the monetary system and things of that sort. But this kind of lack of 
integration between the inland economy and the coastal economy has 
always existed. An increasing number of scholars are now looking at these 
things somewhat diff erently.
But in that sense Pearson’s book didn’t really help either.2 He showed that 
the Portuguese could develop their operations on the coast because the inland 
powers were not really interested in what was happening there. He actually 
emphasised that there was a separation.
I had fi rst met Pearson at a seminar I had given to Holden Furber’s group 
in 1971 at Philadelphia, and we had talked about some of these things. He 
had either just fi nished or was fi nishing his thesis. And the book came out 
in ‘76 and as it happened I read it almost immediately. It was a book that 
for a while made a great impression because it proceeded on the basis of 
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distinct categories. But I think at one level these categories were stretched 
by Pearson into such exclusive compartments that they ceased to be very 
real categories. He said the ruler was the ruler, the Indian merchant the 
Indian merchant, the foreign merchant the foreign merchant, and there 
was nothing that brought them together. But you cannot really have these 
exclusive categories—if you are this, then by defi nition you are not that. 
Not only are you by defi nition not that, but you have nothing to do with 
that other category and you are either opposed to each other or completely 
indiff erent to each other.
You mean that the people from the coast were not really that diff erent from 
those from the inland and people from big cities?
I think it would make much more sense to talk of a continuum. A 
continuum not in any big political sense, but in the sense that where the 
inland stops and where the coast begins is something which is in a way 
an artifi cial distinction. Th e hinterland sometimes really goes all the way.
Th at is of course a subject that Braudel has been talking about.
And in this context I must talk with great admiration about the work of 
Hans van Santen. I strongly feel his dissertation should be translated into 
English and then published.3 It is one of the best pieces of work on this 
kind of thing where you are bringing out the relationships between the 
internal economy and the coast. Th at thesis again I think shows a great 
imprint of Heesterman’s thinking. You have material available, and that is 
the kind of material you would need.
I want to go back to a very basic issue. And that is if you look at your career, 
you have had to battle with certain existing or emerging paradigms, right? You 
started out with, let’s say, the Van Leur paradigm. Th en you were confronted 
with, let’s say, the Pearson paradigm that came out of Portuguese India. Th en 
you were facing the Cambridge school, which developed new explanations 
for what happened in India in the second half of the eighteenth century. Not 
forgetting Glamann who showed how the Company worked as an intra-
Asian entrepreneur, or Niels Steensgaard with his original thesis that has been 
pestering everybody in the fi eld for twenty years. It seems to me that there is 
something quite specifi c to the Indian Ocean studies: you seem to have this 
succession of big paradigms. A new book comes out, Glamann, Steensgaard, 
Pearson, and each time everybody says, ‘well that’s it,’ until a new study 
appears. You must have had this feeling when you were working your way 
through the VOC archives ‘Oh my God, now I also have to deal with this new 
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paradigm’; or perhaps even ‘I have to pierce through these theories because I 
have so much more material.’
As you say it has been in many ways, for a young scholar at any rate, a very
confusing picture.
But exciting.
Exciting but confusing. You see I wrote my thesis in the 1960s and it was 
a very diff erent kind of work. A publisher in Delhi off ered to publish it 
straight away, but in retrospect I am glad that I didn’t do that, because it 
would certainly not have done much good to my reputation. But when I 
really sat down and began revising it, it began taking on a very diff erent 
shape. I was lucky to get the help of many people in doing that. One I 
distinctly remember was M. M. Postan from Cambridge who spent a few 
months in 1968 or 1969 at the Delhi School of Economics as a Visiting 
Professor. His own fi eld of work was very diff erent, but he was kind 
enough to read my thesis and spend several hours talking about it with 
me. Th e gist of what he said was that on the basis of the material I had in 
the thesis I could write a much more broadly based book. I then decided 
to go beyond Bengal and situate the book and the VOC in the Indian 
Ocean–South China Sea trading network. Today if you ask me, I think 
the only merit of this book, which was eventually published by Princeton 
University Press in 1985, was placing Bengal in the VOC’s Indian Ocean 
trading framework.4 I had realised that without bringing in, in a major 
way, Japan and the Spice Islands, one could not tell a very meaningful 
story. So this is not so much a book on Indian economic history alone; it 
is really on the history of the operations of the VOC in the Indian Ocean–
South China Sea trading network. I do not believe that anybody until that 
point had emphasised strongly enough the critical signifi cance of the spice 
monopoly and exclusive access to the Japan trade as the principal factors 
behind the outstanding success of the VOC in intra-Asian trade. Now 
in this Cambridge book which has just been published, I have covered a 
good deal of additional ground.5
So what is the new Cambridge book about?
As I just said, the canvas has been broadened a great deal. Th e book deals 
with the Indian operations of each of the European corporate enterprises as 
well as those of the private European traders functioning in Asia between 
1500 and 1800. As in the earlier book, the quantitative base remains 
important. I believe that if you are providing a quantitative profi le as an 
important ingredient in the story you are telling, then it is important 
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to be as precise as you can. You see, there may be situations where you 
don’t have data of the kind that you would need, in which case you must 
say, yes, this is the limitation of my work. What I am strongly opposed 
to is a situation where, on the basis of a very small amount of data, you 
are off ering very wide generalisations. Th at’s one kind of problem. Th e 
other kind of problem is that in situations where the data do not allow 
you to be suffi  ciently precise, you are nevertheless conveying a false sense 
of precision. Let me give you an example of the second kind of problem. 
In 1993 there appeared a book called Portuguese Trade in Asia under the 
Habsburgs by James Boyajian.6 It is a major book that completely revises 
the orthodoxy in relation to the Portuguese trade in Asia and the relative 
role of the offi  cial trade on the Malabar Coast in the total Portuguese Euro-
Asian trade. But if you look at the statistical basis of Boyajian’s revisions 
of the orthodoxy, there is a very serious problem about the quality of his 
data. He is completely honest and he has covered himself fully. Th ere is 
no question about that. But only a specialist will really fi nd out that some 
of the quantitative data are indeed very shallow and much too fragile to 
bear the weight of a major reformulation of current orthodoxy. He is, I’m 
convinced, moving in the right direction, but the extent of the revision is 
not fully supported by the kind of data that he has.
I think all of us have been over-enthusiastic at some stage when working in 
the archives and discovering all these shipping fi gures. You get all enthusiastic 
and say ‘My God, so many ships came on Monday and on Tuesday,’ and before 
you start thinking you are noting all this down and you make this fantastic 
pie diagram say for two months, and then suddenly you don’t have anything 
for eight months and then you again have a little bit and then you don’t have 
it for two years, and then by the time you have amassed all this you suddenly 
realise that you cannot do at least what you originally wanted to do. Am I 
hitting you at a weak spot?
No, quite the contrary. I spent quite a bit of time putting together all the 
shipping lists relating to Bengal and then processing them. In the course 
of the processing, I found that a very large part of the statistical material 
pertaining to the goods carried by the ships would have to be thrown away. 
Th is was because of a whole range of problems relating to the manner in 
which this material was available in its raw form. Even in respect of an 
analysis of the number of ships on a given route in a given season, a large 
part of the data was unusable. Th at is the kind of problem that you just 
pointed out. Th e biggest problem was in terms of the coverage of the lists. 
I soon found out that in a shipping season of, say, six months, if I did not 
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have information for the whole of the six months, I would have to live 
with that. Because if I made a rule that I must have information for the 
whole of the six months, then there would probably not be even one list 
left. So I laid down the arbitrary rule that I would accept a shipping list 
if it gave me information for a minimum of, say, fi ve and a half months.
Five and a half months?
Whatever. On the basis of their usability as a credible indicator of shipping 
movements over the entire season. All those lists that did not fulfi l those 
criteria simply had to be dumped. It was a very hard thing to do. I had spent 
all that time recording them, but I did exactly that. If you are completely 
open and completely honest about the quality of your statistical material 
and you are continuously emphasising its limitations, then it is for the 
reader to decide how much trust to put in your conclusions. But it is you 
alone who know the weaknesses of the data, and I believe it is incumbent 
upon you to come out explicitly with its limitations. I would nevertheless 
emphasise that in spite of all the problems that exist in relation to the 
various kinds of quantitative data available in the VOC documentation, 
it is still probably the richest body available, and if one is deliberately 
conscious of the methodological problems involved in using this material, 
one can still get an enormous amount of mileage out of it.
Not only fi gures, but what used to be seen as a hard fact, has of course been 
very much questioned recently by the post-modernists or subaltern-studies 
people. What do you feel about this viewpoint as an economic historian?
I must admit that I am not quite into post-modernism. I’m not terribly 
comfortable there. In many ways I am a traditional historian where telling 
a story in an analytical, interesting and meaningful framework constitutes 
the basic craft. Th e particular points of departure may vary—everybody 
has his own view on things—but so long as you are specifying clearly the 
underlying basis of what you are doing and are putting all your cards on 
the table as it were, I think that is still the best way of writing history. I 
don’t feel terribly comfortable with post-modernism not because I have 
any specifi c problems with their approach, but partly because I have never 
felt interested in it. In relation to the subaltern and related work, it’s a 
diff erent kind of a problem. I don’t think it’s my job as a historian to 
feel obliged to propagate a particular viewpoint. In short, let 100 fl owers 
bloom.
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I have a very silly question about the position of being an Indian scholar. 
Because having witnessed your going and coming over the years, I have this 
personal distinct mixture of slight jealousy on the one hand and empathy on 
the other. I know that you spend the horrible summers in Delhi and melt 
away. I know how you have been building your new house with all kinds 
of problems. So on the one hand there is this empathy, but when you think 
of it, there is also ‘envy,’ in the sense that through all kinds of international 
agreements or whatever, as a good Indian historian you can go places. I am 
sure you have spent about fi ve times as much time in the archives here in the 
Netherlands as I have. When you just think of those years, the time you have 
been able to travel and there is also this whole network of conferences. Now 
what does this do to you? Do you fi nd it a silly question?
No, it is not a silly question. Let me put it to you this way. You see living 
and working in India vis-à-vis living and working in the West is a choice 
that one has to make. It has not been an easy choice. It was not an easy 
choice in the sense that when I came here fi rst in the 1960s, I am sure 
that if I had chosen to stay here that would not have been a problem. But 
I went back. And when my wife and I were at Harvard for a little over 
two years in the early 1970s, I was off ered a job at another American 
University. Th at was in 1971. Th is was not an Ivy League University, but 
it was a well-paid job, and I spent many sleepless nights deciding whether 
to take it and stay in the United States or to go back to my job in Delhi. 
I must say one of the important factors in this has been my wife, who 
has consciously maintained that travelling is fi ne, but that she would not 
want to live in the West. So I fi nally said no to the off er and we returned 
to Delhi in 1972. But this was the period of the great shortages in Delhi 
and elsewhere in India. You had to stand in a queue for bread and things 
of that sort, and then sometimes I would wonder if I had made die right 
choice. But fortunately that phase did not last very long. In retrospect, 
let me put it to you that if you are a bit envious I can understand that, 
because in some sense I have had the best of both the worlds. I live in India 
and by Indian standards Professors are paid reasonably well. If the weather 
is hot, it is hot for everybody. And in addition, it is a good University 
Department that I happen to be in. It’s an unusually good Department 
both in terms of its academic stature as well as in terms of inter-personal 
relations amongst colleagues. So from the point of view of job satisfaction, 
I am quite happy. And then I have been able to travel a great deal. I spent 
two years as a research student here, and then came back for a full year 
each time in ‘76–‘77, ‘82–‘83, and ‘92–‘93.1 have been a visiting professor 
at Virginia University and a visiting scholar at Harvard, Heidelberg and 
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Paris. I have done my share of travelling and academic work. And, as 
you said, I have had access to the Algemeen Rijksarchief on a continuous 
basis so that my research at no point has really suff ered because of my 
dependence on a body of archives which is located several thousand 
kilometres from my home base. So I think in some sense it has been the 
best of both the worlds. If I had lived in the West, I don’t think I would 
have been a happier person.
Is that perhaps the reason why only a few Indian scholars are actually interested 
in Europe, in Western history; they always seem to stick to India?
Th at is another thing. Th is reminds me of the Presidential address that 
Furber gave to the American Association of Asian Studies in 1969. Th at 
was the Gandhi centenary year and one of the points Furber made towards 
the end of the address was that while we have associations of Asian studies 
in the West, there were no associations of Western European or American 
studies in the East, which made for an unreal basis for a continuing 
mutual exchange. So you are absolutely right. If you ask me to name fi ve 
major Indian historians working on non-Indian history, and it is a very 
large category, I would fi nd it a very tough job to do that. Of course there 
are some outstanding exceptions, but they are just that: exceptions.
Th is is in a sense a shame because when you look at Orientalists like we are, or 
even Indians teaching in America, they will get a lot of their new ideas, their 
methodological ideas, in short get a lot of mileage out of what is happening 
in European history. Th e fi rst time I read Foucault for instance was at the 
campus at J.N.U. in Delhi. Because everyone was talking about Foucault and 
the French coupe and things like that.
But not many of them would perhaps have read Foucault. Some of them 
would really know about Foucault, but almost nobody would use Foucault 
in his own work. Th is is something I frankly have never have thought 
about. But now that you mention it, yes, it is a problem area.
It is a waste of talent because there is so much talent.
Absolutely. But there is one thing about borrowing models lock, stock and 
barrel. Th ere can be big problems with that sort of complete borrowing.
But you have to start out somewhere. Wasn’t Van Leur really in the same 
situation when he applied Weber’s ideas on Asian trade? He used even less 
material than most theoreticians nowadays.
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Let me put it this way. You see there are diff erent ways of writing history, 
and each historian chooses the way most suited, not just to his material, 
and not just to the kind of problem he’s addressing. An important 
ingredient is his temperament and style. A historian is before anything 
else a person, a living human being. And I think the approach that he 
takes is a personal decision. After a while, once you have made that kind 
of decision, it sometimes becomes too late to go back. Th at, I think, is the 
way in which some of these things develop.
You have met quite a lot of the great historians. You worked with Holden 
Furber for instance.
Holden Furber was one of the kindest men I have come across. As I 
mentioned earlier, he was one of the examiners of my Ph.D. thesis, so he 
knew my work very well. He taught at the University of Pennsylvania at 
Philadelphia but he spent his summers at his house in Marblehead, very 
close to Cambridge, Massachusetts. Since I was at Harvard for over two 
years, I would often go to his place in the summers and we would talk 
extensively. I would always cherish whatever I learnt sitting, as it were, at 
the feet of Holden Furber. Th e kinds of things that would come out in a 
very gentle way would make you stop and think, ‘why didn’t this occur to 
me’ and ‘if I looked at it this way it would make more sense.’ He was such 
a humble man. He was writing his Rival Empires of Trade at that time and 
he would say: ‘Look, I am looking at your chapters, would you be so kind 
as to look at mine?’7
So those who have been most infl uential in your work, who would they be?
Starting with Tapan Raychaudhuri who was my teacher/mentor, I would 
say yes, Holden Furber. Another person, who infl uenced me a great deal, 
although he was not in this fi eld, was Henry Rosovsky. He was then a 
Professor of Economics at Harvard. He had done an enormous amount 
of work on Japanese economic history, some of it together with a Japanese 
colleague, Ohkawa. Our fi elds were quite diff erent but he was kind enough 
to read my dissertation and comment extensively on it. At the level of pure 
ideas, I have benefi ted a great deal from Harvard. Another professor of 
economic history there, the late Alexander Gerschenkron, used to run a 
seminar which I attended regularly. And one year when Gerschenkron 
was on leave, Henry Rosovsky ran that seminar. Th e presentations I made 
in these seminars elicited extremely valuable comments and suggestions. 
David Landes was still in the History Department but he would come 
to this seminar often. In Delhi, I have benefi ted extensively from 
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discussions with Dharma Kumar. Our fi elds are quite diff erent, so are 
our temperaments, but I have nevertheless learnt a great deal from her. 
And here in Leiden, fi rst of all Jan Heesterman. During 1976–77 when 
I was here for a whole year, I interacted with him a great deal. And of 
course there are many others. Henk Wesseling, more than anyone else, 
has helped facilitate my work in a whole lot of ways, providing a support 
structure that I could always bank upon.
How do you see yourself in relation to a younger emerging generation? Is there 
such a generation? We have all the time been talking about you assembling 
materials, thinking about books, uniting books, but what about you as a 
teacher?
Let me put it this way. I am a teacher in an economics department. And 
although we have a Centre for Advanced Study in Economic History and 
Economic Development, the students that we get are of a kind where 
economic history essentially is at the fringe of things. So I cannot really 
expect to get the very best students of ours to come to my fi eld. Th e only 
exception was Sanjay Subrahmanyam. In a way I am very pleased that I 
was associated with him. I was his teacher in his MA programme. And 
then I was his advisor for his Ph.D. programme together with Dharma 
Kumar. I am very glad that he has reached heights that anybody can be 
proud of. I have lots of students who are very much interested in the kinds 
of things I do, but they would not want to do it for a living.
You have been working with all these source materials close to forty years. 
In Holland we have the Linschoten Vereeniging, the R.G.P;, in Britain the 
Hakluyt Society; we have published some substantial series ourselves at IGEER; 
but don’t you think European research institutes like for instance HAS should 
play a much more central role in setting out a policy on how to make Western 
materials better available to Asian scholars?
I couldn’t agree with you more. In my own case, Th e Dutch Factories in 
India which I published in 1984, contains in English translation and 
annotation the documents of the VOC relating to India for the early years 
of the seventeenth century.8 Th at was a modest beginning and Bhaswati 
Bhattacharya, Dirk Kolff  and myself are now planning to continue this 
series. But the point is that, partly because the kind of organisational 
framework that you are talking about has not been available, the progress 
has been rather limited.
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Th e Study of Contrasts across Europe: 
Interview with Patrick O’Brien
To most people Patrick O’Brien is known as an author who has written 
extensively on the Industrial Revolution in Britain and in Europe. Readers of 
this journal will without any doubt also know him as a scholar who has studied 
the economic relations between the West and the rest, especially the costs and 
benefi ts of European colonialism and imperialism. His other main fi elds of 
interest are taxes and state fi nance. He started his career as an undergraduate 
at the London School of Economics. His doctorate (written at Oxford) was a 
thesis on the fi nancing of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars from 1793 
to 1815. At present he is Centennial Professor of Economic History at the 
London School of Economics and Senior Research Fellow and Convenor of 
the Programme in Global History at the Institute of Historical Research of the 
University of London. Peer Vries conducted the interview in November 1999.
Th e main interest in your academic life has been the study of industrialisation, 
and especially British industrialisation. What struck me in reading your books 
and your many articles is that you describe, analyse and compare the British 
Industrial Revolution, but hardly ever discuss the causes of this revolution, at 
least not in a very explicit way.1 Do you think it not a sensible question to ask 
about the causes of the Industrial Revolution?
Economists look for parsimonious explanations concerning the cause, or 
a set of causes, that promoted British industrialisation ahead of that of the 
rest of Western Europe. But I think that the important thing is that one 
should see British industrialisation as part of a broader European process 
in which, for a number of rather fortuitous geopolitical reasons, Britain 
took the lead and then the rest followed. I doubt whether there is a primary 
cause of Britain’s industrialisation. I am certainly not in the business of 
producing monocausal explanations. Marc Bloch told us decades ago that 
historians can only utilise comparative methods if they wish to converse 
about causes.2
Of course there is always a big element of contingency in historical processes. 
On the other hand there must be some reasons one can adduce for the fact 
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that Britain became the fi rst industrial nation. It is not a completely random 
happening.
To answer that particular question, I think you would have to position 
yourself in the mid-seventeenth century and look at possible countries or 
locations for an industrial revolution. I think in all probability you would 
select Britain as one of several likely places. You could also have picked 
Holland or France, Saxony, or one of many proto-industrial regions within 
Western Europe, which could have generated the major technological 
innovations behind Britain’s early start.
Granted that all these other regions might have been the region where 
industrialisation appeared for the fi rst time, what are the conditions that 
made Britain fi rst?
I think Britain exemplifi es what I have referred to as precocious structural 
change, or let us call it ‘proto-industrialisation’ simply because this term 
is in common usage, despite Donald Coleman’s attempt to expunge it 
from historical discourse.3 Quite early on, a high proportion of the British 
workforce was employed in the manufacturing industry and a lot of its 
output was sold overseas. From this base I can produce something of a 
probabilistic story as to why industrialisation should have happened in 
Britain before other places. Into that narrative I would want to bring 
coal, and also some geopolitical facts that explain why Britain in the 
mid-eighteenth century obtained a bigger share of world trade and of the 
profi ts from servicing the world economy than other European countries, 
including the Netherlands.
I can imagine that some readers will be amazed to hear that you want to 
emphasise the importance of the geopolitical context. After all, among other 
things you are famous for your thesis that world trade, and especially the role of 
the periphery, was not that important in moving the process of industrialisation 
forward. Have you changed your mind?4
Th at is a pertinent question. Often when I write I am reacting to scholars 
who produce some sort of grand thesis, a monocausal or exaggerated 
picture of history I know something about. What I was reacting to in 
my 1982 article was Immanuel Wallerstein’s thesis about why Europe 
industrialised ahead of the rest the world, and why in particular England 
industrialised ahead of the rest of Europe.5 Th e core of his thesis is about 
colonisation, foreign trade and imperialism. What he misses out—and 
this is not just the case with Wallerstein but also with Braudel6—is a 
number of what an economist would call endogenous preconditions. I 
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like mountaineering metaphors and I will use one here: I think there are 
a number of conditions that will carry an economy up to a plateau, and 
there are a number of things that will take it to the peak. If you want 
to have an explanation as to why somebody climbed a mountain, you 
have to consider both sets of factors. Th us to miss out British agriculture, 
British coal, the long involvement of Britain in intra-European trade, the 
role of London and its geopolitical position is myopic. It gives you only a 
fraction of the story. Nevertheless, if you repose the question and ask what 
it was that made Britain leap ahead of the rest (given the fact that in the 
early eighteenth century there really are a number of candidates for the 
position of fi rst industrial nation) then I think Wallerstein has a point.7 
I do not want to be too critical. Th e fi rst volume of his work appeared 
in 1974. At that time the history of Britain’s industrial revolution was 
Ashtonian.8 It was very much a story of laissez-faire, British capitalism, 
humble artisans from the north of England, the role of Manchester, and 
above all of private enterprise. It left out the state, and any story that does 
that is grossly underspecifi ed. I think I was right to write that article in 
the way that I did. Although as a Celt I am also fond of hyperbole and 
may have been exaggerating when, at the end of my article, I called the 
contribution of the periphery to European industrialisation ‘peripheral.’
From a rhetorical point of view I think that was an excellent phrase.
Nevertheless, people only remember that sentence and think that is my 
entire thesis. What I am saying is that there are a series of endogenous 
factors which led Britain to a certain point, and then beyond that point 
Wallerstein’s story begins. He brought power and the geopolitical context 
back into our discourse, which was absolutely necessary. For the early 
phases the question is: where is the extra industrial output being sold? 
Why does England have such a large cotton industry, as compared to, let 
us say, the Dutch? Both are trading with the East; they both know about 
cotton. Why do the Dutch not have a big cotton textile industry?
People could argue that the Dutch would have been forced to basically sell their 
cotton to themselves: the English had a larger internal and external market.
But the United States had become independent in 1783. Th e Dutch could 
have sold cotton there. Th ey marketed textiles in South America. Th ey 
had their own colonies in the Indies. Nevertheless if you want to make 
a case for the signifi cance of British imperialism, you can only construct 
it from cotton. Cotton was a very desirable material; it was the nearest 
thing Europe had to silk, which was a very expensive material. It was used 
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in the slave trade and to clothe slaves. It was the cloth you could sell all 
over the Empire. Cotton was the material out of which the major textile 
innovations actually emerged. All those machines were fi rst used, not in 
the traditional industries of woollens, not in newer industries like silk or 
linens, but in cotton. For two or three decades cotton was very important 
for innovation in textile production. But cotton is not all there is to the 
Industrial Revolution. 
Personally I think Ken Pomeranz has a point when he emphasises that the 
British Industrial Revolution could go ahead not only because of coal and iron, 
and because of the fact that Britain was able to export cotton textiles, but also 
because it was able to import enormous amounts of cheap cotton.9 What would 
have happened if the British had not been able to import this raw material so 
cheaply and easily? I think this is a point where the role of the periphery (or 
more generally, of international trade) also becomes highly important. When 
it comes to the relationship between capitalism—in whatever sense—and 
industrialisation, I think it was, as Wrigley puts it, more casual than causal.10 
Granted you have a periphery, granted you are a colonial power, and granted 
you are capitalist (as Wallerstein interprets the word): what then is the direct 
link of all this to what I would call the ‘essence’ of the Industrial Revolution? 
By essence I mean using other sources of energy and other materials. Is there 
a link, or do you think there are two separable trajectories? Th at Britain 
industrialised because it was a country that on the one hand had become 
the centre of a global trading system and that on the other hand, more or less 
fortuitously, stumbled onto the steam engine?
I do not think the steam engine is one of those innovations that you 
simply stumble upon. It emerges from a location with very large deposits 
of coal, which Britain is exploiting from Tudor times onwards for 
domestic heat and then for several heat-intensive industries such as glass, 
salt boiling, soap making, etc. Th ere then arises a problem for those who 
are mining the coal, namely, how do you pump water out of the mines so 
you can sink them deeper and obtain more coal from a given amount of 
investment? Th at was the problem addressed by the engines of Savery and 
Newcomen. Out of the Newcomen engine comes the Watt engine, and 
then the application of steam power to industrialisation. But the extent of 
the diff usion of the steam engine as late as the 1820s remain rather small. 
So in its early phase the Industrial Revolution is not a steam-powered 
revolution. Initially the revolution was an example of unbalanced growth. 
It took place in just a few industries.
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Might it be more correct to say that because of steam the Revolution could go 
on? At the beginning it was still largely a form of Smithian growth, then we 
see something you might call ‘Schumpeterian growth.’11 It is the innovations in 
the use of energy and iron that allowed the process to go on without running 
into Malthusian traps.
I think that is right. To repeat, there are two separate points: what starts 
something moving towards the peak, and then what sustains it in that last 
phase of ascent? I think that once the economy is through the 1830s and 
steam power is spreading from industry to industry and the railways are in 
place, then you are in another era. But most people date the beginning of 
the Industrial Revolution in Britain further back. Savery and Newcomen 
made their inventions in the early decades of the eighteenth century. Major 
innovations in cotton were all in place in their technological essentials by 
the 1780s. Th e steam phase really appeared after the 1830s.
I can imagine Eric Jones listening to us and observing: ‘Th is is a Little 
Englander view of industrialization.’12 Large parts of Europe—Belgium, 
Switzerland, France and Germany—also went to the plateau and then to 
the top. Ought we not, for the real explanation, to be looking for common 
characteristics pertaining to large parts of Europe? Characteristics that made 
it possible for these regions to catch up, not immediately, but often in less than 
half a century, whereas it took most of the rest of the world so much longer?
Indeed. Th e lags between the advanced countries in Europe are really 
rather short. Th ey are, however, much longer than anybody in the 
eighteenth century would have predicted because of the Revolutionary 
and Napoleonic Wars which devastated, for example, the Dutch economy 
and the economies of large parts of North-western France. If one looks 
at Europe in the 1780s, one sees the British moving ahead. But one also 
observes Catalonia, Saxony, North-western France and the Netherlands 
being totally aware of these technological developments and poised to 
take them on board. What gets in their way is a quarter of a century of 
revolutionary upheaval, massive destruction of capital, and then a series 
of reactionary governments following the Revolutionary and Napoleonic 
Wars. It is in that period that the relative position of the British economy 
really changed.
But Britain itself was also involved in these wars. It had to fi nance them. It 
had to do an awful lot of fi ghting. It was a very turbulent time for Britain too, 
not exactly a period in which one would expect an economy to fl ourish. What 
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exactly is the relationship between the wars and the fact that Britain achieved 
an advantage over other countries?
In the absence of the wars I think that the whole of the West-European 
economy would have moved forward in a much more balanced way. But 
by the 1820s and 1830s the British economy is clearly the dominant and 
the rest must catch up. Th e relative destruction wrought by the wars 
and the gains that the English made in terms of imperial conquest at 
the expense of the French, Dutch, the Portuguese and Spaniards implied 
that after the war there was no serious imperial competitor left. Yes the 
Dutch colonies were returned, but the English could go into their colonial 
markets. Th ey had moved that much further ahead. It was a bit like the 
position of the Americans after the Second World War when there were 
also large productivity gaps. England in 1815 is equivalent to the United 
States in 1945.
But still, what you see in Europe is that even devastated regions such as 
Belgium, France and Germany were able to catch up rather quickly. Does there 
not have to be something you might call ‘a common European denominator’? 
What made it easier for most European countries to industrialise than it was 
for, let us say, China or India? What had Europe in common that made it 
move ahead as a continent? Looked at from a more long-term and more global 
perspective, one could say that Europe industrialised and the non-western rest 
did not. So there must have been fundamental characteristics of Europe as 
opposed to the rest. Could you give some hint as to what, according to you, 
these characteristics might be?
Yes. We do have to think about the characteristics of ‘the Rest’ and ‘the 
West.’ What are the unique characteristics of the West? And what were 
the problems and unfortunate characteristics of the Rest in the period 
from, say, the late 1780s right up to the 1840s? What is happening in Asia? 
First there are a series of exogenous political shocks to which European 
power contributes. European imperialism is not helpful for preserving 
the political stability of Asia’s great empires. But what we now know is 
that something called ‘capitalism’—a label we should get rid of—was not 
unique to Europe. Th e Europeans had markets, credit, entrepreneurial 
merchants and mercantile networks. But one fi nds these things in many 
regions of Asia. Yet the density of populations in these ancient empires 
was one factor that made it more diffi  cult for them to industrialise on a 
broad front than for Europe.
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What exactly do you mean by density of population?
I mean that the industrialised share of the working population in Europe 
was higher than it was elsewhere. Although in Asia they had proto-
industrialisation and many features of ‘capitalism’, but probably confi ned 
to a limited range of maritime areas. In the interior of Asia, where the 
mass of the population lived, agricultural productivity was not low, but 
it was not that high. Furthermore the backward linkage eff ects of Asia’s 
industrialised regions cannot be as strong as they were in Europe. Th ey 
did not have the overall ‘pulling power’ because they had many more 
people to pull up to a high average standard of living. If you have an 
industrialised set of regions in England, Switzerland or Saxony, they very 
quickly become poles de croissance that actually lift the whole system up. 
Th e sheer weight of population in Asia was much larger. Pulling that lot 
up (however capitalist you are) is going to take a long time.
I am not an expert on the demographic history of Asia, but there are, for 
example, fi gures from Paul Bairoch that indicate that the region in Asia where 
population was most dense is Japan. At least when we compare the population 
to the amount of arable land.13 Still, somehow the Japanese managed to 
industrialise. If your reasoning is correct then, ceteris paribus, Japan would 
seem to be a highly improbable candidate for early industrialisation. Would 
you then say this is because Japan is not such a big country?
What we need to do now is to compare the Japanese case to certain 
maritime regions of China and to the maritime ports of South India 
and look at Asian economies one at the time. Th ere may be some special 
features about Japanese agriculture and the Japanese taxation system in 
the eighteenth century or in the level of urbanisation of Japan which were 
really rather special to Japan. Th ere was a kind of competitive state system 
in Japan.
What strikes me in your answer is that you do not seem to have any problems in 
seeing that some parts of Asia were just as wealthy as Western Europe. People 
like Pomeranz and Goldstone, and most explicitly of course Andre Gunder 
Frank, emphasise in their work that the most developed parts of Asia in the 
early modern period were just as developed, and had a GNP per capita that 
was not much lower, if indeed it was any lower, than that in the advanced 
regions of Europe.14 Do you agree? Do you think the diff erences were really very 
small in 1750–1800, just when things started changing rapidly in Britain?
I think what recent scholarship has done is to raise the question of just 
how big the gap in productivity, real wages and real income might have 
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been between certain regions of Asia and the most progressive regions in 
Europe. Whether there was no gap at all or whether the gap was signifi cant 
I think we do not know. We need to look very carefully at real wages and 
calorifi c levels of consumption. What we cannot see at the descriptive level 
is a system called ‘capitalism’ or what Smith called ‘commercial society,’ 
existing only in Western Europe. All the features of Smithian growth were 
present in large parts of China for centuries, and they were also there in 
certain parts of India. Whether that led to levels of income that were as 
high as in Western Europe to me is a question that requires quantifi ed 
answers.15
Th is means you support the deconstruction of one of the most cherished 
narratives about European industrialisation and Asian non-industrialisation: 
the narrative that capitalism was uniquely European. Furthermore, if, 
as you are saying, all these capitalist features were present in Asia and still 
industrialisation did not take off  there, then there are two possibilities: 
Europe frustrated Asian industrialisation, or there was no industrialisation 
in Asia to be frustrated as capitalism in itself is not a suffi  cient condition for 
industrialisation.
It may be a necessary condition, but it is not a suffi  cient condition.
We have without much ado begun to discuss Japan, China and India. 
I gathered from the discussions we had yesterday and from your answers 
that you have been studying Asia. Does this mean you have been changing 
perspective? Would you consider yourself a global historian, or in any case 
someone who thinks global history is where the interesting things in the fi eld 
are now happening?
Yes, I really do. Th e shift in the last decades in which a number of Western 
economic historians have started to take Asia into their perspectives is 
entirely heuristic. I used to think that really signifi cant illumination could 
be derived from the study of contrast across Europe: why England was fi rst 
and why Belgium was second, etcetera. Th ose were the sort of questions 
you and I were raised on. When we were answering such questions we 
were not thinking about three-quarters of the world’s population, even if 
quite early on in my career I spent a decade at the School of Oriental and 
African Studies, where I learned Arabic. I wrote articles and a book on the 
Middle East, so I have always been interested in the Th ird World.16 In that 
sense, I am returning to an early interest in populations beyond Europe. 
Th e sheer volume of research we now have available in European languages 
on these economies has grown immensely. When I started working on the 
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history of underdevelopment there were just three of us actually working 
on the economic history of Middle Eastern countries. Now there is a huge 
amount of scholarship available, even if you do not read diffi  cult Asian 
languages, which take decades to learn. I think Eric Jones was really the 
fi rst person to perceive that the only way to understand economic growth 
and to answer questions about gaps in income per capita around the world 
is to take a very long run and a very wide geographical perspective. He has 
written two excellent books, which are an example to us all.17 He has been 
the major pioneer in global economic history.
I think it is an indication of the way and the speed in which things are changing 
in economic world history that the latest fashion has become to claim that the 
centre of the world economy in early modern times was not in Europe, as was 
suggested in so many rise of the West stories, but in China. Do you think that 
is putting too much of an Asian perspective into world history? To be more 
specifi c, do you agree with Frank that we should ‘ReOrient’?
When Frank wrote his ReOrient book I did write to him to say that this 
is a book that occupies the commanding heights of the fi eld. He does 
not like what I say about imperialism and is rather critical of my work. 
Still, this is a book we have to address.18 I think he did a lot of reading 
and he has a very strong thesis and a very polemical style. His thesis that 
the Chinese economy was a very big element within the world economy 
as a whole and that things happening in China fed back into world-trade 
through India and via the Indian Ocean back to Europe is correct. But 
what is the quantitative signifi cance of all that for the growth of Western 
European economies? I think for a very long time it was small. He wants 
to say it was really rather big. Frank also wants to say (and I do not agree 
with him), that there was already an economic world system way back 
in time. He has edited a book with Barry Gills with the title, Th e World 
System: Five Hundred Years or Five Th ousand?19 In it he defends the thesis 
that for already 5,000 years there has been a world system. Th ere may 
be 5,000 years of long distance trade, but there was no world system or 
anything a modern economist would recognise as globalisation. Th at 
sort of integration did not exist before the coming of the railways and 
steamships.
Let me try and defend Frank. I can imagine him reacting to this by stressing, 
for example, that all these developments in the British cotton industry which 
you yourself think are important were a reaction to what was happening in 
India. So even if, from a purely quantitative point of view, they were not that 
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important, intercontinental contacts were something of a trigger. Does that 
make sense?
I think some kind of a case can be made for cotton. But, as I said before, 
there is much more to the Industrial Revolution than the cotton industry. 
As late as 1840 cotton was only 7 per cent of GNP. Global contacts do 
not explain British iron or coal. Th ey also do not explain why the rest of 
Europe (that also imported Indian cotton) did not make the inventions 
and innovations the British made. It was the British who went for cotton 
early on and then produced a series of technological innovations which 
have to be explained.
Reading Asia-centric texts like those of Frank or Pomeranz in which especially 
the Chinese economy is presented as highly developed makes you wonder why 
the Chinese did not industrialise. Obviously you have given some thought 
to this question. Do you think China was an improbable place for modern 
economic growth to arise?
I do not think so. What is perhaps less probable is that Chinese society 
and culture in the eighteenth century would have generated a comparable 
series of technological innovations. Th is has nothing to do with the 
Chinese character or anything else that lies very deep in Chinese culture. 
In previous centuries the Chinese had generated impressive innovations. 
As Mark Elvin showed more than two decades ago, they invented the 
equivalent of a very sophisticated spinning machine for hemp, not for 
cotton.20 Th ey could do it. Th ey had done it. I think they were locked 
into an agrarian economy which satisfi ed the food requirements of the 
population, and the population grew very rapidly. China was a commercial 
society. It had a certain level of proto-industrialisation and a very labour-
intensive economy. Th ere was no momentum for change, no group of 
people looking for labour-saving devices or for technologies to do things 
mechanically in the way that that was occurring in the advanced regions 
of Europe.
Does this mean that in the last instance you think Elvin was right in his idea 
of a high-level equilibrium trap?
Yes, I think there is a lot to that justly famous thesis, although I tend to 
think that it is more of a description of where the economy was than an 
explanation of why China did not have technological innovation. What it 
does show is why there was no very strong pressure for change. Th e Chinese 
were well fed, their economy was not Malthusian. Sometimes innovation 
can grow out of crisis. Pressure for change can become so intense that you 
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have to do something. Th e Chinese were not in a desperate situation. Th e 
state, moreover, tried to make sure that nobody was starving.
But there was no serious crisis in England either. Does this not imply that 
David Landes has a point in emphasising the role of culture? Th e British 
did not need to industrialise. It is not that there were just two possibilities 
for them: industrialise or perish. If they were both not in a crisis, what then 
is it that makes the British innovate so much in the eighteenth century and 
the Chinese so little? Could culture not make some diff erence—not all the 
diff erence as Landes says, but some?21
It depends what we want to do with this ‘catch-all’ word ‘culture.’ If it 
means a desire to better oneself materially and to respond to price signals 
and markets, then that existed in China as well as in England. In both 
countries there was a market-oriented population wanting to make profi ts. 
I think we may be talking about diff erences in the level and embodiment 
of useful technical knowledge and in the number of people who were 
skilled enough not only to invent these machines, but to also carry them 
forward to the development state. It may be that the supply of that kind 
of labour—carpenters, clock makers, skilled metallurgists—in Western 
Europe was in excess, per capita, of what it was in India or China. For 
perfectly good reasons, the Chinese and Indians were using labour-
intensive technologies and saw no reason to change. Th ey were doing quite 
nicely with them, while Europe could make higher profi ts by moving 
along other technological frontiers. I do not think there is anything deeply 
defi cient in Chinese or Indian culture. Otherwise they would never have 
changed. I mean what has re-ordered or changed Chinese culture? Why 
was it so innovative back in the Sung period? In Growth Recurring Eric 
Jones made the point succinctly a decade ago.
I think it is evident that Sung China was bristling with innovations while 
Qing China, which defi nitely was fairly wealthy per capita, was not—Mark 
Elvin, and even Needham, says so.22 Qing China may have been rich, but 
it was not innovative. Th e ‘classical’ explanation, apart from references to 
changes in Confucianism—which I myself do not believe in—that always 
pop up in the literature is that after the Sung, the Chinese state became more 
repressive in the sense of repressing innovations. Joel Mokyr in his Th e Lever 
of Riches, for example, toys with the idea that the state destroyed initiative in 
China.23 Do you think that this could be a convincing way of explaining the 
change?
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I am disinclined to reach for the state in the way that some of my friends 
in neo-classical economics always do when growth slows up or reverts to a 
phase of stasis. I am reluctant to do that because we are beginning to get a 
revisionist view of the Chinese state, and also of the Moghul Empire. Of 
course these states were predatory when they could be predatory. But they 
were not particularly powerful states.
Weak states can be dangerous for growth because they are unpredictable.
You are right. Th ey can be unpredictable and arbitrary. And they may not 
have been particularly helpful. But I doubt whether this is the actual cause 
of a slowdown in Chinese innovation. I do not think that the Chinese 
state was powerful enough. Ken Deng’s recent work on the mercantile 
classes in China shows that for centuries they just carried on doing their 
own thing.24 Th e notion that they were heavily repressed by the state does 
not seem to be correct.
Personally, to some extent because of reading your work I am inclined to take 
a completely diff erent point of view with regard to the role of the state than 
the (neo-) classical one.25 I think in early modern and modern Europe the 
state was very important not in hindering, but in fostering economic growth. 
At least in Western Europe it was not an impediment to growth. And on the 
other hand, the problem with the state in China and India at the end of the 
early modern period was not so much that it hindered growth, but that it did 
not do much to promote it either.26
I think at that time Asian governments were worried about their own 
stability and survival, and they had very good reasons for their anxieties. 
Th ey were challenged by the Europeans, who by that time were militarily 
much more powerful. Th ey did not want massive social and economic 
change. Peasant rebellions in China and in India had long been extensive 
and frequent. Th e degree of internal disorder in those two empires is much 
greater than what governments had to cope with in Western Europe.
But of course then I could say, as a kind of counter-argument, that if we look 
at the history of Europe, that was anything but peaceful too. If you take the 
sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, we see war after war after 
war. If you say China was hindered by peasant revolts, then what about this 
constant destruction and bloodshed in Europe? Moreover, the eighteenth 
century in China was, at least internally, relatively peaceful, while the wars 
China waged were all won. I do not think the situation in Europe could be 
described as more peaceful. Could Sombart with his thesis that war in Europe 
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was to some extent conducive to economic growth in some way be right?27 
When we were discussing the Napoleonic Wars, you were hinting at the fact 
that war is not necessarily bad for economic developments. Of course there are 
winners and there are losers, but still.
It goes against the liberal grain to say that war is good for anything. But 
we are now talking global comparative history. In that context Europe 
stands apart as a competitive state system to which wars were an integral. 
In Europe states made wars and wars made states, as Tilly puts it.28 In that 
process powerful states emerge that are interested in their fi scal base and 
in promoting economic development and in attracting people with money 
and skills from other states. As a result of this internecine war, Europe 
constructed the most developed armaments industries in the world. Th is 
gave the Europeans superior navies and superior weapons when they 
went to Asia and into the Middle East. Th is may be a helpful way of 
comprehending the diff erences. As a result of this strife, frontiers were 
carefully drawn and citizens were protected. Insofar as they were powerful 
governments attracted capital and skills. People fl ed from weak states to 
states that could protect them. Th us many Dutchmen in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries took their capital and their skills to where they 
were best protected: to London, and for very good reasons.
All in all a completely diff erent view on the rise of the West arises from that of 
David Landes, who has written the book on the subject that has without any 
doubt sold best. He says Europe, and especially Britain, was characterised by 
laissez-faire. I think I would stress that the diff erence par excellence between 
the European and the non-European state, and a very important element in 
fostering European growth, was mercantilism. Th is was abhorrent to Adam 
Smith and to many laissez-faire (neo-)classical economists. If I had to indicate 
whether laissez-faire or mercantilism was the economic policy that helped the 
West in rising, I would choose mercantilism. Do you think that would be a 
thesis that makes sense?
Schmoller said just that, a long time ago.29 Th e German Historical School 
had it right. For some 100 to 130 years Holland was a very successful 
mercantilist state. Th en England from the late seventeenth century right 
through to 1846, when it went over to laissez-faire, was also a highly 
eff ective mercantilist power.
You can look at it from the opposite side. Ken Pomeranz told me that in 
the last instance China did not have colonies, no colonial policy and no real 
foreign economic policy because government had other priorities. It did not 
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bother that people were trading, but on the other hand when Chinese traders 
were killed in Batavia or Manila, Chinese government did not declare war 
and did not mobilise its power.
Yes, the Chinese stayed inside their boundaries, keeping law and order. 
Ground rules for capitalism and credit were in place for mercantile 
activity and for moving goods and people around the country. Th e state 
maintained a very good network of canals and a very good stabilisation 
policy against agrarian crises. Th at is what they wanted: an ordered society. 
Th ey were not willing to go beyond the borders and take on the foreigners 
because they knew they did not have the navy to do so.
But that is because they had not built one: they could have easily aff orded to 
have a navy. 
I am not so sure about that. I think that if one could actually measure 
the ratio of taxes to GDP collected by these great empires it was very low. 
Contrary to David Landes I suggest we are talking about weak and strong 
states, not about laissez-faire.
But even then, it has always struck me that the Kangxi emperor in China 
in 1712 declared—and nobody forced him to do so—that by far the most 
important taxes, the land taxes and the corvée, would be fi xed at a certain 
‘ decent’ level and would never be increased.30 Of course, there is a rhetorical 
element in this, but Chinese emperors never formally increased taxes in the 
eighteenth century, while there would have been a possibility, I think, to raise 
more money. So there is more to it than just constraints. Is it not the case that 
in China they had a diff erent view on what governments should do, allow 
and forbid?
Th eir view is much closer to what David Landes implicitly means by a 
laissez-faire state. Th ey wanted to leave well alone.
Anyhow, in Europe the history of taxes is the history of tax increases.
Yes it is. Taxes increase with state building. States became more powerful; 
law and order were imposed; property rights were being better defi ned and 
states were protecting themselves against foreigners.
China ends up, I think, with the worst of both worlds. Offi  cial, central 
taxation was insuffi  cient to maintain or increase infrastructure and unoffi  cial 
local charges and downright corruption payments went up steeply, which did 
not have any positive spin-off s.
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Th at is a weak state with war-lordism, local predators who do not care 
about civil society.
During this interview we have referred to the ideas of some very infl uential 
people in the fi eld of world history: Wallerstein, Braudel, Jones, Frank and 
Landes. You told me you are planning to write a book with an overview of 
what people have been saying about the idea of economic or material progress. 
Could you expand a little bit more on that? How does it fi t in your whole 
career? Have you become a historian of ideas?
Ideas matter, but I haven’t become an intellectual historian. Europeans 
have been thinking about the rest of the world since Herodotus. Th ere is a 
lot of discussion about economies, as well as of societies, families, customs 
and culture. Th ere is a very long tradition, which carries on through 
Christian universal history in the Middle Ages, when for very obvious 
reasons people were intensely interested in Islam. Th en with the voyages of 
discovery a whole lot of imports come from the East into Europe and you 
obtain much more data in the form of artefacts, but also of knowledge. 
People begin to refl ect. In the period we call the Enlightenment, the fi rst 
great school of universal historians emerges, Montesquieu, Voltaire and 
Hume, interesting remarks from Adam Smith and vast tomes from the 
Göttingen School in Germany. All that really dies away with the French 
Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars. Th ereafter, with the success of 
European imperialism the nineteenth-century view appears that these 
‘other cultures’ and these ‘other peoples’ have always been backward. Th at 
was not the view of Herodotus who always compared the Greeks with the 
Persians and very often to the disadvantage of the Greeks.
It was not the view of Leibniz, or Voltaire, not even of Montesquieu, although 
he did say some rather strange things about peoples outside Europe.
Scholars are now beginning to think about material progress down 
through the centuries in diff erent parts of the world. And in the late 
twentieth century, as a result of globalisation and as a result of the fact 
that the world is—in terms of time—small, young people have become 
very curious about other cultures.
Do you study this subject to get some ideas you can use in your own work 
about European Asian and global economic development? Or do you do this 
from another perspective, that of a historian of ideas who just happens to be 
interested what European people have been saying about other cultures?
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An increasing number of people have recently been writing (or are at 
the moment writing) books on the history of material progress. I would 
like them to be more aware that there is a very long historical tradition 
of which they are just a recent part and which they should have read. 
Th en they can place their own work within a ‘European vision’ of the rest 
the world. Th e visions of some modern scholars are really Eurocentric, 
blinkered and ignorant. Had they read the historiography, they might 
have realised that they have to be very serious about what they were doing 
in the way Max Weber was.
Even if he has appeared to be wrong in various ways, he could not have done 
much better at the time and I think nobody can really blame him for not 
having done better.
Th ere are also other historians like Toynbee, Wells, Dawson and Sorokin 
who made a serious attempt to come to grips with other civilisations. It 
takes time, and I think a lot of what has been written since the war about 
the economic history of underdevelopment has been remarkably ignorant 
of their work. I think the fi rst breakthrough actually comes with Braudel. 
In Anglo-Saxon economic history he has not been given the place he 
actually deserves. If you read those three volumes on material life, the 
market economy and capitalism, there is a serious attempt to understand 
other civilisations.31
I think he is brilliant in posing the right questions, although I am not quite 
sure what he thinks the answers are.
He perhaps started the resurgence in global economic history. Th en we get 
the books of Jones. Th e fi rst one was good but the second one is excellent.32 
But there have been a number of books in which the attempts have not 
been scholarly and that do not deserve to be treated very seriously. Some 
scholars just read sections of Mark Elvin on China and then think that is 
enough.
Some people have only read Mark Elvin on China and to cap it do not 
understand him. I think we have got a fi ne view of your career: from a Little 
Englander to an economic historian of Europe to a global historian and now 
even as somebody who studies the history of global ideas.
Th at is what some of my friends call ‘megalomania,’ and others ‘senility’!
I would call it ‘ development.’ 
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History is Placing a Man in the Context of 
his Times: Interview with the Late Ashin 
Das Gupta (1932–1998)
One of the fi nest historians of modern India, Professor Ashin Das Gupta was 
engaged in teaching and researching for nearly four decades. Born in Calcutta 
in 1932, he spent his childhood in small towns in West Bengal. He came 
back to Calcutta to fi nish school and had lived there ever since. He taught 
History at the Presidency College, Calcutta University and the Visva Bharati 
University in India and at St Antony’s College (Oxford), the University of 
Heidelberg and the University of Virginia at Charlottesville, USA. He was 
also the Director of the National Library and the Administrator of the Asiatic 
Society, both in Calcutta. Towards the end of his life Das Gupta was suff ering 
from a crippling disease. But his mind was as sharp as ever throughout. Sitting 
in a wheelchair, he kept on dictating essays, both in Bengali and English, 
almost until the end. It was shortly before his death that he was asked for an 
interview by Itinerario, and in spite of the condition of his health, he kindly 
agreed to it. Itinerario found the issues raised during the interview and the 
comments of the historian very interesting and wanted to go back to him once 
more. But unfortunately he passed away before that opportunity came. Th e 
views of the late historian on history, social science and Indian politics are 
still very valid. Th at is why Itinerario decided to publish this interview as its 
homage to the memory of Das Gupta. Dr. Mrs. Uma Das Gupta kindly gave 
us permission to publish the interview. 
Ashinda, would you tell us something about your childhood and school days?
All I remember of my childhood is travelling all over West Bengal. Being 
a civil servant, my father had a transferable job. I attended small schools in 
diff erent towns and one school was no diff erent from another. Th e schools 
were not rich; they were quite poor. Th ey were no inspiration but I loved 
some of those small-town schools in Hijli, Burdwan, Katwa, Nalhati, 
Bishnupur, Bankura and Arambagh. So, I was brought up in rural West 
Bengal up to Class IX. Th en we moved to Calcutta and stayed there.
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You were a student of Science. When did you choose History as the subject of 
your study and what made you change the course of your study?
After I left school, I studied science for two years. I had my aptitude tested 
in the Science College. Th ey said ‘go and take up Arts (Humanities).’ 
Th en I gave up Science and chose History.
Many people we know remember you as an ‘Ishan scholar,’ among the most 
distinguished awards of Calcutta University. It is still considered remarkable 
that, being a student of History, you scored higher than students of the Science 
faculty and won this scholarship. You created a record that has not been broken 
so far. What else did you do besides studying?
Yes, I was an Ishan scholar. What I did beyond my studies at college was 
to enjoy debating and writing. Of course, the life of the college was in the 
Coff ee House. I used to write a lot on political issues in the Presidency 
College Magazine. My near contemporaries were A.K. Sen, Sukhamoy 
Chakrabarty and Barun De who belonged to the Sushobhan Sarkar 
school of thinking—they were ‘left’ of Centre... I used to have debates 
with them... the funny thing about Calcutta is that they remember you as 
an Ishan scholar and have no idea of what happened afterwards!
You were a student of Narendra Krishna Sinha...
In college I remember the teaching of Sushobhan Sarkar. We read a lot of 
European history with him. He recommended simple textbooks. I liked 
his lectures immensely. He was very simple and lucid. Th e thing I did not 
like about his lectures was that he was asking questions on the subject 
and answering them himself for the students. What became clear to me 
much later on, but not at that time, was that these were complete lectures, 
not unfi nished. Th en when I studied with Narendra Krishna Sinha at the 
MA level and heard him asking questions on the subject, I realised the 
value of asking questions. At the beginning several others joined N.K. 
Sinha’s class but he discouraged them from staying on. Only I remained 
in his class and he was delighted with that. He said with a chuckle ‘the 
others fl ed’! His class was made up of me asking the questions and him 
answering them. After completing my Master’s at the Calcutta University, 
I started research. After one year of research I went to Cambridge on a 
State Scholarship of the Government of India.
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Did you notice any diff erence in the method of teaching History in India and 
in England?
I was a student of Eric Rich at Cambridge. He was the Vera Hamsworth 
Professor of Imperial History at Cambridge University and later became 
Master of St Catherine’s college. I also got to know T.G.P. Spear who was 
at Sellwyn College in Cambridge. I think what I gained from Cambridge 
was a ‘take off ’ from N. K. Sinha’s teaching. Th at same method was pushed 
ahead at Cambridge—that was the value of asking my own questions and 
fi nding answers to them. Th at was a proper introduction to research.
Your favourite historians...?
At that time my favourite historian was Postan. I thoroughly enjoyed his 
Medieval Among my contemporary historians I am a great admirer of 
Arasaratnam. I met him fi rst in Th e Hague and we became good friends. 
Among my Gurus I would list fi rst Sushobhan Sarkar, second N.K. Sinha, 
and third Mrs M. A. P. Meilink-Roelofsz. Later two other scholars came 
very close to this circle—C. R. Boxer and Holden Furber.
What do you understand by History; how would you defi ne history?
History is a subject where there is diff erence of opinion about its defi nition. 
History is not written in any one way, in any one manner, so it cannot be 
said that History should be written in this way or that. Still, for the sake 
of a better analysis it is necessary to have a defi nition. In broad outline, 
History to me is placing a man in the context of his times. If one can do 
that one becomes a good historian. If one cannot then one should not 
write.
Would you mind saying a few words more on this point?
We can think of a man in diff erent ways, but the contrast between a lone 
man and a man living in a society is to be noted. History cannot reach a 
man who is really lonely. An individual has his existence, but no history. 
A man becomes part of history only when he is part of society. I do not 
mean that many lonely human beings come to an agreement on a certain 
date to create society and state and then they become history. Th e lone 
man and the man living in society have been related to each other from 
time immemorial. History only explains the life of the social man. It is 
acknowledged that history is not just the story of kings and dynasties—it 
is the story of ordinary people. Th ose who keep this in mind, in their 
writing the special individual tends to form part of the larger crowd. It 
is needless to say that if history is considered to be the story of kings and 
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dynasties, that story would not explain the life of man as part of society. 
On the other hand, when the historian is in search of the crowd in order 
to move away from the history focused on one person, it becomes diffi  cult 
for him to bring out the human side of that crowd.
Is that in your view the point where History diff ers from Social Science?
Social Scientists do not like this human aspect of History. So far Social 
Science has not been able to say anything on the special contribution of 
a particular person. Th e more there is an emphasis on ‘analysis’ in Social 
Science and the more History is trying to become the ‘science of the 
society,’ the more human faces are disappearing from the account of the 
past. In an attempt to rid History of the people of the upper strata of the 
society, Social Science in the West is putting more and more emphasis on 
statistics. In special cases, and depending on the questions being asked, 
one must have recourse to statistics, but that exercise must be only a part 
of the total eff ort to understand the man of the past. Th e relationship 
between History and Social Science is complex. Without entering into 
that large topic, I would only say that it would satisfy no one if the human 
aspect were removed from the study of the past. I have said that History 
explains the life of man as part of society; but that man also has a human 
side, and if we put too much emphasis on statistics that might result in an 
immense loss. Whatever the historian chooses to write on, and no matter 
how he writes his story, it is history because it is a reconstruction of the 
past. Apparently this may sound very simple, but in fact this is a complex 
statement. One has to know about what is meant by historical past. Past 
and ‘historical past’ are not the same. Scientists say that man is very young 
compared to the earth. Th e coming of man is a very recent development in 
the history of evolution. Since history deals with the past of man as part of 
the civilized society, it concerns only a fraction of the past in general. Past, 
on the other hand, is being created every moment. Yesterday is a thing of 
the past today; the last moment is also past at this moment. Where will 
the historian draw the line? So far, historians, even when they have studied 
modern history, have lagged behind the present. Recently, something 
called ‘recent or contemporary history’ has come into being. It is more 
modern compared to modern history. But there are still some doubts 
about it. Th e historian dealing with the past has a clear advantage. Th e 
results of the events of history are known, and that is why it is possible to 
analyse those events in a scholarly way. It is known that Siraj was defeated 
in the battle of Plassey. Since the historian is aware of this fact, while 
writing on the subject he automatically focuses on the role of Mir Jaff ar. 
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Th e reader is surprised to note that a detailed analysis of the character 
of Siraj-ud-daula, the circumstances at that time and the historical role 
of Clive only leads one to think that it would be more surprising if the 
battle had ended in a diff erent way. If, suppose, Siraj had been victorious, 
no doubt historians would have found some qualities in his character, the 
role of Madanlal would have been more emphasised and poor Clive would 
have faced strong criticism. History knows everything because history is a 
thing of the past. Recent history, on the other hand, is not. For that reason 
it would not be wrong to think that ‘contemporary’ and ‘history,’ these 
two thoughts, are confl icting with each other. If, suppose, as a result of the 
forward march of communalism the power of the state rested with some 
Hindu organisation and a merciless Ramrajatva was established in India, 
historians would then focus on the role of the Visva Hindu Parishad and 
modern men like you and me would be considered a failure. But those 
who are trying to write that history at present would have to combine the 
roles of journalist and historian. A historian to me is the journalist of the 
past, and the journalist a historian of the present.
Th e historiography of Indian maritime history is a rather recent trend. 
Together with Tapan Raychaudhuri, Arun Das Gupta and a few others you 
are one of the pioneers of this trend. Why did you go for the maritime history 
of India?
On the day I got my MA degree, N.K Sinha said to me ‘Ashin, get out’—
so I went to work on the coast and thus got out of Bengal. My fi rst book 
was on Kerala (Malabar). But as I worked on the coast, I realised that in 
order to explain the coast Indian developments were not enough—you 
have to go out of India. Th at is the beginning of my move into maritime 
history. I have studied mainly the period from 1500 to 1800, which I 
would characterise as the Age of Sail. Th e Age of Sail can only be written 
by European historians mainly from the European documents. I am very 
grateful for the European expansion in the Asian Seas. But the point is 
that historians always have to challenge the documentation on the subject.
Would you like to comment on the recent trends in Indian historiography?
I think this is a very exciting time for Indian History. Th ere is a very 
defi nite attempt to break away from the elite and go to the masses in 
writing history, as also to explore new themes. I would specially single out 
the study of the Indian mind. Naturally it is not possible to do this from 
British administrative documents. So there is an eff ort to stand our history 
on its own head. Th ere is a determination to explore and use vernacular 
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sources, but up to now the results have been meagre. Th is does not mean 
it is not exciting.
Could you comment on present day Indian politics?
No.
Your classes on Gandhi were famous. Could you say a few words on Gandhi—
what do you think of him as a person and a politician and his relevance for 
the present?
I think very highly of Gandhi. But I think he was asking for the impossible. 
India would always admire Gandhi but India would never follow him. 
Th is admiration is very important. It makes Gandhi relevant to India for 
all time.
As you know, activities on part of the fundamentalists in diff erent parts of 
India during the last few years have brought the question of communalism 
to the forefront these days. How would you analyse it in the Indian context? 
What do you think secularism in India should mean?
Secularism in India has come to mean a message of unity of all religions. 
I do not believe this can be changed. Even an atheist can accept this. 
So let it be. We shall be extremely lucky if we can achieve this much of 
secularism.
What are you currently working on?
I am basically trying to put down my thoughts about India and the Indian 
Ocean since the days of Vasco Da Gama. I am doing this both in English 
and in Bengali. I am particularly keen on Bengali because it is a tough 
challenge to reduce complex thoughts into simple language, which will 
communicate them directly to those reading in Bengali. 
125
‘I didn’t get into history to avoid math 
or physics’: Interview with Patricia Seed, 
Professor of Rice University
Last year, FEEGIs inaugural vice-president, Professor Patricia Seed of 
Rice University, gave a fascinating lecture for the honours students of the 
Crayenborgh course at the History Department of Leiden University. After 
lunch Leonard Blussé and Patricia Seed had a chat about upbringing, 
maturing and computer games.
First of all, how did you get into the fi eld of history? We are talking about the 
late 1960s, aren’t we?
I had a charismatic high school history teacher at Scarsdale who collected 
exotic orchids in South America (a practice since banned). He managed to 
make Spanish America sound like the most intriguing place on the planet. 
I was hooked.
I understand your parents wanted you to go on in the applied sciences.
What is the story behind this? Were there ideological issues?
No, I’m the oldest of three siblings, all of whom are in biology and 
medicine. Since my father, uncles and grandfather were and are also in 
medicine, and my mother was a biologist, they have frequently wondered 
where I came from. Fortunately, if you move my hairline to the back of 
my head, you would be looking at my father’s face. I don’t have a clue as to 
where my interests came from either. Anyhow, my parents were horrifi ed 
that I went into history.
Where you did you get your academic formation?
I went to Catholic schools for most of my early schooling, as well as 
university. First the nuns, then the Jesuits! And then my Master’s degree 
in history from the University of Texas at Austin and fi nally a Ph.D. from 
the University of Wisconsin.
Th at’s quite a jump—from a Jesuit school to Texas.
I would call it a culture shock.
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What was your motivation for that Great Leap Forward?
Th e Latin American Center was very well known. One of my fi rst teachers 
was the legendary Nettie Lee Benson, for whom the Library in Austin 
was named. She spoke the most heavily Texas-accented Spanish I had 
ever heard. But she was passionate about Mexican history of the national 
period, and her enthusiasm was contagious.
Who else was teaching in Austin at that time?
Jim Lockhart was there, Richard Graham, Magnus Mörner...
Sorry for interrupting, but a Swede, some Yankees... Weren’t there any South
Americans in that fi eld?
Yes, there were several, but mostly they were only at Texas temporarily. 
My most memorable visitor was the late Angel Rosenblatt.
What was your MA thesis on? Was it on South American history or on 
anthropology?
For my MA thesis I reinvented economic anthropology. I didn’t know it at 
the time, but obviously I found out later. It just seemed to be a reasonable 
way of understanding the data. I used the fi nancial records of a long-
operating estate in east-central Mexico. Th e estate started with sugar and 
slaves in the sixteenth century, and by the mid-eighteenth it was selling 
pulque (a locally produced alcoholic beverage from the Agave cactus) 
in the Mexico City market. Th ese estates were entailed, itself a rarity in 
Mexico, and belonged to the Counts of the Valley of Orizaba. Th e valley’s 
name comes from a small volcano just north of the central trade route 
between the port of Vera Cruz and Mexico City.
Were you as a student specifi cally infl uenced or impressed by anyone?
Around 1971 Jim Lockhart was a charismatic public lecturer, and his 
social approach to history was intriguing. I specifi cally went to Wisconsin, 
to work with John Phelan, the colonial Latin Americanist, who suff ered 
a massive heart attack less than a month before I was due to arrive in 
Mexico to start my fi eld work.
What about Philip Curtin? He was the Godfather of the Wisconsin school, 
wasn’t he?
Yes, Phil Curtin founded the program that included John Phelan. 
Latin America was simply a subdivision of the euphemistically named 
‘Comparative Tropical History.’ Th at’s what my diploma from Wisconsin 
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actually says. Comparative tropical history meant Africa, Latin America 
and Southeast Asia; areas which were also called the ‘Underdeveloped 
World’ and now the ‘Postcolonial World.’
And those other great men, Jan Vansina and John Smail...?
No, I didn’t study with either one. I didn’t study with Vansina because of 
the legendary hatred between Curtin and Vansina. Th ey could not stand 
to be at the University of Wisconsin at the same time. (Mind you, this was 
a sixty plus person department, so they could have dodged each other.) 
But if Vansina was teaching, Phil Curtin would be on leave or out of the 
country. And vice versa. Both were on leave my fi rst year at Wisconsin, 
and Curtin was around my second year. John Smail was a well-liked 
teacher; I just didn’t see his fi eld as closely linked to Latin America as it 
was connected to Africa.
Tell me about your Ph.D. thesis.
Th e Ph.D. thesis created the core of what became To Love, Honor and 
Obey, my fi rst book. I didn’t go to Mexico intending to study marriage. 
At the time studies of race and social status were in vogue, so I went 
there intending to work on the Mexico City census of 1752, and look for 
allied documents that might illuminate the way census takers categorised 
individuals according to racial and social categories. Four months into this 
project, I realised that the kind of information I wanted was organised in 
such a way that it would take decades to mine the data. I only had a year 
and a half. What I managed to salvage from the initial project became 
‘Social Interpretations of Race: Mexico 1752’ in the Hispanic American 
Historical Review which people still read and cite.
Had this any connection with C.R. Boxer’s writings about Portuguese race 
relations?
No, although I had actually met Boxer in Austin. He came to give a 
series of lectures, which later became his last book: Women in Iberian 
Expansion Overseas, 1415–1815. I found him a charming, congenial 
British gentleman of means, a very recognisable social character. But at 
the time I met him, and read his works after meeting him, I did not take 
his material into my thesis on Mexico City. Unfortunately, then, as today, 
scholars of Latin America remain sharply divided between Spanish and 
Portuguese speakers. Few researchers on Portugal’s overseas empire read 
any of the material on Spain’s overseas empire and vice versa. Students of 
modern Brazil rarely read works on modern Mexico. For most Americans 
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the linguistic barrier is the greatest—because all too few scholars are 
familiar with both languages. For the Latin Americans themselves a 
variety of cultural and national prejudices often deter comparative eff orts 
at scholarship. Th ere are plenty of Argentine jokes about Brazilians, 
Brazilian jokes about Argentines, and so forth. It’s a fairly familiar genre 
in the international prestige game.
Why is your article still cited?
Perhaps because I argued that the category of ‘race’ is (and was) socially 
constructed—not in itself an unusual argument—but I employed statistics 
to analyze how census-takers and priests employed racial categories. 
Uniting a social constructivist argument with statistical techniques 
was, and I guess still probably is, fairly uncommon. Another reason 
might be that I looked at a wider range of potential infl uences on ‘race’ 
than was usual—the employment of women and children and type of 
residence. Additionally I tracked individuals from the census to marriage, 
christening and bequests to the church to see how racial categories were 
assigned diff erently. Th is process is often misnamed ‘passing’ but it works 
both ways.
In what year have we arrived by now?
Phew... ‘Social Interpretations of Race?’ 1982 perhaps? Anyhow, I think it 
was very badly written, because I hadn’t learned to write for humanities 
audiences. As a result the text appears very condensed. I actually invented 
three new statistical techniques that are in the footnotes of that article. I 
subsequently wrote them up in statistical journals.
You seem to enjoy applying the exact sciences in your research.
In 1983 I explored new statistical techniques as well as the then-new 
approach in mathematical physics called chaos theory to study interracial 
marriage and religious de-conversion processes. But the opportunities for 
further dialog with other Latin Americanists on these technical issues 
were extremely limited so I abandoned the idea of making this a full-
scale research project. In short, I didn’t get into history to avoid math 
or physics. I just got in to fi gure out where cultural, political and social 
patterns of behavior came from. 
I know you fi rst of all as an anthropological historian. When did you turn 
anthropologist? Is this after you met George Marcus, your husband?
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Actually, yes. When we met George was putting on the seminar whose 
papers were later published as Writing Culture. He introduced me to a 
whole series of books that I had never read—or been interested in reading 
before. When he handed me Susan Handelman’s Slayers of Moses, I was 
hooked. I understood religious hermeneutics from my religious schooling, 
and had gained a smattering of knowledge of Jewish hermeneutical 
traditions. So everything fell into place.
When did you two meet?
In 1983. George was at the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton the 
year I arrived at Rice. He had heard about me because Stuart Schwartz 
had told him about me. But when he returned to Rice University, he 
couldn’t remember my last name. He knew my name was agricultural. He 
thought I was Patricia Corn instead of Patricia Seed! Actually people kept 
pushing us, shoving us, ‘oh you should meet, you two should really meet.’ 
And then we fi nally met and I gave a talk at his department and sparks 
fl ew. High drama!
Th is was after that fi rst book had come out.
No, that was in ‘88. We met in ‘83. I was doing the revisions on that book 
then. I was writing a lot of other things at the time, mostly statistical. But 
I was working my way through a literary and anthropological reading list.
Your fi rst book—it’s about marriage and about ceremony? I’m wondering 
why you didn’t include the gender factor or, for that matter, the ceremonies 
of marriage, the rites de passage and how these aff ected this kind of ceremony.
I didn’t think that such an idea fi t the topic. I wrote about the theological 
assumptions behind Catholic marriage (before and after the Council of 
Trent), but not with the ceremony itself. Th e only political ceremony that 
you can say is in any way gendered is the English action of possession and 
it’s only gendered because the English thought of their act of possession 
in gendered terms.
Th at is the same as in traditional Dutch Law. Th e wife is onbekwaam, unfi t.
Th ere is much more on this in my new book, American Pentimento: Th e 
Invention of Indians and the Pursuit of Riches. In the fi rst line of the book 
I talk about spending ten years browsing through bookstores in Europe 
and Africa, Asia, Australia and New Zealand and looking for any books 
on history. I didn’t come across American history books or histories by 
American authors. I found American fi ction, books on computers, on 
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HTML, but not American history books. Even Australian, English and 
New Zealand bookstores carry few, if any, American historians.
Do you mean books on America or books by American historians?
Books by American historians. Books by American historians have an 
audience solely in America. Th e US has a very large internal market but 
it’s not the world. So the idea that you do world history for an American 
audience doesn’t mean you’re doing it for the rest of the world because 
other people are going to have diff erent visions as to what constitutes the 
world.
Couldn’t one make the same point on French historians?
Yes, I do feel the same way about French history, but the French don’t 
seem to have found it necessary to write the History of the World (from 
the vantage point of France). Th ey seem to concentrate on histories of 
their own terrain—and those of their former colonies.
Would you agree that world history as taught in the US is rather a kind of 
recipe to deal with issues in the US itself than a really new approach to history. 
Is not it very ideologically motivated?
I quite agree. In the United States world history is a ground-up phenomenon, 
which is why there are no world historians at the Ivy League and similar 
universities. Th e course usually replaces the Western Civilization course—
the one that began with Greece and Rome and ended with post-World 
War II United States. Th at course originated at a few elite universities 
early in the twentieth century, but never became popular until after the 
Second World War. ‘Western Civ’ (the usual name of the course) created 
a narrative that explained why all children of European immigrants 
belonged in America—by positively portraying European history up to 
and including the moments of greatest European immigration. World 
History, on the other hand, arose because of the dramatic increase in 
Asian immigrants to the United States. In the 1960s and 1970s South 
Vietnamese refugees, of Chinese and Taiwanese Nationalists, and Indian 
and Pakistani physicians and computer programmers all came to the 
United States. When their children began to be educated in the United 
States, their past had no place in this Western European narrative, and 
so when their children began to enter the school system in large numbers 
they created a demand for the story of their pasts to be included as well. So 
world history was Western Europe plus China (at least initially).
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I don’t mean to shoot my own foot or yours, but aren’t most of the American 
FEEGI members really American colonial history-oriented scholars? What 
should we do about that?
I don’t really know membership numbers, but in FEEGI’s defense I can say 
that it has successfully drawn Canadian historians into the group. From 
Europe, this is a minor achievement, but in the hemisphere it remains 
unusual. All we can do about it is to expose US historians to excellent 
European scholarship. To achieve that end, it might make sense to have 
FEEGI meetings every third year in the Netherlands, making it easier to 
attract European scholars. If we were to do that, I think that it would be 
vitally important to integrate all the panels, that is, not allow any sessions 
to be composed strictly of members from a particular nation’s education 
system.
Take, for instance, the problem of language. I fi nd it very interesting that some 
teachers in the US say: if students want to study Italian or Spanish, let them 
study the language in those countries. Th ey will never learn it in the US.
Th at’s a real problem, compounded by the prevalence of English as an 
international means of business communication. Perhaps the reason why 
teachers urge their students to go abroad is that at all levels US schools and 
universities teach languages very poorly.
In that sense I fi nd intellectual life at American Universities a bit stifl ing. 
People seem often so much taken hostage by ongoing debates, paradigms. Th is 
also has its good points because it focuses research, but somehow it also makes 
it very diffi  cult to carry on new research of one’s own, don’t you think so? I ask 
because you seem to be pretty good at setting your own agenda.
You more kindly characterize what I call ‘group-think’ as ‘paradigms.’ 
Failing to conform to one or more well-understood and well-known paths 
of inquiry becomes most disabling when securing research funds in the 
US. If you cannot disguise the originality of your work successfully, you 
don’t get funded. Of course you can do your own research, but you have 
to be willing to make fi nancial sacrifi ces in order to do so.
What have you learned from theoretical or applied techniques or, let me put 
it diff erently, are you interested in the work of historians working on cultures 
in Asia and Africa?
Absolutely. It’s what I call respect for the native point of view—one of the 
fundamental ethical tenets of anthropology. If you are writing about the 
Netherlands, for example, you have to read what Dutch historians have to 
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say about the subject. After all, it’s their language, their culture, and their 
tradition. You need to respect that. Th e same thing goes for Malaysia, for 
example. If I want to write about Malay history, I have to understand how 
Malays write their history and why. And when disagreeing, you need to 
respect your overseas counterparts. In Europe, I particularly admire Dutch 
and Portuguese historians. Th e secondary and higher education systems in 
both countries have produced extremely able academics in the last twenty 
years. As you probably know well, their work is underappreciated in the 
United States, in part because of the lack of knowledge of those languages 
in this country.
You are, after all, mainly a Latin Americanist, aren’t you?
Sort of. I’ve actually become much more involved with the history of 
cartography and navigation in the years immediately preceding Vasco da 
Gama’s voyage to India. Th is includes studying Latin America, but also 
takes me to the Davis Straits (between Canada and Greenland), South 
Africa, the straits of Malacca and the like. My Latin American interest 
remains, but I have become more interested in Latin America as part of 
an integrated, nearly global network. Portuguese and Spaniards overseas 
might be a better way of phrasing it.
During the course you gave yesterday you mentioned various games and 
teaching techniques including your site on the web. Please explain.
Pedagogy is one of the more interesting arenas of research at the moment, 
largely because the generation currently enrolled in universities diff ers 
greatly from the preceding generations. Th e revolutions in communication, 
the internet, cell phones, live-from-the battlefi eld pictures have transformed 
students’ preferred means of learning and doing research. While some 
people made this argument about television, I don’t think of that as true. 
Television was conceived as an entertainment medium; the internet was 
created by scientist seeking a better means of communicating and sharing 
knowledge. Th e printed book’s centrality as a source of knowledge has 
changed greatly. Many professors don’t seem to have realised how quickly 
the world of their students has shifted. I use computer, board and role-
playing games as vehicles for teaching an introduction to history because 
by the time they reach university undergraduates have spent a good part 
of their lives playing games, dissecting, and criticizing them. In short 
they arrive with an existing critical apparatus that can be sharpened and 
refi ned by showing how narratives, plots and arguments infl uence the way 
you re-tell history. Additionally, games allow telling the same story from 
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diff erent points of view, so students do not receive a monolithic idea of 
History.
What’s your agenda? Is Ceremonies really the fi rst volume of a series of books?
American Pentimento was the second volume in the series—dealing 
with the persistent images of native peoples. Th e third volume will deal 
with narratives of warfare, but in the meantime, I’ve taken a detour into 
histories of cartography, navigation and science.
You mentioned tensions in the family when you took up history. What about 
that?
My family could not understand why someone talented in mathematics 
and biology would voluntarily go into history. It was (and still is) completely 
beyond them. But they do understand my interest in the history of science, 
and are fans of my top-rated website called Latitude: Th e Art and Science of 
Fifteenth-Century Navigation. Interestingly enough, however, humanities 
audiences seem unable to make sense of the site because I refuse to adopt 
a linearly defi ned narrative. But science teachers, scientists and quite a few 
major scientifi c institutions think it’s just fi ne! 
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A Sea of Histories, a History of the Seas: 
Interview with Adrian B. Lapian
When Prince Claus of the Netherlands visited Indonesia in 1994, he asked 
Adri Lapian whether it wasn’t diffi  cult to describe Indonesia’s past—where 
to start? Th e answer: ‘Just as diffi  cult as Germany’s history, should one start 
with Bavaria, Saxony, Alamannia? Surely not Prussia?’ In December 2003, 
Hendrik Niemeijer interviewed Adri Lapian in a place where they had often 
met before, the Warung Sate Tegal close to his house at Jalan Haji Sa’abun 
no. 9 in Pasar Minggu, South Jakarta. Professor Lapian was born in Tegal 
on 1 September 1929. A year later the Lapian family moved to Manado, 
in the Minahasa, the northernmost province of Sulawesi, where his father 
was elected to the ‘Minahasa Council.. Until then his father, Bernard W. 
Lapian, had worked for the Koninklijke Pakketvaart Maatschappij (KPM) 
and he wrote articles for Indonesian newspapers in Batavia and Manado. 
He even published a short-lived paper of his own, Fadjar Kemadjoean. In 
1938 the Minahasa Council elected B.W. Lapian to the Volksraad. As the 
Volksraad convened only twice a year, the Lapian family continued to live 
in the Minahasa where Adri attended school in the village (now the town) of 
Tomohon.
Th e Minahasa is known for its high standards of education at that time. What 
was your early youth like there?
In Tomohon there was a good school, the Louwerierschool, established 
by a Dutch Christian Protestant foundation. Th e children had to speak 
Dutch. Th ere were seven classes and this basic school gave access to the 
MCILO—the highest institute of learning in the Minahasa before World 
War II. In January 1942, however, when I was in the seventh grade, we 
were occupied by the Japanese. Th at meant that I had to go to a Japanese 
school. We were certainly infl uenced by the Japanese occupation. 
Where we were Dutch-oriented before, the Japanese presence gave us 
another view of the world outside. But in my case something important 
happened during my childhood in Tomohon on 31 January 1938, when 
Princess Beatrix was born. I was playing with the children of our Dutch 
neighbour, one of the Dutch teachers at the MOLO who rented one of 
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my grandfather’s houses. We used to sing in anticipation of the event, ‘Er 
is een prinsje geboren, Oranje blijft bestaan.’ Th e message reached us by 
radio while we were playing. It was still night in the Netherlands, and I 
ran to my grandfather with the news. ‘So what?,’ he said. ‘But she will 
become our queen,’ I replied. I became confused when he remarked: ‘Your 
queen?’
After the war we had to go back to the Dutch education system, from 
the third grade of the Japanese Chu-gakko to the third grade of the Dutch 
MULO. It was a diffi  cult time because my father was held prisoner in 
Java by the Dutch (as a result of the February 1946 revolt when North 
Sulawesi declared it would join the Republic of Indonesia). I was the eldest 
in the family, and had attended the AMS from 1947, a year after it was 
opened. But in December 1949, after the Round Table Conference, my 
father came back home, just a few months before I fi nished school. He 
urged me to go on studying as I was actually planning to look for a job. I 
chose the Fakultas Teknik Clniversitas Indonesia in Bandung to study to 
become a civil engineer.
At the time, there were not as many options as there are today. For 
tertiary/higher study, there were medical, law, agricultural and technical 
colleges. A faculty of arts and philosophy had been opened in Batavia in 
1941, mostly for Dutch children, as they could not go to the Netherlands, 
and then occupied by the Germans. But at high school I had opted for 
mathematics and the natural sciences, so the obvious choice was to become 
either a medical doctor or an engineer. Th erefore, I went to Bandung. 
But this was not a good choice. Th e theoretical side of it was interesting, 
but I felt I could never become a good engineer, and I disliked the long 
periods of standing behind the drawing board. In 1952, I fell ill with 
severe pneumonia, and in 1953 I decided to leave my studies in Bandung. 
In the same year my father (1892–1977) was transferred to Jakarta to 
the Ministry of Home Aff airs, and retired shortly afterwards. After his 
release from prison he had been appointed acting governor of the province 
of Sulawesi, which at the time comprised the whole island. His transfer 
made it possible to re-unite the family in Jakarta where I started looking 
for a job.
First, I worked in the library of the Biro Perancang Negara, the 
forerunner of Bappenas, the National Planning Agency, on a day-to-day 
basis for a salary of 14 rupiah per day. A year later this was raised to 15 
rupiah and it was clear to me that it off ered no prospects at all. So I decided 
to leave and applied for a number of jobs, until I became a journalist for 
the Indonesian Observer in 1954. Th at was a completely diff erent kind of 
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life. In 1955, the Asian-African Conference was held in Bandung, and as a 
young reporter I could meet great political leaders such as Nasser, Nehru, 
Ho Chi Minh, King Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia, the Burmese 
premier CI Nu, and the like. Archbishop Makarios of Cyprus attended as 
an observer. Th ere was also Zhou Enlai of China, but I couldn’t get near 
him. He was always surrounded by a host of big senior reporters.
You were 26 at the time. What was your own ideological position?
Th e Indonesian Observer had as its motto ‘independent and objective.’ It 
expressed no preferential sympathies for the World Powers and I agreed 
with that. Initially assigned to proof-reading, I was then placed at the 
‘foreign desk’ of the newspaper, receiving foreign telegrams from Reuters, 
Associated Press, United Press, AFP from France, but not from Aneta 
in the Netherlands. I had to select those news messages that I thought 
were interesting, for instance, on the Kashmir confl ict. Often, when the 
Observer published news about the confl ict, the press attachés of either 
India or Pakistan would come to my offi  ce to protest when the news was 
not in their favour. Th at stimulated me to read more about the history of 
the region. Although I had liked the history lessons at school, it had never 
crossed my mind before to become a professional historian. As for many 
of my contemporaries at that time, the Faculty of Arts (opened in 1941 
mainly for Dutch youngsters) was a luxury for those who did not need to 
fi nd a practical job. But journalism changed all that.
How did you come into contact with Sartono Kartodirdjo?
A rather interesting story. He infl uenced me even before he became a well-
known historian and before I had met him. As I said, my journalistic 
work forced me to read more about the historical background of current 
events, so I was toying with the idea of studying history at the Universitas 
Indonesia. But I was informed that the history department was at the 
point of closing down. Th e Dutch professors had left because of the New 
Guinea confl ict, many times lectures had to be cancelled as those who 
replaced them were working part-time, so the students left and chose 
other subjects like archaeology, law, sinology, philology and linguistics. 
Th en, while perusing reports from Antara, the Indonesian news agency, I 
came across the name of Sartono Kartodirdjo among those who graduated 
from the Fakultas Sastra. At that time new university graduates were 
newsworthy people, and he was from the history department. So, history 
was being taught after all.
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Who were the fi rst history teachers at the history department at that time?
Soon afterwards, in 1956, I was registered as a student, very easily without 
any selection as is the rule nowadays. I attended courses given by the fi rst 
generation of Indonesian scholars such as Professor Husein Djajadiningrat 
who taught the history of Islam and the Middle East and Tjan Tjoe Som, a 
sinologist from Leiden who not only taught the long story of China’s past, 
but also problems of Chinese historiography. Th ere was also an Italian, 
Giulio Costantini who had fl ed from Shanghai after the communists took 
over the city, and was teaching aspiring diplomats at the ADLN (Akademi 
Dinas Luar Negeri, the academy of the offi  ce of foreign aff airs). As one of 
our part-time professors he gave a course on diplomatic history, but also 
enlightened us on Italian political history and philosophy, introducing 
names like Giambattista Vico and Benedetto Croce, and also Machiavelli 
and Mazzini. Th e unifi cation of Italy was a relevant topic for Indonesia at 
the time. Later I learned that Sukarno had also read Mazzini!
How long were you registered as a student?
Five years, I graduated in 1961. Th e time when I had to sit my examinations 
during the early years often coincided with a busy period at the newspaper. 
So the editor of the Observer wanted me to make a clear choice: history or 
journalism. I chose the fi rst, although when I enrolled as a student history 
was only meant to help me in my work. But I had come to know the city 
of Jakarta, and it was possible to make a living from translation work.
In 1958, I met Pak Sartono for the fi rst time. I had seen him from a 
distance the previous year at the fi rst National Seminar on History in 
Yogyakarta, but he was very busy at the time and I wanted to explore the 
city and its surroundings. He was then working for MIPI (Majelis Ilmu 
Pengetahuan Indonesia, the Indonesian Council for Sciences, later LJPI) 
and was assigned to be co-ordinator of the fi rst National Science Congress 
(now known as KIPNAS, Kongres Ilmu Pengetahuan Nasional) held in 
Malang. A friend, Eddy (now Prof.) Masinambow, told me that he was 
looking for an assistant co-ordinator, so I applied for the job. Afterwards 
I was off ered a part-time job in the MIPI library and later in the public 
relations section. Th is involves programmes like the popularisation of 
science, and I had to lay the groundwork for setting up science clubs, 
modelled on the Science Clubs of the USA. Th e director, Dr Watson 
Davis, came over as a consultant. I also had to assist Dr. Richard Russell, a 
distinguished American geologist, who came as a consultant on scientifi c 
organisations. We had to organise many conferences, national as well as 
regional. It was the fi rst time that Southeast Asian scholars had worked 
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together. Before independence, each of them was oriented towards their 
respective colonial metropoles.
When in 1962 Sartono received a scholarship to Yale University, 
I became the co-ordinator of the second Science Congress held in 
Yogyakarta. It was also the time when Taufi k Abdullah joined MIPI. It 
was diffi  cult to organise such an event in the early 1960s. Th ere were not 
many hotels, and there were many practical problems. For instance, the 
University of Gadjah Mada did have cars, but all the tyres were completely 
worn out. As the co-ordinator, I went to the tyre factory in Bogor, only 
to fi nd that I needed permission from the Department of Industry. We 
procured a truck full of tyres, but the road from Bogor to Yogya was very 
unsafe because of robbers. We therefore had to ask for a police escort. Of 
course I did not have to climb on that truck myself!
As coordinator of the Second Science Congress in Yogyakarta, I had 
various kinds of responsibilities. President Sukarno had to open it offi  cially. 
Th ere had been quite a few assaults on his life, and he already suff ered 
from a kidney problem. A special toilet was reserved for him, and we had 
made sure that nobody had placed a time bomb in there, and so on, and I 
had to keep the key, which I felt to be an enormous responsibility. Later I 
helped to organise another conference, the fourth IAHA meeting, held for 
the fi rst time in Indonesia in 1974, also in Yogyakarta. Sartono was, then, 
president of IAHA, and I was the secretary-general. Former Vice President 
Hatta was the keynote speaker. Curiously enough, he also had to go to 
the toilet and I had to be on guard. I guess I’m the only historian who has 
guarded the two proclaimers of Indonesian Independence in such a way!
I guess that is so! How did the fi rst contacts with Dutch historians develop 
meanwhile?
Th at brings me to another anecdote about another conference. Th e First 
International Seminar on Southeast Asian History held in Singapore 
in 1961. Th ere I met Padre Antonio da Silva Rego who was an expert 
on Portuguese sources about Indonesia. He later helped me fi nd my 
way in the Portuguese archives. Th e Indonesian delegation consisted of 
Sartono, Soetjipto Wirjosuparto and Soekmono. Th ere was also Prof. 
Slametmulyana who lived in Singapore. And Soedjatmoko—already a 
well-known fi gure—had been specially invited. It was a privilege for me 
to join the group, just a few months before I graduated. Th e only historian 
from Holland was Dr H.J. de Graaf who, of course, was very curious 
about the situation in Indonesia. We had many discussions during coff ee 
breaks. We were the only Dutch-speaking participants. After a full day of 
140 world history – a genealogy
sessions, we had to attend a reception at the palace of the Yang Dipertuan 
Negara, the head of state. As De Graaf was alone, we shared a taxi, and 
as we entered the reception hall together, the major-domo announced: 
‘Th e delegates of the Republic of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands!’ And that happened during the height of the Irian Barat 
confl ict! Later I met De Graaf very often in the KITLV library in Leiden.
At that time you also developed an interest in maritime history.
Th at began in 1963. I thought I had had enough of organising conferences 
and looked for a job more in line with my historical interests. Machfudi 
Mangkudilaga was head of the Historical Section of ALRI, the Indonesian 
Navy. He invited me to join his staff . He was also the contact person 
between KITLV and its Indonesian members with the title of commissaris. 
Despite the disruption of political relations with the Netherlands 
because of New Guinea, we continued to receive the Bijdragen via Basel, 
Switzerland. In 1963, the confl ict was resolved and Machfudi received 
the very fi rst scholarship from the Netherlands. I became head of the 
historical section, but was at fi rst reluctant also to take over his work as 
the contact man for KITLV. But Prof. Resink persuaded me to accept: 
‘After Machfudi returns you will be given a scholarship, too.’
As staff  member and later the head of the historical section of the 
Navy, I had the opportunity to join several sea expeditions to various 
places in the archipelago. Even Maluku. Th is is how I learnt to observe 
Indonesia from the sea. Moreover, these expeditions often did not follow 
regular routes. We also had to deliver provisions to faraway places, for 
instance, lighthouses on remote islands. Once we went to Th ailand as the 
Navy had to procure rice during the hard times of the mid-1960s. Th at 
gave me the opportunity to meet Th ai historians. I also met the doyen, 
Phya Anuman Rajadhon at the Siam Society.
When were you fi nally invited to the Netherlands?
In 1967. I was then back at MIPI where research institutes had been 
established, including the LRKN (Lembaga Research Kebudayaan 
Nasional), the National Institute for Cultural Studies. I was asked to 
join this new institute, but got permission to go on study leave, as in 
1966 I had already applied for a scholarship in Leiden to study maritime 
history. When I applied I only had one name, Prof. De Milo, specialist 
in the history of the sea. But he had passed away, and his forthcoming 
successor, Jaap Bruijn, was still working on his Ph.D. dissertation with 
Prof. Kernkamp. I attended Jaap Bruijn’s courses, together with younger 
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fellow students like Femme Gaastra and the late Frank Broeze. Prof. 
Bruijn retired this year (2003), after having supervised scores of Ph.D. 
dissertations.
What were your initial experiences in the Netherlands?
I realised that it was not possible to work on a dissertation. Th ere was 
no supervisor, and the grant was for only one year, later extended for 
another year. True, Mrs. Meilink-Roelofsz who helped me enormously in 
the Dutch archives, was appointed temporary professor, but that was in 
1969 when I had already packed my things. Th erefore, besides attending 
courses, I worked in archives and (mostly) in the KITLV library which 
was then close to the station. At the time, the archives of the nineteenth 
century were still kept in a bunker in Schaarsbergen, only to be reached 
by bus from Arnhem. It was a very cold location in the winter. Th e keeper 
saw me shivering, so the next time he lent me his personal electric radiator 
from his fl at. I only consulted the indexes; the documents I needed were 
sent to Amsterdam, to the municipal archives on the Amsteldijk. I lived in 
the Lassusstraat, close to De Lairessestraat. I had fi rst lived in the cheapest 
pension in Leiden, then for six months in Katwijk-aan-zee. I stayed for a 
year in Amsterdam, and the last six months in Leiden again for library 
research. It was interesting to work together with Bruijn, reading the ship 
logs of the VOC.
Which historian do you admire the most?
Braudel, of course. As soon as his La Mediterranée came out in 1966 (the 
fi rst edition was published in 1949), I ordered it for the MIPI library, as I 
could not aff ord to buy the two volumes myself. Now this French edition 
is still kept in the library of the Documentation Centre of LIPI, but I am 
afraid not many students are using it. A revised edition appeared in 1979, 
and there is now an English translation. Th e way Braudel dealt with the 
Mediterranean world was very appealing. I also liked Chinese history, but 
as I don’t know Chinese, I have only learnt about it from French books 
like those of Rene Grousset, Marcel Granet and later Elysseeff .
As a consequence, I began to divide the Indonesian seas in the 
Braudellian way: the Java Sea, the Banda Sea, the Sulawesi Sea, etc. Th is 
was a liberation from ‘traditional’ history writing which was completely 
Java-centric, or as before viewed from a Dutch perspective. History books 
used to follow the Dutch trail, beginning with the arrival of the fi rst 
Dutch ships in Banten in 1596, to Maluku, then back to Java, as if the 
history of Maluku stopped when the Dutch became more interested in 
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the exploitation of Java and later shifted to the big plantations of Sumatra. 
As a matter of fact, the Dutch legacy is still being felt today. Th e study 
of history begins with the availability of European sources. Indigenous 
sources should be studied by philologists only, while the ancient 
monuments belong to the fi eld of archaeology.
Other historians were also inspired by Braudel, for instance Anthony Reid.
Yes, there is a Fernand Braudel Center in New York, and in 1985 (shortly 
before he died) many historians and economists gathered at Chateauvallon 
for the ‘Journées Fernand Braudel,’ three days of discussion on his three 
most important works: the Mediterranean, capitalism; and the identity 
of France. However, Southeast Asia is not like the Mediterranean which 
is a well-researched and a well-documented area with an abundance 
of sources. Certainly, I have immense admiration for Anthony Reid’s 
works and always enjoy reading his books and articles. He did much 
pioneering work, and I like Th e Age of Commerce. It is a much better 
name than Chinese expansion or Indianisation, the colonial era, or the 
age of European expansion, or, much less, ‘the Vasco da Gama era.’ Yet, 
sometimes I wonder whether there were no other, earlier ages of commerce, 
during the Sung, Tang or earlier times. Of course, for these periods West 
European sources are of no use and most indigenous texts do not give 
chronological data. But trade with East and West Asia has had a long 
history. And there are still many sites waiting to be excavated. Besides, I 
don’t think that history is linear.
Until very recently most Indonesian archaeologists only looked for 
ancient monuments. Now they realise that there are more things hidden 
below the surface. Perhaps they might dig another Sambisari (a temple 
which was completely buried), but harbour cities like Kota Cina in North 
Sumatra have also provided interesting material. Th e work in Bali by I 
Wayan Ardika, for instance, gives new insights into trade relations in 
remote periods, and the results of the French team working with our 
archaeologists in Sumatra and Bangka are improving our knowledge 
about ancient trade. Excavations in the Mekong delta are still going on, 
also in other places in Southeast Asia, including the Philippines. Here 
we should not expect pre-Spanish monumental remains, so excavations 
are focused on old trading centres. And marine archaeology is here more 
advanced than in Indonesia.
By the way, I think our Philippine friends are not only well advanced 
in the study of shipwrecks. Th ey are also much better at fi nding and 
exploring new approaches to the study of their past. As you know, I was 
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teaching Southeast Asian history at the University of Indonesia from 1961 
(also at Gadjah Mada University from 1962 to 1966), on and off , not 
continuously, only as far as my work at the Navy and at LIPI allowed, and 
I also travelled, including in those days. When I decided to stop teaching 
as I joined the group of the 70-Ups in 2000, I chose as topic for my 
last semester ‘New approaches in Philippine historiography.’ For the last 
sessions, with the help of the SEASREP Council I invited one Filipina 
and two Filipino historians to give lectures in my course. SEASREP 
stands for Southeast Asian Studies Regional Exchange Program, set up 
with generous support from the Toyota Foundation. Th e chief offi  cers are 
Shaharil (Malaysia), Charnvit (Th ailand), Maris Diokno (the Philippines) 
and Taufi k Abdullah (Indonesia).
Well, for my course I invited (1) Dr Teresita Maceda. She analysed 
protest songs, an alternative mode of truth-telling under martial law. It 
was an attempt at rewriting history from the point of view of the rank 
and fi le members of social movements; (2) Dr Francis Gealogo, a young 
demographic historian. Th e use of parish documents has provided 
interesting insights into the social history of the country during the 
Spanish colonial period, while labour statistics reveal historical patterns 
of labour emigration—most relevant to the Indonesian situation as the 
number of workers who are fi nding jobs abroad is growing; (3) Prof. Rey 
Ileto, a very prominent historian and well known for his Pasyon studies 
that, he believes, are already quite old. But he also discussed more recent 
topics such as writing non-linear or non-developmental history and 
avoiding Orientalist pitfalls.
It has often been said that during Soeharto’s New Order a great deal of 
historical objectivity was lost in Indonesia. Th e focus was almost completely 
on contemporary, national history. How did you deal with that problem in 
your situation?
Th e focus on contemporary history has nothing to do with New Order 
policy. It is simply a matter of access to Dutch sources. Studying pre-
national history requires a good knowledge of the Dutch language. 
Although Dutch language courses continued to be given to history 
students (even during the New Guinea confl ict when the use of Dutch 
was discouraged or prohibited—although Soekarno and cabinet 
ministers spoke Dutch among themselves) results are very poor. A lack 
of motivation, perseverance or just sheer incompetence? Perhaps because 
of wrong methods of teaching? I don’t know. It is of course very diff erent 
from my generation who—as the expression goes—imbibed Dutch with 
144 world history – a genealogy
the paplepel, the porridge spoon, when we were fed as babies. But I often 
told my class how Japanese history students manage to obtain a fair and 
sometimes a very good command of Dutch, although the structure of 
their language is also very diff erent.
As for objectivity, I must say that any offi  cial history is per defi nition 
subjective. History from below is a new phenomenon, and there is a 
distinction between great and little traditions. But indeed, in those days 
there was much self-censorship in the case of newspapers, books, including 
history writing. One had to know what to say and what not to say. Certain 
topics were taboo, like ethnic and race relations and also religious subjects 
that might cause confl icts. One should not deviate from the government’s 
interpretation of the PancaSila. Th ere was also concern about the style 
of writing, the choice of words, how to recount things. But, well, lately 
I have been thinking about those years and have come to the conclusion 
that we have been conditioned to that kind of situation. Just suppose as a 
boy of only eight years plus I had run to my Dutch neighbours and told 
them that, according to grandfather, their queen was not my queen? Th at 
would have caused grave consequences for my grandfather. But by instinct 
I didn’t do that. Perhaps I already knew that certain matters should be 
kept within the family. At the time, I learned to sing Indonesia Raya, 
taught by an older cousin. In the original version, that is, Indonesia mulia 
(noble) instead of merdeka (free). But my parents told me that this must 
only be sung indoors.
During the so-called New Order, we did say certain things which 
some people in the government did not like. I don’t remember everything, 
but a few weeks ago at a party I met an old journalist friend whom I had 
not seen for many years. He reminded me about a statement I had made 
against the looting of wrecks apparently condoned, if not supported, by 
top offi  cials. A great deal of important historical information had been 
lost since the divers were hunting only for treasure and not systematically 
recording the location and the way the wreck and its contents were found. 
However, I must say that the Soeharto era was not entirely negative 
with regard to historical studies. Besides seminars on national history, 
many workshops on local history were also held. And we—the late 
Abdurrachman Surjomihardjo, Taufi k Abdullah and I—were frequent 
consultants for projects of the Department of Education and Culture, 
notably the IDSN (Inventarisasi dan Dokumentasi Sejarah Nasional) 
and IDKD (Inventarisasi dan Dokumentasi Kebudayaan Daerah), the 
inventory and documentation of national history and local culture.
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Speaking about local history, during that period there began a trend 
to search for the origins of towns, districts, etc. Some research projects 
for this purpose were carried out quite scientifi cally; others less so. But we 
should see it as a desire to look for one’s own roots and identity. And what 
is interesting is the fact that each wanted a date much older than the others 
and—more importantly—preferably much older than Jakarta’s. We may 
see it as a counter move, perhaps unconsciously, against the centralising 
process of the Jakarta government. But, if well researched, the dates could 
provide options of where to start when writing Indonesian history. As I 
once wrote, from being in Provence or Okinawa the history of France and 
Japan is seen from a diff erent perspective.
Can you tell us more about your Ph.D. thesis? You developed it at a later stage 
in your career. Was that an advantage?
In my case it was certainly an advantage. I had read more books, articles, 
records, and so forth and I didn’t have to rush—no worries about career—
and my supervisor, Prof. Sartono, I had known for decades. I was then 
in my late fi fties. During the TANAP workshop in Xiamen last October 
Prof. Zhang Zhiliang from Beijing told me that, according to Confucius, 
if you are 50 you already know the way to heaven. And when you are 60, 
you only want to hear pleasant things. At 70 you may do what you like. 
So, I think there is a good reason to write a thesis at an advanced age! 
Today, a Ph.D. degree is the fi rst step in a long career, but I belong to a 
vanishing generation. Many old professors in Japan wrote their theses at a 
later stage, too. My dissertation deals with the phenomenon of piracy. In 
the 1960s during one of our sea expeditions, we landed on a tiny island of 
a group called Taka Bonerate in the Flores Sea, on Dutch maps called the 
Tiger Islands. We wanted to buy fresh food, chicken or fi sh. But it was a 
very sad forlorn sight. Only two days before pirates had raided the small 
village. Th ey took away everything, including their stock of chickens. We 
had to give them some rice and canned food instead. It was the fi rst time I 
witnessed such a terrible scene. Piracy, I thought, was something you only 
read about in newspapers, history books or novels. You know, of course, 
the lines of Gilbert and Sullivan, ‘... and it is, it is a glorious thing to be a 
pirate king.’ And if I remember well, wasn’t it Th ucydides who wrote that 
in the old days people were not off ended or ashamed if they were called 
pirates?
Th e title of my thesis is Orang laut, bajak laut, raja laut (Sea-people, 
Sea-robbers, Sea-lords). Th e idea is that each can call the other a pirate, 
depending from whose angle one is looking. But piracy is a concept in 
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the minds of people with an established government where the state 
has the monopoly of violence to exert its authority. Until late in the 
nineteenth century, there were many states in the archipelago with no 
clear boundaries either on land or at sea. At sea, they were raja laut in 
their own right, but pirates according to the colonial documents. Th ere 
were also maritime communities with no fi xed places of abode, the orang 
laut par excellence, the sea nomads who lived on boats. Th ey were also 
featured as pirates in reports compiled by colonial authorities. But surely 
the VOC ships were initially seen by the local people as pirate vessels, too. 
At least, that can be surmised when reading the old texts. Only at a later 
stage, notably in the eighteenth century, was the VOC accepted as a ‘local’ 
power. As I said on another occasion, the VOC was then going native. 
But the arrival of Daendels changed everything. And with the arrival of 
steamships the balance of power shifted in their favour. By ‘they’ I mean 
the Western powers, the superpowers at the time, the adiraja laut. Like 
the superpowers in our time who had the monopoly of nuclear energy, the 
adiraja laut had the monopoly of steam power. Some indigenous raja tried 
to own steamboats, but the colonial powers only allowed them to order 
small ships. Well, I can go on and on...
What I wanted to say is that it is certainly worthwhile, if not necessary, 
to study Indonesian history from a maritime perspective. Van Leur 
complained that Dutch historiography about Indonesia was written from 
the decks of VOC ships, but I think that we must go sailing to have a fresh 
comprehensive look at our past. After all, we call our country tanah air—
land and water. Th erefore, for a balanced picture the study of Indonesian 
history should be oriented towards both. 
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Sympathetic ‘Farangi’: Interview with 
Michael N. Pearson
Michael N. Pearson, Professor Emeritus at the University of New South 
Wales, Australia, and Adjunct Professor of Humanities at the University of 
Technology, Sydney, is a renowned scholar of maritime history. His books 
on Indian history have been pioneering ones, though not without criticism. 
His range of scholarship has been wide. He began his academic journey 
with a book on Gujarat, moved on to pilgrims to Mecca and then to East 
Africa, and fi nally covered the entire Indian Ocean. On this trajectory, he 
contributed enormously on the rulers, merchants, pious passengers and many 
other categories of the people who inhabited a large part of the Indian Ocean 
littoral. Recently, he was very much engaged in talks about his latest book, Th e 
Indian Ocean, which is an ambitious work indeed. On the way to England 
for a conference, he stopped at Leiden to share his views on history with the 
TANAP students. Th is provided a good opportunity for Ghulam Nadri to 
interview him.
Tell us something about your early life and education.
I was born in 1941 and grew up on a quite remote farm in the North 
Island of New Zealand, and people claim they can still hear tinges of New 
Zealand vowels in my speech. Th is farm was about ten miles from the 
nearest town, and that was a town of only 2,000 people. Th e farm was not 
particularly prosperous, and we lived an almost self-suffi  cient existence, 
growing most of our own food, buying very little from town. We lived 
on lamb; when we had eaten one sheep, my father would kill another and 
we would eat that, and so on. So, it is probably an unusual background 
for someone going for higher studies and ultimately becoming a professor 
of History. Indeed, of all the people I went to primary school with, only 
one other went on to university. After primary school, I boarded at a high 
school in Napier, and there did quite well in history. So when I went to 
university in Auckland I did more history, and did a BA and honours MA 
there. What was being taught at Auckland University was very traditional 
history indeed. Th ere was some New Zealand history, a little Australian, 
and a lot on the history of the ‘Mother Country,’ Britain. Th ere was a whole 
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course on the Congress of Vienna that is very old-fashioned diplomatic 
history. Th ere was a little bit of American history too, but almost no history 
of Asia or the Th ird World at all. Actually ironically there was a course 
on British expansion and there was an Indian component as part of that, 
and this was traditional Indian history as taught by English people, which 
talked about the Battle of Plassey, the methods of British administration, 
the British bringing civilisation to India, and so on. Looking back, it was 
really shocking. I didn’t enjoy the Indian part of the course at all, and I 
did my MA thesis on an early business fi rm in Auckland. It was pretty 
boring really.
My political background was I suppose leftist. I became quite active 
politically in one of the biggest issues in New Zealand at that time, the 
early 1960s, that is tours by South African sporting teams, which were 
selected only from the white South African population. At this time, New 
Zealand bowed to South African pressure and didn’t include any Maoris 
in their teams going to South Africa, even though about half the rugby 
union team, ironically called the All Blacks, would usually be Maori. 
Vietnam was central in my political thinking. I still remember going to a 
lecture in 1963 where the speaker told us there was a place called Vietnam, 
and the Americans were getting increasingly involved in the civil war 
there, and this was going to be a major problem, as indeed it did become. 
My time in the United States, which I’ll get to in a minute, began in 1965, 
as the Americans began their build-up of troops, and ended in 1975 just 
after they had all been evacuated and Vietnam was reunited. In terms of 
political consciousness, Vietnam was absolutely central.
At this same time, I began to have a rather callow and unfocussed 
interest in India. I had some sort of undergraduate interest in Buddhism, 
especially Zen, and I suppose my increasing interest in the Vietnamese 
resistance to colonialism led me to look at earlier examples, and especially 
India. So I read autobiographies of Gandhi, Nehru, etc. Th is was while 
I was fi nishing my MA, and once I fi nished that my choice was to 
become a high school teacher in New Zealand or see if I could manage 
to go overseas and do a Ph.D. somewhere. At that time, there was still a 
pronounced ‘cultural cringe’ in New Zealand. Th e only place worth going 
to was an English university, and preferably Oxford or Cambridge. Most 
of my peer group in the early 1960s went to England, and indeed there 
was quite a prejudice against American higher education. Nevertheless, 
I thought the US would be more interesting for me, and I wrote to four 
or fi ve diff erent American universities who off ered Indian history for the 
Ph.D.. Th ese letters were hand written, which shows how long ago this 
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was, or maybe how behind the times New Zealand was. One of my letters 
was to the University of Michigan, and it was read by a person called 
John Broomfi eld, who sent back a very positive reply. He turned out to 
be a fellow New Zealander who was beginning his own career as, at that 
time, a junior academic. Of course, I hadn’t done any of the US qualifying 
tests such as GRE, so they really had no idea whether or not I would be 
capable of handling Ph.D. work at a prestigious place like the University 
of Michigan. So I went on a wing and prayer. Th ey paid my fees, and gave 
me about $500 worth of research work, and that was it for the fi rst year. 
Luckily, I did well enough in the fi rst year to get very generous fi nancial 
support after that; that is from 1966. I was lucky in another way too. 
Broomfi eld was a specialist on modern Bengal, but before I left New 
Zealand, he told me that the area of modern Indian history was already 
rather over-populated. He suggested I think of looking at the early modern 
period, and more specifi cally think of using the Portuguese archives in 
Goa. He had been there the year before, that is 1964, just three years after 
Liberation, and he was sure these archives were a great untapped resource. 
So he encouraged me to learn Portuguese, and also Persian, so that I could 
handle whatever material there might be from the Indian side.
My then wife and I left Mew Zealand in August of 1965, and this was 
my fi rst maritime experience. We travelled for three weeks from Auckland 
to Florida on quite a small ship with, I think, about 200 passengers and a 
lot of cargo. Th is was in fact just at the end of the time when one travelled 
by sea rather than air; I’ve never again done a long voyage by sea. Th e 
voyage was interesting in another way too, in that we stopped in Tahiti 
and Panama on the way. Tahiti was the fi rst time I had been in a non-
English-speaking country, and Panama was the fi rst time I had seen real 
poverty—both places left a profound eff ect on me.
Once we got to Ann Arbor and the university, I started studying. My 
Portuguese language was now up to the level of effi  cient reading at least; 
Persian was a continuing battle, an enormously diffi  cult language to learn, 
at least for me. At the time that I did my Ph.D. research I could struggle 
through a Persian chronicle with very great diffi  culty and constant 
reference to a dictionary; I was never able to read contemporary Persian 
documents. I can’t claim any mastery or any competence in Persian. And 
what modest ability I had acquired in the late 1960s I could not keep up, 
so that today I would make no attempt to read anything in Persian. It’s a 
language, like all others, where if you don’t use it constantly you lose it.
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Did you fi nd Michigan in any way diff erent from your own university at 
Auckland? Who were the people who looked after your fi nances and logistics?
My supervisor was John Broomfi eld, but in fact when I arrived in Ann 
Arbor he was away in India, and my fi rst teacher of Indian history was 
Peter Reeves, who fi lled in for Broomfi eld for two semesters. I was really 
lucky to have him as a teacher, and he remains a dear friend to this day, 
nearly forty years later. Th is was the American degree system, rather 
diff erent from the British one that we had at Auckland. I had three years of 
course work and language training. Most of the course work was history, 
and I had four fi elds here: ancient India, modern India, British Empire 
and Southeast Asia, and at the end of that we had one or two written 
exams and then a two- or three-hour oral exam. Th is was an intimidating 
experience indeed: fi ve professors grilling me orally for about three hours! 
But I passed, and then had two years overseas doing Ph.D. research and 
writing a fi rst draft of the thesis. I had support from the University of 
Michigan and also from the Gulbenkian Foundation in Portugal, which 
was a very generous foundation indeed. I had a whole year in India, 
mostly in Goa but also in Baroda where I met Satish C. Misra. He was a 
wonderful friend and very, very helpful, and he made it possible for me to 
attend the Indian History Congress in 1968 at Bhagalpur. I did research 
in Baroda and a little bit in Delhi and I am more or less sure that there I 
met Om Prakash in 1969.
What were your personal experiences in the archives in Goa and Lisbon?
I was very lucky to be working in Goa in 1968–69. At that time, most 
Indian archives were much bureaucratised and very slow. Th is wasn’t the 
case in Goa, where for nearly all the time I was the only person doing 
research. Th e Director at that time was V.T. Gune, who was a Maharastrian 
historian and therefore not very well liked by the local pro-Portuguese 
people. However, he left me alone, and even gave me a cup of tea each 
week. I was also privileged several times to meet P.S.S. Pissurlencar, who 
had been archivist under the Portuguese for thirty or forty years. He 
knew the archives intimately. He had long ago retired, but he gave me 
some excellent advice. He was dying of cancer at the time, and I had the 
melancholy privilege of attending his funeral also.
Th e archives at this time were in a Portuguese bungalow, single storeyed, 
with a veranda, which was where my desk was, and a garden outside where 
I used to wander around smoking from time to time. It was still very 
informal. I more or less had open access to all the bound documents. Th en 
I had time in Baroda and Delhi, and late in 1969 I started eight months in 
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Lisbon, where I used most of the major Portuguese archives. Portugal at 
that time was a dictatorship, that is during 1969–70, and that was another 
new experience for me.
What were you researching at that time in these archives?
I was working on my Ph.D., which later became my Merchants and Rulers 
in Gujarat book, which was about Portuguese policies on the west coast 
of India, trade control and so on, and particularly the reaction of Indian 
rulers and merchants to Portuguese policies. I wrote a fi rst draft of the 
thesis in Lisbon, and then had a little time in London. Around the middle 
of 1970, thanks entirely to my supervisor, John Broomfi eld, I landed a 
job at the University of Pennsylvania. My thesis was accepted in 1971, 
and after revision fi nally published in 1976. What I was trying to do in 
this book, and indeed in most of my later work, was to use European, 
especially Portuguese, documentation to write about the history of India, 
or indeed other Asian and even African areas in the early modern period. 
It was the sort of thing Ashin Das Gupta did so well for Surat. I never 
really considered myself to be a Portuguese colonial historian; rather I 
wanted to use Portuguese documents to write Indian history.
Th e central argument in Merchants and Rulers was that the Muslim 
rulers of Gujarat, fi rstly independent Sultans and then the Mughals, 
were almost entirely land-oriented and not really concerned about what 
happened on the sea. Th e fact that the Portuguese built forts on the coast 
of Gujarat at Diu, Daman and Bassein and taxed trade coming out of 
Cambay and Surat was not seen as a threat to the authority of the rulers of 
Gujarat, because their ethos and their attitudes were almost entirely based 
on land and what happened at sea was of no interest or concern. And 
I would certainly today modify this piece of juvenilia. As Om Prakash 
and also Van Santen have shown, it seems clear that the Mughals derived 
much more revenue from sea trade and customs duties and also took more 
interest in what was happening at sea than I allowed for in my fi rst book. 
Indeed, on my fi rst visit to Leiden, I think in the late 1970s, both Van 
Santen and Heesterman criticised me along these lines, saying that the 
disjunction I found between land and sea was drawn far too strictly.
Did you fi nd the academic atmosphere conducive at Pennsylvania, since 
Holden Furber was still there, someone who was very much involved in 
Companies’ trade and maritime history, etc?
Between 1970 and 1975, I taught at the University of Pennsylvania and 
I was in both the History Department and the South Asian Studies 
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Department there. Th e history department at that time was rebuilding 
and a young competitive department. Th ere were about twelve of us 
who were assistant professors. Th is meant we were on fi xed three-year 
contracts. Towards the end of the second contract you were evaluated 
for tenure by all the tenured professors, and only about one in four made 
it: a very ruthless system indeed! Th e South Asian department at that 
time had a large number of very senior scholars in most of the disciplines. 
One of them was Norman Brown, the very eminent Sanskritist, but the 
person with whom I had much more to do with was Holden Furber, and 
that was a unique privilege for me because I was at the beginning of my 
career and Holden was nearly at the end of his. He retired I think in 1973, 
and soon after that he fi nished his great book Rival Empires of Trade in 
the Orient. He was a very supportive colleague. He read my thesis and 
provided very useful comments. We taught together sometimes, and it 
was a real privilege to have such a senior scholar as a colleague, and indeed 
as a friend too.
Didn’t you seriously consider continuing at Pennsylvania?
After a few years at Pennsylvania, my then wife and I began to think 
seriously about where we wanted our two young boys to grow up. Should 
it be Philadelphia, or would somewhere closer to home be better? We 
thought that New Zealand might be a bit ‘slow’ for us after all our travels, 
so I tried for jobs in Australia and fi nally got one at the University of 
South Wales, which I joined in 1975. I retired from there as professor of 
History in the middle of 2001.
What were your main academic achievements at the University of South 
Wales?
I did a few articles and book chapters which were off shoots from the large 
amount of research I had done for the thesis. Th ey dealt with topics like 
piracy, corruption, Hindu seafarers and Indian participation in the Goan 
economy. Subsequently I revised some of these to make my second book, 
Coastal Western India, and Teotonio de Souza, an old and dear friend, 
was instrumental in that happening. I then got involved with Ashin Das 
Gupta in Indian Ocean matters. I fi rst met Ashin when I was in America 
and he was passing through, as indeed did many others, including Om 
Prakash, for a great advantage of being at the University of Pennsylvania 
was that all the best Indian historians visited at one time or another. Th is 
was in the early 1970s, and we could see that there was a certain similarity 
in what we were trying to do, even though he used Dutch sources and 
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I was using Portuguese. He was beginning to establish Indian Ocean 
Studies at Vishvabharati University at Shantiniketan, and in the late 
1970s he had a few people there to do a seminar on the Indian Ocean. 
Subsequently we worked together to produce the book called India and 
the Indian Ocean from 1500 to 1800. Th is was not so much based on 
new research as an attempt to say, ‘Here is what we know about private 
English trade,’ ‘Here is what we know about the seventeenth century,’ and 
so on. We hoped to sum up the fi eld and perhaps show what else could be 
done. We had chronological chapters on the overall sixteenth, seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries; we had one on Sri Lanka in the Indian Ocean; 
Southeast Asia; East Africa; East Asia; we had one on the companies; two 
on private trade; and a charming one by A. Jan Qaisar on life on the sea. It 
was not purely a maritime history book because it was very much focused 
on India, and I don’t think the book had any sense of the sea in it. It was 
mostly a book about trade and a large part of the maritime experience was 
not mentioned at all. In a way, I have subsequently tried to rectify these 
omissions.
Before that, however, I was asked to contribute to the very large project 
of the New Cambridge History of India. My brief was of course to write 
a book called Th e Portuguese in India. Th is was meant to be a very short 
book, and in a way, it’s an essay, and certainly is not meant to be a complete 
coverage. I’ll say a bit more about my attitudes towards colonialism later.
At about this same time I was asked to present the Heras Lectures at 
St Xavier’s College in what was then Bombay. Th is invitation came from 
Fr. John Correia-Afonso, who was one of those courtly, worldly Jesuit 
scholars. I mentioned that my politics were mildly leftist. I’d read a bit of 
Marx, just as everyone did, and in particular had become interested in the 
world-system theories of Immanuel Wallerstein. I liked the way he tried 
to present a complete account of the recent history of the world from a 
neo-Marxist standpoint. In the 1970s and 1980s his work was very much 
on the scholarly agenda, though I suppose more recently the fad is cultural 
studies rather than Marx. So for the Heras lectures I presented a summary 
of his theory, and then critiqued it, and discussed how it could apply to 
the Indian Ocean area. So again I was moving a little closer to the sea! 
Th e lectures were published as Before Colonialism, a teleological title that 
I really shouldn’t have used.
My next eff ort was to write a book about people travelling over the 
ocean for religious reasons, that is the hajj to Mecca. In a way this was 
a critique of Wallerstein, for I felt he doesn’t give enough attention to 
the way people are not motivated only by economic factors. In one 
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fundamental way this was not a satisfactory book, as it used almost no 
Persian, Turkish or Arabic sources, except in translation. It was mostly 
based on various European sources. My understanding is that in fact there 
are very few indigenous sources for the early modern hajj, but even so 
there is a central problem with a book that discusses a matter which is so 
important and so central for Muslims and yet uses few Muslim sources. My 
main indigenous source was an unpublished work called Anis-ul-Hujjaj, 
which is a seventeenth-century account by an Indian Muslim pilgrim. Jan 
Qaisar at Aligarh Muslim University very kindly gave me a transcript and 
a rough translation of this. Th e author talks about the journey to Mecca, 
and what happened on the ship, so this was a very useful source for me. 
And despite the limitations, one of the reviewers said it was a very nice 
account from a sympathetic farangi, which I consider to be high praise.
Th is book had a rather strange history. It was called Pious Passengers and 
was published by Sterling in Delhi, but they sold it at the Frankfurt Book 
Fair to both an English and an American publisher. Th e English edition 
was the same as the Indian one, but the American edition was a major 
disappointment. It was called Pilgrimage to Mecca: Th e Indian Experience. 
Th e publisher was Markus Weiner in Princeton, and he insisted that the 
book be heavily edited. In itself, that was no problem, but there was no 
acknowledgement in the book that it was substantially the same as the 
previously published Indian version. Th e editor also took it upon himself 
to translate several short passages that I had left in French. He got most 
of these wrong and distorted the meaning badly. Finally, on the title page 
‘Indian’ is spelt ‘Indan.’
Your area of interest is well diversifi ed, from Portuguese to pilgrims and then 
to medical practices and so on. What inspired you to write on the exchange of 
medical practices between Europe and India?
I entered the medical area quite by chance. In the mid-1980s, I had become 
friendly with a very eminent paediatric neuro-surgeon in Australia, and 
he encouraged me to investigate contacts between Indian and Portuguese 
medicine in Goa. In fact, I have twice spoken at major medical conferences 
on such topics. In 1989 I was a visiting Professor of early modern history 
at the University of Minnesota, and one of the things I did there was to 
give a public lecture that was organised by the John Ford Bell Library, a 
wonderful library on Europeans in early modern Asia. Th is lecture was 
later published, and I’ve maintained, to an extent, my interest in this area. 
Th is is partly because my wife is a very experienced nurse and midwife; 
she is a big help in correcting at least some of my errors in the area of 
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medicine. I’ve published four articles or book chapters on aspects of 
medicine in early modern India, and all of these will be in a collection of 
my shorter work published in the Variorum series, to be called Th e World 
of the Indian Ocean. Th e next thing I worked on was East Africa and the 
Swahili coast. I must admit that this was partly because I wanted a chance 
to travel somewhere other than India: not that I will ever get tired of 
visiting India! Working there was also a chance to enlarge my knowledge 
of the shores of the Indian Ocean. I had a couple of research trips to the 
area, met various people there, and accumulated quite a lot of interesting 
material. Th en someone I had known for some time, John Russell-Wood, 
out of the blue invited me to deliver the Schouler lectures at the Johns 
Hopkins University. Th is was really quite an honour, as my predecessors 
included Le Roy Ladurie, Charles Boxer and lots of other very eminent 
people. I took the opportunity to write up my African material, and the 
lectures later were revised and published as Port Cities and Intruders—
which incidentally was not my choice of a title. Th e reviews were mixed, 
some good, others not. I did have a sense that some of the critical ones from 
established East Africanists were really complaining about my having the 
temerity to encroach on ‘their’ turf. In any case, people must have bought 
it, because to my surprise it had a paperback edition also.
Your writings are often taken as Indo-centric and written from a very anti-
colonial perspective. Why is this so?
I mentioned in the beginning various things that I suppose in a way 
politicised me to some extent; white South African sporting tours and 
in particular the Vietnam war. I suppose this gave me a broad sympathy 
with anti-colonial struggles, and an opposition to western imperialism. 
Th is did fl ow into a sometimes-critical look at the activities of the 
Portuguese, though I am never as rough on them as they were themselves 
in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Th ere are a host of complaints 
written at that time about corruption and other things. Unfortunately, my 
writings have sometimes not found favour in Portugal among some of the 
more traditional scholars, who grew up in the dictatorship period (which 
ended only in 1974) when the notion of a civilising Portuguese mission 
was very much part of the prevailing ideology. Even today there still is 
an attitude among some Portuguese scholars that ‘After all, we weren’t as 
bad as the others,’ meaning other colonial powers. But I certainly don’t 
include all my Portuguese friends in this category of tacit apologists for 
their country’s history. And if I were to write on any other colonial power 
I imagine my attitude would be the same!
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Why are you so much interested in the sea and maritime history? Have you 
often been to sea and been observing the coastlines, that fascinated you so 
much?
I’ve shown as I’ve been talking how my interest gradually became more 
and more focused on the sea. A group in Western Australia, especially 
Peter Reeves and Ken McPherson, and also a Dutch scholar called 
Frank Broeze, helped this. Th ey organised various conferences, large 
international ones, and McPherson set up an Indian Ocean Centre, which 
went through various manifestations and now has been closed down by 
an unsympathetic university administration. So this kept my interest in 
maritime history alive. On the other hand, I have very seldom travelled 
by sea, and I’m certainly no sailor. As I mentioned earlier, my fi rst trip out 
of New Zealand was by sea to the US. In 1969, I travelled by sea from 
England to Portugal. I’ve done the ferry from Mumbai to Panaji several 
times, and short off shore trips in dhows in East Africa and small boats 
on the coast of Goa. But this is hardly a nautical experience. Th e only 
other fi rst-hand sea experience I have is that I now live north of Sydney in 
a house right on the beachfront! In short, while I had written on aspects 
of the Indian Ocean, it was not my central concern. Th en yet another 
invitation appeared.
Your last book, Th e Indian Ocean, is an ambitious work and has been received 
largely with applause, but also with criticism. I think it deserves a rather 
detailed introduction here.
Th ere is a series from Routledge called Seas in History. Its general editor is 
Geoff rey Scammell, a retired early modern historian at Cambridge whom 
I’ve met at various Portuguese-oriented seminars and conferences. Before 
mine two volumes in this series had been published, one on the Atlantic, 
and one on the Baltic and North Seas. Geoff rey asked Ashin Das Gupta 
to undertake the Indian Ocean book, but soon after that Ashin was struck 
by a very debilitating disease, which he died of, and that was the tragic end 
of a good friend and a wonderful historian. Scammell then asked me to 
consider taking it up. I did not have anything really important on my desk 
at that time, and I also realised that a lot of my publications had a strong 
maritime element anyway, as I’ve already mentioned. Th e requirement was 
to do a very broad overview with a text limit of about 150,000 words. I felt 
that I had a good background in the early modern period, particularly on 
the Arabian Sea side. For the earlier period, and the period after 1800, I 
read very widely in secondary work. I also read masses of fi rst-hand travel 
accounts. I was lucky here, as in the Fall of 2000 I was Vasco da Gama 
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professor at Brown University. I had almost no teaching, so I could use 
excellent libraries at Brown, and also at Yale University and New York. 
I quoted these travellers extensively in the book, partly to make it more 
readable, but more because that way I hoped to get a bit of ozone into my 
work, to give some sense of what it was like to travel by sea at diff erent 
times. Th e other guiding principle was to try and write an amphibious 
history, one that moved easily between land and sea.
I felt that most of the more recent books on the Indian Ocean were 
far too much concerned with trade, to the exclusion of other matters, and 
especially religion. And I felt they gave no impression of an actual nautical 
experience. Certainly, I would include the book Ashin Das Gupta and 
I edited in this category, as well as the very fi ne work by another dear 
friend, Sinnappah Arasaratnam. As to earlier histories of the ocean, the 
French scholar Toussaint’s book seemed to me rather jumbled, and with 
far too much attention to land matters which had nothing to do with the 
ocean. Ken McPherson’s book on the Indian Ocean was a fi ne synthesis, 
showing an impressive command of the secondary literature. But it was a 
bit pedestrian, with no hint of the actual maritime experience, as people 
have lived it over history.
Th e Indian Ocean is a vast and old body of water and, obviously, I 
could not hope to be comprehensive. My original text was about 240,000 
words, but the publishers quite correctly insisted it be cut down to the 
specifi ed word limit. Th is does mean there are gaps, especially on the 
Bay of Bengal side, and for the earliest period. Some of the reviews have 
pointed to important matters which I either ignored or covered cursorily; 
sometimes I have to plead my word limit, but at other times I have to 
admit ignorance.
I started the book with a discussion of maritime history in general, and 
deep structural elements in the Indian Ocean. My debt to Braudel, and 
to another, recent, book on the Mediterranean by Horden and Purcell, 
is clear. One of the themes, which is scattered through the book, is a 
discussion of whether in fact there is such a thing as an Indian Ocean, 
something that can be treated as some sort of unit, which is capable of 
being analysed historically, just like, say, the history of a town or a modern 
state. I tried to show how people on the coasts related to the ocean, and 
the extent to which aff airs in the hinterland aff ected sea matters. And I 
spent probably more time oh people travelling over the ocean for religious 
reasons than I did on traders. Naval battles got very minimal coverage 
indeed.
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One of my themes is that for about 1,000 years, from say 750 to 1750, 
one of the strongest connections across the ocean was Islam. Most of 
the people on the coasts, who were my main interest, were converted. 
Conversion itself is a major theme in the book, for I see it as a process 
rather than an event. It takes time, maybe generations, for a person to 
reach close to normative Islam. And travelling Muslim scholars were 
important here, both in making the initial change, and then reinforcing it 
and trying to get rid of pre-lslamic practice. Ibn Battuta, whose wonderful 
travel account I used extensively, is a good example of this. He had done 
the hajj, he had met great ulema in Mecca and Medina and elsewhere, and 
this meant he felt capable of commenting on Muslim practice around the 
shores of the ocean.
Th e book is also really an attempt at writing World History, that is 
a history which is not bounded by states and political borders. In fact, 
this sort of history now has more appeal to me than does World-System 
theory, even though I still very much admire Wallerstein’s totalising 
ambitions. Th e book has had a few reviews already. Th ere is a Roundtable 
discussion in the International Journal of Maritime History, with a reply by 
me. It is disappointing that most of the reviews have not really addressed 
my discussions of maritime history as a fi eld, but rather have commented 
on gaps related to their own specialties. However, I may sometime later 
attempt to write more specifi cally about the problems of writing a history 
of an ocean, and if I do this I will also address some of the criticisms of 
my book.
Apart from research, in which you made enormous contributions to the 
academia of the Indian Ocean world, what other engagements did you have?
I retired from the University of New South Wales in the middle of 
2001, and I really had thought that once I fi nished the Indian Ocean 
book I would fi nd completely non-academic ways to spend my time. 
However, instead I became part of a research project called ‘Culture and 
Commerce in the Indian Ocean’ with two colleagues from the University 
of Technology in Sydney. Th is means I am working more or less half time 
on scholarly matters, and spend the rest of my time in various community 
activities in the little coastal village where I live. Th e research grant means 
I can travel a little, to conferences and for research. It’s an ideal life really, 
as I don’t have to do the parts of an academic job that I had got tired of: 
committee meetings, marking vast quantities of undergraduate essays etc.
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What is your message to the young scholars who are working not exactly on 
maritime history but on trade history?
Th e VOC archives I don’t know at all but I am sure they have not been 
exhausted. Th e Australian scholar Bob Elson said he was the fi rst person 
to use many of the documents he found in Th e Hague, when he was 
researching his excellent book on the Cultivation System. My impression 
is that a large amount of work is still to be done in the archives here (in Th e 
Hague) and most of the Portuguese archives. Th ere is a mass of material 
in diff erent libraries and archives in Portugal. Th e big gap probably is the 
eighteenth century that has not been that much worked on, and I know 
there is massive Portuguese documentation both in Lisbon and in Goa.
I would certainly expect people to be asking the right kinds of questions 
of the documents and not just summarising what these have to say about 
the past. It’s best to go in with a problem, and use the documents to solve 
it. Th e Indian Ocean Project, which I am part of, is concerned to use a 
Cultural Studies approach to the history of the Indian Ocean. Here is 
the offi  cial description: the project examines trade cultures in a region 
which was the hub of the major world economic system in the pre-colonial 
period, and is now restrengthening. It thus links the earliest global system 
with current globalisation studies, giving those analyses historical depth. 
It is the fi rst cultural studies project in Indian Ocean studies, and it aims 
to match new theory to the empirical diversity of the region, analysing 
the way cultural forces add value to commodities, while creating diverse 
forms of transnational culture and identity. Th e project will make major 
contributions to cultural/historical and post-colonial thought, with the 
potential to create a new fi eld of study. Th e project has room for new 
researchers, and is in partnership with the Asia Research Institute in 
Singapore for the planning of an international conference in 2006.
So far my own work has not been in this sort of area at all, but I am 
sure that this approach could provide new, exciting and very diff erent 
work on colonial history as well as maritime history.
Which aspects of history do you think can be unearthed from these documents?
It seems to me that there is still a lot to be done on the social history of 
the Europeans in Batavia, in Goa and in many other places also. Urban 
history has also been largely ignored, and researchers here could work 
with historical archaeologists to establish site plans and so on. I think 
conversion is constantly interesting, that is especially to see it as a process 
rather than an event, as I mentioned above. Comparison would be 
interesting here too: both between, say, the Portuguese and the Dutch, 
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and then looking at diff erent successes in diff erent areas. Th ere is a huge 
ongoing series called ‘Asia in the Making of Europe’ and I imagine that it 
would be very interesting to do a variant of this and write on the infl uence 
the returned VOC people had on life in the Netherlands: what was the life 
style of the people who returned to their mother country after a few years’ 
service in Asia, what role did they play in politics, society, the economy, 
and things like that.
I think it would also be very useful, especially for doing social history, 
to have some background in social anthropology and in the theoretical 
work that talks about clashes of culture, and culture contact generally. 
Th ere is a very good collection from a conference at the University of 
Minnesota called Clashes of Culture, edited by Stuart Schwartz, and this 
gives some idea of what can be done. Th ere is material in the Goa archives 
in an early version of Konkani, and in theory at least I think it would 
be possible to take an area of land in Goa, just a few hectares, and trace 
its history and possibly even its use, over even fi ve centuries. Th is would 
be an incredible thing to do. As for diplomatic history, I am not really 
interested in this, but that is not to say that people could not do some 
interesting work on this. I think the interaction between Dutch, English 
and Portuguese in, say, the Gulf of Aden or Mocha or Jedda or with the 
Ottomans could be very interesting.
We still don’t know much about Portuguese activities in Southeast Asia, 
in Th ailand, Vietnam, Burma, etc. Sanjay Subrahmanyam and Luis Filipe 
Th omaz put forward the idea that the Portuguese had grandiose ideas of 
conquering large parts of Southeast Asia, which I fi nd very improbable, 
but that is something that probably could be investigated more. Th ere 
were some thousands of Portuguese adventurers or mercenaries operating 
in the Bay of Bengal. Most of them were peaceful traders, but some of 
them for a while became successful pirates and even were able to establish 
quite large areas of infl uence. We need to know much more about these 
people. However, Sanjay Subrahmanyam and George Winius to the 
contrary, their presence did not in any sense constitute an ‘empire.’
I envy younger people starting off  to do research on the early period 
of interaction between Europeans and Asians. We have some benchmarks 
now, or what could be called ‘foundational studies,’ but there are endless 
possibilities to do new and innovative work. It’s challenging no doubt, 
both in terms of the language skills needed (which of course should 
include European and Asian languages where appropriate) and the need 
to use ‘theory’ of one sort or another to avoid writing history which is 
antiquarian, or which does not address general historical processes which 
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are of interest to our discipline generally. We need to be able to talk to 
scholars working in related, but diff erent, areas. I read lots of histories of 
oceans and seas as I prepared to write my Indian Ocean book; similarly, 
we must avoid being parochial, and rather try to look at related work from 
other areas. Just one example of this would be the series by Jonathan Hart 
on imperialism. I would like to close by wishing all those embarking on 
research in either the colonial or maritime fi eld: ‘Bon Voyage.’ 
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Why Is China So Big? And Other Big 
Questions: Interview with John E. Wills, Jr.
John E. Wills, Jr., Jack Wills to all his friends and colleagues, was born in 
1936. He completed a BA in Philosophy at the University of Illinois in 1956, 
and went on for an MA in East Asian Regional Studies, 1960, and a Ph.D. 
in History and Far Eastern Languages in 1967, both at Harvard University. 
He taught history at the University of Southern California from 1965 to 
2004, and now is Professor Emeritus. He lives in the Los Angeles area and has 
fi ve grown-up children, seven grandchildren, and two great-grandchildren. 
Th is academic year he is a Visiting Scholar at Leiden University. Hendrik 
Niemeijer and Frans-Paul van der Putten met him in Amsterdam.
So how did I come out of the Midwest, 1,000 miles from salt water, and 
get involved in maritime history and the history of China? My particular 
slice of middle America had a number of kinds of latent cosmopolitanism. 
Our big state universities were and are very open-ended mixes of diff erent 
kinds of education: business, the arts, the humanities, technology. Th e 
one that shaped me, the University of Illinois, was the dominant presence 
in a small city—30,000 students in a town of 70,000. My father was a 
professor of agricultural economics. After World War II the world came 
to America, especially to the applied faculties of our universities, in search 
of the secrets of modernization, very much including their agricultural 
sectors. My father had graduate students from India, Iran and South 
Africa. In the general conformism of 1950s America, my high school was 
remarkably tolerant and hospitable to creativity and intellectual ambition. 
I was an undergraduate philosophy major at Illinois, and have never 
stopped reading philosophy, but never had the right temperament for 
professional philosophy. At Illinois I met my future wife, a history major, 
whose links to history now are a fascination with vernacular architecture, 
especially in the old Dutch towns, and real involvement in genealogical 
research, which has led to a lot of volunteer library work.
In 1956–58 I did my military service in San Antonio, Texas. I found in 
an Army post library Harold Isaacs’ Th e Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution, 
about the Communists and the Kuomintang in the 1920s. Th en I found 
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a not very good translation of the Analects of Confucius. Certainly I was 
moved by Isaacs’ passionate account of terrible events obviously important 
in the shaping of our world, but I think the impact of Confucius was more 
fundamental. I could not have spent my adult life studying a people whose 
high culture was obsessed by God or life after death. I had been raised in 
an environment where organized religion was an option but not central to 
the way you thought and lived your life.
So how could I go on to learn more about China? Th e answer came 
from the American foreign policy establishment. Th e attacks of McCarthy 
and his allies on experts on China had the eff ect that few people wanted to 
go into the fi eld, and the country was short of specialists on almost every 
area of Asia. First the Ford Foundation and then the federal government 
off ered fellowships to anyone who would study Chinese, Japanese, Arabic 
or a few other weird languages in graduate school. In 1958 we got married 
and I enrolled in an MA program in East Asian Regional Studies at 
Harvard.
So China was an attraction because of a more secular mind-set?
Confucius has said, ‘We don’t yet know about life, how can we know about 
death?’ [Analects, XI, 12]. Th at doesn’t mean that there is no hereafter, but 
that how to live is more important. In the longer run, I can’t think of a 
better starting point than China for thinking about the transformations 
of our own times and contributing to this strange new trend we call ‘world 
history.’
Talking about Confucius, at your age you must have heard and submitted 
already to the Decree of Heaven. At 70, Confucius said, you can follow your 
heart’s desire without overstepping the bounds [Analects, II, 4]. Was it your 
academic heart’s desire to compose such an original work as 1688: A Global 
History?
My dissertation on the Dutch East India Company and China, fi nished 
in 1967, ran to over 700 pages. In the US we don’t publish dissertations 
as accepted as you do in the Netherlands, but spend years improving 
and revising the darn things and then fi nding a press, hopefully a good 
university press, that will publish the monograph. It was at that point 
that my doctoral mentor, John King Fairbank, told me that Harvard 
University Press wasn’t looking at 700-page typescripts any more, and 
asked me to give them no more than 450. So I knocked out the 1680s 
and the two embassies to Beijing, and the rest became my fi rst book. I 
published the embassy studies together with two Portuguese embassies in 
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1984 as Embassies and Illusions. Th is left a third book on the 1680s still 
to be published. Th ings I had to know something about for the 1680s 
book—not just China but the British in India, the Dutch in what is now 
Indonesia, Jesuits pretty much everywhere—started me accumulating 
notes on diff erent parts of the world all in one year. I really wanted to do 
1687 or 1689 so that I wouldn’t have to try to write something sensible 
about the Glorious Revolution of 1688 in England, but there were a few 
stories, perhaps most of all the fall of Constantine Phaulkon in Siam, 
that made 1688 irresistible. My original title was 1688: A World History. 
Steve Forman, my excellent editor at W.W. Norton, suggested ‘global’ in 
place of ‘world.’ Th is nicely raises the fl ag for all our talk pro and con 
about globalization. Many of the short pieces in the book are about 
surprising connections among diff erent parts of the world. Th ere also 
is an implicit comparative theme, which I’m not terribly surprised that 
no one has noticed, of the diff erent modes of state-making and political 
culture within Europe—Golden Age Holland, Restoration England, 
the France of Louis XIV—and outside, especially in the great empires, 
Qing, Mughal and Ottoman, and in Japan. Th e chapters about the Dutch 
East India Company even fi t in here, as one of the more international, 
highly developed examples of mercantilist state-building. And your work 
[Niemeijer, Batavia: Een Koloniale Samenleving in the 17e Eeuw, 2005] fi ts 
in here wonderfully, showing from above and below the transformations 
of Batavia and its environs by commerce and capitalist agriculture.
Who stimulated you to study seventeenth-century China? 
Beats me. Th e whole ethos of the Fairbank Ph.D. program was that there 
were so many important things to fi gure out about China that each of 
us ought to fi nd something that no one had really worked on before. 
But both there and in the study of pre-modern foreign relations it got 
pretty lonely with no one to talk to. Part of what interested me was the 
theme of center-regional relations and the ways in which the possibilities 
of the regions to mobilize themselves and pull away from the center were 
limited. Th e Ming–Qing transition of course was the last great case of 
this in pre-modern China. Here I fi nally found people to talk to, at a 
wonderful conference that led to the publication of From Ming to Ch’ ing, 
which I edited with Jonathan Spence and for which I wrote an article 
taking maritime Fujian as my case study. I still fi nd people to talk to in 
the new millennium, have a follow-up essay out in a conference volume 
edited by Lynn Struve, and am fi nding ways to link this emphasis on the 
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center and periphery back to my studies of foreign relations; it makes a 
huge diff erence to those relations that China is so big.
So what were the forces at work in the Ming–Qing transition?
What I show in both my essays is that in many ways, not all of them 
obvious, the Manchus made a diff erence. We can see interactions among 
diff erent provincial power holders, such as princes of the imperial house, 
adventurers and people who rose through the examination system—and 
that example, by the way, comes right out of the Dutch Company archives 
and is in my fi rst book! Within the existing Qing structure people found 
ways to promote themselves, and continued to work within it. I’m still 
happy to spend a lot of time on the history of political action. I know 
there are lots of other important things to study, but I think human 
commitment and contingency come through in such dramatic ways here.
Does that connect to another one of your books, Mountain of Fame? Why did 
you decide to write a collection of biographies on major Chinese historical 
fi gures covering a period of more than 4,000 years?
Th e book is the result of the worries about political culture we’ve been 
discussing and of teaching. Th e thread of political culture that runs 
all through the book is the many transformations of the ruler-minister 
relation, and the moral mystique of the ministerial role. Th is already is 
apparent in the traditional life story of Confucius. Th en it’s enormously 
helpful for our understanding of the wrenching changes of twentieth 
century China to see, about 1898–1911, a lot of very smart people saying 
‘Look, this isn’t working any more,’ and seeking instead some form of 
the solidarity of the citizens of a nation. Th e concept of the book is very 
Chinese, with its focus on stories of ordinary mortals, heroes, sages, 
villains. Chinese friends jump right into the discussion when you ask 
them, for example, whom they would take as a representative fi gure from 
the Northern Song (960–1125).
Is there one person you feel particularly attracted to?
Su Dongpo, from the Northern Song. He had a great deal of interest in 
Buddhism, especially when he was convicted for opposing the emperor’s 
policies and sent into internal exile. But more fundamentally he was 
interested in human feelings and connections as they’re expressed in 
literature, and also how to be a good and eff ective person who accomplished 
something. When he was the magistrate at Hangzhou he supervised the 
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building of dikes along one side of West Lake to control the fl ood waters; 
you still can walk on ‘Mr. Su’s Dike.’
But here we are interviewing you not for a Chinese studies journal but for 
Itinerario. You have also been very much involved in the ‘overseas history’ 
fi eld.
Yes, and here early and late there has been a thin but world-wide network 
of wonderful human connections. I fi rst met Charles Boxer in 1963 or 
1964 when he gave some lectures at Harvard, and my wife and I saw him 
one last time in 1994, when he had just passed 90, was very frail but still 
full of ideas and books read. Bailey Diffi  e taught off  and on in the USC 
Department after his retirement, and I visited him and his wife at the 
lovely country house at Santiago de Cacem south of Lisbon. Ts’ao Yung-ho 
befriended me and advised me in Taipei when he was still a librarian and 
not yet a famous Academician. But the fi rst memories are of the morning 
and afternoon coff ee gang in the canteen of the old Algemeen Rijksarchief 
on the Bleijenburg in 1963–64: Om Prakash, Kwame Daaku, John Fynn. 
Each of us, I think, saw a specialist or two about our eyestrain problems 
reading the old Dutch manuscripts in the imperfect light of the reading 
room. But we also shared our sense of amazed discovery; I remember John 
Fynn looking up in amazement from a map that gave unique clues to the 
locations of some peoples in the interior of West Africa. And of course 
upstairs, doing her work and always accessible for our questions, was Prof. 
M.A.P. Meilink-Roelofsz. I saw Om again in Delhi, at a Vasco da Gama 
quincentennial conference in Australia, and at the VOC conference in 
2003. Kwame, I understand, died young in the service of Clio, promoting 
oral history in odd and septic corners of Africa. When I fi nally got a 
chance to go to Ghana and see Castle Elmina in 1999, I spent a few very 
pleasant hours with John Fynn.
And then there was the very tall, skinny young Dutchman who turned 
up on our fourth-fl oor doorstep in Taipei in 1972, waving an air letter and 
saying ‘Boxer said I have to come fi nd you’: Leonard Blussé. I can’t count 
the intersections on several continents or in several fi elds of common 
interest. It also was on a Sunday sail on Leonard’s extremely slow boat in 
1980 that I met Dhiravat na Pombeira, who in 1999 dropped everything 
and took me to Lopburi, making an important contribution to 1688, and 
in 2004 helped me identify a Siamese seal on a photo of a document from 
the Beijing archives. And this year I have an offi  ce on the corridor in the 
Leiden Department that is the world vortex of ‘overseas history.’ Pieter 
Emmer, Femme Gaastra, Henk den Heijer, Henk Niemeijer and Peer 
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Vries, perhaps not quite in the fi eld but very important for its interpretative 
challenges.
Th e coff ee gang of 1963–64 were glad to fi nd each other to talk to, 
but we didn’t have much sense that we were part of something bigger. 
Itinerario was part of the growth of the fi eld, and you can trace a lot of it in 
its pages. In the late 1980s I saw a lot happening, and a lot of historians not 
being aware of it. A fi rst draft of a review article had three books listed at 
its head. Several years later, after quite a bit of fumbling and development, 
my ‘Maritime Asia’ review article appeared in the American Historical 
Review with over twenty books listed at the head. Th ings certainly haven’t 
slowed down since then. It’s quite an experience to be around the TANAP 
students, where everyone is as convinced as I am of the importance of the 
history of maritime Asia!
You mentioned trips to Ghana, Th ailand, and Australia. Is visiting places 
important for your work as an historian?
Certainly, and a key personal pleasure as well. I didn’t travel outside the 
US as I was growing up, but saw a lot of the American west with my 
parents, and have always had an itchy foot. Most of my traveling has 
been more or less ‘in line of duty’, surveying archives and sightseeing 
on the weekends. A fi rst set of Asian adventures in 1973 took me to the 
Dominican archives in Manila, the Arsip Nasional in Jakarta, the Tamil 
Nadu Archives, the Historical Archive in Goa, and others. I have learned a 
lot from archives and personal connections in Portugal, and my wife and I 
are very fond of Lisbon. In 1979, after 21 years in Chinese studies, I fi nally 
got to mainland China with a delegation of Ming-Qing historians led by 
Frederic Wakeman. In 1997 my visit to Australia led to 1688-related visits 
to the Dampier Peninsula in the far northwest of the country and to Bali 
and Ambon in Indonesia. And in 2004 I had a fi rst visit to Vietnam, with 
some work in the excellent Han Norn Institute and a chance to get a sense 
of a society very much on the move despite the authoritarian government; 
Hanoi reminded me a lot of Taipei in the 1970s.
Did you ever get into disputes with other historians?
Not really. For a long time no one was much interested in pre-modern 
foreign relations. I’ve written my share of negative reviews of second- and 
third-rate books, but I don’t think I’ve ever had a counter-blast from an 
author.
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What do you think of today’s academic climate?
It has gotten much too hard to get started as a young historian. Universities 
are over-producing Ph.D.s without a shred of worry about whether the 
degree opens up a door to an academic career. Even if you get a ‘real job,’ 
the requirements before tenure are ever more rigid: a book published, and 
often more signs of continuing ‘productivity,’ while the university presses 
are cutting back on publishing monographs. Do we go to too many 
conferences? Probably, but Chinese studies have profi ted a great deal from 
them. Interaction at article length can get synergies going among scholars 
a lot faster than waiting for each other’s books.
One of the reasons I’m glad to be retired is that I was increasingly 
uneasy about recruiting young people into a Ph.D. program in the face of 
the uncertain futures even for the best of them. Another was that I was 
fed up with the status anxiety that is so prevalent in American academe. 
About a hundred American universities aspire to be in the inner circle, the 
top twenty. A few do improve their relative standing, but at the cost of not 
doing anything diff erent from those who already are in the circle. But the 
Dutch, British and German systems now strike me as no better, and as in 
some ways having deeper systematic problems. A few days ago I saw Peer 
Vries doing a pile of photocopying. Knowing the range of his interests, 
imagine how much of this he has to do! In the US the Department has 
work-study students who help with such things. Th e American system 
doesn’t give an almost free ride to the upper-class student whose parents 
could aff ord to pay for his or her education. Students who do need fi nancial 
assistance get a package—a grant, a loan, a job as one of those work-study 
students. So getting stuff  copied becomes a small example of a system 
that is more equitable than the European. Th e European low-cost higher 
education on balance often is a net income transfer to the more affl  uent.
Do you see any similarities in Sino-Western relations today and in the 
seventeenth century?
I think there is a tendency among European and American policy-makers, 
especially American and especially the current batch, to think that there 
ought to be clear and straightforward basic principles in foreign policy. 
Th at is what made some of them so optimistic about the transition from 
dictatorship in Iraq. Th ere’s no such straightforwardness in relations with 
China. Human rights and the rights of minority nationalities will remain 
issues. But in fact we all seem to take a many-sided approach. It’s right 
that Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and the Free Tibet 
movement keep the pressure on China, but there also are excellent reasons 
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for maintaining positive relations with the Chinese government. A stable 
China that sees its interest in stable relations with the rest of the world is 
in everyone’s interest.
Th e Chinese elite is changing in ways that make such relations possible.
Th irty years ago the old guys never really retired, but remained the ultimate 
decision makers. Now you see ambitious and pragmatic younger people 
leading many organizations and calling the shots on many issues. But not 
on Taiwan. No one can get very far from ‘Taiwan is part of China.’ Th ere 
is little realistic sense of how Taiwan has grown away from China. It helps 
to go there, and see how people, whether of Taiwanese or ‘mainlander’ 
origin, have become comfortable with being there. Who knows what 
will happen if and when more mainland offi  cials and opinion-shapers 
get to visit Taiwan? China is trying to lure Taiwan with opportunities to 
invest, and is having some success. But the Taiwan political establishment 
isn’t very mature, and politicians tend to seek votes by making strong 
statements that they know will off end the Chinese leaders. So the whole 
darn thing remains very dangerous.
I’m still trying to make a contribution to some of this discussion of 
China’s foreign relations by looking at pre-modern Chinese foreign 
relations and asking if there may be echoes or structural similarities in the 
way China deals with the world today. For many years I’ve been trying 
to argue that the ‘tribute system’ is not a very useful master concept for 
understanding pre-modern Chinese foreign relations. But one of my best 
statements on this was in my book about Dutch and Portuguese tribute 
embassies, and no one seems to have noticed very much. More recently 
I’ve been interested in the eighteenth-century relations between the Qing 
and Annam, which got the name Vietnam in the course of these relations; 
very interesting stuff , in which the institution of the tribute embassy 
really was quite useful. But in trying to build a broader framework I 
turn back to my ideas about Chinese political culture and why China is 
so big. Maintaining internal unity was the main goal of China’s rulers. 
Foreign adventures or entanglements with foreigners could threaten that 
unity. So there was a wariness of foreign contacts, a general tendency to 
defensiveness. Does that persist in any way today? I really don’t know, and 
the specialists on contemporary Chinese foreign relations don’t agree. But 
certainly China’s bigness continues to shape its relations with the rest of 
us, sometimes in confi dence in their ability to take a long view, sometimes 
in frustration at the limits of their power.
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You seem pretty busy for someone who’s retired. What brought you to the 
Netherlands this year?
Leonard Blussé had been after me for years to come talk to the TANAP 
students or get more involved in some way. When he knew that I had 
retired and that he and his wife Madelon de Keizer were going to Harvard 
this year, he made me an off er I couldn’t refuse: a loose visiting association 
with the Leiden History Department, helping out where I could with the 
TANAP Ph.D. students, and a place to live, their house in Amsterdam 
with Leonard’s amazing private library. Th en I added a short course for 
Leiden MA level students on the new big books in ‘world history’. Th is 
was a very impressive group of students, and their responses to the books 
were very instructive. Th ey were particularly taken with John R. McNeill’s 
Something New Under the Sun, an environmental history of the twentieth-
century world. Clearly they see these big environmental problems as the 
policy challenges of their adult lives. I literally sat there open-mouthed as 
they all jumped in to argue about all the issues.
And I’ve been very much impressed with the TANAP students and with 
the way the program has developed dialogues among young historians 
whose homes range from Japan to South Africa, who if they were ordinary 
members of the historical profession in their home countries would never 
have much to do with each other. Th is became especially clear to me at 
one of our Wednesday evening seminars when a student from Vietnam 
talked about the geography of the port area from Hanoi down to the river 
mouth; pretty soon everyone was jumping in wanting to talk about the 
rivers of Gujarat, of Siam, and so on.
And you have some research, projects for this year? What’s all this about opium?
For thousands of years people had taken opium by mouth. Around 1670 
they started smoking the stuff , at fi rst mixed with tobacco; you have 
some of the key citations in your Batavia. Th e greater addictiveness of 
inhaling makes this a change of world-historical importance. But it’s a 
long way from smoking opium mixed with tobacco to the vaporizing and 
inhaling of pure opium, and at the moment I’m not getting very far with 
that project. Th e one that is getting somewhere is a study of a batch of 
seventeenth-century Dutch books about distant areas of the world all by 
one author, Olfert Dapper. I’m interested both in their contribution to 
a European sense of a wider world and in the information they contain, 
some of which can be found nowhere else. And working on this in the 
superb libraries of Amsterdam and Leiden and picking the brains of the 
experts on book history and Golden Age Amsterdam are great fun.
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So you certainly seem to be enjoying your work as a historian. Do you have 
any advice for young people who might be attracted by the intellectual rewards 
despite what you say about the diffi  culties of getting started?
Actually I think in some crucial personal dimensions young scholars today 
are making more sensible decisions than most of my generation did. Many 
of us married young, had children early, and struggled forever after with 
the competing demands of marriage, parenthood and ‘my beautiful career.’ 
Now I see in general later marriages and very frequently fi rst a book and 
tenure and then a baby; I just learned of another case last week. I’m less 
sure about the commitment of a younger generation to contributing to the 
nonacademic cultural life or the ‘public sphere.’ My mentor John Fairbank 
devoted a great deal of time to writing for the general public, as did quite 
a few of the Harvard faculty of that generation. So did Erik Zürcher at 
Leiden. Perhaps my generation was more content to seek academic success 
and to assume that somehow the knowledge we elaborated would ‘trickle 
down’ to the general public. Now? I don’t know. Some younger scholars 
are deeply involved in some pretty esoteric sub-discourses in Chinese 
studies and in history in general. But there also is a lot of extra-academic 
political and cultural involvement in the younger generation. All I can say 
is we have to worry about the public sphere; it’s a big mess in the US, and 
only marginally better in Western Europe. 
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Slavery, Migration and the Atlantic World: 
Interview with Piet Emmer
Professor P.C. (Piet) Emmer studied history, and earned his Ph.D. at the 
University of Amsterdam in 1974. He has written and edited several books 
on the history of the Atlantic world, Dutch colonial slavery and migration 
history, including Th e Dutch Slave Trade, 1500–1850 (2000), Th e 
Dutch in the Atlantic Economy (1998) and Th e General History of 
the Caribbean (1999). Professor Emmer has held a chair in the History of 
European Expansion and Migration History at Leiden University since 1991, 
has served as a visiting professor at the University of Texas at Austin, and 
was appointed a member of the European Academy of Sciences (Academia 
Europaea) in 2004. Th is semester Damian Alan Pargas caught up with him 
in his offi  ce in Leiden.
Professor Emmer, you’ve had a long and distinguished career as a historian 
of the Atlantic world, colonial slavery and global migration. How did you 
become interested in these interrelated fi elds?
First of all, I think I should object to the word ‘distinguished.’ It has been 
a long career, but whether or not it’s distinguished remains to be seen! 
Anyway, the answer to your question is very simple, banal really. As a 
graduate student, I was asked by my advisor to write a Master’s thesis on 
a Dutch slaving voyage, and it all started from there. Th ere is a wonderful 
archive on the Dutch trade, and more specifi cally the slave trade, in the 
Atlantic in Middleburg, Zeeland. Th e archive of a Middleburg-based 
trading and slaving company has remained complete, and you could 
actually follow the actions of the individual captains, of the Company’s 
directors, etc, from year to year. And studying the slave trade, it was 
virtually impossible not to look into what happened with the slaves—and 
that led to the study of slavery itself. Th en, after the abolition of the slave 
trade and the abolition of slavery, other migration streams take over. All 
that followed from this one MA thesis on the history of the last offi  cial 
Dutch slaving voyage.
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Your Ph.D. research was also on the Dutch slave trade?
Well, it was more specifi cally on the ending of the Dutch slave trade, 
and the eff ects of the ending of the slave trade on the economy of the 
Netherlands, as well as those sections of the African coast where the 
Dutch had the most contact, and of course the eff ects on the receiving 
end—the Dutch colonies in the Caribbean.1
Why do you think there was no large abolition movement in the Netherlands, 
like there was in Britain or the United States?
I think we should rephrase the question and ask ourselves why was the 
abolition movement in the UK and in the US so popular. My feeling 
is that the Dutch case was much more normal. In the Netherlands, the 
experts mainly discussed colonial matters. What’s remarkable is that in 
Britain the ending of the slave trade and slave emancipation became a 
hotly debated issue, among people who’d never seen a slave, never seen the 
slave trade in operation. It’s possible that they’d seen empty slave ships in 
port, but what happened on the Middle Passage and on the plantations 
was something that most abolitionists only learned about by reading 
pamphlets and other literature. I think the amazing thing is that people 
became interested in this topic and that they united their indignation 
on a social basis, and that this resulted in a mass movement that became 
instrumental in abolishing the slave trade and slavery—both of which 
were still very viable economic institutions.
Obviously, if the slave trade and slavery had not been profi table, it 
would have been far easier to abolish them. Normal practice at the time 
dictated that the market would take care of everything. If the slave trade 
and slavery were losing propositions, private entrepreneurs would stop 
investing in it, and that would be the end of it. And, of course, that is not 
what happened. Even at the height of the abolition debate, the slave trade 
was still growing and so were the number of slaves. And in spite of all the 
evidence suggesting that it was profi table, in spite of the fact that slave 
prices kept rising—which is an excellent indicator of the viability of the 
slave trade and of slavery—in spite of those indications, it was abolished 
for political and ethical reasons. Only after Britain had abolished the slave 
trade and slavery in its own colonies did economics dictated the interest 
of Britain in abolishing the slave trade and slavery elsewhere in order to 
prevent unfair competition with its own ex-slaveholding colonies.
Your book, Th e Dutch Slave Trade (De Nederlandse Slavenhandel, 1500–
1850), was published in 2000 and received a lot of publicity.2 What was your 
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motivation in undertaking that research and how did your interpretations 
compare with earlier works on the slave trade?
Well, in fact that book was the result of many years of research and study, 
in addition to reading the works of other historians of the slave trade and 
slavery in the Anglo-Saxon world, France, Spain and Portugal. During 
the past forty years, there has been no historical fi eld with so many rapid 
developments in quantitative, social, economic and anthropological 
approaches as the study of the slave trade and slavery. I tried to do justice to 
these studies, and in many ways my book refl ects the international debates 
and the results of the international research providing more accurate data. 
I combined that with my own research on the Dutch slave trade and on 
slavery and abolition in the Dutch colonial world.
Th e fact that there was so much upheaval when the book was published 
had to do with the fact that, of course, the Dutch readership at large had 
not been aware of these international developments and of the course that 
the international debate was taking. I think that one of the issues that 
sparked a lot of interest—and sometimes indignation—was my insistence 
on the fact that the ending of both the slave trade and slavery was not 
caused by economic factors, but by ethical motives. Th at is not always 
easy to accept. Another issue was the fact that slaves taken from Africa 
and sent to any of the plantation sectors of the Americas—particularly 
North America but also the Caribbean or Brazil—were not necessarily 
worse off  in economic terms than if they had remained in Africa. Actually, 
it seems that all immigrants who went to the New World, be they forced 
or free, were usually able to increase their standard of living. Th at was 
important in a world where people were chronically undernourished and 
frequently died of starvation in Europe, Africa and Asia. Th ose results—
which were not of my own research alone, but of that of a whole range of 
researchers—seem to have come as something of a shock to some readers 
in the Netherlands.
What were the prevailing views on Dutch slavery and colonial history when 
you began your career?
Well, in many ways, because of the limited number of monographs and 
articles on the volume of the Dutch slave trade and on the nature of slavery 
in the Dutch colonies, there was very much the same feeling here that 
prevailed in the Anglo-Saxon world—especially before the 1970s, when 
Fogel and Engerman’s Time on the Cross sparked a revolution in slavery 
studies.3 And that was that slavery and the slave trade were institutions that 
were not very economically sound, that these were institutions designed 
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to degrade Africans, and that the tremendous profi ts that had been made 
by the slave trade and slavery were instrumental in making the West rich. 
Th ose were the prevailing views in the 1950s and 1960s, and in Holland 
they continued to exist much longer than in the Anglo-Saxon world.
And in Holland the larger debate about whether colonialism was good 
or bad also continued much longer than in the neighbouring ex-colonial 
powers such as the UK or France. When I fi rst started to specialise in this 
fi eld of history, the general view was still that colonialism was ‘a good 
thing.’ Th at view was mainly advanced by former colonial civil servants 
and, I guess you could say, the ‘colonial lobby’ in the Netherlands. In spite 
of the diffi  cult decolonisation of the Dutch East Indies, they continued 
to insist that colonialism was benefi cial for all concerned. In the same 
period, however, the public aversion against the Dutch colonial past 
increased and in the late 1960s and 1970s the advocates of decolonisation 
and independence were becoming much more vocal. I personally think 
that it is a stifl ing debate, and not very conducive to historical research, 
but that was the state of aff airs when I fi nished my Ph.D.. dissertation. 
After my book was published, I received some letters from both sides; 
some congratulating me on my objective view of the Dutch slave trade, 
but also of course there were letters of protest and indignation.
Why do you think especially the descendants of former slaves reacted with 
indignation?
It’s a very complicated issue to explain. In general, you could say that 
black people whose ancestors were forcibly moved from Africa to the New 
World have better and sometimes even much better chances of economic 
improvement than the descendants of the slaves who remained in Africa. 
However, the descendants of slaves sold into the Atlantic slave trade have 
been robbed of their cultural roots. And in the long run they haven’t 
done as well as some other immigrant groups in the New World, such as 
Europeans and Asians. In order to explain that many blacks in the New 
World look at the past. Th ere is no doubt that their ancestors arrived in 
the New World on a diff erent footing from those who are now doing 
better. So obviously the two must be connected. Th at, I think, is what 
has stimulated many blacks, particularly in the US, to take an interest 
in the history of slavery, in the hope of fi nding reasons to explain the 
discrimination and low economic and social status that they face.
By the way, the interest in the history of slavery diff ers considerably 
among the various ex-slaveholding areas of the New World. It is most 
pronounced in North America. Among blacks in the Caribbean and in 
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Brazil there seems to be less of an urge to blame the past for the problems 
of today. It’s really ironic that among blacks in the US, where the 
advancement of the descendants of the slave population has been most 
pronounced, the indignation about what brought them there, and how 
they were used as slaves, is strongest. In fact, there is no black population 
in the world with such a high average income as that of the blacks in 
the US. Of course, compared to other immigrant groups within the US 
the situation looks diff erent, and it is that perspective that has sparked 
the public interest in the history of the slave trade and of slavery, and 
has led to a whole new ethnic industry with ‘black studies’ departments 
at universities, travel agencies specialising in study tours to the roots in 
Africa, and fi lms and TV serials about these historical topics.
How did the Dutch colonial experience in general in the New World compare 
to that of other European powers, such as the British and Iberians?
I would argue that the British and Iberian experience in the Atlantic 
was diff erent from that of the Dutch and the French. Th e Dutch did 
not establish very large settlement colonies, and I think that made all 
the diff erence. Th e Dutch mainly concentrated on the exploitation of the 
tropical sections of the Atlantic (and of Asia for that matter), and that 
explains to a certain extent why the lasting impact of the Dutch Atlantic 
was more limited than that of the British. In the British Atlantic, we see 
in the eighteenth century a growing market in the settlement sections of 
British America. In the second half of the eighteenth century, the Atlantic 
market became increasingly important to Britain as she was losing 
markets on the Continent. Certainly, part of that increase was not only 
caused by more buyers in North America, but also due to the booming 
economies of the plantation colonies in the Caribbean. Th e economic 
importance of the markets in the New World was far less to the Dutch. 
Th e Dutch slaveholding colonies were not nearly as dynamic as those of 
Britain. However, the combination of having a settlement colony in the 
North with a growing market consisting of people who are on average 
wealthier than most European consumers, in addition to a dynamic set 
of slaveholding colonies in the Caribbean, was absent in the Dutch case. 
And that’s why I think the impact on the Dutch economy of the Dutch 
colonies in the New World was only very limited.4
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Why do you think there was no large-scale migration from the Netherlands to 
its colonies in the New World, like there was from Britain to North America?
Th at’s an excellent question and a very diffi  cult one to answer. Th e 
propensity to migrate among Europeans in the various countries diff ers 
widely, even today. And we only have some vague indications why this is 
so. First, one of the explanations is that the internal mobility in a country 
is related to the external mobility. In other words, the number of emigrants 
is larger when the internal mobility in a country is high. Th e internal 
mobility in Holland was not very high, and when regional shortages in 
the labour markets occurred the Dutch resorted to importing labour from 
outside the Netherlands—much more so than was the case in Britain. 
Th e Dutch were not alone in this. France was a country with less internal 
mobility and certainly less emigration than the UK. So, again, the British 
were unique in having both a high internal mobility and a high emigration 
rate. Secondly, the Dutch were able to send many young, unmarried, poor 
males abroad, but they were used as sailors and soldiers in the tropical 
sections of the world rather than as colonists. In the Atlantic, the Dutch 
trade was directed mostly towards the tropical zones, and less towards the 
non-tropical ones. In Asia the Dutch did the same. Th e Dutch-Asiatic 
shipping project at Leiden University revealed that the Dutch East India 
Company sent about one million men to tropical Asia, half of them non-
Dutch. Less than half eventually returned to Europe. So my feeling is that 
the Dutch obviously felt that it was more to their commercial advantage to 
explore and exploit that dangerous, lethal niche of tropical colonial trade, 
rather than to send large numbers of colonists overseas as the British did. 
In Britain, small planting companies fi nanced by a couple of merchants 
succeeded in bringing the colonists to North America, and those small 
companies did not exist in the Netherlands, or in France for that matter.
In a chapter you wrote for the recently published volume, A Deus ex Machina 
Revisited: Atlantic Colonial Trade and European Economic Development 
(2006), you opened with the sentence: ‘“Globalization” is a term coined by 
journalists in order to impress people who don’t know history.’5 What did you 
mean by that?
I think there is a strange idea that the world during the last ten or fi fteen 
years has become more globalised than before. In fact, the peak of the 
development towards globalisation is far behind us. If you look at the 
percentage of goods not produced in your own country, but produced 
elsewhere, it was higher in the period of the 1500s, 1600s. Th en the national 
economies started growing much more rapidly than the international 
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economy. Now, of course, it’s increasing again. But compared to the goods 
and services produced either domestically, or in neighbouring countries, 
or on the same continent, we’re still dealing with a small percentage of 
really global trade. More products are now produced in countries that 
were traditional importers, and it has always been attractive to import 
cheaper goods from outside, provided they have a similar quality to the 
goods produced at home. But if you look at the trade of those countries 
with a small domestic economy such as the Netherlands, Norway and, 
say, Luxembourg—and there are few countries in the world where trade 
makes up such a large share of the GDP—you will see that fi rst of all most 
of the trade is domestic, then second in size is the trade with neighbouring 
countries, third in size is the trade within the developed countries of the 
Western world, and the trade with the Th ird World is smallest in size. So 
the whole idea of globalisation is, I think, a straw man.
Th e reasons for European global expansion in the fi rst place are the source 
of much debate among historians. What do you think was responsible for 
stimulating European expansion?
Obviously, there is a combination of motives. Some of it, in my view, can 
be attributed to a spirit of pure inquisitiveness. To try and sail around 
Africa, not really thinking about trade or penetrating the interior, but more 
just to see what the world looked like, I think that is typically European. 
Obviously that spirit was lacking elsewhere, because sailing round the globe 
was technologically not impossible for others. Th e Chinese, the Indians 
or the Arabs could have done the same thing. It’s a myth that Europeans 
expanded because they were technologically superior. Research has shown 
that the ‘big divide’ between European technology and that of the rest 
of the world is something that came later. So Europeans were inquisitive 
about what the world looked like, what other people were doing and not 
doing. In addition, there were also private investors in Europe who felt 
that they could make money by sending ships and sometimes colonists to 
non-European parts of the world. Th at fi nancial drive is also something 
that is lacking elsewhere. Th e Chinese could have done the same, and they 
did send colonists to other sections of Asia, but not further away. And 
eventually they closed up the country, and that would have impossible 
to do in multi-nation Europe. Europeans were always in competition 
with one another. Trying to conquer overseas possessions outside Europe 
became a sign of political prestige in Europe. Th at was another reason for 
European expansion. Another point that is perhaps sometimes overlooked 
is the fact that Europe was the only continent, I think, where it was 
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possible to migrate freely. In other words, in Western Europe migration 
was an individual decision. You could move 200 or 300 miles away in the 
hope of improving your standard of living. Th at was very diffi  cult to do in, 
say, Africa. Lone travellers on any road in Africa were like walking bags of 
money for the slave traders. I’m not so sure what the situation was in Asia. 
It could be that it was possible there to move—protected—to another 
place. But I think Europe was unique in the sense that in many parts of 
Europe it was possible to make an individual decision to migrate, and that 
an individual could travel safely over long distances. In Germany and 
elsewhere in the centre of Europe, people had a choice whether to move 
eastward or westward. Most people in Germany moved eastward, towards 
what are now Russia and the Balkans, while a smaller percentage moved 
westward. In view of the geographical location of Britain, of course, it 
stands to reason that long-distance migrants from Britain moved to the 
New World.
Contemporary migration, especially from developing nations to Europe and 
North America, has become a much-debated issue, both within the Netherlands 
and abroad. Elsewhere you’ve advocated an ‘open door’ immigration policy.6 
Would you mind explaining this theory?
Well, the argument is very simple. If people are allowed to move where 
they want, we’ll have unrivalled economic growth. People will then settle 
where they feel they can use their talents best. And they will be able to 
compare their income before and afterwards, and thus be able to detect 
whether or not they’ve made the right decision in choosing to migrate. 
In an ideal world, that is the best possible procedure. People should be 
allowed to move freely and settle wherever they want to. In the real world, 
it’s more diffi  cult. Th e history of economic growth in the United States 
during the past two centuries can only be explained by open immigration. 
If there is a developed country with an open door policy, then the United 
States certainly comes very close. Everything is relative, of course, and 
I know all the hassle you now have to go through when you want to 
migrate to the US offi  cially. I’ve been a victim of that bureaucracy there 
myself. Yet, it’s a country that makes it possible, legally or illegally, for 
large numbers of people to come in. Anybody with a drive to earn money 
and do an honest job is accepted in the US. Whether you do it illegally by 
climbing over a fence at night or whether you do it by the book, anyone 
who enters the US with the intent to work and try to improve his status, 
legally or illegally, can stay, and will meet with a lot of understanding, if 
not sympathy. Th at is something that is ingrained in American society.
interview with piet emmer 181
Now let’s look at Europe. First of all within their continent, Europeans 
are not nearly as mobile as the population of the US. Today, if you’re a 
farmer in Sicily you earn just one-third of what a labourer in Munich 
earns, and yet you see virtually no migration any more between Sicily 
and Munich. Also, migration out of Europe has been drastically reduced 
since the economic growth of Western Europe started to pick up after 
the ravages of the Second World War. Th at means that to Europeans 
migration became a strange phenomenon, something for a limited number 
of refugees from the communist block who managed to slip through the 
Iron Curtain.
Migration had become something for losers. And because Western 
Europe had become static, it could construct a welfare state that is 
unique in the world. Th e solidarity in that welfare state—the fi nancial 
solidarity and the social solidarity—is extremely high. Th at welfare state 
is very generous for those living in that state, but hostile to immigrants, 
particularly if they threaten to take more from the welfare state than 
they give. Th at explains the present attitude in Europe, and that’s why 
I think that advocating an open door policy is now mostly an academic 
undertaking in Western Europe. Because in Western Europe you can only 
be an advocate of the free movement of people if at the same time you 
advocate abolishing the welfare state.
Th e European Union has implemented an open door policy of sorts, albeit on 
a smaller, continental scale. What.do you think will be the consequences of 
opening national borders within Europe for individual welfare states?
I think what we want to do is have the best of two worlds. We want 
to keep the welfare state, but open the borders within Europe. At the 
same time we realise that nowhere is the population ageing as rapidly as 
in Western and Eastern Europe. Migration movements from Eastern to 
Western Europe, from the new member states of the EU, are declining and 
will never be substantial and permanent. In the past, a similar mechanism 
operated between Southern Europe and Western Europe, when Spain, 
Portugal and Italy had become members of the EU. And as soon as these 
new member states began to experience a higher economic growth than 
the old, industrial heartland of Europe, like the UK, the Netherlands and 
France, migration stopped and the Spanish, Portuguese and Italians stayed 
put. Actually, Spain is now the country with the largest immigration of 
all EU member states. Emigration can change into immigration very 
rapidly. Th at is now happening with migration fl ows from the Ukraine, 
Russia and Belarus to Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland. And 
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after Bulgaria and Romania become member states you will again see an 
upsurge in emigration and then a decline again as soon as the economies 
of these new members grow more rapidly than those of the older EU states. 
You do not need absolute equality of wages in order to stop people from 
migrating, but long before that point migration will decline as long as the 
growth rate at home is increasing. And after the migration from Rumania 
and Bulgaria has levelled off , the EU needs to consider the immigration 
from non-western countries. Th at will not be an easy decision as the 
non-EU immigrants from Turkey, Morocco and the Caribbean have done 
very poorly in the past. Brussels could perhaps set standards for that, in 
designing a green card system for example, or a points system. At this 
very moment, most European countries are designing new immigration 
laws using very selective criteria. So if you admit people into your welfare 
state you make sure that in the end they will contribute more than they 
take out, or at least not become a burden on the welfare system, as some 
previous groups of immigrants have been.
Would an open door immigration policy benefi t only the West, or would the 
sending nations also benefi t?
Both. We should not exaggerate the negative impact of emigration on 
poor countries, but studies have shown that emigrants—particularly the 
fi rst generation—do actually send a lot of money back home. Some of 
that money is used for conspicuous consumption, for example to build 
houses that stand empty most of the year or buy big cars. It has also been 
shown that in very poor sending countries money is often used to enable 
the family of the emigrants to buy extra food and clothing. However, 
there is a whole range of countries where family members use that money 
to set up small businesses. For the US, it’s Mexico. For the Netherlands, 
it’s Turkey, Morocco and Suriname. In contrast to the offi  cial developing 
aid, it’s very unlikely that that money sent home by emigrants will wind 
up in some under-the-counter deal or in a numbered Swiss bank account. 
So remittances can be benefi cial and stimulate development, although if 
you look at the numbers you would need a very small sending country 
with a very high percentage of emigrants to really make it work. Yet the 
Philippines obtain 6 per cent of their foreign earnings by way of money 
sent home from emigrants. But, say for India, it’s important but it’s very 
small in relation to the economy as a whole. It goes for all countries, 
though, that offi  cial developing aid amounts to only half, or one-third, or 
even a quarter of what is sent home by emigrants. So I think that private 
remittances are really the way forward.
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Th e other side of the debate is the problem of brain drain, because the 
emigrants who are educated in the countries where they are born are some 
of the most attractive immigrants in the rich West. In most poor countries 
the education of students is paid for by the public purse, and that makes 
emigration similar to a loss of investment, detrimental to the sending 
country. But you could argue fi rst of all that that is an internal problem 
in the developing country. If they off er free education to those who are 
most likely to emigrate, they should change that system by taxing those 
who leave or by charging tuition for university education. Provide free 
education only for those who remain in the country. Anyway, developing 
countries could have devised a system to make it work, but the ruling 
elite likes to provide its children with an education that is paid for by tax 
money. And secondly, you could argue that educated emigrants can sell 
their expertise and skills at much higher prices in the West than at home. 
‘Brains’ are an excellent export item. If you can’t sell your products on 
the world market, sell your brains. And that’s what’s happening at the 
moment.
Studies on migration have increased substantially in the past decade. Do you 
notice any general patterns in the direction that new historical research on 
migration is taking?
Yes. We’re learning more about the reasons why people decide to migrate, 
both economic and non-economic reasons. We’re learning more about 
the migration policies of the migrants themselves—stock migration, 
family migration. We’re learning more about the sexual divisions among 
migrants: for example why it is that unmarried men migrate more than 
women, and whether there has been a change over time. So I think 
migration research is important and is changing. But there is still too 
much of a divide, I feel, between the study of European migrants in the 
western world and of non-European migrants in the rest of the world, 
such as slaves and indentured labourers. In the case of the migration to 
the New World, European and African migrants have traditionally been 
seen as so very diff erent that scholars did not even dare to think about 
making such comparisons. While you must keep in mind the diff erences 
between free and unfree migration, in some cases a comparison can be 
fruitful. For instance, we always thought that racism was behind the 
terrible conditions aboard slave ships. Hundreds of slaves were confi ned 
to a very small space, and suff ered high mortality rates en route to their 
destination. But research on European migrants to North America in the 
eighteenth century has actually revealed that in some instances the space 
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on board allotted to German migrants in the eighteenth century might 
have been even smaller than that of the slaves. So if you want to explain 
the higher mortality rates on the slave ships, the allotment of space might 
not have been as important as the diff erence in disease environment or 
diff erent conditions before boarding. Th at’s one example of how fruitful 
a comparison between free and unfree migrants can be, and the study of 
these two groups has been separated for too long. So, there’s still a long 
way to go.
What are you working on now?
At this very moment, I’m working on a book summarising the history 
of the Caribbean. I think we have learned a lot lately from diff erent 
perspectives on the slave trade and slavery, compared to what we used to 
know about it fi fty years ago. And those new views have not yet penetrated 
the existing overviews of Caribbean history. My feeling is that we need to 
reconsider the historical stereotype of the Caribbean as a region equal to a 
hell on earth. A region where none of the immigrants actually wanted to 
be. Th e slaves would rather have stayed in Africa; the Europeans had come 
out only in order to make some money and to return; and the Asians were 
off ered a free return passage before they left Asia. However, when we look 
at the material conditions of the immigrants, we should realise that the 
region acted as a life buoy to many. Th at is what I would like to point out. 
I realise that the Caribbean has never been able to off er the opportunities 
and economic growth rates that North America was able to off er, but 
to many it was far better than the opportunities they had at home. Th e 
historiography regarding the immigration of Asians into the Caribbean is 
a case in point. Traditionally indentured labour from Asia has been seen as 
a new type of slavery. On the other hand, of course, it’s remarkable to see 
how many people actually tried to migrate as indentured laborers to the 
ex-slaveholding colonies in the West Indies and how many decided to stay 
and not use the free return passage. How do we explain that dichotomy? 
Western historians see a continuation of slavery, and at the same time 
historians of Asia are trying to explain the huge supply of mobile labour 
in India, Java, China, Japan and the Philippines. How could an ex-slave 
society in the New World be attractive to migrants? Was the standard of 
living there higher than in Asia? Th at is one of my projects.
Th e second project is to keep writing on present-day migration 
problems, and to try and arouse public interest in the wider view of 
migration. We need to do away with the narrow and negative view that 
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many people in Europe now have of migration, and I think that’s where 
historians can play a role. 
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‘I am not going to call myself a global 
historian’: Interview with C.A. Bayly
Binu M. John, at the time of the interview a Ph.D. Candidate in the TANAP 
program at Leiden University, interviewed Chris Bayly in his offi  ce in late 
2006.
You have already given a short account of your entry into the fi eld of South 
Asian studies in your work, Origins of Nationality in South Asia. Th ere you 
mentioned your fi rst overland travels to North India as an experience that 
triggered your interest in Indian history. To what degree have such ‘fi eld 
experiences’ infl uenced your writings?
Very much so, I think, and from the very beginning. On my fi rst trip to 
India I went to Gwalior with a friend who had spent a year teaching in 
the Sindhia School there. We travelled around the city and environs, met 
people with memories of the past and began to get a sense of what Gwalior 
and its fort might have been like in eighteenth-century India. From then 
on I remained interested in late-Mughal India and the very early British 
period, though it was nearly twenty years later that I published Rulers, 
Townsmen and Bazaars, a book about India in that period. In fact, I had 
originally intended to write a thesis on the eighteenth century. At that 
time, Dr. Ashin Das Gupta was teaching in Oxford and he confi rmed my 
interest in the period. He taught a specifi ed course on Warren Hastings 
and India, and I remember him saying: ‘I am not interested in Warren 
Hastings. I am interested in India in the eighteenth century.’ Th is was 
shortly after I came back from the trip to Gwalior. Th e reason I didn’t study 
eighteenth-century India for my Ph.D. was that Ashin Das Gupta soon left 
the University and S. Gopal replaced him as Reader in Indian History at 
Oxford. Gopal was just beginning to work on his biography of Jawaharlal 
Nehru and he obviously wanted some background to Nehru’s early life. 
So he suggested that I write a thesis on Nehru’s home city, Allahabad. It 
was only later that I came to know why he made this suggestion. But I 
think he was probably right. At that time, there was developing interest, 
particularly in Cambridge but also in India, in the nationalist movement. 
Going to one Indian city and hinterland, working on it quite intensively 
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for three to four years was actually a good way of getting into the subject. 
At that time, they didn’t really teach Indian History as such at Oxford. 
It was really Colonial History and Indian history was simply tacked on 
to it. So, for me, the path into the proper study of Indian history was 
living in Allahabad and seeing the complexity of the city. I moved round 
diff erent areas, looking at the central part of the city where the merchant 
community resided and examining the links between the inner city and 
the people who lived in the Civil Lines and Cantonment. Th at was the 
time when I became interested in the local politics and commerce of north 
Indian cities and I moved on from that over the following decade.
You also mentioned your travels in the south. What were the diff erences 
you perceived between North and South India? Are they diff erences in the 
perception of historians or are they based on actual historical facts?
In order to answer this question one thing we have to consider is the 
Mughal state. Of course, the Mughal state itself was based upon a series 
of underlying political segments. So the distinction between ‘north’ and 
‘south’ should not be made too great. But it does seem to me that the 
state, and particularly the Indo-lslamic state, did have a kind of presence 
in North India that it didn’t have in quite same way in the south. For 
example, take the case of the kingdom of Arcot in the eighteenth century. 
Th is was formally an Indo-Muslim state with features in common with 
the Mughal provinces of the North. But it had a very small revenue base 
and little more than a vague claim to local political authority. Of course, 
it’s possible to exaggerate the power of the Mughal state even at its centre. 
Th e Aligarh historians probably wanted to see the Mughals as a kind of 
precursor to the British, as a very strong, centralised state. While Irfan 
Habib himself sometimes viewed the Mughal state as a shifting system, 
Athar Ali, in particular, emphasised its character as a centralised, highly 
rational empire. As a comparative assessment alone, this is partly correct. 
Quite apart from language and cultural diff erences, South India had much 
less experience of the extractive pre-colonial state than did the North. At 
the same time, I don’t want to go to the extreme of saying that history is 
simply constructed by historians. Otherwise, we would be out of a job!
Colonialism is the recurrent theme in your books. Are you somewhat 
‘sympathetic’ to colonial rule, as you have been concerned with discerning 
the ‘co-operative’ and somewhat weak structure of colonial administration—
giving enough room for the local elites to exploit the condition in India—than 
with its destructive impact on the colonized society?
interview with c.a. bayly 189
I think there is a certain degree of misunderstanding here. To say that 
the impact of colonial rule was elusive and often weak, as some historians 
including myself have suggested, does not mean that it was not very 
destructive at some times and in some places. I have suggested that North 
India in the early nineteenth century was still in a state of war, and not 
just in 1857–59. Th ere were constant peasant movements and landholder 
rebellions going on in all parts of the country. Company troops were 
constantly shooting ‘dacoits,’ burning villages and hanging headmen. To 
say that the Company state was weak doesn’t mean that it wasn’t destructive. 
It was an intrusive force, but a very uneven one with only limited means. 
Th ere is an assumption in much of the historiography that the strong 
and eff ective colonial state that people saw in the 1930s and 1940s was 
typical of the whole period right back to 1757. Th at wasn’t the case. As for 
‘cooperation’ or ‘collaboration,’ the British Empire in India couldn’t have 
functioned without a considerable degree of Indian cooperation, even if 
it was unwilling. Th e British wanted to rule India without paying for it. 
Th ey needed a ‘free army’ in the form of the presidency armies, and later 
the Indian Army. Indian troops, like Indian merchants and Indian writers 
and scribes, were central to the operation of empire.
Do you also entertain the view that the collapse of the Mughal Empire had a 
decisive impact on Indian society or not?
My point is that it would be wrong to say that the period of the Mughal 
Empire saw complete centralised rule and social harmony. Equally, 
it would be wrong to see the eighteenth century as a period of total 
warfare and anarchy. Later, when we see once again the appearance of a 
more centralised form of rule under the East India Company, it doesn’t 
mean there aren’t local factional confl icts and rebellions, as I just said. 
What I wanted to do in Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars was to get away 
from the perception of universal decline and anarchy in the eighteenth 
century. Th ere were new forms emerging: new political forms, new forms 
of trading relationships and new relations between town and country. 
Mughal elites migrated from the old centres such as Delhi and Agra and 
re-established themselves in new centres where they fostered relations 
with existing power-holders. Another helpful thing about this perspective 
is that it diminishes the diff erence between the North and the South. 
Hyderabad, Arcot, even Madras, were places to which groups from North 
India migrated and where they built new social forms.
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In that case, do you think that it is a sort of replacement of the existing power(s) 
by a new emerging power rather than the emergence of a new system after the 
decline of the earlier ones?
Yes, that is right. Obviously, British rule by 1820s was much stronger and 
much more intrusive, certainly taking more taxation than the previous 
eighteenth-century rulers. But, in some respects at least, the post-Mughal 
kingdoms anticipated the form of the British provinces.
You have mentioned in an earlier interview that ‘modernity’ did not have an 
entirely ‘Western’ origin, and you favour the concept of ‘multiple modernities,’ 
some of which had their roots in Asia. Th en how do you explain ‘the rise of 
the West’ in the nineteenth century and the comparative decline of the East? 
Do you think that colonial rule did not play an important role in this decline 
in India? Or was it the inherent inability of Indian society to modernise itself 
that resulted in its decline?
Th e key phrase is ‘comparative decline.’ My book, Th e Birth of the Modern 
World, tries to show that western dominance did not completely wipe out 
movements of progressive change in the rest of the world. Clearly ‘the West’ 
was dominant during much of the nineteenth century for certain reasons: 
its military strength, the vibrancy of its ‘civil society,’ the accumulation of 
knowledge, the worldwide projection of power, and so on. However, this 
doesn’t mean there were no developments elsewhere. Th ere were changes 
and, in fact, positive changes, progressive changes in non-European 
societies, and some of those, I think, had their origins in the period before 
that of European dominance. If we take the form of government in late 
Qing China and of the type of evolving economic system in nineteenth-
century Japan, these were not simply the products of Western domination, 
but the consequences of its people striving against Western domination, 
using resources drawn from the earlier histories of their own societies. 
So, what I am suggesting is a halfway position between those who still 
stress the ‘triumph of the West,’ on the one hand, and writers such as 
Andre Gunder Frank, on the other, who seem to suggest that there wasn’t 
anything particular about the West, and the dominance of the West 
happened almost by chance and as a consequence of the ‘collapse of the 
others.’ I think that the truth is somewhere in the middle. I have always 
been interested in the non-Western origins of the modern world. I pointed 
out, for instance, how Asian merchant communities survived Western 
domination and re-emerged as powerful forces in the post-colonial world. 
I am not just thinking about inland Indian merchants here, but I am also 
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referring to the overseas Chinese diaspora, the Indian Ocean Hadrami 
traders, and so on.
You also paid due attention to the role of religions in world history. Do you 
think that the revival of ‘world religions’ in the nineteenth century changed 
the character of what you call the ‘pre-history of communalism’ in India from 
an earlier period?
Many scholars have failed to notice that there is a question mark in the title 
of my article ‘Th e Pre-history of Communalism?’. Certainly, there were 
many pre-colonial religious confl icts. Sanjay Subrahmanyam has recently 
confi rmed this, using many more sources than I can read. But the type 
of religious confl ict that occurred before colonial rule did not have the 
eff ect of breaking up society into competing communal blocs. Even in the 
twentieth century many of the ‘religious confl icts’ that we observe were 
quite local. Th ey did not result in the collapse of social relations between 
the various religious communities. I think this argument is perfectly 
compatible with the argument that in the nineteenth century religion 
began to take on a new form. Religions began to mimic or imitate each 
other. All religious leaderships by the late nineteenth century felt that they 
had to have history, that they needed a creed and rules for certain forms 
of deportment. One begins to see what one could call ‘Islamisation’ or 
‘Hinduisation.’ Religion did, in fact, become something rather diff erent, 
increasing the sense of competing communities that colonial political 
arrangements helped to foster. Th at is not to say that much of society 
didn’t still operate on the older pattern of religious interaction. I would 
argue that there was a pre-history of religious confl ict in India and that it 
involved the generation of competing ideologies and some degree of social 
confl ict. But ‘communalism,’ the breaking of society into huge, mutually 
hostile blocs, was very much a feature of the 1930s and 1940s. It was part 
of the civil war to appropriate the colonial state.
How much has the contemporary religious revival around the world infl uenced 
your thought process while writing about the signifi cance of religion in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries? Is it a kind of ‘projection’ from the 
present to the past?
My interest in religion pre-dates the emergence of what people now call 
Hindutva and ‘Islamic fundamentalism,’ because they are really a feature 
of the period after Ajodhya or 9/11, when a real debate about religion 
began, in particular about Islam. My interest in religion in India actually 
goes back to my fi rst visits there. I don’t think that I am simply projecting 
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backward contemporary situations, but certainly my views have become 
stronger in recent years. Many historians—and I’m not only referring 
to secular Indian historians, but also to western social historians—
underestimated the signifi cance of religion in their works of the 1970s and 
1980s. Th ere was a general belief that religion had declined in the course 
of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It was a terrible shock for them 
when Islamists, Hindutva ideologues or American born-again Christians 
suddenly came into view. My position explains the persistence and even 
growth of religious belief and practice much more eff ectively.
You believe in the emergence of a ‘modern period’ by the end of the eighteenth 
century when many people began to believe that they were living in a ‘modern 
world’. Th en do you also believe in a ‘post-modern’ period in history?
What I wanted to get away from was the idea that there was some kind of 
essence of modernity that took hold, either in the sixteenth century or in 
the seventeenth or eighteenth centuries. My point is twofold. Modernity 
was not one thing, but many things that came to be intertwined especially 
after 1750. So modern forms of economic management combined with a 
modern state and with new forms of warfare. It was the interaction of all 
these forces at a very rapid pace that created what we call modernity. But 
there’s still an essential element lacking from that formulation, which is 
that people need to feel that there is a concept of ‘modernity’ and I think 
really from the eighteenth century that concept of modernity became 
much stronger and much more refl ective. At about this time, people began 
to justify their thoughts and actions in terms of what was modern rather 
than by calling on the past to provide legitimacy. Th is was true in some 
Asian societies as well. People began to write ‘histories of the moderns’ in 
the Islamic Middle East and South Asia, for instance.
What about ‘post-modernism’?
What I see is that the processes of ‘modernity’ continue to speed up at a 
transnational or global level. However, I don’t believe the argument that 
the state is falling apart and everything in social or economic life is now 
fl uid. On the contrary, it seems to me that there was a short period towards 
the end of the twentieth century when the state was in trouble. But this 
was only a tremor. If anything, the nation state has become more powerful 
again since the 1990s. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri have written 
in their book Empire that there is something above the state which is 
created by the interaction between super-states and capitalism. But I don’t 
think that either in volume or in form this is very diff erent from what we 
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earlier called ‘modernity.’ I don’t mind if you want to call this period ‘late 
modernity.’ But I don’t think we are in an age of ‘post-modernity.’ Today’s 
increasingly multi-centred and fl uid world is in some senses no more than 
a return to the conditions of the eighteenth century.
Have ‘post-colonial’ writings infl uenced your approach towards history?
To some extent one can’t help but be infl uenced by them. But I suspect 
that the post-modernist emphasis on ‘fragments’ or the subaltern school’s 
emphasis on resistance is actually a continuation of earlier trends in 
historical writing. Th e French Annales school made the real breakthrough 
long ago. Th e emphasis on the history of experience and on the autonomy 
of localities or individual actors goes right back to Marc Bloch in the 
1930s. Again, subaltern history was anticipated by the writing of E.P. 
Th ompson and Christopher Hill in their emphasis on resistance and the 
‘world turned upside down.’ Post-modern and post-colonial history always 
comes back to the history of elites and the state in order to understand 
why things change. Post-colonialism is more a ‘brand name’ than a new 
way of doing history or the social sciences.
How far has your ‘ local’ knowledge of South Asian history helped you to write 
or infl uenced your writing of a ‘world’ history?
Well, very much. My book, Birth of the Modern World, came out of 
undergraduate teaching. When I was lecturing to students on the very 
broad canvas of the ‘Expansion of Europe’ or ‘Th e West and the Th ird 
World,’ I always had in mind the experience of South Asia. Th ough I am 
sure that historians born in South Asia would have written it diff erently, 
I was attempting to go beyond the bounds of Western historiography. I 
didn’t want to write just another story of the ‘rise of the West,’ as I said 
earlier. I have always remained a local historian and a regional historian as 
well as writing world history, and I am not going to call myself simply a 
‘global historian.’ Historians have a tendency to become very parochial and 
privilege their own method. Th ere is great resistance to transnational or 
world history in some quarters today. Th irty years ago some historians said 
that I was wasting my time by writing a study of only one city, Allahabad. 
My position is that global history, when done well, can explain connections 
and bring up valuable comparisons that would otherwise be invisible. But 
this is in no way to diminish urban history, local history, national history 
or regional history. All these methods continue to throw up important 
arguments and fi ndings and can be employed simultaneously.
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Tell me about the Cambridge–Delhi–Leiden–Yogya programme of the 
comparative history of India and Indonesia in the 1980s and whether you 
found that a stimulating experience when later writing a ‘world history’?
I think international comparisons and connections are very valuable even 
if they don’t necessarily produce immediate published work. Th ey do put 
us in touch with other scholars and other intellectual traditions. I have 
always been very interested in the diff ering views of Asian history coming 
out of Delhi, Yogyakarta, Leiden, Cambridge and Oxford. Meeting 
historians such as Andre Wink, Henk Wesseling, Dharma Kumar, Om 
Prakash and Dirk Kolff  through this scheme was quite fascinating. Some 
of the published work that came out of these meetings was very interesting. 
But it was the long-term eff ects of informal contacts and discussions with 
scholars in diff erent fi elds, who were working in diff erent ways, that really 
mattered.
Th ere is a widespread belief among academics that the new generation is 
turning away from the social sciences. Peter van der Veer in a recent symposium 
[2006] and John Wills in an earlier interview with Itinerario mentioned this. 
Th e latter particularly noted the increasing uncertainty that even the best 
students face in pursuing a career after getting their degree. What are your 
thoughts on this?
Actually, I think that the number of jobs available to the younger 
generation has increased massively since I fi rst came into the profession. 
But the supply has gone up even faster. Th erefore, even some of the best 
students can’t easily fi nd jobs and go into other professions. In my view 
this is not necessarily a bad thing. Some of my recent graduate students 
have left the teaching profession. Some of them have gone into business, 
overseas aid work and some have been recruited by ‘think tanks.’ One 
of my recent Ph.D. students, who wrote on the British campaigns in the 
Middle East during the First World War, is now working for a Middle 
East ‘think tank.’ It’s not a bad thing to spread academic knowledge in 
this way because thinking critically about history may stimulate critical 
thinking about the contemporary world. We badly need this. Th ere may 
be diff erences between European academia and some very specialised 
academic systems, such as the American one, where people are 35 by the 
time they fi nish their Ph.D.s. In our system, where people fi nish their 
Ph.D. by the age of 26, they can contemplate a life outside academia. 
On the other hand, the crisis of the social sciences can be exaggerated. 
New centres of excellence are emerging even while some older ones face 
trouble. I was in Warsaw a couple of weeks ago for a conference and there 
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is a fl ourishing history department at Warsaw University. Th ere are people 
studying a wide range of historical topics, from Ottoman history through 
Russian history to the history of Latin America.
As a scholar particularly interested in the Indian subcontinent, what is your 
scholarly interaction with Indian academia?
Th ere must be about twenty-fi ve of my Ph.D. students working in Indian 
universities or Indian students who have gone to British, European or 
North American universities. So I have many Indian colleagues and 
friends. In India, my connections with Jawaharlal Nehru University and 
Delhi University are particularly strong. Th ough I have begun to return to 
the subcontinent, I haven’t gone to India so much recently, mainly because 
I have been working on a Southeast Asian project. My colleague Tim 
Harper and I have published two books on the region: Forgotten Armies: 
Th e Fall of British Asia, 1941–1945 and Forgotten Wars: Freedom and 
Revolution in Southeast Asia. So in recent years I have been to Myanmar, 
Singapore and Malaysia. But I’m about to return to the full-time study of 
Indian history and I am working on Indian liberalism in the nineteenth 
century, or what we might mean by Indian liberalism in the nineteenth 
century. Th e fi rst results of this will be in a volume of the journal Modern 
Intellectual History to be published in April 2007. Eight of us, from India, 
Britain and the USA, have tried to suggest ways we might develop an 
intellectual history of modern South Asia.
What is the current situation of South Asian studies at Cambridge University 
and in the UK in general? Is it comparable to the conditions at the start of your 
studies at Oxford, which you referred to earlier?
When I was at Oxford you could study only one document-based subject, 
which had some Indian history inserted into it. You couldn’t study 
Indian history as such. Modern history, as it was called, was the history 
of Western Europe, especially France, Germany and southern England. 
Well, that has changed. Th ere are courses on South Asian studies, even in 
Oxford and certainly in Cambridge and London. So it is possible to study 
South Asian history. Of course, the other point is that graduate studies 
have expanded very greatly over this period. Th ere were very few people 
before the 1960s taking history Ph.D.s at all. Now my own South Asian 
and imperial history Ph.D. group has fi fteen or more students, including 
fi ve Indians, several continental Europeans, two or three British students, 
and several North Americans. It is a very diverse and international group 
and my colleagues all have similarly large groups. However, there is a 
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crisis, I would say, in the study of early India in Britain, and to some 
extent elsewhere. Cambridge has decided that it can’t aff ord to keep the 
Sanskrit undergraduate course, though the subject will be taught at the 
graduate level. My job in the next year or so will be to try to create a 
postgraduate course in both modern South Asian studies and classical 
South Asian studies. Still, there is tremendous general interest in modern 
Indian or South Asian history, and in Indian development economics, 
anthropology and geography, partly, of course, because of the growth of 
the Indian economy. I remain hopeful about the future. 
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Th e Retreat of the Elephants: Interview with 
Mark Elvin
Mark Elvin is currently visiting fellow at the Research School of Pacifi c and 
Asian Studies at the Australian National University. His research interests in 
Chinese history include environment, economy, demography, proto-science, 
geography and emotions. He has published extensively on these subjects. Among 
his key publications are Th e Retreat of the Elephants: An Environmental 
History of China (2004), Th e Pattern of the Chinese Past (1973), Cultural 
Atlas of China (edited with C. Blunden, 1998), Another History (1996), 
Changing Stories in the Chinese World (1997), and Sediments of Time: 
Environment and Society in Chinese History (edited with Liu Ts’ui-jung, 
1998). Frans-Paul van der Putten and Bede Moore met him when he was in 
Leiden for the Crayenborgh Lecture.
Mark, perhaps you could start by telling us how you fi rst became interested in 
China?
Well, there’s a background and there’s a foreground. Th e background is 
that my earliest years of remembered life were in San Francisco. So I never 
knew a world where there weren’t Chinese people around. In other words, 
they were never particularly strange or exotic. China was just part of the 
Pacifi c world. Th at’s the background. Th en, much later, when I was doing 
history at Cambridge, I got interested in the work of two people. One was 
Joseph Needham, whom I soon got to know, on the history of science and 
technology in China. Th e other was Max Weber—so I got interested in 
the comparative method. And it struck me, even though now it seems very 
obvious, that the nearest miss from self-generated modernity, when put in 
comparison with Europe, was China.
So I thought I would look at the economic reasons for this, as I was 
basically an economic historian in my impulses. It then happened that I 
needed to do the doctorate. In the Yenching Library at Harvard I found 
a rare book containing 1,020 documents from the Chinese Municipal 
Council at Shanghai, which turned out, when looked at, to be the world’s 
fi rst Chinese-run democracy; it had everything that was necessary. 
So I wrote a thesis on that, and it showed me that what was then the 
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completely conventional view that the Chinese were not culturally suited 
to democracy was just rubbish, at least at a low level in the hierarchy of 
political institutions. My ideas were extremely unpopular and the thesis 
was read by hardly anybody until much later.
Can you say something about the Shanghai Council? How did it originate?
Yes, that was an interesting question and it led to a huge argument in 
private with John Fairbank. It seemed to me that there were many roots, 
one of which involved the much-neglected institution of the episodic 
gentry-assembly at local levels in China. It also turned out that a number 
of the guilds in the past two or three centuries had had quasi-elections, 
which I called ‘public selections.’ Th e general opinion of the members 
was vital to installing people in leadership positions. Th e idea of it is clear 
enough. Th ere was a lot of local commitment by members of the gentry 
and the leading merchants to various forms of things that were on the 
edge of a kind of corporate democracy.
Elements of limited democracy came together quite rapidly, and people 
knew what they were doing. Th ey started in 1905, and by 1908 they had 
a lot of fairly respectable organograms—separating policy formulation 
from its execution, for example—a lot of specialised services. Th ey were 
promoting primary education for girls, as well as of course for boys; 
they were running originally a municipal hospital where treatment was 
meant to be free—they couldn’t get funds enough for this so they went 
commercial, but they had the ideal of doing this.
My reaction at that time to the general wisdom of sociologists writing 
on China in that epoch was that it was 50 per cent rubbish. So I became 
for a short time a very unpopular political historian, being accused of 
being a romantic reactionary. I said the best course for China would 
have been to have a Japanese-style semi-constitutional monarchy, which 
allowed these local and provincial experiments at democracy to get some 
real roots, which they never did. I justifi ed it afterwards by saying this 
is also part of modernity; and this is a very interesting example of the 
diffi  cult Chinese case: there’s a lot more there than you think. Th ey never 
quite achieved what we would call self-generated modernity, but it came 
incredibly close.
You have named a number of fi elds in which you’ve worked in history. I’m 
wondering how it is that you have jumped from political history to writing 
environmental history, and beyond?
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It’s all a little mixed up together, generally speaking. Th e political history 
was actually a sheer accident. I shifted away after a while from it because I 
suppose I regarded it as not really my strength, but it was interesting and 
I remain interested in it. I was really an economic historian by instinct. 
How do people make things, sell them, use them seemed to me at that 
time to be the foundation of modern life. It was too simple because I was 
leaving out two of the other things, the science, which in the nineteenth 
century became critical to the continued development of the technology 
of production; and the environment, which led back very deep. It was very 
much later that I realised you can’t put the economy out in a world of its 
own. By the end of the 1960s it was obvious to me that the environment 
had to be taken into account.
Th en I became interested in science and China. Becoming a personal 
friend of Joseph Needham was a very important part of this process. Th ere 
had been a very odd bifurcation between those who knew a bit about the 
economic history (as I thought I did by then) and those who really knew 
about scientifi c and technological history, as Joseph did, while having a 
much less sure grasp of the economic side; China was becoming a large 
fi eld and taking it all into one’s consciousness was even then becoming 
extremely diffi  cult, and not only for the comparative historian. It’s so 
easy to get it wrong. At any rate, both agreeing with and arguing with 
Needham was a very critical point in getting me involved in the history 
of science. I went for a long time to the history of science seminars given 
at Oxford by my late friend Alaistair Crombie. In fact, I built very much 
on Crombie’s own work in trying to look at China’s science more sensibly. 
Forget the word ‘science,’ use ‘diff erent styles of scientifi c thinking.’ 
Crombie found six basic styles of Western European scientifi c thinking 
which were critical, and you can show that all of them—except probably 
‘probabilistic’ thinking—were found to a signifi cant degree in premodern 
China. In other words, you have the same phenomenon I mentioned earlier. 
Th e Chinese had managed to be impressive, but they never got across the 
line and to a self-sustaining, self-generating situation. Comparison with 
China remains indispensable for sharpening up the thinking of slightly 
Euro-chauvinistic historians. Th ey’re quite right, Europe was special. For 
how much longer we don’t know, but it is, or has been, special. And I 
thought it was worth taking real trouble to get away from the clichés and 
work out what is the real nature of this country.
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Can you tell us what you think the role of the environment in Chinese history 
is?
Let me say, I don’t think you can actually do any Chinese economic history, 
or at least not anything large- or middle-scale, without being constantly 
aware of certain environmental factors. You must, for example, take the 
‘environmental buff er’ into account, and its eventual near-disappearance, 
which made intermittent shortages much harder to handle. Historically, 
the real crisis came very late for China, above all in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, since at that point so much of the vulnerable sub-
tropical temperate soil was being stripped of trees. You get enormous 
erosion problems, and again you need to be aware of this. I mean, for 
example, the costs of irrigation maintenance exploded. Obviously, that’s 
economically important to consider. And it becomes a huge cost on labour 
when they have to start doing much more dredging, and it’s going on 
all over the place. Th is is just a small example, but it shows how you 
must remain conscious of the environment. It’s really best taken not as an 
independent subject, but as something that a historian must always bear 
in mind.
What about today? What role does the environment play in contemporary 
China?
Th e simple answer is water. Nothing matters as much as water. Clearly, 
Chinese environmental pollution has led to enormous health problems 
that are connected not just with water but with other things. But to focus 
on just one thing: northern China is going to run out of water. It’s been 
relying for some time on supplies of ground water, which have been falling 
more than a metre a year in some places. Th e Yellow River has basically 
stopped reaching the sea, and the quality of water is spectacularly awful. 
Th e water problem, particularly in north China, is completely critical and 
there’s just nothing else that compares with it. Th ere simply is not enough 
water in the north. Th ere is enough in the Yangzi, but it will have to be 
used properly.
As an issue, environmental conservation is both taken very seriously 
and completely ignored. Chinese environmental law, for example, is some 
of the best in the world, or at least last time I looked at it. Th e trouble is 
that enforcement is usually handed over to the local authorities, who are 
getting large incomes from the local industries, and are therefore extremely 
unwilling to prosecute. Essentially, fi nes for infractions have become 
a form of local government income. In other words, they do not take 
enforcement at all seriously. Th e only exception is modern, hi-tech joint 
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venture operations with foreign fi rms, where often very high standards 
are applied. So I think the problem with conservation and other desirable 
outcomes is that the law is great, the rules are great, but the enforcement 
has fallen completely foul of a desire to increase local government income. 
Th e thing that will probably eventually make a diff erence to political 
motivation is concern with health.
To go back to the history of science in China, one of the topics on everybody’s 
lips is the ‘Great Divergence,’ to borrow from Kenneth Pomeranz. What do 
you think about arguments based on coal, or the New World, or even culture? 
Where does science play a role?
Th ere’s a lot of coal in China and if they’d developed anything like the 
British mining techniques, which they had the elements for in terms of 
drainage and ventilation, they could have done much better. Basically, we 
don’t really know how much coal they could have got out. Th ey were using 
coal enthusiastically in some places. It’s hard to tell because, certainly 
looking at the maps, there is an awful lot of it in China. Th e notion that 
they couldn’t have produced a lot more if they’d wanted to badly enough 
using accessible techniques is a little hard to believe. I don’t agree with 
Pomeranz, although I have a great regard for him and think everyone 
should buy his book, as I said in my review. But I don’t think he’s got the 
key point, which in my view was science, or, rather, the near-absence in 
China of its modern form before it was imported from the West.
Culture is elusive, and of course it is critical when you come to the 
point I was making. Why, when you can produce people like Zhu Zaiyu, 
with good mathematics and good experimental technique, and some 
correct results—why can’t you get a community going, within which a 
critical number of participants will interact? So clearly there is a cultural 
block, but it lies in a very, very special area. Th ey could produce a number 
of extremely acute thinkers, who paralleled many of the contemporary 
European thinkers up to sometime in the seventeenth century, but 
there was an insuffi  cient density of interest. Th ey were mostly somewhat 
isolated individuals (the fi eld of historical phonetics excepted) and they 
could not, it seems, fi nd or at least concentrate enough of them to get 
an interacting community going. So there was something missing in 
the collective operation, which wasn’t quite absolute (as the exception of 
phonetics shows), but which I think was completely crucial.
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So what happened to Chinese science after, let’s say, the 1800s?
Th ey basically began to slowly translate and read Western textbooks. 
And then by the beginning of the twentieth century there were a number 
of reasonable scientists mostly in practical areas like geology. It took a 
bit longer than it did in the case of Japan. Th e Japanese had got there 
a generation or two earlier, and China was a little bit slower. What 
actually matters is that the density of contact creates a continuous process 
of criticism, transmission, communication, and that is why things start 
moving. Th e heart of it is this interaction, and it failed for a long time to 
take off  in China.
How about today, is there only one type of modern science?
Ultimately, yes. People need to be educated in the right environment 
because everything depends on this interaction I’ve talked about; that’s 
what really matters. I mean it’s striking that virtually no Chinese scientist 
who was brought up in China, educated in China and stayed in China has 
got anywhere near a Nobel Prize, whereas you only need to compare that 
with Chinese scientists who went to America and got their Ph.D.s there. 
Th ere’s a barrier here, and it comes back to what I’ve been saying with 
interaction. In this, I don’t think there are any deep, distinctive cultural 
barriers. You’ve only got to look at the list of authors’ names in publications 
like Nature and Science; you fi nd Indian, East European, Chinese, and so 
on. On the whole, the only major absence is Africa, which is probably just 
a refl ection of the desperately diffi  cult situation and the obstacles in the 
way of most people there getting a proper education. If you’ve experienced 
training within the tradition, that’s what is critical. And I don’t think 
there is anything much that’s come up in later times, say, the nineteenth 
century on, which really suggests that there is another way to get good 
results outside this tradition.
Do you think there can ever be a world-divide again, like the China–Western 
Europe divide we saw prior to the nineteenth century, or do you think the 
world is just too globalised now?
I think the world is generally too globalised. Although, there are some very 
weird counter-trends. It is astonishing that the credibility of evolution is 
accepted by the overwhelming majority of the Chinese but barely by a 
majority of Americans (depending on how you set up the defi nitions). 
Th e role of religion is also quite interesting. For example, Zhu Zaiyu, 
whose work cast implicit doubt on the ‘correctness’ of the tuning used by 
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the Ming dynasty—which was seriously subversive—was never put under 
house arrest by the authorities as Galileo was.
China has work to do before it really competes internationally. It is 
still not quite like Japan, and the Chinese are not able within their own 
borders to fully reach the heart of Westernisation. It’s still on the surface 
and they’re prodigiously clever at it. But it’s commercially and profi t-
driven stuff , motives by which scientists ultimately of any value are not 
driven. Of course, there’s no reason at all why Chinese scientists who go 
to America shouldn’t become world leaders, and many of them are. But 
inside China something in the system works against the ‘right’ ways of 
thinking. Th e same is said by John Clark at Sydney University, a specialist 
in Asian art, who says that originality really only takes off  when Chinese 
artists migrate to Paris or somewhere else. Th ere’s some kind of liberating 
eff ect, which still holds good at the moment.
Th ere’s some element that allows the Chinese to produce professionally 
competent imitations, but it does not quite tend to spur highly original 
invention, and yet the capacity for highly original invention can be liberated 
if the right people get abroad for long enough. I think it’s something in 
the political culture. Look what’s happening with the internet in China 
at the moment. Th ere’s an enormous eff ort to limit access. Th ese sorts of 
things slow down globalisation, and I would expect this to disintegrate 
after some while, but at the moment it’s quite striking.
Th e Chinese limited international trade for a long time. Why did they do 
this, and was it related to the same reasons the Chinese never really sought to 
expand?
Th e blockage on international trade was indeed at one time a very clear-
cut political factor. Th e legitimate ports of points of commerce with the 
West were limited by the early Qing to four places, and then in the middle 
of the eighteenth century to one place in the South and one in the North 
(for Russia). It was not quite absolute, because if you disguised yourself 
nobody worried, but it was very strange. Th ere was even a ban on teaching 
Chinese to foreigners, while Chinese who went abroad were not meant to 
come back because they were seen as being traitors and were punished if 
they did. Of course, a lot of trade still went on.
It’s a very diffi  cult question to answer. It was felt very strongly in the 
government of China that the contacts made at the boundaries through 
trade were extremely likely to turn politically dangerous. It was believed 
that the resources and the techniques coming from the outside would be 
in the hands of people who were on the periphery and who could supply 
204 world history – a genealogy
and help rebellions. So it was very much a form of conscious political 
control for that reason. And it really goes back to the ideas of the founder 
of the Ming dynasty, who, with eff ects that lasted for a long time, closed 
things down because he was frightened of Muslims. He actually moved 
large numbers of the northwestern Muslims to the area around Tianjin 
by the coast to separate them from contacts with Muslims in the Islamic 
regions just outside the country. It was felt that these people were not 
naturally submissive subjects.
So the consciousness of the need to stop foreigners of any kind from 
communicating ideological or political positions that might endanger the 
state was part of the conventional political toolkit. But don’t forget that 
in the later nineteenth century the Chinese themselves were still being 
imperialists in re-conquering Turkistan, and even while being subjected at 
the same time by the west to a form of what might be described as ‘negative 
political acupuncture’ on the other side of their country. Th ere was, 
though, some high-level hesitation about this northwestern reconquest, as 
it was rightly thought the main threat came from the sea, from the
Westerners. And in the end, of course, it became impossible to keep the 
façade needed for the political prestige-structure intact, and cracks began 
to open.
Th e problem for China is not really the West to the degree they often 
say it is. Th ere never was a conquest of China the way there was a conquest 
of India. Th ere never was a British Governor General in a white hat 
sitting in Nanjing. In fact, the Chinese would never have allowed that to 
happen; there would have been an extraordinary resistance. Th e Chinese 
were not occupied, except for a short, horrible experience under the 
Japanese. Th e process operated on China was not conquest, it wasn’t even 
a general economic domination; it was what I have just called ‘negative 
acupuncture’: foreign powers put a number of ‘needles’ (so to speak) into 
key places in China, which did a lot of damage, above all psychologically. 
Th e fascinating question is why did it bring the culture down? Why did 
this process hurt China so severely?
Were there any ideological ramifi cations because of this ‘negative acupuncture’?
Well, the Westerners were able to induce a movement within the Chinese 
intellectual world such that by the middle of the 1890s the traditional 
culture was strategically dead. Most Confucian beliefs, more or less the 
whole of what might be called ‘scriptural Confucianism,’ as opposed to 
generally more or less ‘Confucian’ attitudes, had strategically collapsed. 
Th is was critical. No other major civilisation had ever lost its system 
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of basic beliefs so fast. It was mostly undermined by distinguished 
Chinese intellectuals in the period indicated. Th e destruction left China 
increasingly without a generally believed-in set of values, over a period of 
about two generations, as fi nally became evident by the 1890s. Th at is, 
scriptural Confucianism disappeared as a self-renewing force.
And then it happened again! Maoism was in many ways a set of props 
of a psychological nature, which gave the Chinese a new self-respect, a 
sense of place in history again, and a sense of mission, a sense of what they 
were doing. Th ey adapted a crude form of Stalinism, and once the Chinese 
had begun to guess what that really involved it was rejected. Nobody really 
believes in it today. I call it the ‘double disavowal.’ China lost a dominant 
ideology, not once, but twice, chronologically speaking roughly in my own 
long-lived father’s lifetime. What does this mean for a society? Certainly, 
for a society of this size and sophistication it’s surprising. I mean, Europe 
never had a collapse like this. Maybe the process of secularisation, but 
that’s still far from complete. But China’s ‘double disavowal,’ that’s close 
to the heart of the country’s problems, whether one sees it as a symptom 
or a cause.
You’ve talked about a ‘crisis of absurdity’? .
Yes, I believe that China after the fi rst quarter of the twentieth century 
suff ered a crisis of absurdity, both patent and latent. Th is type of crisis 
typically arises when the surface level of socially accepted ideals manifestly 
diff ers from what people themselves increasingly know to be the case. 
Th ere is a visible gap—but a mostly unacknowledged one. And this 
has happened in other places in the world, the German-speaking world 
between the wars, for example; even America could be struggling with this 
right now. So this is another point that needs to be thought about, as the 
crisis of absurdity is still very deep in China. Importantly, the literature is 
fi nally beginning to express it again as some of it did in the 1930s. Th is is 
now coming back, and there are various works stating, in eff ect: ‘Th is is 
an absurd world we’re living in.’ So I think the critical question for China 
may very well be, ‘what do we do about this crisis of absurdity’? It will 
particularly be the case if there is an economic downturn. No bubble of 
economic growth lasts forever, no boom lasts forever. And how will they 
make sense of things then? Th ere are probably inadequate psychological 
and spiritual resources in China to deal with anything like this. In the 
West there were and are more, whether adequate or not in the longer run 




Wanting to know everything in a complex 
world: Interview with Allison Blakely
In the fall semester of 2007 Professor Allison Blakely visited the Netherlands, 
a country that he studied extensively for his acclaimed book on racial imagery,
Blacks in the Dutch World: Th e Evolution of Racial Imagery in a Modern 
Society (Indiana University Press, 1994). His other work on the black 
experience in Europe, Russia and the Negro: Blacks in Russian History 
and Th ought (Howard University Press, 1986), won the American Book 
Award in 1988. Professor Blakely published numerous articles in a myriad of 
national and international journals. Blakely is currently Professor of European 
and Comparative History and George and Joyce Wein Professor of African-
American Studies at Boston University. In 2006 he was elected president of 
the Phi Beta Kappa Society, and in the spring of 2008 he will be a visiting 
fellow at Harvard University’s W.E.B. Du Bois Institute. On 6 November, 
Suzanne de Graaf had the opportunity to attend his seminar, ‘Th e Other 
Culture Clash: Is colour prejudice a thing of the past?’, at Leiden University. 
During these two hours, we discussed the evolution of racial imagery in the 
United States and Europe from early modern times to the present, as well as 
the increasingly complex questions that surround the formation of identity in a 
multicultural society. Th is proved to be a good starting point for the following 
interview, in which she was able to ask Professor Blakely not only more about 
these issues, but also about his career, his current research and his experiences 
in the Netherlands, which ultimately led to Blacks in the Dutch World. And 
so a conversation followed about the appeal of history, the development of a 
career, the joy of researching new subjects and the challenges of investigating 
an ever more complex world—all with a slight Dutch fl avour.
How did your interest in history begin?
It began seriously when I was a teenager in Portland, Oregon. I cannot 
really explain it in logical terms, but I trace it back to one experience 
that I had while riding on a bus in the early 1950s. It was one of these 
buses with electronic attachments to a cable. Somehow the cable became 
disconnected, and the bus had to stop. While I was sitting there all of a 
sudden I started wondering, ‘Where do I fi t in all of this?’. As I grew older 
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I became a really passionate reader. I spent a lot of time in the library. 
It was a good way—from my mother’s perspective—to keep me off  the 
streets and stop me from getting into trouble with some of the other boys 
in my neighborhood. So I made her happy, and it made me happy when 
I was not in school to spend a lot of time in the public library. I became 
very interested in academic subjects and I enjoyed school. When I went 
to college at the University of Oregon I did not know what I wanted 
to major in for certain. I thought I wanted to become an engineer, so I 
began thinking of engineering as my chosen profession. But I discovered 
there were very few electives in terms of choices of subjects for classes 
to take in an engineering program. So I became more interested in the 
liberal arts—history, philosophy, literature and the life sciences. I wanted 
to learn a lot about a lot of diff erent things, and when I came to a choice 
in the advanced years of college I discovered that history seemed to be the 
one formal discipline that included a lot of my interests. So history for me 
was a way to not make a choice of specializing. By the time I decided to 
go on to graduate training you had to choose some specialty; I decided 
I would specialize in Comparative History or something broader than 
just US history. At that time there was no formal fi eld in comparative 
history or world history, so, because I am an American, and because I had 
taken almost exclusively American history in my undergraduate training, 
I decided to specialize in European history.
Because you had not covered that previously?
I had taken one course. I decided deliberately to specialize in a broader 
kind of historical area. By studying something beyond what I mistakenly 
thought I would naturally know because I was an American, I would 
have a more comprehensive kind of competence in terms of understanding 
history when I got a degree. I thought I could know American history on 
my own, but if I wanted to understand the world I should specialize in that 
broader framework and then I would have more at the end. And not only 
that, I decided to specialize in Russian history because I was very interested 
in revolution. I was very interested in Russian literature—that was one of 
the things I had begun to read as a teenager. And I have been very happy 
with the way it turned out. My doctorate is in modern European history 
with a specialization in Russia, but once I had the degree I could fi nally 
pursue that dream of doing comparative studies, and that is what I have 
done with my career. I started with a focus on Russia, but I branched out 
in a way that made me more of a scholar of the history of democracy. Even 
in Russian history my specialty was the Russian revolutionary movement, 
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but focusing on popular democracy, which that movement was aiming at. 
I have always been fascinated with that. It was only later in my career that 
I developed this interest in European dimensions of the African diaspora. 
And of course that was an outgrowth of my own background, being of 
black African descent and noticing, as I progressed in my studies, that 
this was a neglected area of history. So it was some place where I thought 
I could make a contribution, because in the meantime I had gained a 
number of foreign language competencies so I could do formal research in 
fi ve languages. I could go deeper in trying to piece together some of this 
history of the African diaspora than a person who had the interest, but 
didn’t have the tools to be able to do primary research.
What made you study so many languages? Did you study them out of interest, 
or did you need them for your research?
Initially I started with Russian in high school because I wanted to read 
Russian literature in the original. And then I discovered I enjoyed learning 
the languages so I added German (at least the reading knowledge). For my 
doctoral degree [at the University of California, Berkeley] I had to be able 
to conduct research in at least two foreign languages, and then in the 
course of the actual research I wanted to pursue, I had to learn French and 
Dutch because of my chosen areas to explore.
Was there a specifi c event that triggered your interest in the history of the 
Netherlands?
Th ere was a specifi c event. I was actually in the Netherlands conducting 
research in Russian history at the International Institute for Social 
History (IISG) in Amsterdam. I was looking at archives that were not yet 
offi  cially open containing the original documents from one of the Russian 
revolutionary parties, the socialist revolutionaries. I made a couple of visits 
to the Netherlands to explore those materials just in summer research 
trips. And I happened to be in the Netherlands in the mid-1970s, when 
Suriname became independent [in 1975]. And what triggered my interest 
in actually studying Dutch history was experiencing a certain amount of 
racism after the sudden increase in the black population in the Netherlands 
itself. I had no warning that there would be this kind of experience 
because I had found the Netherlands so diff erent from the United States 
up until that point. But then all of a sudden, because I began to speak a 
little Dutch in the shops and on the street, I began to be treated as if I 
was a Surinamer. And to my surprise, that was not very pleasant in those 
days. And that was such a surprise that I wanted to know: what were the 
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historical reasons that something like this could occur in the Netherlands, 
which had a reputation for tolerance.
Th at’s very interesting! Originally we wanted to ask you if you had found any 
diff erences between the Dutch self-image of tolerance and your own research. 
Now it turns out you did not even have to do research, because you experienced 
it yourself...
Th at’s right, it was not about reading other people’s accounts. But I had the 
positive image also from my own experience because I had been treated 
so well during those fi rst visits in the mid-1970s. I just thought this place 
that had sheltered the American Pilgrims and Jews from Iberia, that had 
sheltered Huguenot refugees from persecution in France, and was a major 
place to give asylum to people suff ering various late-twentieth-century 
kinds of turmoil in their own countries, was a safe haven. Th en I was 
brought down to earth by this realization that even here you could have 
these changes in public attitudes. I think it was mainly because of the 
sudden appearance of the new population in the late 1970s, which put a 
certain pressure on housing, or maybe the job market. It is not clear to 
me whether it was really competition for jobs or just the perception of 
competition. Maybe the perception is more important than the reality. 
I think there was a perception among the Dutch population that there 
was this unwanted sudden infl ux of outsiders who looked and acted 
diff erently. Maybe this was just too much of a shock to take without 
some kind of backlash. I did not really understand it because I had just 
assumed that these kinds of things were not there at all. I just thought 
this was such a wonderful, peaceful, civil society. Don’t get me wrong, 
I still recognized that the Dutch laws and the Dutch social system were 
some of the most advanced and inclusive in the world. I still realized that, 
but I was just surprised at what I perceived as nevertheless the presence 
of some of the same kinds of negative attitudes that I was so familiar 
with in other societies. Th e Netherlands, France and Scandinavia had a 
reputation for being places that especially African-Americans, musicians 
and just ordinary people, had often found to be a relief from the racism 
they routinely experienced.
You mentioned that around this time you were starting to speak some Dutch. 
Did you encounter these negative new attitudes when talking to people, or just 
walking on the streets?
In a way, I think both. In the shops I was looked at more suspiciously than 
before. I was accustomed to that at home but not in the Netherlands. And 
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then when I started to speak Dutch, little did I know that would make 
it worse! I should have spoken English and then I suppose there would 
have been a sigh of relief from the shopkeeper and I could have perhaps 
experienced my earlier kind of reception. But I was not yet sophisticated 
enough to realize that. Th e other way that I experienced it in public 
without verbal communication was in the public transport. Th e seat next 
to me would always be the last one to be occupied, if at all. I felt that this 
had changed. I felt there was more apprehensiveness from the Dutch. Still, 
if I had to put my reception and my experience in the Netherlands on a 
scale of one to ten, it was still somewhere around a seven. But it had been a 
ten, and I didn’t understand why. And then, after all, I was a historian and 
so it just tweaked my curiosity. I asked myself: ‘Is there a reason for this? Is 
there something that I can identify that might be useful, that could help 
people to understand better that we have got to learn how to get along?’ It 
was probably pretty naïve in itself, but that was my motivation.
Do you still feel that your research can contribute something to the way people 
interact with each other?
I am less confi dent now than I was before that I can contribute something 
that will be useful. I have a sense that it has all become much more complex 
now, with this new element of the clash between Islam and the West. I 
think my concerns have been somewhat overshadowed in some ways, and 
it is more complex because part of the Islamic population is also black. In 
France for example, they estimated that about 30 percent of those youths 
in the banlieux, the people at the heart of the disturbance, were black as 
well as Muslim. And then there were blacks living in these poor areas who 
were not Muslim as well. So it is a very complex kind of social dynamic 
that I had not bargained on when I started doing this kind of research 
over twenty years ago. I never realized how complicated it could get. So I 
am also not certain how helpful the products of my investigation will be 
or how much attention they will be given, because so many people have 
their attention riveted on violence and other kinds of more conspicuous 
clashes. What I’m talking about may just be a little bit too subtle and too 
academic. Or it could be that, with things swirling at such a pace, people 
just do not have time to even think about these issues so much as simply 
responding to crises. I hope I am not being too pessimistic... I am still not 
pessimistic enough to just stop what I am doing and try to take Voltaire’s 
advice and just go tend my own garden, stick my head in the ground.
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You could also be researching for the sake of knowledge.
Th ere are certain kinds of intellectual activity that I enjoy just because I 
enjoy it. I enjoy translation of certain kinds of materials, poetry, for example. 
I enjoy trying to write a little poetry. I enjoy trying to write music and to 
play a little bit. So I do those kinds of things just because I enjoy it. Most 
of my more academic kinds of eff orts have been pragmatically motivated. 
I started out thinking—and again, perhaps naïvely—that a lot of what 
is wrong with the world is a lack of understanding, both in terms of race 
relations and in terms of other kinds of societal problems. I thought that 
all I had to do was become a good teacher, and perhaps infl uence the next 
generation of leaders in society. I thought that everything could become 
better with education and understanding. Yet the longer I have lived and 
the longer I have taught, the less optimistic I am that people learn from 
history. And it’s not because we can’t learn from history. What I have 
learned is that we don’t. It is not that the history does not teach us useful 
lessons that might be applied benefi cially. It is because the will is not there 
among key elements of society to put into practice the lessons we have 
learned from history. If you look at what is taking place at this moment 
for example in the Middle East, it is not for lack of knowledge—at least 
not for the lack of knowledge being out there about what could be done 
to improve things. It is the lack of will by those who are in power, who are 
in positions to actually enact policies, to bring about what is desirable. So 
what I have learned is that the critical points of intervention into world 
aff airs—to the extent that human beings can infl uence world aff airs—are 
often not under the control of those with the knowledge and with the 
values that I would prefer. And so that has given me a whole diff erent 
perspective on how eff ective anything I teach can be in infl uencing the 
way of the world.
Coming to your book, Blacks in the Dutch World. What kind of eff ect do 
you think that raising awareness about racial imagery will have? Will it be 
benefi cial in some way?
My hope has always been that there are enough people of goodwill out 
there who, even if they might be unconscious racists, might be infl uenced 
enough to be brought into an awareness that might do some good. But 
of course this is the kind of hope that you can never actually confi rm 
whether it has been realized or not. It will often happen out there without 
feedback. One encouraging thing is that I have seen an increase in the 
number of people actually engaging in related research of their own, 
which tells me that at least my eff orts have been reinforced, projected 
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further, by the energy of others. And sometimes into areas that I would 
not have tried to explore. So that is one of the kinds of things I think that 
university professors hope for; but you can never really plan on it. So I 
guess that is the brightest kind of result that I have ever achieved. But I 
am continually reminded how unhappy a story I have gotten myself into. 
Th ere are so few happy endings along the trails that I try to follow and in 
the diff erent aspects of this research.
Can you give some examples of what scholars elaborating on your research are 
working on?
One current example in the Netherlands that immediately comes to mind 
is Esther Schreuder, who a few years ago completed a Master’s thesis at the 
University of Amsterdam in art history. She says she was initially inspired 
by my book Blacks in the Dutch World and is at the moment hard at work 
on a major exhibit on Africans in Dutch and Flemish art, to be mounted 
next summer at the Nieuwe Kerk in Amsterdam. A recent example of 
some infl uence from my book, Russia and the Negro: Blacks in Russian 
History and Th ought, can be seen in an anthology on Russian literature by 
several authors who are mostly unknown to me; yet a number of them cite 
my book in their chapters.1
Several times in your research you have written about the Dutch tradition in 
which Saint Nick (Sinterklaas) is accompanied by a black fi gure whom the 
Dutch call ‘Black Pete’ (Zwarte Piet). As you note in your book, this fi gure has 
been highly controversial for years.2 Recently, Dutch television has consciously 
tried to alter the image of Pete as a black man by introducing Petes who 
are blue, orange, lilac or shocking pink, explaining to the children that this 
happened when Pete sailed through a rainbow. Nowadays, there are also more 
St. Nicholas fi gures made out of brown chocolate and Pete fi gures made out of 
white chocolate. What do you think about these developments?
It is very complicated and obviously associated with this whole broader 
identity question. It strikes me that the Sinterklaas tradition is very closely 
associated with traditional Dutch culture. And I suppose the ideal would 
be to come up with some resolution that would still allow a certain amount 
of distinctive character to this tradition, but at the same time remove its 
off ensive character. Th at’s why I thought the solution I came up with in an 
unpublished, rejected essay, was not a bad one. And that is to have Zwarte 
Piet be zwart but not in the old negative, highly derogatory stereotypical 
forms. Have Sinterklaas and Zwarte Piet as companions, and have them 
as a symbol of national unity, rather than one being a saint and the other 
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being a devil that hauls bad children away. Th is has been a more complex 
question since I wrote that essay because now increasingly the issue of 
Islam and the Muslim community has surfaced. Th e question is, if it is 
going to be a unifi ed Netherlands how do you prioritize the white saint 
and the black companion, leaving out the other groups? So perhaps there 
might be some way of honoring the multicultural nature of twenty-fi rst-
century Dutch society without totally renouncing what was bicultural 
and now could be multicultural.
You have mentioned the complexity one encounters when asking questions 
about racial identity in Europe. Did this complexity make it harder to research 
black history in a European context than it would have been in an African-
American context?
What I have always found about research in the Netherlands is accessibility 
to sources that I think is actually freer than what I fi nd at home. It may 
be in part because there had not been this kind of research before when I 
was working on the topic between 1982 and 1993. If only I could come up 
with the right questions to ask I could fi nd sources that were not viewed as 
in any way questionable by the bibliographers, or the establishment if you 
will. I was able to fi nd a lot because I had done enough initial investigation 
to know where to look for sources, and because I found a considerable 
amount of assistance from people who knew about this kind of source 
material but did not want to deal with it themselves. In the United States 
I could not have found out very much about this kind of subject matter; 
there is that kind of distance.
I can also imagine that it was not the kind of topic that was researched at the 
time.
Well, not at all! Th at’s why it was waiting there for me. It was a sensitive 
subject for Dutch scholars—and I found the same thing in France. I don’t 
think they would have wanted to be the ones to write about this. Maybe 
now that is more possible than before because now you have a society 
that is more multicultural and so there is a greater interest in these kinds 
of subjects as legitimate scholarly subjects. But they were not thought of 
as important earlier within the established academic circles in Europe. 
And the people who would logically have pursued this kind of research 
of course would be people of predominantly black African descent from 
the former colonies; but very few of them were highly educated. Very few 
of them had doctoral degrees or were in a position to do this. And if they 
did have such credentials and if they wanted to advance in the profession 
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they might have been very hesitant to pursue subject areas that might be 
considered embarrassing.
Do you feel your fi ndings and those of your colleagues who have researched the 
history of blacks in the European diaspora have challenged prevailing views 
among historians?
Yes, absolutely so. I think the main achievement in that regard is the extent 
to which we have revealed the actual presence, and at times signifi cance, 
of blacks in European societies. I have found that once this presence and 
signifi cance is known, other scholars in various disciplines have become 
attracted to the subject area. Th ere are literally countless works with 
interests related to mine that have been published over the past several 
years.3
What are you working on now?
What I am trying to do is to look at the respective histories of blacks 
in diff erent European societies and do a comparative overview of those 
narratives. Th ere is more of a history in, let’s say, England, France or Th e 
Netherlands than there is in the rest, but I want to do a comparative 
overview of all of those histories, coming down from the Middle Ages to 
now and see what that history is. Th en I want to see how those respective 
histories are converging with the present, in which you have a larger actual 
black population in Europe than ever before. And the kind of negative 
stereotypes that I was sharing with you today, and that can be found 
in my books, illustrate how history can clash with the present. Even the 
controversial nature of Zwarte Piet now is a case of history clashing with 
the present. But you can also see a similar kind of clash in terms of other 
aspects of the social interaction of Europeans with these groups that 
were formerly part of their empires—but not actually people you had to 
live with at home. You could live with them in the colonies, where you 
dominated them, but now, living with them at home, sometimes in the 
same neighborhoods, in the same jobs, without the hierarchical earlier 
structure, that is an interesting kind of dynamic to try to sort out: how are 
the histories melding with the present?
Do you think that the results of this research will yield new viewpoints that 
could also be useful for African history or African-American history?
I’m counting on it! You could look at my frame of exploration as sort of 
circum-Atlantic. We are talking about the African–American–European 
exchange, because that is what has been going on in terms of this African 
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diaspora history and my interest in the European dimensions of it. And 
so I think there should be an audience in all these diff erent parts of the 
world that should be interested in what I have to say. Especially with the 
new interest now in the new immigration to Europe, only a small part of 
which is this black population. 
Notes
1 C.T. Nepomnyashchy, et al. (eds.), Under the Sky of My Africa: Alexander 
Pushkin and Blackness (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2006).
2 Th e fi gure of Zwarte Piet has always had a somewhat ambiguous role. 
Descended from a devil hauled through the streets by St. Nicholas on 
horseback on 5 December, he has evolved into a black- or brown-skinned man 
who acts as a servant to St. Nicholas and is both a clown and a bogeyman to 
children. His ambiguity also shows in the way he is depicted: he carries both 
a sack full of sweets and toys to reward obedient children with, and a bundle 
of birch twigs to punish disobedient ones. Zwarte Piet is also said to put 
especially disobedient children into his sack and take them to Spain, where 
he and St. Nicholas reside during the year. Th e bogeyman aspect has been 
softened over the decades, but Zwarte Piet still shares traits that have been 
used to stereotype blacks, both in appearance and in behaviour: he has thick, 
black, curly hair, full red lips, brown skin and he wears big golden earrings; he 
is dressed in the attire of a sixteenth-century page; he is a servant more than 
a companion; and often acts clownish and childlike. For more information 
on the Dutch St. Nicholas tradition, see Allison Blakely, Blacks in the Dutch 
World: Th e Evolution of Racial Imagery in a Modern Society (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1994), 39–49.
3 For fairly recent examples see: David Dabydeen, John Gilmore and Cecily 
Jones (eds.), Th e Oxford Companion to Black British History (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007); Peter Martin and Christine Alonzo (eds.), Zwischen 
Charleston und Stechschritt: Schwarze im Nationalsozialismus (Hamburg: 
Dolling und Qalitz Verlag, 2004); Tyler Stovall, Paris Noir: African Americans 
in the City of Light (Boston: Houghton Miffl  in, 1996); and Maxim Matusevich 
(ed.), Africa in Russia, Russia in Africa: Th ree Centuries of Encounters (Trenton, 
NJ: Africa World Press, 2006).
217
Transoceanic Trade: Th e Reconstruction of 
Al-Mukhâ through VOC Records: Interview 
with C.G. Brouwer
After climbing the steep steps of their town house along Amsterdam’s busy 
Ceintuurbaan, Carolien Stolte and Leonard Blussé are warmly greeted by 
Kees Brouwer and his wife Rie. As soon as we are seated, we are served original 
Yemeni coff ee. In a spacious living room that contains without doubt the largest 
library on Yemen in the Netherlands if not Western Europe, and is decorated 
with several Yemeni oil paintings, this sets a fi tting scene for an interview 
that will focus on South Arabian trade and the larger Middle East. However, 
as we remark, Brouwer’s recent study of Yemen’s overseas trade makes the 
point that in the seventeenth century coff ee was not at all the prime export 
commodity of Al-Mukhâ, the trading emporium that Brouwer has studied in 
such detail. He cheerfully affi  rms this, saying that it is not suffi  ciently realised 
that coff ee was really a by-product in the early days of Al-Mukhâ’s trade. His 
experiences with (and in) this port would be the pièce de résistance of our 
interview with him—but fi rst we must go back to earlier years.
Could you tell us something about your background?
My experience as a boy both at home and at school has to such an extent 
given shape to my later research that I perhaps should speak in some 
detail about it. I was born in 1936 in Amsterdam, where my father was 
a metal worker at a shipyard. But that term is an understatement: he was 
actually an incredibly dexterous and skilled craftsman who, for instance, 
made cylinders, piston rods and propeller shafts for ships’ engines. He 
could repair anything and as a result we often had lots of fi sh to eat from 
grateful fi shermen whom he had helped out, repairing their engines even 
in the dead of night. Th e city that most people see nowadays is not my 
Amsterdam. I can still say that I was brought up in an Amsterdam that 
really was a port city of old, with businesses and workshops connected to 
shipping everywhere around us. 
Since the 1930s, my in-laws had owned a little cabin near the village 
of Ransdorp, in the Waterland region north-east of Amsterdam. Th is is 
an extremely idyllic part of the Dutch countryside that has remained 
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basically unspoiled since the seventeenth century. Ransdorp is famous 
for its truncated church tower, which you see depicted on numerous 
seventeenth- or eighteenth-century drawings or etchings of the IJ estuary 
of Amsterdam—for instance, Rembrandt van Rijn’s drawing of ‘Th e 
church at Ransdorp.’ Legend has it that the top of the tower was chipped 
off  by the bowsprit of an East Indiaman that was not able to tack in 
time. Th e cabin, which Rie and I still own, is amidst meadows, pools 
and lakes where we sail our little boat and live in complete harmony with 
nature during the summer period. Th e popular name for Ransdorp used 
to be ‘Rarup’ or ‘Rarob,’ and that was exactly the name of the fl ute ship 
aboard which Pieter van den Broecke, the hero of my research on early 
seventeenth-century Yemen, made an explorative voyage to the Red Sea in 
1638. Hence I have attached the name of ‘D’Fluyte Rarob’ to my private 
publishing house, about which I presently hope to tell you more.
What about your school years?
In the early 1950s, I had the kind of excellent Jesuit education that 
just does not exist anymore. My teachers at the Ignatius College in 
Amsterdam all had doctoral degrees and were well-known scholars. It 
is touching how completely devoted they were to bringing out the best 
in all of us boys. Apart from languages, mathematics and sciences—the 
usual curriculum—we were taught music, singing in the school choir 
and playing in its orchestra. I played the cello passionately; even today 
I cherish a great love of that instrument, admiring composers such as 
Witold Lutoslavski, Rodion Shchedrin and Tigran Manssurjan. We read 
Jean Racine as 14-year-olds in the second form, translating his French 
alexandrines into Dutch ones, and of course we had to learn by heart the 
verses of that great Dutch playwright, Joost van den Vondel, townsman 
and contemporary of Rembrandt. We were literally immersed in the arts, 
in music, in literature, and painting. It was in those years that I became 
a worshipper of modern Dutch poets like Adriaan Roland Holst, and 
most of all the incomparable Jan Hendrik Leopold, whose translations 
of Omar Khayyam are truly gems of literature that made me aware of 
Persian mysticism. As a schoolboy, I wrote two theatre pieces myself, one 
of which, in the fashion of Roland Holst’s ‘heathen ideas,’ was promptly 
banned from performance by my teachers. 
After secondary school, I fi rst attended teacher training college 
(kweekschool) where I met Rie, and ever since then we have been inseparable. 
Not quite ready to take up teaching, I decided to fi nish my studies with 
an academic degree in Dutch language and literature at the Gemeente 
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Universiteit van Amsterdam (now Amsterdam University). Here too, it was 
a great privilege to be taught by capable professors. Although I do not 
think this will be of great concern to Itinerario’s non-Dutch readers, I 
have to add that I was taught by impressive fi gures, among whom was the 
authoritarian philologist W.G. Hellinga, a famous Vondel specialist, who 
introduced both the codicological approach to medieval manuscripts and 
the bibliological analysis of the printed book into academia at that time. 
C. van de Kieft, in charge of medieval history and auxiliary sciences, 
showed me how to decipher charters and documents with the help of 
palaeographical and linguistic skills. Jacques Presser, specialising in 
modern Dutch history, a sparkling successor to Jan Romein, taught me to 
pose challenging questions about the past. Later on their teachings turned 
out to be of great importance for my research on manuscripts, books and 
documents related to Yemeni history. I feel grateful to them all.
You seem to have had a very dedicated approach to your studies right from the 
beginning.
Well, you are jumping the gun here so to say, because I was just going 
to tell you that after two years of university I was thoroughly fed up 
with the academic world, and so in 1962 Rie and I decided that we were 
going to make a Bildungsreise of one or two years with a donkey through 
Yugoslavia. But since it turned out that we were not exactly welcomed by 
the bureaucracy of Marshal Tito’s paradise we continued our trip through 
Macedonia and Greece and walked down south through the valley of 
Th essalia and the Pindos Mountains all the way to Athens. We slept in a 
tent or in the open air, and everywhere we were treated with the hospitality 
that Greece has been famous for since antiquity. Once a week we bought, 
or simply received, a fi ve kilo loaf of bread from farmers or shepherds; and 
they fed our donkey too, with the notable exception of the monks of one 
of the Meteora monasteries who refused to do so. Th at still bothers me!
From Piraeus, an exciting port, we took the boat to Alexandria 
and settled in Cairo for a while. We then travelled up the Nile aboard 
the Sudanese postal boat—mind you, the Aswan dam was not yet in 
operation—and visited a number of Nubian villages, admiring Byzantine 
churches and Pharaonic temples alike, which now, unfortunately, have 
been swallowed up by the river or moved elsewhere—such as Abu Simbel. 
I should emphasise that although we did visit many monuments, Rie and 
I were much more fascinated by Islamic architecture and contemporary 
Egyptian life than by the remnants of antiquity. A life-long passion for 
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the Arab world was born on this trip, and in that sense it really was a 
formative experience. 
Via the Red Sea littoral—with its oil-derricks and aquariums—we 
returned to Suez and Cairo, sailed to Beirut and witnessed the tragedies 
of the Palestinian camps. Shortly after we arrived in Damascus, in March 
1963, the revolution broke out and Assad came to power. Th us we had to 
fl ee to Jordan where we again faced the hopeless situation in the Palestinian 
camps and the understandable outrage of their inhabitants against Israel. 
Back in Holland, fi nally, I not only again picked up my Dutch studies but 
also started with Arabic, which I had learned to speak on our wanderings. 
In the 1960s, the IMNO, the ‘Institute of the Modern Near East’ in 
Amsterdam, was an organisation consisting of two completely divergent 
tribal groups of staff  members: those who had graduated in Leiden and 
were basically philologists and linguists—formidable scholars in their 
own right but strangely distant from today’s Middle East—and the other 
group, with people like myself and Rudolph Peters—nowadays professor 
of Islamic law at the institute mentioned, who wrote a Ph.D. on the role 
of ‘jihâd’ in colonial times—who were deeply involved in what was going 
on in present-day Arabistan. One other such adventurer was Nikolaos van 
Dam, now Her Majesty’s Ambassador in Jakarta, but then a student of 
tribal factions within the Syrian army. His Ph.D. thesis, rendered into 
Arabic, is still being studied today in Syria and only available within army 
circles!
How did your own academic career henceforth progress?
In 1969, I got my degree in Dutch studies, with a subsidiary degree in 
Arabic. At about the same time, I was appointed staff  member in the Dutch 
Department, teaching medieval literature and codicology. Among my 
colleagues were eminent scholars such as Eddie Grootes, Bert Paasman—
since 2002 in charge of the colonial and post-colonial history of culture 
and literature1—and Herman Pleij. A few words about my BA and MA 
theses may be called for. Th e former focused on Willem Godschalck van 
Focquenbroch, the latter on Aernout van Overbeke, both of whom lived 
in the seventeenth century. Focquenbroch, a physician and burlesque 
poet, served in the West Indian Company (WIC), whereas Van Overbeke, 
a lawyer and poet, was an employee of the East India Company (VOC). 
My investigations brought me into contact with the VOC archivist, 
Mevrouw [Mrs.] M.A.P. Meilink-Roeloefsz, as we all piously named her, 
with whom I would work later on. Already close to her retirement at the 
General State Archives in Th e Hague, she had fi nished her impressive 
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Ph.D. thesis,2 a reply to Job van Leur’s pioneering work,3 and had also 
completed the inventory of the VOC deposit at the Algemeen Rijksarchief.4 
She was thus both an eminent archivist and a formidable scholar who in 
the next decade sired a new generation of VOC historians. I myself was 
not yet ready for all that. 
As far as my Arab studies are concerned, I had chosen medieval Arab 
history as my fi eld of study. So I wrote an elaborate essay on Ibn al-Athîr 
and his famous Al-Kâmil fî al-Târîkh (‘Th e Complete History’), checking 
whether his account of Salâh al-Dîn’s reconquest of Palestine in 1187, 
causing the fall of the Cruasaders’ kingdom, can be considered faithful 
to the events, especially when compared to the authoritative relations of 
contemporary biographers such as Ibn Shaddâd, Abû Shâma and ‘Imâd 
al-Dîn.
Well, let me now continue my story. I soon observed, while lecturing 
on [Middle] Eastern themes or motives in Dutch medieval literature 
that few students were interested, even though I tried to carefully select 
attractive research subjects such as pilgrims’ travelogues to Jerusalem, 
Jacob van Maerlant’s representation of Muslims and Hein van Aken’s 
call for a new Crusade.5 I did not always have, moreover, the freedom to 
treat Oriental infl uences in the Department of Dutch Studies. So I felt 
increasingly limited by these institutional boundaries, and I noticed that 
I was slowly but surely drifting away from my Dutch-oriented comrades: 
I had a strong Arab perspective.
How about the ‘academic climate’ in Amsterdam in those years?
I was quite devoted to leftist ideas in those years—perhaps even more 
so than my own students—and deeply involved in the democratisation 
movement at Amsterdam University. But I became increasingly 
disillusioned: all those reforms did not lead to more capable, autonomous 
or proactive students; all they really accomplished was slowing down the 
decision-making processes by endless arguments and squabbles. We did 
not discuss the nature of academic teaching, or anything relating to the 
content of our work, but we did pull all-nighters discussing policy with 
regard to less urbane topics such as the right to smoke during the courses, 
grade evaluations etc. Still, I found Leiden University scarier in those 
days—there the students addressed each other by surname, and everyone 
seemed very conservative, students and teachers alike. I did take Persian 
classes in Leiden, but I generally felt more at home in Amsterdam, even 
though I realised I could not tolerate the situation even there for much 
longer either. 
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All these considerations together led to the conclusion that I did 
not want to continue on the path I was on. In 1973, I gave up my safe 
position at the Dutch Department of the University of Amsterdam. 
Th is immediately created an enormous sense of freedom, enabling me to 
pursue my second love: the study of Middle Eastern history. A year later, 
I fi nished my degree in Arabic, with Persian and Turkish as subsidiary 
[subjects]. Now I looked for a suitable subject in which I could put all my 
diff erent capabilities together. Having re-discovered the wealth of Dutch 
archival sources, I resolved to focus on the maritime economic past of 
South Arabia, of Al-Mukhâ in particular, during the early decades of the 
seventeenth century, when the Ottoman occupying forces were driven out 
by the Qâsimid imâms. Contemporary Yemeni chronicles and biographies 
would be explored for political and military developments; Dutch records 
preserved in the archives of the VOC—the Dutch East India Company 
maintained a semi-permanent factory in the Tihâma port for 150 years—
for economic data. In this project, actually, my passion for both Dutch 
and Arab history, my competence in the source languages involved, my 
philological, codicological, archival and palaeographical skills and, not 
least, my various experiences in Near Eastern countries merged. Th is was, 
so to say, my axial experience.
Who were the leading scholars in this fi eld at the time?
As far as the Middle Ages and early modern history are concerned, Middle 
Eastern historiography, I discovered, was (and still is) based mainly on 
annalistic chronicles and biographical accounts providing for the most 
part dynastic and military information. In the area of socio-economic 
history, reconstructed on the evidence of a multitude of documents, there 
was (and still is) a lot less activity. But that was exactly the area I wanted 
to work in! Let me give some examples. In his Ph.D. thesis, Lein Oebele 
Schuman, my fi rst professor in Arabic, focuses on the Qilâdat al-Nahr, 
a chronicle written by Abû Makhrama (±1540), dealing inter alia with 
the Portuguese arrival in Southern Arabia from 1513 onwards.6 Basically, 
this is a photomechanical edition of a handwritten Arabic text version, 
supplemented with a translation into modern English and a limited 
number of mainly philological comments. Th is type of research exemplifi es 
an age-old tradition. To Schuman’s family belong European scholars like 
Oscar Löfgren7 and Gentwell R. Smith,8 and Yemeni historians such as 
‘Abd Allâh Muhammad al-Hibshî9 and Sa’îd ‘Abd al-Fattâh ‘Âshûr.10 In 
fact, these researchers are philologists rather than historians.
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Robert B. Serjeant, on the other hand, a top Arabist and anthropologist 
who had lived in Aden when it was still a British protectorate, collected 
in his Th e Portuguese off  the South Arabian Coast extensive quotations 
from various Hadramî manuscripts.11 He does not aim at a synthesis, but 
simply juxtaposes diff erent accounts, leaving it to his readers to construct 
a chain of events. But worse, long-lasting patterns are far more important 
to him than ever-changing facts. Situations in one century can be clarifi ed 
by situations from another one. So he is not a historian either. Th en there 
were the writings of the pre-war Company historian Heerd Terpstra. 
His study on the Westerkwartieren or ‘Western Districts’ of the VOC,12 
based on dozens of records, was very useful, although it concentrated on 
political and military events, and was thoroughly eurocentric. Whereas 
Van Leur, Niels Steensgaard13 and Meilink-Roelofsz rightly drew attention 
to economic issues, they treated Yemen and its main port only in passing, 
deriving their insights or paradigms, moreover, from a very limited 
number of (mainly edited) documents.
And before I forget: every Wednesday Margot van Opstall, Marius 
Roessingh (both archivists working at the Algemeen Rijksarchief) and 
you, Leonard, used to organise the so-called Loempia lunch at a Chinese 
restaurant around the corner for visiting VOC researchers from all over 
the world who happened to be visiting the archive. During those lunches 
we would exchange  information about our recent discoveries. Together 
with monthly Saturday morning meetings at the Amsterdam Historical 
Museum where enthusiastic historians of overseas history used to present 
their latest research in a more formal manner, these get-togethers were 
very inspiring and useful, not only for a lone wolf like me but surely for 
everybody. Margot and Marius both sadly passed away in 1986 and not 
long after their death these meetings came to an end.
In conclusion, I put a lot of time into getting to know the fi eld, and I 
established that the economic history of Yemen was both important and 
understudied. Th e Dutch presence in South Arabia, moreover, was almost 
a ‘blind spot’ in the historiography of the Company. In 1975, I approached 
Mrs Meilink-Roelofsz—recently appointed extraordinary professor of the 
history of European expansion at Leiden University—who accepted me 
as a Ph.D. student, even though my plan of using a ‘double perspective’ 
by treating Western as well as Arabic sources did not appeal to her much. 
I visited her regularly in Th e Hague. We had confl icting worldviews, but 
we got along quite well. She was supervising some promising Ph.D.s at 
the time: Jurrien van Goor, Hugo K. s’ Jacob, Christiaan Jörg and Frank 
Lequin, to name just a few. 
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How did your fi rst book progress from there?
Personally, I wanted to leave the Netherlands again, and I was adamant 
about going to Cairo—the Egyptian capital being the location for some 
of the more important Yemeni codices, kept in the Dâr al-Kutub or 
‘National Library.’ Professor Meilink agreed, and I left in 1976 with a 
generous scholarship from ZWO,14 which covered my expenses for living 
and working in Cairo. It also allowed Rie and our two young children to 
accompany me.
We lived on Zamâlek, an island in the Nile, and right across from us 
the new library building was under construction. Th e island itself was 
very picturesque. Soldiers swam by all the time—it was part of their 
training to cross the Suez Canal I suppose. Feluccas charged with all types 
of earthenware jars sailed along. In the light of the moon touching love 
scenes were shot by fi lm directors supported by their crew. Peasants had 
won small plots of land from the river to cultivate their crops, and they 
fi shed with little lanterns at night. Peasants, fi shermen and other creatures, 
this whole shady underworld lived in cabins along the riverside. I became 
acquainted with them, and Rie and I actually got to know them well as 
friends. I was able to arrange that every morning one of the boys from these 
huts would row me to the library in his little fi shing boat—arriving on the 
opposite side, I had to plough through the mud a bit in order to get ashore, 
it’s true, but it was so much shorter and more agreeable than taking the 
long route over the bridge by bus in the murderous heat! You can imagine 
that the other less enterprising (mostly very proper) scholars working in 
the Dâr al-Kutub thought that this bearded giant who emerged from the 
Nile River did not quite fi t the description of a real scholar. No doubt they 
thought I was insane, or at least highly eccentric. But, needless to say, in 
Cairo (and Alexandria) I also made several friends among scholars studying 
South Arabian history such as Ayman Fu’âd Sayyid—who composed an 
impressive repertory of Yemeni manuscripts15—Muhammad ‘Abd al-‘Âl 
Ahmad,16 Fârûk ‘Uthmân Abâza17 and Jâd Tâhâ.18
After having lived in Egypt for about a year, Rie and I went to North 
Yemen for the very fi rst time. We had sent the children to Rie’s parents 
in the Netherlands, because we felt it would be better for them. We 
immersed ourselves in Yemeni life, which turned out to be totally diff erent 
from the Egyptian way of doing things. Yemen may have been a republic 
since 1967, but in fact it was still very much a tribal area of which large 
parts had not really been brought under any kind of government control. 
However, this was already changing right then—Yemen is so strategically 
located that many countries were more than willing to reform and develop 
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its age-old infrastructure. Foreign companies, from Chinese to Dutch and 
German fi rms, were building asphalt roads at an incredible pace. Asphalt 
notwithstanding, it was still a beautiful country. Th e Red Sea coast or 
Tihâma, unbearably hot with a 100 per cent humidity rate, has a partly 
African population and culture, whereas the mountainous hinterland 
with its green terraces is inhabited by pure Arabs.
What about Al-Mukhâ, the main subject of my research? On 
a memorable day, after a tiring journey all the way down from Ta’izz 
through the burning plain of the Tihâma, we approached that legendary 
city. Th en we saw a heap of ruins in the sand. It seemed like a still from 
an old western movie. We drove into this deathly quiet village with a jeep 
full of heavily armed tribesmen. We asked where the city centre was—and 
we were told that we had already reached it. Al-Mukhâ was, in fact, a most 
desolate place. A handful of three- to four-storeyed ramshackle houses, 
reminiscent of the once busy trading port, stood amidst a vast number 
of poor fi shermen’s reed huts, within a wide mud wall that had for the 
most part collapsed. A few rusty carcasses lay scattered on the beach. Th e 
lighthouse, once a beacon for cargo vessels, had gone out of use. 
After two to three months we returned to the Netherlands. I now had 
the feel of both local historiographical sources off ering a wealth of written 
data and a lot of local experience under my belt. I was now eager to study 
the relevant VOC records in Th e Hague. It was wonderful to work in the 
old Archives building at Bleijenburg, but very time-consuming. As few 
documents relate exclusively to Yemen, I always had to comb through 
caseloads of fi les to fi nd even a mention of Al-Mukhâ. But whenever I 
did, it held a great sense of discovery. During a two-day interdisciplinary 
symposium at Bamberg held in October 1977, I expressed my opinion 
that the Dutch records are of paramount importance to the study of South 
Arabia’s economic past. Th e printed version of this lecture, dating from 
1978, was the fi rst one of a long series of separate essays published since in 
a variety of languages and in a wide range of scholarly journals. Of course, 
getting to know eminent Yemen researchers of German and Swiss origin 
such as Prof. Hans Becker, Horst Kopp, Volker Höhfeld, Klaus Kreiser, 
Hans Steff en, Barbara Finster and Armin Schopen personally mattered 
greatly to me. Some of them became friends for life!19
In those days I switched from Prof. Meilink-Roelofsz to the maritime 
historian Prof. Jaap R. Bruijn, Mrs Meilink having become increasingly 
disenchanted with me because I devoted so much time to minute research 
without presenting her with any results or, to put it bluntly, chapters of 
my thesis. Prof. Bruijn was more sympathetic to my ‘currycomb’ approach 
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to the archival data, although he did not want to supervise me without a 
scholar who would look at the Arabian side of things. Prof. Stefan Wild, 
successor to Schuman in Amsterdam, was willing to take up that part, and 
then I really had two great guiding lights with both a wealth of knowledge 
and a passion for the subject matter.
In the years that followed I completed my archival explorations, but 
for reasons of a personal nature that I shall not enter into here I was no 
longer in a hurry to fi nish. First of all, in 1988 I published with Brill in 
Leiden, in close cooperation with my Palestinian friend Avo Kaplanian, a 
bulky book including a variety of VOC documents of a socio-economic 
nature concerning early seventeenth-century Southern Arabia translated 
into Arabic with historical annotations.20 Th en, after a serious copyright 
war with Brill, I established my own publishing house, called D’Fluyte 
Rarob. A second edition of the Arabic book was successfully launched, 
and in the end ‘Ubâdî Publishers in Sana’a even distributed a third one at 
Yemeni prices which is, to my great pleasure, still available. At about the 
same time, 1988–89, a large travelling exhibition on Yemen visited the 
Netherlands, and I was asked by the Tropenmuseum in Amsterdam to 
arrange the section on Dutch–Yemeni relations through the ages. It had to 
be done within three months, so I put all my contacts into the project, both 
Dutch and foreign ones. And we succeeded in getting the job done! I even 
managed to publish an accompanying book on the activities displayed by 
the VOC in South Arabian waters during the 1614–55 period, containing 
a wealth of hitherto unknown data.21 
Finally, in order to distance myself temporarily from matters Yemeni, I 
edited six original Dutch tragedies, in three volumes, dealing with decisive 
episodes in Islamic—read Timurid, Persian-Afghan and Turkish—
history, dating from the Golden and Silver Age.22 In three subsequent 
seasons, from 1992 to 1994, they were offi  cially presented in the national 
Th eaterfestival at Th e Hague. One of them, Johannes Serwouters’ 
Tamerlan (1657), was staged and broadcast; transformed into an opera 
by Klaas ten Holt it is still awaiting performance. Another one, Abraham 
Kemp’s Osman (1623)—featuring the gifted Sultan who in 1618 granted 
the Dutch permission to conduct commerce in the Red Sea area—was 
played twice in Beograd. It should be remarked here that, tracing the 
patron of Frans van Steenwyk’s Koelikan (1745), the Afghan conqueror of 
Persia and India, Nâdir Shâh, I could rely on Lequin’s admirable thesis on 
the Company’s staff  in Bengal.23
However, I could no longer ignore the serious pressure exerted on 
me by my two supervisors. I had to take my Ph.D. degree as soon as 
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possible. So, in 1997 the long-planned book was published under the title 
of Al-Mukhâ: Profi le of a Yemeni Seaport....24 It was a thorough description 
of the city of Al-Mukhâ and its shipping. 
What has happened since then?
Just the description of seventeenth-century Al-Mukhâ had taken up an 
entire book, and I had not even begun to treat its international commerce! 
Having both time and material, I decided accurately to analyse the 
city’s trade by product. I started with minerals, then coff ee, porcelain, 
pepper and other spices, cottons and silks. Some details that I needed 
were hard to fi nd, and I am afraid I can rightly say I have an obsession 
with completeness…. Nevertheless, in 2006 my second book on the Red 
Sea port appeared, entitled Al-Mukhâ: Th e Transoceanic Trade of a Yemeni 
Staple Town….25 It deals with coff ee, spices and textiles. Th e third book 
which will treat such products as dyes, aromatics and stimulants, in 
addition to the minerals and porcelains just referred to, is now well under 
way. So ‘Th e Continuing Story of Al-Mukhâ’ is going to be a real triptych!
As far as possible, all of the commodities have been dealt with in a 
uniform manner. Th e areas of production, ports of origin, destination, 
varieties and qualities, quantities and prices, and, not least, profi ts realised 
or losses suff ered: these are described in the smallest details. Th e consequent 
conversion of weights and currencies into local bahârs and reals of eight 
makes comparisons possible. Not only have the commercial activities 
displayed by Indian Muslims and Bâniyans been analysed, but also Dutch 
and English trading operations, even though these often prove to have 
been utterly futile. I consider the reconstruction of the city, shipping and 
trade of Al-Mukhâ at the turn of the seventeenth century as a contribution 
to the maritime economic history of Yemen, of the Peninsula, of the Arab 
world and, in the end, of the Indian Ocean. In my view, local studies are 
the solid materials for wider surveys or explanatory models.
Finally, my funding in the past has mainly come from ZWO, from 
museums, from the Yemeni government and, last but not least, from Rie, 
who has always supported my investigations wholeheartedly. Th e Yemeni 
government arranged for several trips to South Arabia during which I 
explored the ports of Hudayda, Aden, Mukallâ, Al-Shihr and Sayhût, in 
addition to that of Al-Mukhâ, and lectured at universities and institutes 
in Sana’a, Ta’izz and Aden on the basis of my publications. Th ese lectures 
were all delivered in Arabic—English still being considered a colonial 
language, and therefore not held in high esteem. In addition, education in 
Yemen is progressing only slowly, so most students would not be capable 
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of attending a seminar in English. I always stressed the importance of the 
Dutch sources for Yemeni history as well as the necessity of learning Dutch 
for enterprising scholars who would like to have access to this wealth of 
material. Th ere is a limited group of highly qualifi ed scholars in Yemen—I 
may refer to Sayyid Mustafâ Sâlim, Husayn al-‘Amrî and Muhammad 
‘Abd al-Rahîm Jâzim, all of whom are broaching Yemeni social and 
economic history by editing collections of records26—but unfortunately 
academic life is extremely diffi  cult. Th ere is little money or funding, and 
there is much bureaucracy, two factors greatly restricting scholars in their 
opportunities. I tried all I could to pull some promising Yemeni historians 
into the highly successful TANAP project of Leiden University, which has 
now come to an end, but my eff orts turned out to be fruitless. 
Inshallâh! As I noted in the introduction to the second part of my 
triptych, my work is meant ‘to encourage historians, Yemenis and non-
Yemenis, to steer this rarely sailed course.’ If they do not want to steer 
their own vessel they may come on board ‘D’ Fluyte Rarob’ and navigate 
the largely forgotten past of Yemen’s maritime trade with me as their pilot!
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World History and Other Marginal and 
Perverse Pursuits: Interview with Felipe 
Fernandez-Armesto
Lincoln Paine interviewed Felipe Fernandez-Armesto at the St. Botolph Club 
in Boston on 13 November 2008.
I want to thank you for agreeing to talk to me about your career, your teaching 
and your writing, and I thought we would divide the interview into three 
sections...
Rather like Gaul...
Yes, but I don’t want to come, see and conquer; I just want to elicit information...
You’re very welcome.
But I would like to talk a little bit about your background, your education, 
and also your approach to history and your observations on the craft.
Right, okay. I don’t really feel as though I had much family and even less 
education.
Well, despite your Spanish name, you are very English.
Well, my mother-in-law, God rest her soul, who travelled in Spain with 
me said it was like being with a werewolf. I started off  being exaggeratedly 
English, which I suppose is a desperate attempt to make up for my 
Spanishness, and after a few days I became exaggeratedly Spanish, which 
I suppose is an attempt to make up for my Englishness. Apparently after a 
few days in Spain I always start shouting and wave my arms about.
So, you were born and raised in England?
Yes.
And your father was a journalist?
Yes.
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For newspapers, magazines?
Yes, yes. I mean, he spent most of his career with La Vanguardia, which is 
the main Spanish-language newspaper in Barcelona. He wrote books, but 
they were... essentially it was his collected journalism.
And your mother is English?
Yes.
And where did you grow up?
In London.
Did you go to public school?
Well, I went to a school which I guess technically was a public school. 
It belonged to this group of about 200 independent schools, which was 
called the Headmaster’s Conference. It belonged to that group, but it 
wasn’t a typical public school. It was a day school and it was secular, and 
it had been founded by Jeremy Bentham. Apparently, it had a progressive 
ethos, although it wasn’t apparent to those of us who were there in my day.
And from there you went to Oxford?
Yes. Well, I had a very brief sojourn at the University of Salamanca. But 
whilst I was there, General Franco in his wisdom decided that if you 
talked to more than two people on the street, that was a riot. My faculty 
was closed down. And I had a place at Oxford; in those days, you could 
do things like write them and say ‘I’ve changed my mind. Can I come 
after all?’ So, although I greatly enjoyed being in Salamanca with the 
faculty closed and spending my time drinking with my friends, which I 
subsequently realised was a much superior education to attending class, 
I’m afraid I got a little nervous and decided I probably ought to be doing 
something a little more proper, so I went to Oxford.
And you read history there?
Yes.
What was your initial focus, and who did you study with?
Oh, God. Well, I don’t know. I think before I went there I was really 
interested in the Enlightenment and the transition to Romanticism. 
Th ere are something like 250,000 books about Napoleon and I think I’d 
read most of them by the time I started. As I remember my interview at 
Oxford, they asked me what I’d been reading and I said I’d been reading 
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Sorel’s Europe et la revolution francaise.1 And I probably didn’t need to 
say anything else in order to get my place at the University. However, 
in those days, when you started at Oxford you had a very limited choice 
of what you could do in your fi rst term, and I thought I ought to do 
something unfamiliar, so I did some medieval history in my fi rst term, 
and I rather got seduced by that. I suppose my main tutor in my fi rst year 
was Karl Leyser—I was at Magdalen, which had a big history school and 
had some great tutors. It had Karl Leyser, AJ.P. Taylor and John Stoye, 
Gerald Harriss, Angus Macintyre.2 And I started with Karl and he was a 
wonderful tutor. People don’t realise, people who know his publications, 
don’t realise what a wonderfully uninhibited person he was when you 
were talking to him, because all his writings are extraordinarily inhibited 
articles in which he advances a thesis in the fi rst three lines and then 
spends the next thirty pages withdrawing it. But as a tutor he was liberated 
and he would wander around his room kicking the piles of notes which he 
kept on the fl oor in high dudgeon when he refl ected on the immorality of 
the great ones of the past. He was impassioned and an exciting person to 
be with and he—and his tutorials were immensely wide-ranging. I mean 
you’d start off  with Charlemagne and you’d end up talking about Schiller, 
and you know just being with him was a great educational experience 
and very, very mind-broadening. So, from that time, although I tried to 
compose myself a curriculum with a course which covered as much of 
history as possible, I was really most interested in the Middle Ages.
What was your thesis on?
My doctoral thesis?
Did you have an undergraduate thesis?
Yes. In those days at Oxford you could get a fi rst, which is kind of like 
a summa cum laude; I don’t know what the equivalent in Leiden would 
be. But in order to get yourself into the top category, you really needed... 
typically you prepared for your fi nal exam eleven subjects, and you could 
do an optional thesis. And if you got the top grade in six or more of those, if 
you did a thesis it would be twelve, subjects, you’d get yourself into the top 
category. So I did the thesis. It seemed to me to be the obviously sensible 
strategy, because one of the subjects was just an essay on anything; one 
of them was translating from foreign languages. Two of them were topics 
which you prepared from the original sources on quite a sort of narrow 
fi eld. And then there was something I think called the general historical 
paper in which you could divagate without really knowing anything. And 
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so that was fi ve papers that you could score heavily on, and then if you did 
the thesis I thought you could more or less guarantee yourself the top rank 
without necessarily knowing that much. So that was my strategy.
And what was it that you didn’t know very much about?
Well, my thesis, which was terribly successful because it won the Arnold 
Prize [1971], which is the prize that you get for the best thesis, was about 
the conquest of the Canary Islands.
Was that your fi rst foray into European expansion?
Well, I suppose it was, really, although I also did quite a lot of stuff  on 
that before, for the rest of my fi nal exam. Th e syllabus has changed a 
little bit, but in those days one of these topics that you could prepare 
with documents in the original languages was a paper which, broadly 
speaking, covered Columbus and the conquests of Mexico and Peru, and 
I did that. So I suppose already as an undergraduate I was relatively self-
concentrating on early Spanish colonial endeavours.
And was colonialism at that time already being seen as this idea of European 
expansion or was it still a colonialist, nation-state oriented approach?
Oh, God, well I don’t know because at Oxford we don’t have, and didn’t 
have, approaches. We just got on with it. It was a place which was very, 
very hostile to theory of any sort. I remember when I was a young don 
being stopped in the street by an immensely distinguished Oxford 
historian who said to me, ‘Felipe, you’re the sort of person who would 
know about this. Can you tell me about this person everybody’s going on 
about called Fouquet.’ And I couldn’t think of whom he meant. Th e only 
Fouquet I could think of was an eighteenth-century ethnographer of that 
name. I’d never read anything by him, but the name rang a bell, and I 
said, ‘As far as I know, he’s an eighteenth-century ethnographer.’ And this 
guy looked at me weirdly and walked on, and it was only subsequently 
that I realised he was actually talking about Foucault! And that shows 
you the degree of innocence that prevailed at the time in Oxford. You 
know, you think of the great fi gures of Oxford in those days, people like 
Richard Cobb, Hugh Trevor-Roper, people whose whole career really 
was founded on their objection to theory. So, we weren’t really into post-
colonialism or anything like that. It was very, very humanistic; it was all 
about understanding text. It was philologie et histoire, and you kind of 
didn’t worry whether you were being Eurocentric or not.
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But I do have to say that I was...I found texts which came from indigenous 
sources much more interesting, compelling—very much more mysterious, 
more intriguing than those which were more obviously accessible because, 
though removed by half a millennium, they were recognisably texts from 
a culture with which I could recognise my kinship. When I was looking at 
one of the sources in which the University of Oxford is surprisingly rich—
early colonial and pre-colonial Meso-American texts—I felt entranced, 
and I guess my sympathy for the indigenous point of view started then 
even though I hadn’t read Van Leur or anybody like that at that stage.3
So if you come out of this anti-theoretical approach, do you see in your 
own background a development towards becoming interested in European 
expansion, or did you see yourself running on a parallel track?
Oh, I don’t know. I think I thought I was doing global history. I was very 
infl uenced by [Charles] Verlinden long before I met him and came to like 
him and admire him as a person.4 I was a great admirer of his scholarship. 
And it just seemed obvious that a comparative approach is bound to 
impart some understanding. Th at’s why Our Lord spoke in parables. And 
I think that is why I felt attracted to the Canary Islands. I saw them as a 
sort of fulcrum of global history. I was interested in European expansion 
only because it’s a great global event with an extraordinary global 
resonance which marks the beginnings of the emergence of this Latin, 
Christian world which had been marginal and backward in the Middle 
Ages, by global standards, into a world-shaping force. I suppose at the 
time one of the things that had penetrated the Oxford history scholars 
was interdisciplinarity.
In particular, there were two obsessions. One was cliometrics, which 
I must confess I was never terribly sympathetic to, although I included it 
in my doctoral thesis. I had all of these very elaborately calculated tables, 
in all of which I made fundamental arithmetical errors which I only 
discovered just in time before the thing was published, and which had not 
been noticed by all the important people: my supervisors, my examiners, 
my editors at the Oxford University Press, all the outside readers whom 
they sent this to. Nobody had noticed that all my calculations were wrong! 
And that made me realise that cliometrics was nonsense, and it was really 
unnecessary to have all of these very exactly calculated quantitative data. 
Cliometrics was one of the obsessions, and the other was anthropology. 
One of my tutors was a great friend, Peter Clarke, an urban historian, who 
I think was the person who introduced me to the possibilities of getting 
insights from reading anthropological work. And he made me read Evans-
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Pritchard’s book on witchcraft.5 Of course I subsequently became close 
to him and a colleague of Keith Th omas, who was one of the pioneers of 
anthropology in the Oxford history school, and then there was another—
there were two colleagues of mine, Michael Hurst and Edward Ardener, 
who were respectively a historian and an anthropologist, who had a joint 
seminar and I hung out with them quite a lot, and so I suppose that 
reading the anthropological literature also disposed me to this interest in 
the indigenous side of empire, the indigenous contribution to empire.6
I think that we tend to think of the indigenous in terms of the Americas, or 
Africa, or places where nation-states and a written tradition are not as strong 
as in Asia or east Europe, eastern, or wherever that borderland is, in the 
Caucasus or wherever. It seems to me that you’ve done an amazing amount of 
work in terms of trying to incorporate these other indigenes.
Well, I’ve always been interested in the margins of everything. I suppose, 
partly because being Anglo-Spanish I’ve always felt on the margins 
myself, wherever I am, I’ve always felt a bit foreign. And I’m congenitally, 
intellectually perverse. I had two quite intellectually perverse parents, and 
I’ve inherited the worst of both of them. And, I think, thank God I was 
in Oxford where the whole system is quite sympathetic to intellectual 
perversity. I mean it’s rather like, I don’t know, physical beauty and sporting 
prowess—it’s one of those oddities which the University of Oxford rather 
overvalues. So I was kind of lucky, but of course my intellectual perversity 
did take the form of quarrelling with my tutors and my supervisors 
and being extremely unwilling to accept any historical orthodoxies. 
I’ve suff ered from this perversity ever since. One positive thing about it 
was that it drew me to the margins and did make me reject what I call 
these sorts of slick metropolitan skylines which dominate conventional 
historiography and turn to the frontiers, which I’ve always thought...if 
civilisations are the tectonic plates of history, frontiers are the places where 
they scrape against each other and generate seismic eff ects.
I think that’s slightly diff erent from having an indigenous point of view 
because I’ve always been interested in the settlers who colonise frontiers. 
Th at kind of perversity, that kind of madness has always been mysterious 
to me and I’ve always striven to understand it. I mean that’s why I’ve 
always been terribly interested in people who in the sixteenth century 
were in Peru, which you would have thought was far away—far enough 
from Spain for anybody, but you know they want to go off  and fi nd the 
Solomon Islands. And one wants to know what makes these people tick, 
or people in Qing China who go to Urumchi or Ninguta, these are very 
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surprising undertakings. So my attraction to the margins is I think a little 
bit diff erent from my attraction to the indigenous point of view. But I 
suppose the two things must be connected at some level; that level must 
surely be hostility to or rejection of the mainstream. I don’t know; it’s a 
perpetuation of the form of youthful rebellion which I indulged in when 
my contemporaries were taking to the barricades.
You certainly talk about, in the introduction to Civilizations, you talk about 
the Amalia Eff ect—for the woman in Jorge Marmol’s novel—of her being so 
close, in this opulent European home in Buenos Aires, so close to the pampa 
and the barbarian world just outside town. But you talk about these tectonic 
plates of civilisation which makes me want to ask about your interest in 
geography, which seems to be something that permeates your work, and not 
only in Civilizations, when you’re obviously talking about man’s relationship 
to his environment but also in your work in atlases, the work I think you did 
with Gibbon and the Times Atlas of Exploration, and Pathfi nders—and 
also your famous jibe about maritime historians, historians of exploration 
having not enough wind.
Yes. Too much hot air, not enough wind. Yes. Well, thank you, Lincoln, 
I’m glad you mentioned this. I think it is all to do with, I don’t know, 
wanting to épater les bourgeois, it’s all to do with this rebelliousness. As 
I say, I was schooled in a very textual, very humanistic kind of history, 
and although I certainly strove to master that and I still love textual 
scholarship and I still do indulge in it from time to time, I was looking 
for something diff erent, for something which my tutors and my fellow 
students would fi nd surprising, perhaps even scandalous. I’m not sure 
quite how I stumbled on this conviction that—well, I suppose it’s a dual 
conviction. First is the conviction that history is unintelligible except 
in the context of the environment that surrounds us and the ecosystem 
that sustains us. I don’t think you can make sense of what humans do 
unless you locate them in their ecological context. And the other aspect 
is my growing conviction that humans aren’t the only species that have 
history, and the old idea that this literally humane discipline is only about 
people—that history is about chaps and geography is about maps—that 
just doesn’t work.
If you take the sort of comparative doctrine that I originally got from 
reading Verlinden in the context of colonial societies and you extend it to 
its logical conclusion, you have to compare human cultures with those of 
other cultural species. I think my journey towards the discovery of this 
started when I was an undergraduate. Because I think the very fi rst paper 
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I did at Oxford, for my fi rst term, was called historical geography. And I 
was very surprised to fi nd that there was no geography in it at all. You get 
all these textual minutiae, and the geographical component—which was 
obviously in the minds of some Oxford dons of some past generation who 
thought that it was important, I suppose, just to know where diff erent 
places were—got sidetracked or even lost, and it made me realise that 
maybe one should reincorporate it.
Of course annalisme was very fashionable at the time, and I read a lot 
of that sort of stuff . So I think the idea one did need to start looking at 
the physical environment in which these texts were written in order to 
understand them began to take shape. And I think I also got that idea 
from reading a lot of old-fashioned biblical commentaries and atlases of 
the holy land, this sort of great nineteenth- and early twentieth-century 
attempt to understand sacred texts by looking at the environment in 
which they were written. And I realised how illuminating this was, and I 
thought one should be doing the same with other texts.
So I think that was part of it, but I very much remember that one of 
my epiphanies was reading Pieter Geyl’s critique of Toynbee and thinking, 
‘Pieter Geyl hates Toynbee so much there’s got to be something in this.’7 
And it made me read Toynbee. And Toynbee—you can say what you like 
about him—but he was a great pioneer of environmental history. He had a 
wonderful sense of the relevance and pertinence of environment interacting 
with those very powerful initiatives that arise in our minds and in our 
emotions and which I’m perfectly willing to believe arise independently 
of environmental circumstances, but which only shape history within the 
conditions and limitations of and imposed by the environment. So I think 
that was also part of the reason that I got propelled in these directions.
But it was a great big struggle for me because I belong to a generation 
of English schoolboys who spent most of their time—no, sorry, not most 
of their time—spent more time doing Latin than anything else. I think I 
might have been almost the last of that generation. I took up science at the 
age of 12 and gave it up at the age of 14, and I’ve had to re-educate myself in 
it. I wasn’t stimulated to do this by the struggle between evolutionary and 
counter-evolutionary explications of human behaviour. I did subsequently 
become interested in those, but I hadn’t seen the relevance. Of course 
all of this was long before sociobiology, or maybe sociobiology was just 
beginning to come in, but not when I was growing up, it was more in my 
early years of teaching.
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In terms of geography, again, which I think is a real hallmark of your work, 
it seems to me that you are still somewhat out of the mainstream in your 
use of geography and your willingness to embrace geography as a backdrop to 
historical study. It still seems to me that an awful lot of people rely either on 
texts—or certainly in the Leiden tradition, a more archival approach—or 
on more theoretical understandings. We were talking about that at lunch, 
that there seem to be methodological approaches. But do you think that 
geography, do you think that people are taking a diff erent view of geography 
now, for whatever reason, whether it’s because of climate concerns, or at least 
in America because we’ve lost a sense of where we are in the world and where 
the rest of the world is in relation to us?
Golly. Well, I don’t know about that. I’ll come back to that sort of sub-
question in a moment. I’m always very happy to be out of the mainstream. I 
mean, I’d hate the mainstream to engulf me. I’d have to—that would force 
me into even more marginal and perverse pursuits. But I think obviously 
there is a huge, growing sort of industry in environmental history, but the 
danger to me is that it’s becoming another sub-discipline. I hate it when 
people ask you: ‘Are you a cultural historian or an intellectual historian 
or a social historian or an economic historian?’ I’m just a historian! I try 
to do total history and global history and try to use every kind of source 
material and see the connections between all the spheres in which we lead 
our lives, and I feel that the environment encompasses everything that 
we do and should be part of every kind of history, and not just another 
room which opens off  the corridor, another atomised part of an already 
excessively atomised discipline. It worries me that we have this rhetoric of 
interdisciplinarity, but we don’t even talk to each other, let alone people in 
other departments. And I just feel that specialisation is a vice and it upsets 
me that we have systems of education and of the institutionalisation of 
research which nourish vice. So I do think that environmental history is 
growing, but I’m not satisfi ed with the way in which it’s growing. 
Th e other thing which is growing is obviously global history. In the 
United States this is now the form in which most undergraduates encounter 
history. Th ere are hundreds of thousands of students studying global 
history or world history—slightly diff erent things perhaps, but courses 
under one or other of those rubrics—in the United States, and I think that 
is connected with the geopolitical dilemmas of the United States in the 
world today. Obviously the world history movement in the United States 
started earlier, but it really took off  and attracted these masses of students 
I think after 9/11, when people in the United States at last realised that 
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they do need to situate themselves in the world; they need to learn about 
it if they’re going to survive in an increasingly dangerous future.
And I’m rather...it may be invidious to speak of something good 
coming out of an episode as horrifi c as the collapse of the twin towers, but 
I do celebrate this specifi cally. And when I’m in my own global history 
class with my own students, I love the way they want to know about the 
world and how they’re looking ahead to a post-American century in which 
the United States will no longer be the unique global hegemon and will 
be looking for the help of other decent communities around the world in 
ensuring peace and humanity. And I always ask my students why they’ve 
chosen the course, and overwhelmingly they give me answers along those 
lines. Th ey want to be there when the saints go marching in; they want to 
be there when America rejoins the world.
And so do you think that there’s...not to be too distracted by the American 
question, but do you think that this is sort of...the idea that America will 
not be the only superpower is increasingly part of the Zeitgeist of American 
students?
Well, I don’t think that American questions are a distraction. You know 
America is still the most important single country in the world, and a place 
which the rest of the world needs to take greatest account of and greatest 
notice of. I have absolutely no doubt that the United States can’t sustain 
its position as the unique global hegemon; that position is already in ruins 
and that ruin has been self-infl icted—infl icted by an irresponsible US 
government that’s undertaken wars which are not only a crime but also a 
mistake, and has betrayed every American...destroyed every ingredient in 
the American identity. You know if we had Senator McCarthy around, he 
should be indicting Mr. Bush and Mr. Cheney and Mr. Rumsfeld and Mr. 
Wolfowitz for un-American activities.
Th e global power of the United States is obviously irrecoverable partly 
because the economy is in ruins, the country is mired in inextricable 
wars... America as a moral exemplar has been sullied and besmirched 
so profoundly that no eff ort can redeem it. But above all the position is 
irrecoverable because other countries are ascending to comparable levels 
of wealth and power. Th ere’s been a lot of comment recently about what 
made the United States a global hegemon. I think on the whole historians 
and political scientists have got this wrong. I point to overwhelmingly 
two factors. Well I hate the word ‘factor’; there are two features of the 
history of the United States in the time of this country’s ascent to the 
status of a global power. One of them is the size of its internal market, 
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and the other is its huge underexploited resources, above all the prairie, 
the so-called Great American Desert, which in the nineteenth century 
became the great granary of the world. Well, the United States no longer 
has any underexploited resources and it no longer has a particularly large 
internal market by the standards of the world, so the conditions on which 
American greatness was founded are now irretrievably in the past.
I think your point about the reason for American students’ interest in world 
history is well taken, but I think that another reason that we’re interested in 
global history is that we don’t have quite the same background either as an 
expansionist country, or the same depth of background as any of the European 
countries. We can’t look back to when Roman legions fi rst planted their 
standards on our soil and trace our evolution from that point forward. And 
we tend to ignore entirely our Native American antecedents. And so if you 
can’t look into the past you might as well look laterally. And I’m wondering 
if you think global history is something that is peculiarly American? Or are 
Europeans beginning to look at it in the same way, beyond this colonial 
expansionist, European expansion programme?
It certainly hasn’t taken off  in the classroom in the same way in Europe. 
Th ere hasn’t been this great explosion of courses in it. And most European 
history departments—almost all Europeans—don’t have anybody who 
has a particular responsibility to teach it and to work on it. Obviously 
there is a great, a growing interest in a scholarly context in global topics 
in Europe and a lot of very good work is being done there. But to some 
extent the European tradition, what historians do outside the classroom, 
has always been rather independent of what they do in it. And that’s not 
so much the case in the United States I don’t think.
Again, to go back to my own undergraduate experience in Oxford 
where everybody taught everything and what their own research interests 
were didn’t necessarily have anything to do with what they were doing in 
their lectures or in their tutorials with undergraduates. It would be most 
unusual in the United States, where people go into the classroom and they 
teach their speciality.
So when you’re teaching at Tufts, are you teaching pretty exclusively world 
history or global history?
No. Well, I mean of course everything is, if you have this sort of totalising, 
globalizing approach that I have, then everything is sort of seamless, part 
of the great web, and I don’t really like to pander to specialisation by 
admitting that there are any subcategories. But in practice, to avoid a lot 
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of circumlocution, I do other stuff . One of the obligations of my chair 
at Tufts is to teach Spanish history, so I always teach a Spanish history 
course every year. Or I try to teach it. Teach is a transit verb and I’m not 
really sure I can say that I teach something unless my students actually 
learn it. Tufts has a category of courses which it calls research seminars, 
which sounds rather grand but essentially it just means a small class in 
which people study a subject with reference to the primary sources. And 
my research seminar is on Native American attitudes to Spaniards in the 
early colonial period. I also have an environmental history course that I 
teach, among one or two other things that I use to vary the menu. But 
the environmental history course, the Spanish history course, the Native-
American course and the global history course are the bedrock of my 
curriculum.
I guess if there isn’t this approach to global history in Europe or elsewhere 
that there is in the United States, it would be diffi  cult to discuss national 
approaches to world history in the same way that one might discuss diff erent 
national approaches to colonial history.
No. If there are such diff erent national approaches I don’t really know what 
they are. I suppose it’s inevitable; we always see the world from somewhere. 
What I’ve said about the motivation for American undergraduate students 
to study global history implies an American point of view. I don’t like to 
call it a national point of view because I never like speaking of the United 
States as a nation. Americans do that but it seems to be somewhat an 
abuse of the word. I never really like speaking of nations in any context; I 
try to avoid the word.
Do you think there are, whatever the alternative term is, national views of 
colonial history in Europe—English versus Spanish versus Portuguese versus 
Dutch or French—that have any bearing on the way global history—might 
wind up evolving?
Well, what strikes me as remarkable is that traditionally the national 
perspectives, if you like to call them that, of all these communities—
Dutch, French, Spanish, British, Portuguese—all of these communities 
of people whose predecessors established and ran and exploited these 
empires seem to be remarkably similar. Th ey’ve all traditionally had a very 
metropolitan perspective and all the while kidded themselves that these 
empires were achievements of their forebears who with extraordinary 
cunning and prowess created these empires. Th e great breakthrough 
really of the last forty years or so—sixty years if you go right back to 
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Van Leur—has been to unpick that perspective and to see that empires 
are collaborative ventures and they don’t—except in very, very, very brief 
periods when you’ve got crushing technological superiority—necessarily 
enable outsiders to impose their views on indigenous society.8 Even in 
the most extreme cases—I don’t know, Congo of King Leopold II—you 
always had the quislings and collaborators from the indigenous world, and 
for me the real problem of imperial history that has emerged is trying to 
understand why and how these collaborative relationships grow up and 
above all what’s in it for the indigenous collaborators. Why do people see 
outsiders as potentially positive sources of infl uence in the lives of various 
societies?
Isn’t that something you begin to answer in Pathfi nders, in talking about the 
explosion of people across the world trying to get away from each other and 
then all of a sudden in the period of recorded history coming back together 
again?
Well, Pathfi nders is about a diff erent matter. It’s about, perhaps, something 
else that has always concerned me, which is ‘How does culture change?’ In 
a way, that is the great central theme of the historical discipline. History 
is an attempt to describe and understand how cultures change. And the 
reason why it’s interesting can only be fully appreciated in comparative 
perspective, because human culture is very volatile and mutable compared 
with that of other cultural animals. Th at’s what makes us humans an 
interesting subject.
Pathfi nders is really part of that attempt to understand how cultures 
change, how they change by virtue of one particular mechanism or 
medium—the interaction of one culture with another. Th e subject 
of Pathfi nders is how explorers fi rst led cultures to diverge by putting 
distance between them and moving into diff erent, variously demanding 
environments and then caused them to converge by re-establishing routes 
of contact between them. So I think that’s a slightly diff erent subject, 
although a deeply important and pervasive one.
Th e question of how empires work is a small part of that huge puzzle. 
And I have proposed a contribution towards an answer to this question 
of how empires work, or to the problem of these collaborative ventures 
in which indigenous and incoming elites fi nd each other mutually 
useful. I have contributed something towards an answer to that, but not 
so much in Pathfi nders as in a collection of essays that Leonard Blussé 
and I put together about shifting communities in early modern Asia, 
where I proposed for the fi rst time in print something I’d developed 
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years previously in lectures to undergraduates in Oxford, what I call the 
stranger eff ect.9 I elaborate on this concept, again really on the basis of a 
long course of interdisciplinary readings in sociology and anthropology.
Th e stranger eff ect I defi ne as the propensity that some cultures have to 
defer to strangers, sometimes to the point of investing them with power. 
And of course it’s a very rational form of deference because the stranger’s 
objective; the stranger is unimplicated in existing factions and networks. 
Th e stranger is therefore an ideal arbitrator, an ideal holy man, an ideal 
marriage partner. For all of those reasons, in cultures that have this 
propensity to value the stranger, it’s a perfectly rational strategy to hand 
over power or to incorporate incoming elites in existing power structures. 
But as well as being a rational response to the opportunities that empires 
create for collaboration it’s also rooted in very widely diff used aspects of 
collective psychology and of cultural behaviour.
And you can see this even in societies like ours, which is rather hostile 
to the stranger. Anybody who has tried to get a visa or green card to 
work in the United States knows this is not a culture—I mean, modern 
industrialised cultures typically are not particularly responsive to the 
stranger—but even we value goods from afar, almost in proportion to 
the distance they’ve travelled. Well, there are a lot of cultures that value 
people in the same way. Th e nouvel arrivé who comes with the aura of 
the divine horizon is a suitable person to invest with authority. And I’ve 
particularly found the work of the anthropologist Mary W. Helms helpful 
in formulating the idea of the stranger eff ect.10
What is your view of this idea of empire? I know you’ve spoken a little bit about 
it in terms of the way that Europeans tend to view themselves as the architects 
of their own success. I think that one of the diffi  culties that Americans have 
had—going back to this question of geography and looking at the map—is 
that, unlike the British who could 100 years ago look at this great swatch of 
pink on the world map and see where their infl uences are, America’s modern, 
neo-empire preserves at least the illusion of diff erent colours and diff erent 
states, which doesn’t allow us to see how our culture, economy and military 
permeate the rest of the world.
Even at the height of the British Empire, when British schoolchildren 
were all being taught where cocoa and ground nuts came from, they still 
actually weren’t all that good at geography. I don’t know whether the story 
about Queen Victoria asking for a gunboat to go to La Paz [Bolivia] is 
true; it’s probably apocryphal. It has a kind of symbolic validity. One does 
have to accept that the British have the advantage over the Americans in 
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geography because they have a small country and you can learn where 
the Gorbals [in Glasgow] are and you’ve still got time to know where 
the Ganges is. America’s a very big country and, I don’t know, if you’re 
in Milwaukee, by the time you’ve read the news from Minneapolis and 
Mississippi you don’t have time for Moscow and Madrid. I get slightly 
impatient with Europeans who have this sort of sneering attitude to 
Americans’ geographical ignorance. It’s true, I do know a lot of Americans, 
some very well educated Americans, who don’t know whether Paris is 
actually east or west of Madrid, but I know an awful lot of Europeans 
who don’t even know whether North Dakota is north or south of South 
Dakota. I think this ignorance isn’t peculiar to Americans.
Another question which is really unrelated, but I’ ll try to create an artifi cial 
bridge anyway, about this outsider eff ect, and also a little bit about your 
perversity: as a historian it seems that you straddle these worlds of being the 
academic historian with edited volumes to your credit and essays contributed 
to other people’s volumes, but you’ve also done a lot of very broad-gauge history 
like Millennium and Civilizations and Food. You’ve written about Truth. 
You’ve written the essays on the Americas and on humankind. And I suppose 
it’s too big a question to ask what you think the role of the historian in society 
is, but I want to ask it anyway. Because it seems in the American context that 
historians do seem to be bogged down. When we do see historians writing 
trade books, they tend to be either I think very narrowly focused on, you 
know, the new biography of Jackson, or Washington, or they tend to be very 
polemical. I think of Victor David Hanson or Niall Ferguson. What do you 
think the role of the historian might be?
Well, I think there are two answers, or perhaps three, to that. Th e fi rst, 
or fi rst two: there isn’t anything very much that’s special about history, 
especially if you take my view of it and you think it encompasses 
everything. Everything that we know is in the past, and therefore I 
regard it as proper for me to study it. And though you know you’re right 
that I’ve written about all these diff erent things and it sounds as though 
I’m terribly intellectually undisciplined, which indeed I am, I make no 
apology for that because I chose to specialise in history when I was an 
undergraduate because I was interested in everything and I couldn’t make 
up my mind what to do and I wanted to do the subject that incorporated 
something of everything else. So especially if you take that very holistic 
view of history, there is therefore nothing special about it. Also, it has the 
virtue of all academic disciplines. And I think the common virtue of all 
academic disciplines is that they can do two things for those who study 
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them. Th ey can enhance life and they can prepare for death. And actually 
those are the only two things worth doing in the world anyway.
History does have, I suppose, enough of a distinctive profi le for one 
to be able to say that it enhances life and prepares for death in particular 
ways. It enhances life by enriching your experience, because if you go out 
into the streets and you look at the streetscape and the roofscape you can 
enjoy it more if you know that that building is Georgian or that building is 
Elizabethan. If you go out into the countryside and do this environmental 
history as I do, you can understand why the topography is as it is, why 
particular crops are being grown in particular places, and when all that 
happened—all that actually makes it a more vital experience and more 
enjoyable. It enhances individual lives by helping those who are leading 
those individual lives to situate them in a vast context.
And it helps you prepare for death I think. I hope you won’t think 
this is canting if I say that I think it makes you a better person, or has the 
potential to make you a better person, because it encourages you to strive 
to understand minds very diff erent from your own. I think if you can 
understand people in the past of your own culture, because the past is a 
foreign country and they do things diff erently there, you can understand 
better your own contemporaries in other cultures and people with other 
values. It’s a mind-broadening experience to be a historian, and if it does 
enable, if it helps you sympathise with other people, then I think you’re a 
better person for it.
And my other answer, about the responsibility of the historian: 
obviously the historian is a teacher. I see all these books and television 
programmes and stuff , and all the dreadful journalism that I churn out, 
I see these as teaching in print. I see them as extensions of my life in 
the classroom; I don’t really draw a distinction between them. And what 
the teacher has to do is obviously stimulate—stimulate his students and 
readers to respond; if necessary provoke them into reaction and outrage. 
Th e greatest pleasure to me in my life as a teacher of history is when my 
students disagree with me. I once gave a public lecture in New Zealand 
and a fi ght broke out in the audience and I was so gratifi ed because I 
really thought: ‘At last, I’ve stimulated a response.’ Of course that’s not 
the whole of teaching, because obviously one hopes that one of the ways 
you can stimulate a response is by hitting on the truth, and it’s obviously 
the responsibility of all professional intellectuals to speak the truth, to 
deconstruct myths, to excoriate abuses of power and mistaken policies on 
the basis of privileged knowledge they have as a result of having studied.
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How secure do feel the discipline of history is in the academy?
Do you know, I honestly don’t care about that. I mean—and I know I 
shall get stoned to death by my fellow history teachers for saying this—
but I never lost a moment’s sleep over anxiety that history is going to 
disappear from the curriculum. And I don’t think it really is. But if it did, 
I don’t think it would make any diff erence, because you can’t eliminate 
history from people’s experience of education, because you can’t study 
physics without studying the history of physics. You’ve got to know about 
Einstein and Bohr. And if you’re going to do chemistry you have to know 
about, I don’t know, Lavoisier. Th ere’s no knowledge that isn’t historical, 
which by defi nition is in the past. And people can never get away from 
history. If it ceased to be taught in schools or universities, people would 
still thirst or hunger to read about it, and there would still be work for 
professional historians in Grub Street and as pen-pushers and publishers 
of books.
Do you think history as a discipline—in terms of methodology, do you think 
there are methodological principles or applications that should be taught to 
historians? It sounds like you could be arguing that anybody can be a historian.
Yes. I am arguing that. I mean I think there are all sorts of terribly good 
reasons for taking formal history courses, and even graduate courses in 
history. But to be a historian is not one of them. Some of my favourite 
historians are not professional historians at all. Th ey are lawyers and 
scientists and nuns who have written history books just as good as those 
by any professional historian, and hugely better than my own. And that’s 
one of the great virtues of history, and that’s why to me it is the people’s 
discipline, because anyone can do it. You don’t need any formal training. 
You need to be able to read, and it helps to know more than one language, 
but you just need the compulsion, the passion, and the interest more than 
you need any specifi c technique or methodological training or that ghastly 
stuff , because any such training limits you. It’s in some ways better not 
to have it, or if you have it to react against it and to reject it because then 
you’ve really taken advantage of it and you’ve got something creative out 
of it.
Th e wonderful thing about history being the people’s discipline, 
being universal and accessible, is that it can be the forum in which this 
interdisciplinarity comes together and in which we can all, whatever 
our training, take part in a conversation about the past. It’s inescapable, 
the past! Everyone’s got a past! Everyone is a historian of their own lives 
and experiences. And that’s why I don’t try to write accessible books in 
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order to make them more commercial; I write to make them more easily 
intelligible and more widely inspiring and stimulating and provocative. 
I utterly detest and reject the attempt to make any academic discipline 
hieratic and esoteric and to exclude people by having a lot of jargon and a 
lot of arcane theory that creates a barrier between a writer and the reader, 
or that divides this great common pursuit that I see as being possible 
among warring sects.
Th at brings me I guess to my last question, which I’ ll preface with an observation 
that you write with the conviction of an autobiographer or memoirist, and 
with the genius of a novelist.
Well, I think that’s putting it a bit strongly, Lincoln, but it’s very nice of 
you to say so.
Genius in that you have the novelist’s sensibility. And I’m wondering what 
you think that you would recommend to an aspiring historian, your students, 
whether undergraduates or graduates in becoming historians and to make 
themselves better historians. What do you recommend as the most important 
thing? I think I could anticipate an answer, which would be that they should 
read more literature, and not just history. But I’m very curious to hear your 
take.
I think perfectionism is the end, because you can never attain it. And 
of course being a perfectionist is a recipe for unhappiness, but I don’t 
mind infl icting unhappiness on my students. After all, I think history is 
going to enhance their lives and prepare their deaths, so I think a little 
bit of unhappiness is worth enduring along the way. But it’s perfectionism 
that I recommend. I always smother students’ papers with quibbles and 
complaints and suggestions for changing everything and reworking it. 
And this can be shocking for a student to get their work back and to see 
there isn’t a sentence in which I haven’t challenged them over something. 
I think you’re only ever going to improve if you’re reaching for higher 
standards, and I think that the feel-good society is the enemy of education. 
If you want to be better, feel badly about yourself. Hate your work. But of 
course, I suppose, what I’m off ering here is a prescription for any fi eld of 
study and isn’t peculiar to history.
If I’m looking for a nostrum that history students need to know, the 
thing I do often say to students is, think the best of the people you’re 
studying. Th ey may be the foulest tyrants, the most bloody oppressors, 
the most ruthless exploiters. But what did they think they were doing? 
How did they justify themselves? And scour the sources for clues to that. 
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One way of putting this is to say to yourself, ‘Th e work of a historian, 
the work of a historical researcher, is really the interrogation of the dead.’ 
And the aim of that interrogation is to hear them speak to you with the 
same intelligibility and vividness as you experience when you’re speaking 
to your friends and contemporaries and people whose outlook and 
cultural background are very similar to your own. Th at’s when the wave 
of academic pleasure which is the nearest intellectual experience you have 
to an orgasm occurs.
And I think the ultimate test—again I always try to infl ict this on my 
students—is do you get the joke? And you know you’ve graduated as a 
historian, not when you get the Ph.D., but when you can laugh at a joke 
that is hundreds or even thousands of years old. And that’s the moment 
when you know you’ve established that sympathy which is the unique 
pleasure the study of history can impart. 
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Studying Southeast Asia in and for 
Southeast Asia: Interview with Anthony 
Reid
Leonard Blussé and Carolien Stolte met Anthony Reid and his wife Helen 
for an Italian dinner in Leiden. Cultural confusion ensues: a life and career 
in Southeast Asian studies. For the convenience of our readers footnotes have 
been added concerning some of the people and publications mentioned during 
this interview. 
Could you tell us something about your youth and educational background in 
New Zealand?
Growing up in New Zealand defi nitely contributed to my interest in the 
rest of the world. It bred a kind of internationalism; since the centre of the 
world was so clearly not New Zealand, it had to be somewhere else. I never 
studied history at school. Fortunately it wasn’t available for the academic 
stream in my school, but since memory was never my strong point, I 
would have done badly and would have given up on the whole thing. So 
I didn’t discover history until I was in university. However, my parents 
were good friends with John Beaglehole, the biographer of Captain James 
Cook, and probably New Zealand’s then best-known historian on a world 
stage.1 Since they were diplomats and often overseas, they arranged for 
me to live with the Beagleholes during my last undergraduate year (1959). 
Dr. Beaglehole was a brilliant researcher and writer, though not a great 
lecturer. His passion for history and the infectious humanism that went 
with it must have had its infl uence on me. 
If we remember right, you did not spend all your youth in New Zealand.
Yes, being dragged about to various places as a ‘diplomatic kid’ must have 
had an eff ect. My parents went to the US at the end of the war. New 
Zealand didn’t really know it was an independent country until the end 
of World War II, and hardly had any diplomatic representation until then. 
It did not have a foreign ministry, or a foreign service. Th ere was an offi  ce 
in London to which they appointed ex-politicians, but nothing else. After 
all, we were ‘British’ so we didn’t need to have separate representation—
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Britain would look after us. Th e Second World War was a watershed in that 
sense; New Zealand (and Australia) saw that in a crunch Britain would 
look after its own interests fi rst. If anybody was capable of protecting New 
Zealand and Australia in the Pacifi c, it was going to be America. Th e fall 
of Singapore was a crucial moment. A shift in orientation away from Great 
Britain began, and my father was sent to Washington to open up an offi  ce 
there in 1943. However, the war was still going on and the journey by 
sea was quite dangerous. I was still only 4 years old—I am the youngest 
of four children—and my parents didn’t think it safe for us to cross. So 
the kids stayed behind until the last stage of the war. I was put up with 
an aunt in Auckland for a year. At the end of 1944 it was considered safe 
enough to ship us across the Pacifi c. So we got on an American troop ship 
taking US soldiers back. Th e crossing was still a little dangerous then, but 
for a little boy it was mostly exciting. I remember the target practices on 
board. Th ey would send all of us below decks, saying all the civilians had 
to disappear. My siblings and I knew that those were the fun times when 
balloons would be released and shot at, so we would try to hide in the 
lifeboats to see everything.
So I began school in the US, and experienced that temporary trauma 
that displaced kids do. I was the boy with the funny accent for at least 
the beginning of my four and a half years there. After our return to New 
Zealand in 1949, I was again the boy with the funny accent, talking like 
an American kid. But children adapt quickly for survival.
My father took up a second posting soon after I began high school in 
1952, seconded from New Zealand’s Department of External Aff airs to 
serve the UN as its representative in Jakarta. One of his main tasks was 
to look after international experts from agencies such as the FAO and the 
WHO. It was a frustrating time for him; Jakarta was expanding rapidly 
towards the hills to the south, and the newly built houses in Kebayoran 
intended for international staff  would invariably be taken over by the 
Indonesian army when they neared completion. My father was never very 
comfortable in the role of diplomat, but did believe the Jakarta assignment 
was his most worthwhile. He had been trained as a lawyer, but keenly felt 
his own working class background and being born ‘on the wrong side 
of the tracks.’ He may have been a little over-anxious as an Ambassador 
subsequently, afraid that people would fi nd out that he was just a working 
lad. I did visit them for a few months, but my parents considered me to 
be a failure in the tropics—I reacted badly to the climate, I missed my 
mates and my football, and was sent home. My next foreign visit was to 
see my parents in Japan when I had just started university in 1957. Th at 
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was my fi rst adult experience of Asia, and it made a big impact on me. 
Th e post-war economic take-off  was just beginning. Although I had seen 
poverty in Indonesia, I worried about it more in Japan. I went with my 
brother, and once we got into an overcrowded subway at opposite ends of 
the carriage. Th ere was no problem fi nding each other since we both stood 
a head taller than everybody else. But when I next visited Japan in 1973 I 
no longer stood out at all. It was amazing to see by how much the Japanese 
post-war generation who came to maturity in the 1960s had outgrown 
their parents. 
So you were not a typical New Zealand boy. 
Who is typical? I do think my background made me relatively predisposed 
to appreciate the other; to recognise that there was cultural diff erence in 
the world and to fi nd that endlessly fascinating. 
What did you study in University?
I went to Victoria University in Wellington. As an undergraduate, I took 
history and economics, and in my fi rst year also political science and 
French. I did not initially think history was an important subject, though 
it turned out to be so much more fun than economics. Economics was 
what seemed serious. I was an eager young boy who wanted to improve 
the world, and I thought economics should explain the world’s inequalities 
and how to fi x them, and that perhaps political science would also help a 
bit. But I kept on with economics through my fi rst degree, thinking that 
was what would be relevant to the world’s problems. 
Helen interrupts: ‘Your whole family was like that; it was your Methodist 
background.’ 
Yes, you are probably right. Methodism and the Student Christian 
Movement (which absorbed some of my time as an undergrad) conveyed 
this conviction that one should try to leave the world a better place. Th ere 
turned out (by much later hindsight) to be one great advantage to studying 
history at that time and place. One studied to explain the world, not to 
explain oneself. No one was interested in New Zealand’s history, which 
did not even begin to be taught at university until a few years after my 
time. I was not the only one who suspected that it was not the centre of the 
world. In the interim since then, history in New Zealand and Australia, 
like everywhere, has become more concerned with indigenous heritage 
and identity issues, and we have grown less confi dent about even our right 
to teach and write about the other. Th e history I learned in Wellington 
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was of course primarily European and British history, but that provided 
the frame for adding Asian history to a broadly global understanding. I 
felt I was learning something about the world, and wanted to explain that 
world. If history had meant predominantly the history of my own country 
(as tended to be the case in England and France, for example), I would 
have chosen something else. 
So how did you end up in Southeast Asian studies?
What may have infl uenced things was that around 1949–50, a group 
of Commonwealth countries, spearheaded by Australia and New 
Zealand, initiated a scholarship agreement for students from the Asian 
Commonwealth initially, but eventually extended to most of Southeast 
Asia. Immigrants from those countries were not yet being accepted, but 
after the war it became obvious that they were neighbours and that they 
were poor. So we started off ering scholarships under what was called 
the Colombo plan after the initial agreement in Colombo. Suddenly all 
these diverse and interesting students were coming to homogeneous New 
Zealand. I played a small role as a student organiser of programmes for 
one or two intakes in the late 1950s. Th is programme was one indication, 
along with the Volunteer Graduates scheme for Indonesia in particular, 
of what seemed clear to my generation down under: that the challenge 
was in Southeast Asia. Th ere was no China—it was inaccessible—and 
the Pacifi c Islands that later became important to New Zealand were 
still a colonial responsibility. Southeast Asia was the challenge—whether 
thinking of poverty and development, of politics, or of cultural otherness. 
It was there and it was exciting. It has become less obvious now, but for 
my 1950s generation there was a real movement, a reformist challenge to 
‘do something.’
Helen: Th e fi rst thing his parents ever asked me, was: ‘So what can you do 
for the world?’ I was brought up a Catholic; his Methodist family took me by 
surprise.
Yes, Helen comes along somewhere around this time, towards the end 
of my undergrad years. She played basketball, as did I. We met at the 
New Zealand inter-university summer camp at Curious Cove in the 
Marlborough Sounds. It was a summer camp for wannabe intellectuals, 
full of the pretentious dreams of youth. Garfi eld Todd was one of the 
keynote speakers, and something of a hero as the New Zealand-born 
fi rst prime minister of Rhodesia, trying to fi nd a multi-racial solution 
before the white separatists took over. Helen was a student of languages 
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at Auckland, and a Catholic with a strong Auckland Catholic student 
network, while I was an SCM-type activist, for whom the biggest issue 
of the pre-Vietnam times was to stop racially exclusive rugby tours to 
and from South Africa. We became interested in each other for the usual 
reasons, but also perhaps a touch of the exoticism of otherness. My parents 
were somewhat less impressed. 
I was Christian-activist enough at the time to write my MA thesis about 
Church and State in New Zealand during the Great Depression—the 
only time I ever did New Zealand history. Subsequently, I was interested 
in getting away, whether to do a Ph.D. on something Indonesian or to join 
the Foreign Ministry. Th e Rhodes scholarship rounds came along whilst 
I was working in a construction gang, mostly digging ditches, it seemed, 
over the summer holidays. I foolishly thought I had to tell the foreman 
of my gang that I had to go for an interview with the Governor General 
for a scholarship. I should have just called in sick, since nobody believed 
me anyway. I didn’t get the scholarship, though. I always wondered if 
the problem was basketball—the rules at that time still required that, as 
well as academic prowess, you had to excel in ‘the manly sports’ to show 
the leadership potential needed for a Rhodes. In New Zealand that was 
clearly rugby, and I played basketball. Th e Governor General asked me: 
‘Is that a manly sport?’ But I was still interested in doing a Ph.D., and not 
long after I got a phone call from someone connected with that process, 
asking if I would be interested in a much less lucrative and prestigious 
scholarship handled by the same committee—a consolation prize of sorts 
for not getting the Rhodes. So I took this Oxford scholarship to King’s 
College, Cambridge. 
To return to the question, I did know that I wanted to do something 
on Indonesia. I had even taken an undergraduate class in Southeast Asian 
history and read my Furnivall, Emerson and Kahin at that early stage. 
Th at course was a fi rst for New Zealand, in 1958. It was taught by Emily 
Sadka,2 who was from a Sephardic Jewish family in Singapore and had 
done her Ph.D. at ANU on colonial Malaya. New Zealand was starting 
to get interested in Southeast Asian history and was looking for people 
who could teach it. At Wellington they had also just begun teaching 
Indonesian, which subsequently had a long career in New Zealand before 
being abandoned a couple of years ago. Leslie Palmier3 was appointed to 
Wellington in my time also to start the Asian Studies programme. He 
didn’t stay very long, but I asked him once where I should go if I wanted 
to do something on Indonesia. Of course he said Cornell. But I got 
the scholarship to Cambridge, and did not even apply for anything in 
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America—I was much more interested in going to Cambridge and being 
in Europe. So in 1961 I sailed through the Panama route to start work in 
Cambridge. 
When I got there, they tried to persuade me to do something else. I 
already had an MA. But the historians at Kings said that what they did 
best was the Tripos, the three-year undergraduate degree. Cambridge still 
didn’t pay great attention to graduate studies at that time, and many of the 
other scholarship students from abroad had indeed been persuaded to do 
a second bachelor’s degree. I am glad I had the courage to say no, and of 
course the trend moved quickly in that direction subsequently. But they 
had no one in Cambridge for Southeast Asian studies—the only person 
I might do a Ph.D. with was Victor Purcell,4 who worked on the Chinese 
in Southeast Asia. I wasn’t at all interested in the Chinese at that stage 
(see below), nor he much in Indonesia, but he became my mentor and so 
I went ahead with him. Helen and I married at the beginning of my third 
year at Cambridge (1963). She had come to Europe after teaching for a 
year to get some money, and after we got together again she had taught 
English in Aachen, as near as she could get to where I was toiling in the 
Dutch colonial archives at Schaarsbergen, near Arnhem. 
What about the thesis itself?
Aceh, I am afraid to say, was an arbitrary choice in a way. I worried about 
all those Dutch researchers who would read the colonial sources so much 
faster than me, and although I did start learning Dutch right away, I did 
not want a 100 per cent Dutch topic. Purcell was a fascinating character, 
but he was ageing, fi nishing up his memoirs, and not very interested in 
me. So I used to go to SOAS to talk to the historians there, among whom 
was Jeremy Cowan,5 later Director of SOAS. He suggested I do East 
Sumatra, the cultuurgebied around Medan, as a key economic story on 
which little had been done. I went to the archives, and discovered that for 
every document on East Sumatra in either Dutch or British archives, there 
were twenty on Aceh. East Sumatra seemed such a quiet side-show by 
contrast that it would be hard to justify. So I went ahead with Aceh, trying 
to explain the origins of the war from both Dutch and British records 
leading up to the war, and discovering some fascinating Anglo-Dutch 
imbroglios along the way, largely ignored in the Dutch publications of the 
time because they embarrassingly compromised Dutch sovereignty. One 
of these was the strong Turkish role in the diplomacy of the war; another 
was the Nisero aff air of 1883, which has remained in the shadows although 
a fi lm could be made of it. A British steamer, Nisero, was wrecked on the 
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west coast of Aceh in the middle of the Aceh war, 1883, stranding its 
crew of 25 mostly British seamen. Th e local raja of Teunom had the wit 
himself—or more likely was advised by a French pepper-trader friend, 
Edouard Roura—to see this as a great chance. Why not hold them 
hostage and propose not to let them go until Britain guaranteed a proper 
solution to this war? It proved to be a stroke of brilliance because the 
British (especially in Singapore and Penang) were already very critical of 
Dutch policies, and the emotive pull of British hostages in a Sumatran 
jungle for a year made it imperative for London to appear to be doing 
something. Th e Hague was almost desperate to prevent the British from 
intervening. Th e Dutch government presented the eventual compromise 
with the British and the Raja, including the freeing of trade, to the Dutch 
public as if it was just what they would have done anyway. But losing that 
weapon of trade control was one of the factors that prevented the Dutch 
making a start on conquering Aceh for another ten years. Intriguing. 
Anyway, I completed my thesis in January 1965 and published 
it with the University of Malaya and with Oxford.6 Overall, it was a 
fairly conventional diplomatic thesis, with some interesting data but no 
ambitious new paradigm or anything of the sort. It got a couple of reviews 
and took its place on dusty shelves in a few libraries. So it was astonishing 
to me that a few years later, in the 1970s, I received a letter from Hasan 
Tiro’s independence movement (then still a small thing), saying how 
much they liked the book which inspired their guerrillas in the jungle in 
Aceh! I was incredulous and frankly appalled. I told nobody at the time. It 
seemed inconceivable that this pedestrian dissertation written entirely in 
Europe, with scarcely any knowledge of modern Aceh (I was able to visit 
Aceh only once between thesis and book), could have had such an eff ect. 
It appeared later that Hasan Tiro had read my book in the New 
York Public Library in the early 1970s, and was excited by the picture of 
nineteenth-century Aceh being taken seriously as an independent country 
having diplomatic relations with Britain, France, Turkey and the United 
States. No doubt I had tried to make it, if not Aceh-centric, at least a 
story with three equal protagonists—Aceh, the Netherlands and Britain. 
My generation was fed up with colonialism and therefore inherently 
sympathetic with nationalism. I certainly sympathised with the Aceh 
underdog having little chance in a colonial world. Th e British sources 
provided a useful additional window, just because they were not Dutch, 
and could show the Aceh case. So I see now how that story may have 
inadvertently appealed to Aceh nationalists. After the peace began I felt 
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able to meet Hasan Tiro and Malik Mahmud in Sweden, and I became 
again more active on the Aceh front—especially after the 2004 tsunami. 
What about your fi rst university appointment?
Th at was Malaysia. I had put some feelers out, but the job off er from the 
University of Malaya arrived halfway through an overland trip through 
the Middle East: Yugoslavia into Greece, Turkey, Syria, Iran. A telegram 
somehow reached us at a campground in the south of Turkey, which we 
must have given as a forwarding address for the Poste Restante in Istanbul. 
I had a job option in New Zealand if nothing in the region had come 
through. But having written a thesis without any fi eldwork in the country 
I really wanted to be near Indonesia. And I couldn’t go to Indonesia itself 
in 1965 because of konfrontasi.7 Th e telegram basically urged us to get 
to Malaysia as soon as we could. I think I said we would need a couple 
more months, since we were only a third of the way and hadn’t yet seen 
Jerusalem, Damascus, Baghdad and Isfahan. Th is was before the June 
1976 War and so old Jerusalem was still part of Jordan. We had a booking 
made to get our Volkswagen van onto a ship in Madras, and I think we 
stuck to that.
Malaysia was an exciting place to start a career. Th e History 
Department was itself very interesting for a Southeast Asianist, with 
Wang Gungwu as head,8 Jan Pluvier9 already there as an Indonesianist, 
as well as David Bassett,10 Bill Roff ,11 Tony Short,12 and David Wyatt13 
and Gerald Maryonov as Fulbright visitors. But Malaysia itself was the 
real fascination. Th e late 1960s were turbulent times there as elsewhere. 
My fi rst months witnessed Singapore’s departure from Malaysia (August 
1965) and the abortive coup in Jakarta (September), with all that followed 
from that. Th e most personally dramatic moment was the Kuala Lumpur 
rioting of 13 May 1969, which transformed the Malaysian scene. From 
hindsight it was the end of its age of innocence. About 200 people were 
killed, mainly Chinese, and many gruesomely slashed with parangs. 
Chinese Malaysians, although the victims of this violence, were also the 
big political losers from it, as the Malay-dominated government drew 
the conclusion that Malay resentment had to be addressed through one 
of the world’s most large-scale affi  rmative-action programmes. Almost 
overnight Malay nationalism became legitimate, and the old relaxed 
cosmopolitanism suspect. Transforming the medium of Malaysia’s 
universities from English to Malay, fi rst a distant goal, became a political 
urgency, and (although the transformation came at a heavy price for the 
universities) I was glad to be there for the beginning of the process. 
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I was asked to teach Early Modern Southeast Asia, about which 
I then knew very little. Obviously the seed of the ‘Age of Commerce’ 
idea was planted there. But I got into it and started reading, and it was 
there that I started to fi nd it really interesting. But as long as I was 
living in the region (as I found again in Singapore after 2002) the tug of 
understanding its contemporary shape was hard to resist. Of course I was 
itching to visit Sumatra for the fi rst time, but couldn’t until Indonesia 
recognised Malaysia. When I did start to visit in late 1966 I was struck 
by the enormous contrast between Malaysia and Sumatra, despite their 
rather similar frontier background in colonial and pre-colonial times. Th e 
vital factor appeared to be the Indonesian revolution, which swept away 
so many local anciens regimes. In Malaysia I started work on the ‘social 
revolution’ of Aceh and East Sumatra, which overthrew the old order of 
sultans, rajas and ulèëbalangs in a few violent months of 1945–46. Th is 
proved my most fi eldwork-based book, drawing much from interviews 
with revolutionaries, administrators and surviving aristocrats.14
In total I spent fi ve academic years in Malaysia. In 1970, I took up an 
essentially research appointment at the Australian National University. I 
was glad that I had already accepted the appointment just before the Kuala 
Lumpur riots, so I did not face the problem of some of my colleagues in 
seemingly overstaying their welcome in the transformation that followed 
the riots. 1969 turned out to be a defi ning moment in Malaysian history, 
and Malay-fi rst racial politics dominated the next forty years. I think I 
left at the right time, and my experience in Malaysia was entirely positive. 
And now come the big themes!
Th e fi rst big idea was revolution. Th at Malaysia-Indonesia contrast, which 
stayed with me all my life and is again a feature of Imperial Alchemy 
(2009), underlined for me the enormous importance of revolution. Th e 
revolutionary break with past legal and customary constraints in favour 
of the sacralisation of a revolutionary moment has had results even more 
decisive in Asia than in Europe. Indonesia’s unifi cation as a centralised 
nation-state (not to mention China’s) would have been impossible without 
it. While I was writing my book on the social revolution in Sumatra, I 
was asked to write a short general book about the Indonesian revolution 
which I there called a ‘national revolution.’15 I think it is a necessary 
way to understand Indonesia—it became a nation through revolution, 
providing a certain coherence and eventually shared culture (through a 
very centralised education system), at the cost of much more violence, 
lawlessness and impoverishment than Malaysia. 
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Th rough the 1970s, therefore, I was basically busy with this idea, which 
spawned a number of publications on the 1940s. ANU was fortunate 
in having a critical mass which made possible some joint projects, such 
as those on historiography,16 on the Japanese occupation,17 and later a 
number of others. But by the mid-1970s I was starting to feel that I did 
have something to say about the early modern period that I had taught in 
Malaysia. I started rather cautiously proposing a few ideas about what at 
one stage I called ‘the Origins of Poverty in Southeast Asia,’18 and was able 
to do some serious research on it during a sabbatical in Europe in 1978. 
Th e problem of slavery arose in that early stage of trying to understand 
the pre-colonial social systems. How should one render a concept that 
appeared so frequently in the sources, but remains controversial and 
unhelpfully pejorative in contemporary culture? I convinced myself, 
though not all of my collaborators in the project, that slavery was a critical 
institution in Southeast Asian history, precisely as a point of interaction 
between cultures, and between the state and non-state domains. 
Th e Bondage book19 was therefore a useful step towards the big 
project. Other themes that excited me along the way to the big book 
were the unusually autonomous position of women in Southeast Asia; the 
causes of Southeast Asia’s low population before 1800; and (after a year 
in Sulawesi in 1980–81) the exceptionally open society of seventeenth-
century Makasar.20 Th ese all became minor projects, and to some extent 
diversions, along the way to the two volumes of Th e Age of Commerce. 
I was very relieved to be able to persuade Yale to take one volume at a 
time, because the scale of the thing was getting out of hand and starting 
to crush me. But I was certainly fortunate to be at ANU, which made 
possible an unusually ambitious writing project of that sort. It was the 
perfect research institution for such a project.
Helen: At that stage, Southeast Asia was still relatively very poor, and the 
explanation of that poverty was the challenge that got him started on the Age 
of Commerce project.
Th ank you for reminding me that Methodist social conscience hadn’t quite 
deserted the Catholic adult. In terms of the dichotomy I once proposed 
in the motivation of Southeast Asian studies, between reformism and 
alterity,21 I certainly started with reformism—though somewhere along 
the way alterity (the fascination with cultural diff erence) got the upper 
hand. I did certainly begin with that ‘origins of poverty’ idea, but in 
the twenty years I took to realise it, that became overtaken by a number 
of other ideas. And the transition to ‘capitalism’ in the grand Marxist 
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sense was, I concluded, just too slippery a concept. Nevertheless I did 
pursue what seemed a particular feature of the Southeast Asian scene, the 
diffi  culties experienced in conserving capital. Like the gender question, 
this appeared to be something that distinguished Southeast Asia from 
both of its neighbours in India and China. Th ere was a marked pattern in 
the region for investing in people rather than in institutions. 
Whom were you inspired by in the Age of Commerce project? And did you ever 
imagine that this work would have such an impact? 
I was particularly inspired by Fernand Braudel. Having discovered La 
Méditerranée22 some distance into the project I was greatly relieved to 
fi nd that someone much wiser than I had managed to write inspiring 
early modern history around a maritime unit. I could not have had the 
courage to be so ambitious without that important precedent. Others in 
the Annales school, notably Emanuel Le Roy Ladurie, also showed how 
things could be done. I liked the big-picture work of Geoff rey Parker 
on the seventeenth century, and Charles Tilly, and the anthropologist 
Jack Goody. I certainly did not fully expect all the reactions I got—they 
were strong and they were many. Enthusiasm came from a number of 
unexpected quarters, notably Japan, and among graduate students in 
the US and Southeast Asia. Criticism necessarily came from colleagues, 
perhaps particularly targeting what some felt was seeing the region 
through a maritime/Indonesian lens, and for using sources rather boldly 
at a time when the cultural turn was discouraging some from using them 
at all. But there is not much about the work that I would repent or do 
diff erently. What irritated Southeast Asianists the most was perhaps 
the attempt to quantify some things. Economic history was very little 
developed for Southeast Asia since the pre-war Marxists, and putting 
numbers on things shocked some with a sense of misplaced concreteness. I 
do believe somebody had to begin to do this, to drive home that Southeast 
Asia was not some exotic Shangri-la which could not be compared with 
anywhere else. I love and admire the specialist work of epigraphers and 
literary scholars, but I want that to be more, not less, accessible to the non-
specialist by making the comparisons where we can. One needs numbers 
to compare things; one needs to do one’s best to put viss and pikul and so 
forth into metrics, after all the acknowledgement that nothing is precise 
and that things change with time and place. We needed to go forward, 
and it seemed wrong to me to ignore numbers only on account of there 
being less data. We may never know for sure whether Ayutthaya was as 
big as Paris in 1600, and we will never know as much about Ayutthaya 
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as about Paris. But there are still things to work with. Of course people 
started using my numbers, particularly for population, and people like 
Gunder Frank read more into them than they could bear. Th ey should 
certainly be used with great caution, as I made clear, and treated as only 
one step towards contextualising the comparative place of Southeast Asia 
in the broader Early Modern world. 
And how does your work on the Chinese enter into this story?
I had always felt that the Chinese in Southeast Asia were best left to those 
who had the language and context, but I was thrust increasingly into this 
fi eld in the 1990s. Th ere was a crisis in the study of the Southeast Asian 
Chinese at ANU when Wang Gungwu left for Hong Kong, and then 
in 1989 Jennifer Cushman23 died suddenly in her early forties. We set 
up a series of lectures in her honour,24 and later started a Centre for the 
Study of the Southern Chinese Diaspora, a way of including Australia 
and the Pacifi c as well as Southeast Asia without too many initials. We 
were all shocked at her sudden death, and Craig Reynolds and I were 
both propelled into taking responsibility for this Centre without much 
academic preparation for it. 
Th is in turn gave rise to another ‘big idea’—to compare the experience 
of the Southeast Asian Chinese with the European Jews. Once again, 
fools rush in where angels fear to tread. I am reminded of the opening 
sentence of Cliff ord Geertz’s review of Age of Commerce Vol. I: ‘Of 
impossible books asking to be written, a “total history” of Southeast Asia 
in the manner of Fernand Braudel...would seem very near to the top of 
the list.’25 I acknowledge that I have done some rash things that others 
had the wisdom to avoid, perhaps driven by that Methodist conscience 
or whatever. I had been troubled by this comparison ever since the Kuala 
Lumpur riots (pogrom?). Southeast Asianists and especially Southeast 
Asians steered well clear of it, and this itself began to seem a problem to 
me. I proposed it to the (New York-based) SSRC Committee on Southeast 
Asia, of which I was then a member, on the proviso (I thought unlikely 
to be met) that we could fi nd an experienced Europeanist to handle 
the major sensitivities on that side. Daniel Chirot26 was found able and 
willing—a specialist on Eastern Europe, and a sociologist given to ‘big 
ideas.’ We got together an impressive group about equally composed of 
Europeanists and Southeast Asianists, who met in San Diego, immediately 
before the Northridge earthquake of 17 January 1994 (presumably not 
connected). It was an eye-opener, even more for the Europeanists than 
for us. In Eastern Europe the huge role of Jewish fi nanciers had long 
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been judged to be largely fi ctional, but in Southeast Asia the Chinese 
domination of the economic high points was a fact. Managing resentment 
looked like an even bigger issue for Southeast Asia than for Europe. Th ey 
tended to read the Southeast Asian evidence as similar to that of Europe 
in the 1920s, and in some ways more alarming. We reassured them; it 
was all manageable and under control, at least as long as the economies 
fl ourished. Dan and I defi nitely wanted to publish on the issues, but our 
two colleagues from Malaysia thought that would be much too sensitive, 
given the demonisation of Jews in much contemporary Islamic discourse. 
At this point the Europeanists exploded. Now it really looked like Europe 
in the 1920s, when the establishment preferred to ignore anti-semitism 
as just an unruly fringe. Having insisted things were OK, how could 
we now say it was too sensitive to publish? It was an interesting episode, 
from which both sides learned a lot. While it remains true that the two 
communities have almost nothing in common per se, there are certain 
historical situations when entrepreneurial minorities become particularly 
endangered. Perhaps in both cases the gap between ruler and ruled was 
fi lled by an entrepreneurial minority. In the end, we took care to keep the 
book on a very analytic level.27 We thought there might be some fi reworks 
if the book got into the Southeast Asian press, so we didn’t seek that and 
it never did. 
What about your later career?
Th e book I have just fi nished is called Imperial Alchemy.28 It is another 
example of the way being in the region tends to pull me back to more 
contemporary concerns. I am very happy to be back with more time 
to write, since getting out of administration in 2007. But to go back a 
few years, I left ANU for UCLA in 1999. My formal career ended most 
surprisingly with two off ers I could simply not refuse, since each was 
off ering major resources to build an important new institution. I don’t 
think I am a natural administrator, especially when really tough decisions 
have to be made and defended, but I am proud of these two institutions. 
A viable Southeast Asian Centre in Los Angeles was an important and 
long overdue achievement, since LA is so important a diasporic centre 
for all the Southeast Asian-American communities. Th e Centre is still 
going strong, with Title VI funding from Washington in partnership with 
Berkeley. And after UCLA came the off er from NUS. 
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Helen: Th at was fantastic because it was never our intention to stay in 
America. He always wanted to work on Southeast Asia in Southeast Asia with 
Southeast Asians.
It is true that at ANU in the 1990s I was increasingly conscious that 
Southeast Asian Studies had to be centred in the region itself to be 
healthy. From an Australian base I was trying to develop the concept 
of Asian Studies in Asia, with Australia as very much part of it.29 And 
because there were too many historians of my generation at ANU, and 
too few opportunities for young scholars, I very much wanted to move 
to Southeast Asia if I could fi nd the right way to do it. I had various 
impractical schemes, but never dreamed that somebody would come 
along with generous resources and invite me to build a research institute 
in the region. So, despite many warm feelings about UCLA, I didn’t have 
to hesitate long about the Singapore off er. And I am very honoured and 
grateful that I was able to have those last seven years (2002–09) in the 
region. 
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Th e Red-Haired Barbarian from Leiden: 
Interview with Leonard Blussé
You have reached the mandatory retirement age of 65 and gave your farewell 
lecture on 6 June last. High time to have an interview with you! After 
Itinerario was founded by George Winius and you in 1976, you yourself did 
many of the interviews. Interviews were and still are rather uncommon in 
scholarly journals. Why did you start them?
It was a mixture of egoism and curiosity. We meant the journal to be a 
research journal, so apart from publishing articles we had two things in 
mind: to speak with prominent people active in the fi eld and also to do 
special reports on archives and research institutions. George and I loved to 
ask colleagues about their backgrounds, their personal interests and their 
approaches to teaching and research. Th e interviews worked out well, but 
it turned out to be very diffi  cult to fi nd people who were willing to write 
about their experiences in foreign archives. But before you start asking 
more questions there are two points I would like to make, because they 
are important: I have been very fortunate to work in a happy department 
almost all of my career, a real blessing. Leiden University with its fi ne 
libraries and the National Archives at a fi fteen minute train ride away is 
a great place to be. I have never seriously thought of going elsewhere. Th e 
second point may surprise you, but I never intended to have a career in 
academia. But then, life is full of good intentions. Once I became caught 
in the interesting research developments in overseas studies I was hooked.
Could you tell us something about your childhood?
I was born in Rotterdam in 1946, shortly after the war came to an end. 
Th e whole city centre had been bombed away by the Germans in May 
1940, and during my entire youth the town was in a perpetual building 
frenzy. Th e 1950s and 1960s were a period of tremendous development. 
In those years Rotterdam even surpassed New York as the world’s biggest 
port. Shipping on the Maas river was fl ourishing, tugboats towed barges 
up the river, sea ships were sailing in and out of the city to far-fl ung 
destinations. Across from our yacht club you could see the ocean steamers 
of the Holland America line depart and arrive. We actually used to sail 
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our old fl at-bottomed Dutch sailing yacht with leeboards in the midst of 
all that traffi  c. Th e liners disappeared in the 1960s—but not before I had 
served as a pantry boy on board the SS Rotterdam on the Rotterdam–New 
York line—and for almost forty years now it has been forbidden to sail 
without using an engine on the river. When I was a young boy I devoured 
all the books I could fi nd about the sea: various Dutch writers like 
Anthony van Kampen and K. Norel, and of course British and American 
ones like Slocum, Kipling, Stevenson, and so on. I was much too young 
for Conrad! In any case, it was my dream to go to sea.
Why didn’t you?
One of the frustrations of my youth was that the connections with 
Indonesia were slipping away. I was very much in awe of people of my 
father’s generation who had been overseas visiting interesting places. My 
mother was born in Singapore. Because I had to wear glasses from the age 
of 10 my dreams of becoming a ship’s captain in the merchant marine 
were shattered. My father was a maritime lawyer, and together with my 
two older brothers I have been sailing for as long as I can remember. I am 
the proud and somewhat worried owner of a more than 100-year-old little 
sailing barge on which we go on vacations with friends and my kids. Ships 
have always been a part of my life. I am afraid I passed most of my school 
time dreaming about impossible projects like sailing around the world 
or settling on Tristan da Cunha in the South Atlantic after I had read 
some books about that ‘lonely isle.’ But when in 1961 a volcano exploded 
and the complete population was moved from the island that dream was 
shattered too. I still collect every scrap of paper about Tristan I can fi nd, 
and I am happy to see that James Fichter, who recently published a great 
book on American Trade in the Far East, shares this interest with me.1 
At last somebody I can talk to about the Repettos, the Greens, the Swans 
and the other families of Tristan, who, by the way, have returned to their 
island. 
So why did you take up the study of Sinology?
After I fi nished the Gymnasium I went to University in Leiden. My 
interests had changed a bit, and I wanted to take up anthropology. But by 
coincidence I met with Professor J.H. Van den Berg, a psychiatrist who 
was well known for his writings about Metabletica. He was devising all 
sorts of aptitude tests for school and business purposes at the time and 
needed young guinea pigs. After I had participated in one week of tests, I 
had an informal interview with him to talk about the results. Looking at 
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my records he discouraged me from studying anthropology, saying that 
instead I should do something that would keep me more focused. Out of 
the blue he suggested I should take up either Arabic or Chinese. Feeling 
that China would rise again in the future I decided on Chinese, especially 
after I found out that Holland’s biggest shipping line in Asia, the Royal 
Inter-Ocean Lines, had its headquarters in Hong Kong. 
If you will allow me a funny anecdote: my grandfather De Monchy, 
who had worked on Java for an insurance company in the fi rst decades of 
the past century, liked to play tricks on his little grandson, saying that he 
could speak Chinese. He would tell me to sit down in front of him on the 
carpet. Th en, sitting in his armchair, he would unfold a newspaper in front 
of him, burn a little hole in it with a cigar and send three puff s of smoke 
through it, whereupon he started to ‘speak Chinese,’ mumbling Patcha 
kokka, Patcha kokka. Th ree more puff s through the hole would follow, the 
paper was folded again and there the face of grandpa reappeared. I have 
never found out what those words meant—he never said more. Kokka 
probably was guojia in the Hokkian dialect meaning country. Patcha? No 
idea. He may have overheard some nationalistic slogans in the street. 
Anyway, I had all sorts of romantic ideas of what a career in shipping 
in Asia was going to be like. So I started out with Chinese, but I had 
hardly begun in 1965 when the Cultural Revolution broke out, which 
made it impossible to go to China for years to come. Not that it mattered 
for the time being, because in Leiden at the time students did not learn 
any modern Chinese; all you learned was classical Chinese. So we happily 
continued studying Chinese history and complex traditional characters 
while, in the meantime, the Communists were simplifying all of them! 
Together with a couple of friends I also established the Dutch Open Air 
Barge Museum, saving a handfull of rare, old sailing barges that had been 
sent to the scrapyards at the time and went on restoring them. Most of 
the ships we saved are still in existence and are now incorporated and 
treasured in the Rotterdam Shipping Museum collection. A few years 
later, the ’68 student revolutions occurred in France, and less aggressively 
so in the Netherlands and elsewhere in Europe too. A very exciting time. 
Th e whole youth scene was incredibly vibrant, with great music and good 
vibes. After I had been in Leiden for four years amidst all these kinds of 
distractions—but wisely passing my examinations—I was rather unsure 
of where I was heading. I didn’t feel I had learnt anything useful yet. I had 
read a lot of Far Eastern history, could handle Classical Chinese texts and 
to a lesser extent also Japanese. But then my French girlfriend suggested 
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that we should go to Taiwan to fi nd out what Chinese popular culture was 
really about, and that turned out to be a masterstroke.
How so?
It was like diving in the deep after years of swimming lessons at the side of 
the pool. Just before we left Europe we met with the famous Sinologist and 
Taoist [Kristofer] Schipper, who had been living in Tainan, in the south 
of Taiwan, for nine years. When I complained that I would probably have 
to study Confucius and Mencius all over again, he advised me to enroll 
in anthropology because it would open up Taiwanese society for me. So I 
learned to speak Chinese within six months, thanks to an elderly Chinese 
gentleman by the name of Wang Yuh-chuan. He made me learn by heart 
three or four 300-character stories a week. Th en, I studied anthropology 
under famous professors like Li Yi-yuan and Ch’en Ch’i-lu and was also 
able to engage in fi eldwork among the tribes in the mountains. But I ended 
up doing anthropological fi eldwork on the folk religion of the fi shermen 
in the Penghu archipelago, between Taiwan and the mainland. I ran 
into all kinds of folk tales about the ‘red-haired barbarians’ there. I soon 
realised that these must have been the Dutch, who roamed those islands 
in the early seventeenth century and even built a castle there in 1622. Of 
course this is well-known today, but at that time very little work had been 
done. In the backyard of a temple, behind the laundry of soldiers living 
there, I found an inscription saying that the Chinese had chased out the 
Red Barbarians in the Tianqi period, the early 1620s. A few months later 
I rediscovered the ruins of the castle on a small promontory in the bay. A 
big anti-aircraft gun was positioned in the middle. We were arrested for 
going near it, but now this whole area is open to the public.
Back in Taipei, I was introduced to Professor Ts’ao Yung-ho, the 
librarian of the research library of the university. Professor Ts’ao had 
been schooled by Japanese professors before the war, and was very much 
a product of the Japanese philological tradition. During the 1950s, he 
had taught himself seventeenth-century Dutch by typing out all the 
manuscript copies of the VOC diaries of the Dutch governors of Formosa 
(Taiwan) during the Dutch occupation (1624–62).
Th at does seem like a very timely and fortunate introduction. Who introduced 
you?
Well, Professor Schipper had told me that after my arrival in Taiwan I 
should look up Dr. Inez de Beauclair, a famous anthropologist and niece 
to the last Austrian Emperor. She was living in retirement at the Academia 
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Sinica. She was very old, in bad health, and stayed alive eating nothing but 
biscuits. We agreed that I should see her once a week to have dinner with 
her. She was a phenomenon, full of interesting stories about the aborigines 
of Melanesia, Guizhou and Taiwan, among whom she had been involved 
in fi eldwork. She gave me the nickname hongmao fan, ‘Red Haired 
Barbarian’, and when I met her son years later he did not believe I had 
known his mother until I mentioned that I was the Red-Haired Barbarian. 
Dr. de Bauclair was the one who introduced me to Ts’ao Yung-ho, of 
whom she was very fond. I worked with Professor Ts’ao for two years—he 
tutored me at home and in his offi  ce—after which he suggested that I 
should move to Japan to continue my studies there under the guidance of 
his own former professors, Iwao Seiichi and Nakamura Takashi. Th at was 
forty years ago! Incidentally, last October we celebrated Professor Ts’ao’s 
90th anniversary at Taiwan University. Th ere is nobody in the scholarly 
world to whom I owe as much as to Professor Ts’ao Yung-ho. Now, at the 
end of his career, he has been promoted to academician of the Academia 
Sinica.
A somewhat materialistic question, but how did you make ends meet at the 
time?
We were quite jealous of the well-funded American students of the 
Stanford centre in Taipei. We received a small scholarship, just like our 
Chinese comrades at the University, but did not fancy living in separate 
dormitories. So we taught English and French to make some money. My 
father continued to send me the same monthly stipend I had received 
when I studied at Leiden. To him, it made no diff erence whether I studied 
in Leiden or Taipei as long as I passed exams. Together, this allowed us 
to rent a house with some French friends, buy books and lead a relatively 
comfortable life. In Japan it was a diff erent story altogether. A year after my 
arrival I received a Mombusho scholarship, to be an assistant to Professor 
Hibino Takeo at the Jimbun Kagaku Kenkyujo of Kyoto University. In 
addition I became a recruiter of Western extras for the Toei Eiga fi lm 
company: they needed western faces for Yakuza movies, Tokugawa 
jidai geki (historical dramas) and the like. I was a regular extra myself, 
actually—I have played Russians, drunken GIs, Dutch VOC captains and 
so on in plenty of third-rate fi lms. We even played with Robert Mitchum 
in Th e Yakuza, but unfortunately they cut a lot of scenes out of that fi lm. 
I studied in Japan for three years and ended up working on a thesis on 
the Wako—Japanese pirates—during the Ming dynasty. But suddenly, in 
1975 Korean scholar So Kwan Wai published a monograph detailing most 
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of what I was working on, so I had to fi nd another subject and turned to 
the larger framework of the history of the China Seas.
Who did you study with in Japan?
In addition to working with the historical geographer Hibino Takeo in 
Kyoto, I helped Nakamura Takashi, then at Tenri University. He was 
working on a Japanese translation of the seventeenth-century VOC 
Diaries of Batavia castle. I helped him with the footnotes for the sections 
about Taiwan and Japan. Th at is when I began to see how important it 
is for Asian scholars to use Dutch East India Company sources to fi ll in 
gaps in their own historical sources. Th at really was an eye opener. Among 
Asian historians, the Japanese were and are number one in translating and 
editing foreign sources for their own use.
Even before the war, scholars like Yamamoto Tatsuro and Iwao Seiichi 
had written important monographs using ample foreign sources. Th at 
generation was still very active in the 1970s and 1980s. Th ey were very 
hospitable to me as a young foreign scholar. I was invited to conferences 
and given the opportunity to publish. Kyoto University was a strange 
place to be in those days, because student factions were still bashing each 
other’s heads in with iron pipes. Nevertheless, the Jimbun Ken was heaven 
on earth. At that time the Marxist approach to history, with regard to 
the Tokugawa period, was losing its grip and even fading away. Japanese 
historians were completely revising their views on Sakoku, the so-called 
Closed Country. Based on an essay published by Engelbert Kaempfer in 
the early eighteenth century, it was generally believed that during most of 
the Tokugawa period the whole country had been closed off  and looking 
inward. Th at in itself is to a certain extent true, but it is not correct that 
this was something abnormal or typically Japanese. Autarky was an old 
Chinese ideal. Come to think of it, the Koreans were even better at it 
than the Japanese. While there is no denying that the Japanese strongly 
reduced their foreign trade, they used the Chinese and the Dutch traders 
as their eyes and ears for the outside world. Th e fi rst thing I did when I 
came back from Japan in the autumn of 1975 was to write an article about 
the changing views in Japan regarding the concept of sakoku and how the 
revisionist thinking had developed.2 I also brought out the contribution 
to this discourse by those scholars with access to foreign sources. Around 
the same time, Ronald Toby wrote his article on this topic from a diff erent 
perspective. Later on he published his famous book on the subject.3
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Did you ever return to your dream of working in shipping?
Around the same time I actually applied for a job with Royal Inter-Ocean 
Lines in Hong Kong. I even paid a visit to Hong Kong to see what it was like, 
and found the situation I had always dreamed of: the management of the 
company living on the hill, overlooking the anchored ships, the harbour… 
just perfect. Th e director, Mr. Dirkzwager, was very accommodating—it 
was early spring, but he told me I could begin in September so that I could 
fi nish my contract with Professor Hibino fi rst. But only two months later, 
when I was back in Japan I learnt from a newspaper that Royal Inter-
Ocean Lines was merging with Nedlloyd Lines, and that the headquarters 
would be moved from Hong Kong to Rijswijk, a suburb of Th e Hague in 
the Netherlands! I decided that I had better give up the shipping dream. 
It was not just the main offi  ce’s move to Rijswijk; we were also witnessing 
the fi nal throes of the decline of mercantile shipping in the old sense 
of the word. Most of the vested European shipping lines in Asia were 
disappearing fast. Container shipping was on the rise, and everything 
changed. Th e romance of shipping was lost, too.
What was the next step?
Well, I heard that a Centre for the History of European Expansion was 
being established by Professor Henk Wesseling in Leiden. At the time 
we were living in a little temple in the mountains north-east of Kyoto 
overlooking Lake Biwa. We spent our last year in Japan there. Th e Konrenji 
was a Jodoshinshu village temple, which had been left by its priest, and 
after a friend of mine, Willem Remmelink, had lived there for two years 
we moved in and essentially became the jushoku (caretakers), preparing 
tea for the villagers returning from the rice fi elds in the afternoon and 
performing all sorts of little tasks. So I collected a bag full of 100 yen coins 
and went to the only public telephone in the neighbourhood, near the 
post offi  ce on the hill. I called Wesseling from Japan, constantly throwing 
in all those little coins. He is still fond of telling this story, also because 
it is such an excellent demonstration of how communication lines have 
changed since then. But my call was in vain—Wesseling told me that they 
had just hired Piet Emmer. A new vacancy might arise at some point, but 
not in the next two years.
But did you return to the Netherlands anyway?
Well, I was almost immediately hired by Professor Teeuw upon returning 
to Holland, to help him set up the Bureau Indonesische Studies [Offi  ce of 
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Indonesian Studies] which was to restore the cultural relations between 
Holland and Indonesia on an academic level.
Why the sudden interest in Indonesia?
My interest in Indonesia had been there since my childhood. But there was 
another interesting connection to Indonesia: Professor Nakamura, who 
was teaching Southeast Asian history at Tenri University. Tenrikyo, the 
Tenri religion, is a ‘New Buddhist’ religion. All followers of the Tenrikyo 
have to give part of their salary to the temple. Interestingly, the head of the 
Tenrikyo, the Shinbashira was a great bibliophile. He was absolutely mad 
about books. I was told by Professor Nakamura that the shimbashira used 
part of the incoming money to buy books for the university, because the 
Tenri missionaries in Southeast Asia needed to be well informed before 
going out to spread the gospel, and learn about the customs of the people.
Mind you, this was a man who took KLM planes to the Netherlands in 
the 1950s, where the staff  of Martinus Nijhoff  publishers—who also ran a 
large antiquariate at the time—would meet him personally at the airport. 
After having enjoyed a copious dinner at Sauer, his favourite fi sh restaurant 
in Th e Hague, they would spend the whole night sorting out thousands of 
kilos of books and journals on the Netherlands Indies, mostly purchased 
from retired colonial servants who did not want them anymore. So Tenri, 
until the 1970s, had the most complete library on Southeast Asia in Japan. 
I would go there once a week—fi rst of all to help Professor Nakamura 
translating the Batavia diaries, but also to just delve into the stacks of this 
library. I could stay with friends one night a week. I read everything I 
could fi nd in old journals, specifi cally on the Overseas Chinese.
Overseas Chinese?
Yes, I felt there was a strong connection between the Dutch and the 
sojourners and immigrants from China’s south-eastern seaboard 
provinces in Indonesia—it has always been my idea that the colonisation 
of Java and Sumatra cannot be explained without taking into account the 
strong cooperation and competition between these two partners. I say 
partners, even though the two were part of a diff erent world economy, 
the Dutch within their formal imperial set-up and the Chinese as part 
of an overseas Chinese informal empire. Th ere can be no doubt that this 
was, in political terms, an unequal relationship, with the Dutch ‘colonial 
masters’ on top. Nowadays people even speak of ‘co-colonisation,’ which 
is a somewhat stronger term, but back then this was a new idea. It is also 
what I ended up writing my thesis about, Strange Company. I exploded the 
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myth of Batavia as a Dutch colonial town in the tropics by showing that 
the biggest population was actually Chinese, and that it was a Chinese 
colonial city just as much as it was a Dutch one. Th at idea of a Chinese 
informal empire of trade amidst Southeast Asian state formations in the 
eighteenth century I further developed through papers at conferences in 
Lisbon, Tokyo and London; and it was actually in Tokyo that my friend 
Sakurai Yoneo suggested that I was really referring to a Chinese Century. 
Th at was also the title that I gave to the article when I fi nally published it 
in the book of essays in memory of Denys Lombard.4
What did you end up doing at the Bureau of Indonesian Studies?
Ah yes, it was an interesting experience because I saw how this very well-
intentioned project was not as eff ective as everybody had hoped. It was 
mainly due to a poor selection of students and to an overabundance of 
steering committees on both sides. Professor Teeuw was a fi ne organiser 
and diplomat, but with all those people from everywhere having a say in 
everything the programme was top heavy. Th e selection of the students 
was diffi  cult to control in Indonesia. Th ey came to the Netherlands to 
study history, linguistics, anthropology etc. But we did organise the fi rst 
Dutch–Indonesian Historical Congress since the war! 
Th at was how I got to know both the older and the younger generation 
of Indonesian scholars, like Sartono, Ong Hok Ham, Adri Lapian, Eddy 
Masinambow, Th ee Kian Wie and Taufi k Abdullah, all of them formidable 
scholars. Most of them had had a formal Dutch colonial school education 
fi rst, and university degrees from American universities afterwards, often 
on Fulbright scholarships. I realised how many diffi  culties they had 
encountered after returning to Indonesia to teach the next generations at 
very poorly organised universities. It was an almost impossible mission. 
However, times have changed. Nowadays, we cooperate closely with 
our colleagues of Gajah Mada University in Yogyakarta. Dr. Bambang 
Purwanto is running a tight and dynamic department there and I am 
proud that our TANAP and Encompass programmes, training their 
students in Leiden, have been useful for him and other professors in 
Indonesia.
But at some point, you did join the Centre for European Expansion?
Yes, I did. As Wesseling had said, there was a new opening after two years, 
and I was fortunate enough to be selected. I worked together with Piet 
Emmer (Caribbean history, slavery and migration), Gerard Telkamp (the 
Centre’s documentalist), Robert Ross (South African History), George 
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Winius (Portuguese empire), and later also Jaap de Moor (documentation 
and colonial military history). Piet Emmer had been publishing a bilingual 
newsletter in French and English, but he had only managed to issue it 
twice. George and I decided that there was a task for us to carry out, so 
we founded Itinerario. Th anks to that close cooperation I have learned so 
much from George in terms of writing and dealing with broad historical 
issues. George, Piet, Robert and I took turns as editor of Itinerario in the 
early decades of the journal’s existence.
What were the fi rst years of Itinerario like?
When you look at the fi rst issues of Itinerario, they almost look like issues 
of a high school journal. But we immediately decided that we were going 
to do something diff erent from other journals, that is to say that we were 
going to do interviews with important people in the fi eld. For a period 
of over twenty years there was no greater joy for me than to interview 
great historians. What better opportunity is there to encounter interesting 
people? It was a great privilege to meet so many of these scholars—some 
of whom have long since passed away. But where does one nowadays fi nd 
the likes of Ronald Robinson, Henry Brunschwig, Bailey Diffi  e, Niels 
Steensgaard and Charles Boxer? We republished the most interesting 
interviews of the fi rst twenty years in book form when Henk Wesseling 
moved to NIAS under the title Pilgrims to the Past. It is perhaps time 
that we published the second batch with people like Geoff rey Parker and 
Hermann Giliomee.
Scholars today are bred and nurtured almost exclusively within an 
academic setting. But that earlier generation had often done completely 
diff erent things in life. Diffi  e, for instance, had joined the stock market 
and made a mass of money before he went into academia. Th at would not 
be possible today. I have a close American friend and colleague, whom I 
shall not name here, who after writing a terrifi c Ph.D. thesis joined his 
family’s fi rm. He retired from business at the age of 50-something, but he 
has not been able to join a faculty again, even though he is an excellent 
historian. He would have been a great asset to any US history department 
and its students. Shame on the system!
One of the more memorable interviews we did was the one with Charles 
Boxer. After a copious dinner at my house, he told George Winius and me 
so much about his military past in the Far East that he afterwards asked 
us not to publish it during his lifetime. By the time he died at a very great 
age, the tape had disappeared with George, who moved to various places 
after his early retirement. Boxer, by the way, is another good example 
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of someone who joined academia later in life. His wife Emily [Hahn] 
was a well-known writer for the New Yorker, and Boxer, who was a very 
overpowering fi gure when you met him, changed into a meek schoolboy 
whenever she was at his side smoking thin cigars! Do read Emily Hahn’s 
China to Me, which is about her years in Shanghai and her budding 
relationship with Charles
Boxer.
Anyway, I was fortunate to join the Centre in Leiden, especially since 
I was a Sinologist by training. I was something of an ugly duckling at 
the history department, having had such a diff erent education from my 
colleagues. It was also a great privilege to work with Henk Wesseling, 
and through his connections with French scholars, as we did back then: 
Fernand Braudel, Jean-Louis Miège, Maurice Aymard, Denys Lombard… 
French and English within one conference was no problem. British 
scholars like Robinson, Chris and Susan Bayly and Tony Hopkins would 
also attend conferences where French was spoken.
I am very fortunate to have known quite a few remarkable people in 
the fi eld. Among them was M.A.P. Meilink-Roelofs, the famous archivist 
and VOC historian, whom I regularly visited after she retired. Th is ‘iron 
lady’ gave a lot of impetus to the VOC-related studies that have been 
fl ourishing over the past decades. What would global history be like 
without all those wonderful studies of early modern trade in Asia by 
Bruijn, Gaastra, Glamann, Steensgaard, Prakash, Das Gupta, Chaudhuri, 
to name just a few? Closely involved with the Centre were also the Leiden 
Indologists Jan Heesterman and Dirk Kolff , the multi-talented Cees 
Fasseur, and of course Professor Han Baudet from Groningen. Emmer 
and Wesseling organised special European summer programmes on 
European expansion. As ‘mister Asia’ at the Centre, I helped set up the 
Cambridge–Leiden–Delhi–Yogya programme, which held four meetings 
on the comparative history of India and Indonesia. It was a great success 
and a lot of fun, involving people like Dharma Kumar, Ashin Das Gupta, 
Om Prakash, Sinnappah Arasaratnam and Sartono Kartodirdjo. Mind 
you, this was before the global history craze started. In the 1980s, this 
comparative approach was something new. Indianists used to work only 
on India and Indonesianists only on Indonesia. Th en came a project called 
‘Th e Transfer of Science and Technology’ in which Chinese, Turkish and 
Japanese scholars were also involved.
Th e funny thing was that for some time at the Leiden history 
department we young lions working in overseas history were sort of seen 
as like parachutists—Wesseling had all of these young and energetic 
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people working for him! Rather than creating a chair in Overseas History, 
young scholars were hired and encouraged to develop their own fi elds. We 
started Intercontinenta, Studies in Overseas History, all sorts of workshops, 
and the archival buff s working on the VOC had the weekly loempia 
[spring roll] lunches close to the National Archives in the Hague, with 
archival curators Margot van Opstall and Marius Roessingh! Th ose were 
very energetic years, working closely with people from abroad. Th e idea 
of publishing extracts from the Deshima Diaries was actually born during 
those lunches.
All these things have only been possible because we got a lot of help 
from friends. A good example is Gerard and Ria de Graaff , who have 
been producing Itinerario since its humble beginnings at the Labor 
Vincit printing shop. Th is couple have gone through all the technological 
developments of text production that have occurred since the 1970s. One 
of the great things of Cambridge University Press [which began publishing 
Itinerario in 2010] is that there is something like a gentlemen’s agreement 
that as long as Mr. and Mrs. de Graaff  are still able to produce the journal, 
they will continue to do so. Rosemary Robson has also been editing the 
English for as long as I can remember.
What else did you work on during those years?
As homage to my former mentors in Taiwan and Japan, I thought it would 
make sense to publish the diaries of Zeelandia Castle of Taiwan.5 At the 
time, the Chinese government still had this very strange idea that Taiwan 
had been part of the Chinese empire and Chinese culture for thousands 
of years. Th e original population of the island of course belongs to what 
De Josselin de Jongh used to call the ‘Greater Indonesian Culture Sphere.’ 
Th at is also why Nathalie Everts and I started publishing important 
excerpts on Taiwan’s native population from the VOC archives in Th e 
Formosan Encounter series. We have literally given back history to ‘people 
without history.’6
A mere look at the VOC documents already makes it clear that, 
although there had been some contacts with the Chinese fi shermen and 
smugglers prior to the Dutch arrival, this was basically an Austro-Malay 
language-speaking population and very much part of the larger Southeast 
Asian cultural sphere until the Dutch started bringing in large numbers 
of Chinese settlers who eventually, under the leadership of Zheng 
Chenggong, kicked them out and brought the island under Chinese 
domination in 1662. As I love to say, Taiwan made in Holland.
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Anyhow, I fell into my own trap, so to speak. I had never realised 
what a hell of a job it is to get out source publications, and how much 
time it takes.7 I must confess that I had a lot of help. It was great to 
work with Wouter Milde, Paul van de Velde, Cynthia Viallé, Rosemary 
Robson, Margriet de Koning Gans and Nathalie Everts—colleagues who 
fortunately also enjoy this kind of work.
Eventually source publications were to become a signifi cant part of your work.
Our discipline’s publish or perish credo does not quite tally with dabbling 
in source publications, but somehow I got stuck deeper and deeper into 
this muddle. I often had sleepless nights wondering how we would ever 
be able to fi nish. But the satisfaction of having supplied people in the fi eld 
with sources that they would otherwise never have had access to has been 
enormous. Th e last source publication project in which I am now involved 
in is the Kong Koan Gonganbu project with my Chinese colleagues Nie 
Dening and Wu Fengbin, and others of the Nanyang Research Center at 
Xiamen University: the publication of the minutes of the Chinese Council 
of Batavia. Th is is a ground-breaking project. If I exaggerate a bit, these 
archives may be as important for the history of Overseas Chinese as the 
Donghuang Caves have been for the history of Buddhism in China. 
Th ese minutes of the Chinese Council at Batavia published by Xiamen 
University Press allow us to see for the fi rst time from within how an 
Overseas Chinese urban community functioned in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. Ten volumes are out already.
Such projects depend on the initiatives and personal enthusiasm of 
those involved. Looking back now, I feel proud that we have made these 
source publications possible. In the case of Taiwan they have completely 
changed the views on the early history of the island, as is shown in the 
Ph.D. theses of Tonio Andrade and Chiu Hsin-Hui. Th e Zeelandia Diaries 
have even been translated into Chinese. In the Japanese case, the Deshima 
Diaries also have had an important impact. Here the collaboration 
with the Historiographical Institute of Tokyo University and the Japan 
Netherlands Institute in Tokyo has been absolutely essential. Last year 
my Japanese friends, punctual as always, surprised me a year before my 
retirement with a fl attering Festschrift full of a variety of subjects that they 
have been working on over the past years.8
After China opened its doors in the 1980s I started to go to Xiamen. 
At fi rst I went every three years or so. But later, after the Nanyang 
Research Institute appointed me as extraordinary professor, I started to 
go every year for three weeks or more. It has been very inspiring; to live in 
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China every now and then and work at the university there and to get in 
touch with the daily problems that people face. Every time again I realise 
how important it is to go somewhere regularly if you want to understand 
anything of the history of a country or of the conditions under which your 
colleagues work. In two decades Xiamen changed from a run-down urban 
settlement where there was running water only between specifi c hours 
each day into an attractive modern city with all the modern amenities 
available now.
Was Xiamen at that time already the best place for research on Overseas 
Chinese?
Yes, that had always been the case, but during the Cultural Revolution 
much of the documentary evidence got damaged and eaten by worms. 
Professor Tien Jukang used to say in those days: we started our Southeast 
Asia programme at the same time as Cornell with about the same 
investment, but look what the Americans have achieved and what an 
appalling situation we are in now! But then by the end of the 1980s all 
sorts of young people started to come to the Netherlands from Japan and 
China, and I was able to help some of them, like my friend Dr. Zhuang 
Guotu. Largely thanks to him the Nanyang Yanjiuyuan (Southeast Asian 
Research Academy) has regained its prime position in China and East 
Asia.
You also worked with Zhuang Guotu on a book related to the Queen’s intended 
state visit to China of 1989.
One writes scholarly articles, source publications, articles and books for 
a broader audience, but sometimes you are asked to write something 
for a commemoration—in 1989 I was asked if I could write a book in 
Dutch and in Chinese on the Dutch–Chinese relations to be presented to 
Deng Xiaoping on the occasion of the Queen’s visit to China that year. I 
managed to get this done in six months with a lot of help from Dutch and 
Chinese friends—and this was in pre-internet times. It was great fun in 
the end. We had a Chinese typesetter in Hong Kong but both the Chinese 
and Dutch editions were printed in Amsterdam. Th e Chinese version 
should have been published by a Chinese publisher—but this would 
have taken ages—so I invented a Chinese publisher by translating the 
Dutch publisher’s name (Cramwinckel) into a somewhat antique-looking 
Chinese bookshop name, Lukoudian Chubanshe. Even now this is still 
creating headaches for Chinese librarians all over the world.
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Th e copies got into the aeroplane but, due to the Tian’anmen 
Incident, the state visit was cancelled. Zhuang Guotu had done most of 
the translation work for the book. Now it so happened that the Chinese 
authorities had in turn also asked Xiamen University to make a book to 
be presented to Queen Beatrix, a Chinese book. While he was studying 
in Holland I had taught Zhuang Guotu seventeenth-century Dutch by 
translating into Chinese the authentic travel diary with sketches made 
by Johan Nieuhof, secretary to the fi rst Dutch embassy to China.9 I had 
discovered that rare manuscript in the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris. 
Zhuang now proposed that we also make the Chinese present together, 
without anybody on the Chinese side knowing that we had also cooperated 
on the Dutch present. And so the day after Queen Beatrix was to present 
‘her’ book to Deng Xiaoping, the Queen was scheduled to receive from 
the Chinese another book by the same authors! Th is practical joke gave us 
incredible energy and strength. But because of the political developments 
the whole crazy scheme fell through. Whether the Dutch present ever 
reached Deng Xiaoping, I don’t know. Ten years later it was reprinted 
when the Queen did visit China. On that occasion I told the story to the 
Queen and her husband, Prince Claus, and they found it very amusing.
Tribuut aan China [Tribute to China] was meant to be accessible both 
for Chinese and Dutch readers. So when writing I had these audiences 
in mind—I wanted to write about people and events that distinguished 
Dutch–Chinese relations from the well-known Chinese relations with 
other Western countries.10
Let us return to the Overseas Chinese for a moment. How did your doctoral 
thesis [published as Strange Company] come into being?11
In the early years of the Centre for European Expansion, as I mentioned, 
we did a lot of organising and were very active in setting things up. When 
Ivo Schöff er became the temporary head of the Centre—Wesseling had 
left for Princeton for a year—on his fi rst day in charge he said: ‘What 
about your thesis?’. I was writing an ambitious book on the history of the 
Dutch China trade; actually I had written eight chapters of it but had 
great diffi  culty in pulling the whole thing together with all the various 
odd jobs to do. Th en Schöff er said: ‘You have already written widely about 
Overseas Chinese, so why don’t you turn that work into a book?’. So I did, 
and graduated in one year. Th e moral of the story is that you need at that 
moment in life somebody to help you see things in perspective, things that 
you do not see yourself because you get caught up in all kinds of work. 
One of the chapters from that study I later reworked into Bitters Bruid—
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which was translated into English [as Bitter Bonds] as well as many other 
languages. It is a biographical study cum divorce case of a rich Batavian 
mestizo lady in the seventeenth century.12
Having written about a woman’s life in the seventeenth century I thought 
it would be fun to write a biography of a twentieth-century woman from 
Asia. In Xiamen I became acquainted with the Tan family—intellectuals 
from Indonesia. After Mr. Tan died, when in Xiamen, I visited his widow 
Anni frequently—often three times a week. We hit upon the idea that I 
should write a biography of her interesting life which spanned her youth 
in the Netherlands Indies, her pre-war studies at Utrecht University, 
wartime under Japanese domination, post-war Indonesia and fi nally their 
‘re-migration’ to the mother country just before the Cultural Revolution 
broke out with all its impact on the family.13
What a story to tell!
In comparison with Bitter Bonds, for which I had to dig up everything 
from the archives, I now recorded whatever Anni Tan was saying and I 
typed it out when back in Leiden with the help of our then secretary, the 
redoubtable Mrs. de Kock, whom all past visitors to the Centre will never 
forget. It became something of a sport to look up the people Anni had 
been talking about and to check her story. Th is also brought me into close 
contact with the sons of the famous Raja Gula of yore, Oei Tiong Ham.
I think it is very important to enter such a project knowing quite a 
lot about the society and living conditions of your biographical subject 
before you even start talking to him or her. You must also be able to 
supply all kinds of information so that the story can be placed in context. 
Anni’s story was basically one of female emancipation in twentieth-
century Asia. It is a pity that the book, which sold well in Holland, never 
was translated into English or Chinese—something I may yet do in the 
future. Chinese publishers are hesitating because the book ends with 
Anni’s (rather innocent) memories of her family’s experiences during the 
Cultural Revolution.
When you hear about all these diff erent things on which my friends and 
I have been working, you can see that my research has been fragmented 
over China, Japan and Southeast Asia. And my main interest, the overseas 
Chinese, is itself a fragmented subject. It connects with many other 
subjects, like seafaring, international trade, port cities, state formation 
(Chinese as tax farmers), mestizo societies. So the point is that all these 
various activities do not so much hamper one’s creativity, but they do so 
if one is engaged in a long-term book project. Th e greatest authority on 
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the history of the overseas Chinese, Wang Gungwu—a scholar whom I 
admire tremendously, has however been very successful in making ends 
meet. He appears frequently on all kinds of platforms, delivers public 
speeches and later rewrites them—perhaps he doesn’t have to even!—into 
great essays. I very much enjoyed reading his memoirs recently. What a 
monumental fi gure!14
When did you start the Crayenborgh Lectures?
In 1994 Wim van den Doel and I initiated the Crayenborgh Honours 
Course. Like doing the Itinerario interviews, this too was an egoistical act 
of self-satisfaction. For a period of seventeen years, with the initial help 
of a businessman/historian, Arend de Roever, we were able every spring 
to invite twelve fi rst-rate historians from all around the world for private 
lectures to twelve selected students. We chose a diff erent subject each year. 
Ironically the Crayenborgh Course has been such a success that in the end 
the formula has been stolen and deformed and turned into a monster by 
Leiden University. We never intended the students to get marks or credit 
points for attending, and we selected them not necessarily because they 
had the highest grades but also because they showed character in extra-
curricular activities. Th e university has turned this round completely by 
selecting undergrads with the highest grades in the fi rst two years. Th ose 
often are the most unimaginative students that one can imagine! Our 
idea was that every year there is a number of history students who are so 
intelligent and clever that they will certainly not continue in the historical 
fi eld after they graduate from university, but will seek a career elsewhere. 
Th e sad thing is that such students will have read many books but they 
will never have met and engaged in discussions with great historians 
themselves. And that is precisely what we wanted to provide to them.
You are currently the fi rst Professor of the History of European-Asian Relations.
In Holland there is a system where there is only a restricted number of 
chairs for university professors. And so it becomes very diffi  cult to get 
such a position, especially if you work in a fi eld that crosses disciplines. 
At the Royal Academy (KNAW) this was recognised in the 1990s, so 
they decided to establish some extraordinary chairs for people who were 
bridging diff erent fi elds. Th at is how I was off ered a chair, which I could 
name myself. And so I named it History of European-Asian Relations. 
Leiden University later on formalised this chair on a personal basis, and 
now this has been institutionalised. And because in the Netherlands we 
still have a mandatory retirement age, I am now happy to hand over the 
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torch to Jos Gommans. I found out that a professorial position is essential 
for setting up new projects. Th at was a bit of an eye-opener to me. Once 
you have the ius promovendi and come up with a good plan doors open. 
Mandatory retirement has its upsides: it will give me ample time to do 
research and write and supervise the twelve Ph.D. students that I have left. 
But unfortunately it also closes doors. For example, a French colleague of 
mine wanted to invite me to come to Paris to teach for a month or two, 
but it turns out that his university will not provide money for people past 
the age of 65. Can you believe it?
What was it like to teach at Harvard, when you were there in 2005–06?
After I arrived at Harvard to take up the Erasmus Chair for one year, Wilt 
Idema invited me to give the Reischauer Lectures in addition to teaching a 
course in Indonesian history. Th at really forced me to think about a topic 
and to turn it into three lectures. I decided on the interaction between 
three early modern ports around the China Seas: Batavia, Canton and 
Nagasaki. Th e talks were published as Visible Cities.15
Another anecdote, if you will permit me. I taught the fi rst Indonesian 
history course ever taught at the Harvard history department. I have the 
impression that before the emergence of Obama, with the exception of 
Philip Kuhn, hardly anyone at the department was aware that there existed 
something like Indonesia. I seduced students of the history department to 
participate in this class by challenging them when they came ‘shopping’ 
at the beginning of the semester to draw a map of Indonesia. Nobody 
could. I promised that the three students who drew the best map for the 
next week would be treated to an ice cream. Remember these are Harvard 
students who all want to be the best—so the week afterwards I had eighteen 
students who had all made nice maps, and I took them all to an ice cream 
parlour and said: ‘And now you must sign up,’ which sixteen of them 
eventually did. I returned to the history department, quite content with 
myself, and said to the administrator that I had sixteen students—and the 
administrator said: too bad Leonard, if you had seventeen students you 
would have had a teaching assistant! It was great fun working at Harvard 
for a year. We were living at Adam’s house just opposite the Widener 
Library.
One of the biggest projects you undertook as professor was TANAP. Can you 
tell us how it came into being?
After I had written the book on China, the commemoration of 400 
years of Dutch–Japanese relations in 2000 came up. Th e book for that 
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occasion was put together with some sixty Dutch and Japanese young 
scholars and published in Dutch, English and Japanese versions. It was 
a gigantic undertaking, which would not have been possible to carry out 
without many friends, among whom were Willem Remmelink, Ivo Smits 
and Martha Chaiklin. We had to translate so much. After we had pulled 
that off , the ABN AMRO bank approached me to write a series of books 
about Dutch relations with various countries in Asia in connection with 
the commemoration in 2002 of the founding of the Dutch East India 
Company in 1602. I felt that I should not do so myself, but after realising 
that the various authors in Asia who could do so were all in their 60s and 
70s, I said: ‘Why don’t you give me the money and I shall train a new 
generation of Asian historians who can use the VOC archives.’ Th e bank 
refused and gave the money to the Rijksmuseum for a VOC exhibition 
instead.
But the idea lingered on, and I teamed up with the people of the 
Rijksarchief (now National Archives) and we decided to propose a project 
where the Archives would ask for money to work on the preservation of 
the remaining VOC archives in Asia (Jakarta, Colombo, Chennai) and 
we would train at Leiden young lecturers from universities in some twelve 
countries in Asia which had had VOC trading posts. And out of that major 
off ensive we were able to establish the TANAP [Towards a New Age of 
Partnership] project. Th e whole set-up of the project and its achievements 
can be seen at http://www.tanap.net/.
But let me briefl y explain what it entailed: for three years in a row we 
carefully selected every year ten young university teachers in Asia who 
did not yet have a Ph.D. for a one-year advanced Master’s course. For the 
best ten we reserved a Ph.D. scholarship. Th e project was so successful 
that in the end we acquired twenty scholarships—ten from the project 
and ten from outside. With the exception of one student who became 
gravely ill, all of them have obtained their Ph.D. degrees. I have personally 
supervised more than ten of them. All in all, I have supervised the writing 
of 30 Ph.D. theses over the past ten years. Quite a lot of work. 
By now most of the TANAP theses have been edited by Cynthia Viallé 
and me and have been published in the TANAP Monographs Series by 
Brill. Th e TANAP programme organised with Henk Niemeijer, and later 
its successor, the ENCOMPASS (Encountering a Common Past in Asia) 
programme coordinated with Alicia Schrikker, were ambitious projects.16 
With comparatively speaking modest sums of money we were able to train 
some ninety young historians from Asia to use Dutch archival texts (VOC 
and colonial archives) to write their own country’s history. Again without 
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the help from volunteers like Hugo ’s Jacob (originally from Groningen 
University) and Lodewijk Wagenaar (from Amsterdam University) we 
would not have been able to reach our goals. We have created a whole 
network of young enthusiastic people teaching and working at various 
Asian universities and archives. I hope that these programmes will be 
continued in the future, but when the pilot leaves the ship somebody else 
has to take charge. It is great fun to have one large family spread all over 
Asia.
How do you view the development of the fi eld of European Expansion History, 
from its origins in Colonial History to today’s World History?
Colonial history was already dead when I started studying. It was a dirty 
word. Curiously enough, I think it may soon make a comeback. Th e 
concept of the History of European Expansion was developed at Columbia 
University. George Winius has commented on that in his interview [for 
Itinerario], I believe. Th at topic still has its own value, and also its own 
approach. After all, Europe played a major role in global history for some 
time; as Jü rgen Osterhammel has remarked, the nineteenth century was in 
many respects the European century. When Jan Romein wrote his Eeuw 
van Azië [Th e Asian Century] in the 1950s he was a bit premature, but the 
twenty-fi rst century defi nitely will be so. What I have found fascinating 
about working as an Asianist at the Centre of European Expansion is 
that there is an enormous wealth of Asian language sources to combine 
with Western sources. I hope to continue doing so in my future work. 
What I do worry about, if you allow me to slightly change the subject, is 
the decline in interest among Asian students in the historical discipline. 
Especially in Southeast Asia fewer and fewer students major in history. 
History does not seem to off er attractive job perspectives any more in this 
MBA oriented world.
In your farewell lecture you mentioned your plans to engage in a long-term 
research project on the comparative history of the Rhine and Yangzi deltas.17 
Yet your students performed that same night an eighteenth-century drama in 
which you were symbolically beheaded as a professor.18 Wasn’t that a gentle 
gesture that you should start repairing your old boat, and stop meddling in 
academic aff airs? Any more plans?
Well, during the summer holiday I shall have to read the beautiful 
Festschrift I received from my Dutch friends and colleagues.19 Th en I 
will have to fi nish a book on Chinese shipping to Southeast Asia in early 
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modern times. And who knows, perhaps I may fi nd the old fl oppy discs 
with the chapters on the Dutch China
trade.
One more question: how has modern technology aff ected the fi eld?
We of course profi t from the internet and from progress with regard 
to digitisation but I do have a nostalgic feeling when I think of foreign 
friends who used to come to work for longer periods at the archives here 
or elsewhere. Nowadays many people no longer come because they can 
get most of the stuff  they need from the internet; or they just sit one week 
in the archives photographing like crazy. I think this development is bad 
news for academia. And I am not the only one. Eric Tagliacozzo told me 
last year he felt he was probably one of the last who could aff ord to work at 
the archives here for a longer term and make friends there with colleagues 
like Martha Chaiklin, Tonio Andrade and Kerry Ward.
But is it not positive that digitisation provides access for more people?
Yes, there is no denying that. But if I look at somebody like Om Prakash, 
who spent so much time in the VOC archives before he could really get 
a grip on the seventeenth-century Dutch language and the wide variety 
of materials, I wonder whether people can gain enough depth in the 
archives, even if they take 1,000 photographs. You need to have the focus 
and develop the skills to work with the archival sources in your hands.
 But I agree that the good old days of Charles Boxer are long over now. 
Boxer wrote most of his books and articles on the basis of manuscripts 
he would collect and which he would trade for something else when he 
moved to a new topic. He was a collector at heart—but he collected to 
trade it for something else. When visiting the Netherlands he would bring 
something to trade and exchange with Nico Israëls, the antiquarian book 
seller. By doing so you learn a tremendous lot, by discussing manuscripts 
with people who deal in these manuscripts—like art collectors. It adds 
extra colour to the whole academic enterprise.
Th is also touches on something else, and I guess I should stop rambling 
on after this for fear of turning into the proverbial Dutch Uncle. From the 
early days of collecting ships, as an anthropology student doing fi eldwork, 
and also ‘on the road’ during many of my trips either in Europe, Asia 
or even America, I have always been interested to see how people live 
elsewhere, and discover more or less direct links with the past. Learning 
foreign languages is indispensable if you really want to understand ‘the 
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other.’ Th e interview with the Dutch philologist-turned-Arabist Cees 
Brouwer in Itinerario a few years ago tells it all.
If you talk with Dutch, American or, for that matter, Chinese 
students nowadays, they often have no clue what China was like in the 
1970s or in the more distant past because they grew up in such diff erent 
circumstances. Most of them spend virtually their whole lives at school 
on campus or, even worse, in front of a computer screen. Young people 
should reconnoitre the fi eld. So, I greatly sympathise with the good old 
Minangkabau custom of merantau or, to put it in more romantic German 
terms, das Wandern, das Wandern. Yes, A.J.P. Taylor was right: what a 
good historian needs is a pair of sturdy boots! 
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You turn a page and then there is suddenly 
something on a turtle’: Interview with 
Jü rgen Osterhammel
On 1 September 2011 Jü rgen Osterhammel, Professor of Modern and 
Contemporary History at the University of Konstanz, and his wife, the 
historian and sinologist Sabine Dabringhaus (University of Freiburg), 
visited Leiden to participate in a conference on ‘Forms of Dynastic Power 
in Late Imperial China and Early Modern Europe.’ Th e conference marked 
the start of a new comparative research programme on ‘Eurasian Empires: 
Integration Processes and Identity Formation.’ After discussing the aims and 
objectives of the new programme in a highly stimulating roundtable with 
the fresh researchers, Itinerario (Andreas Weber and Jos Gommans) took 
the opportunity to have a talk with Jü rgen Osterhammel about his career 
and the writing of his recent masterpiece, Die Verwandlung der Welt (Th e 
Transformation of the World). Th is monograph is a painstaking and thought-
provoking attempt to write a global history of the nineteenth century. In more 
than 1,500 pages, Osterhammel off ers a kaleidoscopic view on topics such as 
cities, frontiers, empires and nation states, nomads, music, science, religion, 
work, revolutions and living standards. Reviewers have praised the book for 
its thoroughness and innovative methodology, and an English translation will 
appear in the course of 2013. Already dazzling in itself, it is ‘ just’ the latest 
addition to an awe-inspiring oeuvre of one of the leading historians in Europe. 
First things fi rst: why and how did you decide to become a historian? Was 
there some kind of ‘natural road’ in your family that paved the way?
No, there was no natural road; quite the contrary. I was born in 1952 
in a small town in the Bergisches Land (Rhineland) in the north-west 
of Germany, which is a part of the country well known for people like 
Hans-Ulrich Wehler and Jü rgen Habermas. Nothing prepared me for 
becoming a historian. My immediate family had a strong natural science 
emphasis. My father was a physicist; he did not prevent me from studying 
humanities but also did not think it would be the best of all possible 
choices. Th e inspiration probably came from attending a very good school, 
a public school (Gymnasium) where in the late 1960s questions especially 
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of politics and recent history played an important role. My original 
impulse to do history as an academic subject was very much related to 
contemporary concerns. And in a way it still is. I still consider myself a 
historian who in whatever he does tries to address questions which are 
relevant today.
Being born in 1952, to what extent was this present-minded agenda inspired 
by the generation of the roaring 1960s and 1970s, which aimed to reform 
society. Were you ever a political ‘activist’ yourself?
My school was not in the Bergisches Land, but in Hanau, a city in the state 
of Hesse. Th at is important because in 1968, when I was 16, obviously the 
intellectual hothouse after Berlin was Frankfurt. Hanau was quite close 
to Frankfurt and sometimes I managed to go there. I even played with 
the idea of going to Frankfurt to study philosophy and sociology with 
Th eodor W. Adorno. He was a man who mastered the entire literary and 
philosophical tradition, also a brilliant pianist and composer himself, and 
of course an anti-capitalist radical—that is an interesting tension. I might 
have done that, but unfortunately he died in August 1969, which was a 
year before I took my A-levels (Abitur). So the chance was missed and I 
decided to study at the university in Marburg.
Th is means that you fostered a strong and serious interest in philosophy at a 
rather young age. To what extent was this special at that time?
Many young people were interested in philosophy at that time. I can’t 
really reconstruct the exact origins of that. A couple of friends and I, we 
all claimed a broad range of authors, and in the German language and 
literature classes read excerpts from Hegel and Nietzsche and a lot of the 
dramatist and poet Bertolt Brecht, who was re-emerging as an important 
author at that time. Philosophers were much more in the public eyes than 
they are today. Th at was the time when you opened Der Spiegel, a weekly 
political magazine, and you found interviews with philosophers such as 
Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, the Marxist visionary Ernst Bloch 
and the great men of the Frankfurt school, Adorno, Max Horkheimer 
and the young Jü rgen Habermas. So it was in a way natural to become 
acquainted with their ideas and texts which were made available in the 
famous rainbow-coloured books in Edition Suhrkamp in their original 
shape, with a loose paper fl ap. A real treasure. Th ese little books were my 
early intellectual nourishment.
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So at that time you were not really at the frontline of the new intellectual 
movement?
No, I was too young to be an active rebel, and at my school in Hanau 
there were no sharp confrontations between conservative teachers and 
the wider revolutionary world. Th e school was quite progressive, and 
contemporary history played an enormous role. I read, as part of a regular 
school education, Hannah Arendt, another important author for me. 
When I was 17 or 18, I worked my way through Elemente und Ursprü nge 
totaler Herrschaft (fi rst published in English as Th e Origins of Totalitarism) 
and a couple of other social science classics. We read, for instance, Ralf 
Dahrendorf, so it was not just Marxism and the Frankfurt School. I 
always had an interest in contemporary history and a direct engagement 
with questions of National Socialism and the recent German past, which 
was a generational experience elsewhere as well. Th ose were themes openly 
discussed in a way that a young person easily felt encouraged to study 
history and politics.
To what extent was Germany special at that time? Didn’t the Cold War and 
the division between East and West Germany have a huge impact?
Yes, defi nitely so, because of two factors. Th ere was, on the one hand, 
the need to reconsider the past and move against attempts to cover it up 
and not face its horrors. I still remember the tremendous shock caused 
by Peter Weiss’s drama Die Ermittlung, based on documents from the 
Frankfurt Auschwitz Trial (1963–65). And, on the other hand, there 
was of course the divide between East and West, resulting, among other 
things, in two competing historiographies. A burning issue at the time, 
more important to my generation than the division of Germany, was the 
Vietnam War. We were really concerned as young people about things 
going on in Vietnam. And at the same time, in 1968, we were intrigued 
by the Cultural Revolution in China that, just in 1968, was moving into 
its hottest phase.
So you decided to study in Marburg. What was the academic environment 
there?
Th e environment was that of a quintessential university town. Th ere are 
these old-style university towns, only a few of them are left in Germany. 
When I was a student, there were still dueling fraternities (schlagende 
Verbindungen). You did not meet those people frequently (most of them 
were law students) but they had special inns and you saw them on the 
street with their peculiar outfi ts; they were remnants of a diff erent age. 
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More characteristically, this was an age of enormous expansion in the 
student population. It was not unusual to have large lecture halls with 300 
or 400 students attending one lecture.
How was history taught in Marburg?
History was a fairly conservative fi eld in Marburg. On my very fi rst 
day in mid-October 1970 there was a huge public debate—in the main 
auditorium in front of around 1,000 students—pitting the right-wing 
Ernst Nolte, who was at that time a professor at Marburg (he later left for 
the Freie Universität in Berlin), against Wolfgang Abendroth, a veteran 
socialist jurist and political scientist who had suff ered severe persecution 
during the Nazi period, a Bildungsbü rger of the radical Left. Nolte and 
Abendroth had a vehement public debate about National Socialism and its 
legacy. It was an event with great rhetoric and a scandal at the end when 
Abendroth walked out. Th at kind of political polarisation between history 
and the social sciences was quite symptomatic of the situation in Marburg. 
History was a conservative discipline also in a methodological sense with 
the fresh impulses coming from the Bielefeld School of social history 
making little headway among the teachers of history. As I studied both 
political science (and also some sociology and philosophy) and history, I 
moved in diff erent worlds without really committing myself deeply to any 
of them.
Th is was still very much a German debate. At some point you left Germany 
and developed an interest in China. How did that happen?
It is quite diffi  cult to reconstruct how that came about. Part of the story was 
a revulsion against a kind of narrow Germano-centrism. Really everything 
was German, the whole curriculum was German, not for nationalistic 
reasons, but because it had always been that way. My early irritation with 
the Vietnam War led me to an interest in the Th ird World. In the early 
1970s, people like Dieter Senghaas from the University of Bremen—he 
was quite infl uential at that time—published books on dependencia and 
the economics and politics of poverty and underdevelopment. We also 
read radical economists such as Paul A. Baran and, a little later, Immanuel 
Wallerstein. For a historian, the development of the Soviet Union held a 
special interest, and even more so the attempts of the People’s Republic of 
China (especially in the 1950s) to jump across historical periods, ages and 
stadia towards an industrial future.
At some point I thought I had made a mistake in choosing my subjects 
and that I should learn another language in addition to the languages you 
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learn at school; and it should be a challenge. So I took up Chinese and 
did that as a sort of sideline subject. I accumulated a modest knowledge 
of Chinese, and by the end of my studies in 1976, when I passed my 
Staatsexamen (roughly equivalent to a Master’s), I was able to get the gist 
of a modern Chinese text, admittedly with the help of a dictionary. Th at 
didn’t really qualify me for being a sinologist. At one point I considered 
moving entirely into Chinese studies, but then my interests were too 
broad—you may say, too superfi cial—to be confi ned in one particular 
kind of area studies.
Was this an acceptable road for academic historians at that time in Germany?
No. It was quite impossible to work on China, and also on Japan or on Arabic 
countries within the discipline of history. Only a handful of universities 
off ered lecture courses on the history of Asia or on decolonisation. Despite 
the new methodological approaches and theories of the Bielefeld School, 
German historical studies in the early 1970s were dominated by a strong 
fi xation on Germany and on the development of industrial modernity in 
the Atlantic West. And that was mirrored in the composition of history 
departments. Th ere were very few history departments at that time—
perhaps Hamburg was the most important one—where you had chairs or 
at least lectureships for non-European or even non-Western history. Only 
Latin American history enjoyed a high reputation, being considered less 
‘exotic’ than Asian or African history.
How did you fi nd a job after your student years in Marburg?
I completed my studies in Marburg and then I was looking for, not a 
job, but a post-MA opportunity. Fortunately I was a scholarship-holder 
of the Studienstiftung des Deutschen Volkes (German National Academic 
Foundation), a highly rated institution which, at that time, supported less 
than 0.5 per cent of the student body who were considered to be the best. 
Th ey leave you incredible leeway, even to change your subject, to do what 
you want as long as you give them good reasons. Th ey allowed me to go to 
the London School of Economics for a year after graduation. And I went 
there with all those more or less contradictory ideas in my head about 
history and politics.
Tell us more …
I went to London with the idea that I should forget all German subjects, 
should do something else, and should continue with China. So I went to 
LSE’s department of international history. I also discovered the library of 
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the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) which I used quite a 
lot. At LSE I was registered as a research-fee student, which meant you 
neither had any obligations nor studied for a degree; you just spent a year 
there, doing whatever you wanted. I went to many lectures—by luminaries 
like the historian James Joll and the polymath Ernest Gellner—and at the 
fairly advanced age of 25, I met my fi rst teacher in an emphatic sense. He 
was Ian Nish, Professor of International History and a great expert on the 
history of Japanese foreign relations; perhaps next to Akira Iriye at Harvard 
the greatest non-Japanese authority in the fi eld. He was and still is—he 
is 85 now—a great and good man, and he took this wayward German 
student under his wing. I went to his very small classes (mostly three or 
four students) and got almost personal tuition in diplomatic history. Later 
on, in his 60s, Ian Nish became a much more general historian, but at 
that time he was an excellent specialist in diplomatic history. And that is 
what I learnt from him: diplomatic history. So I am a trained diplomatic 
historian; I am not ashamed to say that after doing all sorts of other 
histories, and one might detect traces of it in my latest book because there 
is a chapter on Die Verwandlung der Welt on the international system, 
international politics and war—somewhat unusual for global historians 
these days. Th is is a legacy of my brief and intense training at the LSE in 
the late 1970s.
Meanwhile, what happened to your research—was there a Ph.D. topic in 
your mind already?
My Ph.D. topic was a combination of my two most important historical 
interests at the time. Th at was fi rst of all the development of China in 
the twentieth century, and secondly imperial Britain. I never warmed 
to Japan, which was Ian’s subject. He probably never understood why 
I didn’t care to learn Japanese, but he was generous and supported my 
developing orientation. So I tried to bring together my old interest in 
China, especially in the pre-1949 Republican period (which one has to 
study in order to understand what happened later) and my newly-acquired 
interest in Britain’s international position, and in particular the British 
Empire.
So the British part of your research was born in London?
Yes, very much so. And I think that was, looking at those origins from the 
vantage point of today, a good starting point. China as that quintessentially 
closed (of course that is a cliché) civilisation with its enormous continuity 
and, on the other hand, the British Empire, waterborne and scattered 
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all over the world. I intuitively found that to be a fascinating tension. 
From that I developed a Ph.D. topic on the question of what happened 
to British imperialism in the Far East after the British had lost their 
dominant position in China after the First World War. Despite the rise 
of China’s nationalism, British business was going strong in the 1920s 
and 1930s without being much aff ected by the political turmoil in the 
country. My question was very simple: how did the big British fi rms 
in Shanghai and elsewhere manage to safeguard and even extend their 
economic interests and their physical establishment of wharves, factories, 
coal mines and whatever else on the territory of the Chinese Republic 
in an age of emerging nationalism and the erosion of Britain’s power to 
control events in China?
Was that still a politically inspired research question connected to your early 
years at the Gymnasium and Marburg?
No, my political engagement was quite weak at that time. Th ere was 
perhaps a tenuous link through Marxist interpretations of Chinese history, 
especially a peculiar attempt to explain China’s ‘special path’ in modern 
history. Th e idea was that before ‘socialism’ was victorious in 1949, there 
had been neither a purely ‘feudal’ nor a ‘bourgeois’ stage. Rather, China 
was a ‘semi-feudal, semi-colonial country,’ and when capitalism came, it 
assumed the characteristic form of ‘bureaucratic capitalism,’ especially 
under the rule of Chiang Kai-shek’s [Jiang Jieshi] Guomindang during 
the Nanjing period from 1927 to 1937. I wasn’t empirically convinced, but 
found that an intriguing idea and wondered what ‘bureaucratic capitalism’ 
was. In a diff erent way, this question continues to be relevant today.
Th e main result of my thesis was to have shown in great detail how 
the big British companies such as BAT or Butterfi eld & Swire operated 
quite independently from British politics on the spot in China, and how 
they dovetailed with the policies of the Guomindang for opening China 
to foreign capital. So in a way this is the pre-history of the opening up 
of China for foreign business that occurred on a far grander scale after 
1978. Th e Guomindang started a precursor of that policy in the 1930s in 
conjunction with Western business interests, and with only the tenuous 
involvement of the government in London and of British diplomats and 
consuls in China. In a way, it was business imperialism after political 
imperialism. And I developed a model to explain that. Th e book was 
published under very diffi  cult circumstances in Germany. No historical 
series accepted it because China was anathema to any decent history 
series, so it was published in a small sinological series.
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But then, to my utter surprise, it won the attention (and this was 
probably the great turning point in my professional advancement) of the 
famous Paul Kennedy at Yale, who reviewed it very favourably in the 
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History and alerted the readers of 
the journal to an article summarising the book that I had just published 
in China Quarterly. Th at article was fairly successful; one of the younger 
scholars later to use the model was actually Frans-Paul van der Putten of 
Leiden University and editor of Itinerario.
Did you ever consider leaving Germany for good to extend you career 
somewhere else?
Not really. Th e Kennedy review was an enormous encouragement. When 
I applied for a research fellowship at the German Historical Institute in 
London, I got it and went back to London in 1982. My boss at the Institute 
was Wolfgang J. Mommsen who, at a fairly late stage of my academic 
education, became my second genuine ‘teacher’. He had no regional stake 
in China but was generally interested in imperialism and a comparative 
approach. In Germany there had been for a short while a broad concern 
with imperialism. Hans-Ulrich Wehler had published his book, Bismarck 
und der Imperialismus, in 1969. A couple of other books, especially on the 
German colonial empire, appeared during the following years. Within 
that generation of historians studying imperialism Wolfgang Mommsen 
was the only one with an almost universal perspective. He was also the 
person who introduced foreign theories of imperialism to Germany. He 
was a friend of Ronald Robinson whom I met several times, of David 
Fieldhouse and of many others of that seminal generation of historians. 
He brought many of them to the Institute. Immediately after I joined 
the Institute in 1982 we had a big conference called ‘Imperialism and 
After.’ Th e volume emerging from it was later published in English.1 It is 
still a very good collection. Robinson was there, Fieldhouse, the economic 
historian Paul Bairoch from Geneva; many of those prominent in the fi eld; 
from the German side, among others, the best-known historian of modern 
India on the European continent, Dietmar Rothermund, who held a chair 
at the South Asia Institute in Heidelberg, founded in 1962. Also present 
was Rudolf von Albertini, a scholar who was instrumental in establishing 
non-European or non-Western historical studies in the German-speaking 
countries, perhaps comparable to Henk Wesseling in the Netherlands. 
He was Swiss and had been a professor of modern European history at 
Heidelberg before moving to Zurich in 1967. Albertini inspired a whole 
generation of talented Ph.D. candidates, and he established a series of 
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monographs on ‘colonial and overseas history’ where much of the most 
important work in German has been published up to the present day.
But to answer your original question: for my generation leaving 
Germany in pursuit of a career elsewhere in Europe or in the United 
States was far less of an option than it has been for younger colleagues in 
recent years. I never received an off er, and I never considered becoming an 
academic emigrant.
After your second stay in London, you got a position as reader in political 
science at the University of Freiburg. Could you include non-European 
subjects in your teaching by that time?
Within certain limits I could include non-European subjects. I off ered 
courses on international relations, colonialism, theories of imperialism, 
China, etc. But my main duty was political theory. Anyway, I maintained 
my old interest in China. And at some point—I can’t remember why and 
when—I decided to write a synthesis of the integration of China into 
the modern world system—a non-Wallersteinian synthesis that would 
include political but also economic aspects and in a sense even vaguely 
cultural aspects. Th at was my earliest book of synthesis. Since then I have 
found it always quite helpful to have a broadly conceived book to follow 
upon a research monograph. So, almost a decade after my Ph.D. thesis 
I wrote the book, China und die Weltgesellschaft (China and the World 
Society), covering the period from the eighteenth century onwards. It 
wasn’t meant to lead to anything because I did not have the intention 
of a ‘Habilitation’ at the time. I just wrote this manuscript and I gave 
it to a history professor at Freiburg, Ernst Schulin (my teacher number 
three), and he passed it on, without telling me, to Beck Publishers in 
Munich. One day I received a letter from the history editor at Beck’s 
expressing his interest in the manuscript. How long would it take to fi nish 
the book? Would I be interested in a contract? I was. Th e book came out 
in 1989. C.H. Beck have been my principal publishers ever since. Th ey 
also published my study of European attitudes towards Asia during the 
eighteenth century (Die Entzauberung Asiens, 1998), a personal favourite 
among my books, meant as a contribution to the debate about historical 
‘orientalism’ triggered by Edward Said. 
It was possible under the rules of Freiburg University to submit a 
published book in application for a Habilitation, in Germany still an 
unavoidable stepping-stone towards becoming a professor. Th us, I obtained 
a venia legendi [permission to lecture] for modern and contemporary 
history. And then I was lucky again. Th e Open University in Hagen had 
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just established a professorship for non-European history. I got that job 
and I spent the next six years writing study materials across a broad range 
of non-European topics. Th at allowed me to read a lot since I didn’t have 
physically present students; it was almost like being in a vacuum. I was 
left with plenty of time on my hands to acquire a broad knowledge of 
colonialism and imperialism, something that stands me in good stead 
nowadays, as a teacher of ‘general’ history at the University of Konstanz.
Would you say that the German approach to this topic, the history of European 
expansion, was in any way diff erent at that time from the more maritime 
historiographies in Britain, France and Holland?
In Germany, there was a fairly strong interest in the continental empires—
the Habsburg Monarchy, the Ottoman Empire and the Tsarist Empire. A 
superb book on an obvious but much-neglected topic had been written 
by Dietrich Geyer. Geyer was the intellectual giant among German 
historians of Eastern Europe. His Der russische Imperialismus of 1977 is still 
a classic study to be read alongside Andreas Kappeler’s great Russland als 
Vielvölkerreich (1992).2 Geyer successfully transposed ideas and concepts 
of Wehler’s Bielefeld School into a Russian context.
A power in his own right was and is Wolfgang Reinhard, a professor 
of early modern history at the University of Freiburg. Reinhard never 
belonged to any ‘school’; in a sense, he created his own. His magnifi cent 
four-volume work on the history of the European expansion (1983–90), for 
mysterious reasons never translated into English, remains internationally 
unrivalled.3 Reinhard blends the maritime with the continental 
dimension. Long before the onset of post-colonialism, he was much more 
sensitive towards culture than all the other German and Swiss historians 
mentioned before. Whereas the Wehlers, Mommsens and Geyers hardly 
ever cared for anything earlier than ‘High Imperialism,’ Reinhard, who is 
also a world authority on early modern Italy, the Papacy and the evolution 
of the state, always bears the long-term sweep of history in mind. His 
scope of vision is unique, while certainly not being ‘typically German.’
Let us now switch to your recently published book, Die Verwandlung der Welt 
(Th e Transformation of the World). What struck us most was the architecture 
of the book. Could you tell us how the book’s idea and fabric emerged?
Th e general answer is that it is a NIAS [Netherlands Institute for 
Advanced Studies, in Wassenaar] book. I spent a full year there thinking 
about the architecture of it. Th ere is actually an intriguing story in the 
background. I came to NIAS with the intention of doing a comparative 
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history of European overseas empires in the nineteenth century. Upon 
arrival, I knocked at the door of Henk Wesseling, the rector of NIAS at 
that time. After a pleasant chat, Henk said: ‘I have just sent my book on 
the nineteenth-century European empires to the publishers.’ I protested, 
as politely as possible, ‘What, that’s my subject!’ And that serene master 
merely said: ‘Don’t worry!’
So what can you do in such a situation? Th ere were just two options: 
either to go several steps backwards and do a research monograph, or 
to hazard a Flucht nach vorn [take the bull by the horns] and attempt 
something even grander with empires being just a facet of a comprehensive 
portrait of an age. I decided on the latter option. So I spent my time at 
NIAS considering many alternatives of the contents and construction of 
the book. Peer Vries, now at the University of Vienna and one of the 
sharpest minds in comparative history, was a fellow at the same time, and 
we had frequent conversations. He doesn’t agree entirely with the book as 
I later wrote it. For very good reasons he prefers a more problem-oriented 
historiography, but we are still on the best of terms. After returning from 
Wassenaar to the mundane duties of a German professor, I shelved the 
project. In 2004, Chris Bayly’s masterpiece, Th e Birth of the Modern 
World, appeared out of the blue, and for some time seemed to have killed 
off  my own venture. But I overcame the ‘Bayly shock’ and managed to 
write the bulk of my manuscript in 2006 and 2007. An invitation from 
the Carl Friedrich von Siemens Foundation to spend a sabbatical year in 
Munich made the completion of the book possible.
So Die Verwandlung der Welt didn’t follow an existing paradigm?
No, and I was lucky in not having to comply with a series template. I had 
nurtured many minor obsessions with things which should somehow be 
included, for instance animals and opera. Th is is one of the reasons why 
even people in search of scholarly entertainment like the book. You turn a 
page and then there is suddenly something on a turtle. You cannot devise 
such ornaments of the ‘architecture’ at the very beginning. Th ey crop up 
spontaneously when you are sitting in front of the screen.
Several features of the overall design had to be corrected during the 
process of writing. For example, the division between the long ‘panoramic’ 
chapters and the shorter ‘thematic’ chapters was a fairly late invention. 
It is the result of a change of gear required for straightforward practical 
reasons. If I had continued in the original epical manner, the book would 
have run into two or three volumes. Th erefore, I pulled the emergency 
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brake and developed a kind of more concise écriture, dispensing with 
much of the illustrative materials I had collected.
Th ere was also a certain infl uence from my university. Th ings I 
learned from my colleagues in the department of history and sociology 
at Konstanz include the importance of communication, memory and the 
media. Th e very fi rst chapter is soaked with those issues. Other things 
had to be corrected in the course of writing. Th us, I never wanted to write 
a chapter on religion, an especially demanding subject. But then I came 
to the conclusion that, for systematic reasons, such a chapter would be 
indispensable. A few people seem to have found it worth reading.
Where would you yourself situate the book in the fi eld world history?
It is in many diff erent respects a middle-of-the-road or compromise 
book. What I mean is that it is neither a ‘synthesis’ nor an ‘analysis,’ but 
both at the same time. Books like this one and also Chris Bayly’s Birth 
of Modern World are analytical syntheses. We cannot have enough of 
them. Someone else should write another global history of the nineteenth 
century. A middle-of-the-road book is also one that includes all kinds of 
concepts and theorems without committing itself to any grand theory, be 
it Marxism, or world-system theory, or post-colonialism. My approach is 
deliberately eclectic. And, third, the book is middle of the road in that 
the barriers between the usual compartments of history are lowered. 
Th e greatest personal joy in writing was in combining so many diff erent 
approaches to history.
Your book is very successful in the German book market. How did people in 
Germany respond to the book? Did you write it with a particular audience 
in mind?
Th e most amazing thing is that even today I get emails and letters from 
all kinds of people pointing out mistakes or making comments. My most 
contentious reader is a retired military offi  cer who has sent me a thirty-
page list of errata, most of them justifi ed. Th e later editions from edition 
number four onwards are much improved. No, I didn’t have a particular 
audience in mind. I am optimistic enough to imagine students tackling 
such a big ‘think book’ even though much of it is unlikely to be useful for 
their exams. And of course it is gratifying that there is a general audience 
interested in such a broad, but in no way racy, narrative. I defend the 
position that a historian should communicate with a broader audience 
without letting his standards slip.
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What is your next project?
After having co-edited, with the much-admired American historian Fritz 
Stern, an anthology of historiography, I haven’t got any plans ready to 
present to the public. But two things are already clear. Th e new book will 
focus on the twentieth century and people will play an important role in 
it. At the moment I am groping for ways—I always need a lot of time for 
that—to come closer to individuals than in my previous work. Certainly 
not a biography, but something with a clearly articulated biographical 
touch. 
Notes
1 Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Jü rgen Osterhammel (eds.), Imperialism and 
After: Continuities and Discontinuities (London: German Historical Institute, 
1986).
2 For English translations see: Dietrich Geyer, Russian Imperialism: Th e 
Interaction of Domestic and Foreign Policy, 1860–1914 (Leamington Spa: 
Berghahn, 1987); and Andreas Kappeler, Th e Russian Empire: A Multiethnic 
History (Harlow: Longman, 2001).
3 Wolfgang Reinhard. Geschichte der europäischen Expansion, 4 vols (Stuttgart: 
Kohlhammer, 1983–90). And more recently: Wolfgang Reinhard. A Short 
History of Colonialism (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2011).
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Are We All Global Historians Now?: 
Interview with David Armitage
Th e interview took place on a splendid summer day in Cambridge, 
Massachusetts. Th e location was slightly exotic: Martine van Ittersum and 
Jaap Jacobs had lunch with David Armitage at Upstairs at the Square, an 
eatery which sports pink and mint green walls, zebra decorations, and even a 
stuff ed crocodile. What more could one want? 
Armitage was recently elected Fellow of the Australian Academy of the 
Humanities. At the time of the interview, he was just about to take over as 
Chair of the History Department at Harvard University. His long-awaited 
Foundations of Modern International Th ought (2013) was being copy-edited 
for publication.1 Granted a sneak preview, the interviewers can recommend 
it to every Itinerario reader. In short, it was high time for Itinerario to sit 
down with one of the movers and shakers of the burgeoning fi eld of global and 
international history for a long and wide-ranging conversation.
Could you tell us something about your life story? Where were you born, where 
did you grow up, what is your family background? 
I had a very land-locked childhood, which, at least superfi cially, gave no 
indication that I would be interested in international and global history 
later in life. I say superfi cially because, as I think back over the years about 
aspects of my family history, I can see that the seeds were already there, 
although I did not realise it at the time. My father, a marine engineer, 
did his British National Service in the Merchant Navy and then stayed 
on for some years afterwards, spending most of his time on the so-called 
‘MANZ run’, which took in Montreal, Australia and New Zealand via 
year-long tours of the Pacifi c. It was perhaps an indication that I was going 
to have a global future as well, and was possibly also the genetic origin of 
my recent interest in Pacifi c history. When I was a child, my father spoke 
very little about his activities at sea. But I occasionally picked up hints 
when I saw occasional photographs of his travels or he mentioned a visit 
to Australia here, having been in New York there. Without putting too 
much of a burden on the accidents of family history, I think that it was 
signifi cant both that my father had had a distinctly global career in his 
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twenties and that he spoke so little about it. Th at seems characteristic of 
the way Britain itself in my childhood was a power with international and 
global connections, but maintained a great amnesia about speaking of 
these connections or acknowledging how much the world beyond Britain 
had shaped British history itself. 
And I also remember as another thread of family history that my great-
grandfather in the years before the First World War had wanted to escape 
his family. He was something of a wastrel, not to be relied upon. He went 
on a long and rather mysterious tour of North America in 1912–13. Th ere 
was clearly a gene for Wanderlust in the family, even though it was rarely 
spoken about, and was thought about in somewhat dangerous terms. I 
have the postcards that my grandmother’s family received from him, all of 
which were dismayingly, suspiciously brief about what he was up to, where 
he was going, etc. Th ere was clearly a strain in my family—my father’s 
global career through the Merchant Navy, my great-grandfather with his 
Wanderlust taking him through North America—that I must have picked 
up in a career that’s taken me to the US for the past twenty years, when I’ve 
lectured on six continents. (Antarctica has eluded me so far.) By contrast, 
most of my relatives have stayed very close to the unremarkable town 
where I was born, Stockport, just south of Manchester. It was a spinning 
and hat-making town, one of the cradles of the Industrial Revolution, 
although all of that industry was already receding when I was a child. 
Th ere is a third coincidence which, looking back, perhaps made me 
into an imperial and ultimately a global historian. My mother went into 
labour on the day Winston Churchill, the last living symbol of the British 
Empire, was buried. I now like to think, without being completely self-
aggrandising, that the weekend the British Empire was buried in the fi gure 
of Winston Churchill was a rather appropriate time for a self-consciously 
post-imperial historian to be born. As the empire was passing away in the 
early 1960s, I was born as part of a generation of historians that would 
regard the British Empire as history, as something to look back on, but no 
longer as a living force. I was part of a generation that came of age in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s, when the last wisps of the British Empire were 
given up. It conditioned the way my generation thought about British 
history in relation to its larger international and imperial contexts. It was 
hardly a coincidence that I should come out of an amnesiac Britain trying 
to forget its international, imperial and global connections, or that I grew 
up as part of a generation which was determined to recover those broader 
contexts, i.e. the impact of the wider world on Britain and the impact of 
Britain on the wider world as well.
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One realises in retrospect that every part of British society was deeply 
enmeshed with the Empire and Commonwealth, even people coming from 
landlocked places. However, this was little talked about, something I call 
imperial amnesia. My parents contemplated emigrating to Nova Scotia 
in the late 1960s, for example. Th is was entirely typical of upper- and 
middle-class whites moving to the Empire in the twentieth century. David 
Cannadine’s refl ections on the hidden but multiple imperial connections 
of his family in Birmingham suggest a very similar profi le to that of my 
own family.2
White settlers born in the Empire were educated at Cambridge and 
Oxford, on the understanding that you would return to the place you 
came from. Th e great historian of political thought, J. G. A. Pocock, 
was born in New Zealand and still retains a very strong identity as a 
New Zealander. It infl ects almost everything he writes, increasingly self-
consciously in recent years as well. His scepticism about Europe as a project 
has always come from his New Zealand identity. In his view, Britain faced 
a choice between Europe and the white settler Commonwealth at the 
beginning of 1970s, and made a choice for Europe and against the settler 
empire. It was exactly at that moment that Pocock wrote his fi rst essays 
on the ‘New British History.’ He envisaged a metropolitan Britain as part 
of a congeries, a global nexus of commonwealth settler societies across the 
globe, a set of islands scattered around the globe, including New Zealand. 
Th e ‘New British History’ came from that charged political moment and 
that set of choices.3
You were educated at the University of Cambridge. What diff erence did it 
make to your intellectual interests and academic career?
I benefi ted from excellent teaching at Stockport Grammar School, most 
notably an inspirational history master by the name of Nicholas Henshall.4 
A very fi ne publishing scholar in his own right, he had done a special 
subject with Geoff rey Elton at Cambridge, and later started a Ph.D. at 
the University of Manchester which he did not complete. I am convinced 
that I got from Henshall as good a history education as I would have had, 
had I done history at Cambridge. Henshall gave me a real feel for what 
it was like to work at the highest pitch of scholarship, absent immediate 
access to the archives. I am immensely grateful for that. Nick is a really 
inspirational fi gure: we all have someone like that, especially in our school 
careers, who showed you the excitement of intellectual life, intellectual 
work, of whatever kind it might be.
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I went to the University of Cambridge in 1983 to read English, in 
probably the only act of rebellion in my whole life. I was supposed to enter 
Cambridge as a History student, but at school I revolted and opted to do 
English instead. Although I lacked the terminology, I knew that I wanted 
to be what we might now call a cultural and intellectual historian. If there 
is one single book that made me want to be a historian, it is Frances Yates’s 
Th e Art of Memory (1966).5 I still have the copy that I fi rst read at the age 
of 15. To me, it was so thrillingly unusual in what it revealed about the 
past. Th ese were aspects of the past that I had never encountered before. 
And Yates did it in such an elegant and revelatory way. I decided that this 
was the kind of history that I wanted to do. At Cambridge in the early 
1980s, the undergraduate History Tripos was still very much focused on 
political and institutional history. I had read everything by Geoff rey Elton 
and his followers by about the age of 16: very impressive institutional and 
political history, but not what I wanted to do myself. In order to become a 
cultural and intellectual historian, I knew I needed training in the reading 
of texts, i.e. interpretation and hermeneutics, with historical sensitivity. 
Th e Cambridge English Tripos—formally entitled ‘English Literature, 
Life and Th ought’—seemed the more sensible option. I had no intention 
of pursuing an academic career at that point. I wanted to be a barrister, 
which meant doing two years of English and one year of Law. My plan 
was totally derailed by surprisingly good exam results in English in my 
fi rst and second years. Everyone said: ‘you should carry on with it, because 
you are apparently very good at it.’ Since I had by then lost my rebellious 
streak, this is what I did. 
Following a BA in English, I immediately started with a Ph.D. in 
English. I spent two years on Shakespeare’s classical sources, particularly 
Shakespeare’s use of Ovid. Halfway through that process, I discovered 
that almost all the Ovidian poets in sixteenth-century England had also 
written poems about English colonial enterprises in Virginia or Guiana. I 
thought: this is a much more interesting topic, this is where the juices start 
fl owing, this is something novel that has not been talked about before. I 
faced a fork in the road. To cut a long story relatively short: rereading John 
Milton’s Paradise Lost was the point on which my work pivoted back from 
literary scholarship to intellectual history. Th ere are two great narratives in 
Paradise Lost: a) the narrative of the Fall of Mankind, and b) the narrative 
of Satan’s discovery of the New World. Th ere are references all the way 
through to Satan as a voyager, a traveller, going to a New World, where he 
encounters the native peoples. Th e poem is saturated with the language of 
empire. I thought: ‘why was this the case?’ Why did Milton refl ect in the 
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late 1650s and early 1660s, when writing Paradise Lost, on contacts with 
the New World beyond Europe? Why did he mention empire, discovery 
and colonisation, often with a negative valence? I related that to Milton’s 
republicanism, his commitment to classical republicanism, to neo-Roman 
thought.6 Th is was the topic I had been looking for: the relationship 
between republicanism and empire. I took this project with me when I 
left Cambridge in 1988, right in the middle of my Ph.D., and went to 
Princeton for two years on a Commonwealth Fund Harkness Fellowship 
in order to retool as a historian. 
I was particularly encouraged do so by J. H. Elliott, who was then 
at the Institute of Advanced Study at Princeton. Elliott’s Th e Old World 
and the New, 1492–1650 (1970), based on his 1969 Wiles Lectures at 
Queen’s University, Belfast, had been a great inspiration to me.7 (I was 
therefore more than usually honoured and delighted to follow Elliott as 
the Wiles Lecturer at Queen’s in 2010.) John himself was extraordinarily 
kind to me and had a decisive infl uence on my career. Although based 
in Princeton, he retained a house in Cambridge, to which he returned 
every summer. I met him one summer when he was in Cambridge, 
explained that I had a fellowship to go to the US, and that I wanted to 
work on the relationship between English literature and English imperial 
ventures in the Americas. He immediately suggested I come to Princeton. 
Since the Institute of Advanced Study does not take graduate students, 
he could not offi  cially supervise me, but off ered to help in any way he 
could. He gave me the names of Princeton faculty members I might work 
with, including Lawrence Stone, Natalie Zemon Davis and John Murrin 
in History and David Quint and Victoria Kahn in Literature. He was 
extraordinarily generous, really decisive at that point in helping me to 
move my intellectual framework towards the US and American academia, 
Princeton in particular. He was amazingly generous to someone he had 
never met before, to whom he had no prior connection. As a side-note, 
I should say that I have been struck at various points by how generous 
extremely senior scholars can be to junior scholars and how decisive this 
can be in one’s academic life. Th roughout my own career, I have tried 
to follow Elliott’s example as much as I can, in my own faltering way. 
I realise that I owe so much to so many generous people who helped 
me at critical moments in my career, when they really had no reason to. 
Elliott was the fi rst one to do that for me. He did not just introduce me to 
Princeton scholars, but also—here is where the irony comes in—to many 
of the great Cambridge historians who would play a decisive infl uence 
in my career for the next ten years. It was at Princeton that I fi rst met 
312 world history – a genealogy
Anthony Pagden, Richard Tuck, Chris Bayly, Linda Colley and David 
Cannadine. It was at Princeton as well that I fi rst really came across the 
work of Quentin Skinner, whose name had never even been mentioned to 
me in the fi ve years I spent at Cambridge studying English. 
So Princeton, not Cambridge, was the decisive infl uence in your career?
You might say that; I couldn’t possibly comment. However, the pivotal 
fi gure in my career is Quentin Skinner, a founding member of the 
so-called ‘Cambridge School’ of the History of Political Th ought, who, 
like Pocock, also had a family background in the Empire.8 Quentin saved 
my academic life. In my second year at Princeton, I had reached a crisis 
point. I realised that I could not in good conscience continue with a Ph.D. 
in English. I wanted to be in a History Department and to work as a 
historian. It became necessary to throw myself at the mercy of at least 
one historian in order to make the transition. By that time, I had read 
a great deal of Skinner’s work. Quentin was then publishing his major 
work on republicanism,9 which fi tted very closely with my interests at 
that stage. I very much wanted to work with him. It was the last chance 
to rescue myself as a historian. Th rough a friend, I got in touch with him. 
On a brief visit from Princeton, we had lunch and I explained my project. 
With what I soon discovered is his characteristic generosity and grace, 
he agreed to take me on as a student and to help me make the transition 
to the History Ph.D. programme at Cambridge. He did exactly that. He 
did all the necessary administrative legwork to transfer me from English 
to History. Th e rest is history—or, rather, History. It was unforced, 
unanticipated generosity on Quentin’s part, and an enormous vote of 
confi dence. When I joined the History Ph.D. programme at Cambridge, 
it was the absolute zenith of intellectual history and history of political 
thought at Cambridge in terms of the breadth and depth of the group 
I was part of. Among my contemporaries were Annabel Brett, Joan-Pau 
Rubiés, and Andrew Fitzmaurice.10 
It was a really extraordinary moment in terms of early-modern 
intellectual history, the move towards connecting intellectual history with 
extra-European history and the history of colonisation. Richard Tuck was 
independently beginning his work that led to Th e Rights of War and Peace 
(1999).11 Th ere was in diff erent areas a move towards the international, 
colonial, imperial, global setting of early-modern intellectual history in 
particular. Sometimes we worked entirely independently of each other, but 
then we discovered that we arrived at the same set of topics via diff erent 
routes. Th ere were common seminars: the famous Monday night seminar 
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in the History of Political Th ought, run for many years by Skinner and 
John Dunn—yet another founder of the Cambridge School who came 
from ‘a sort of imperial family’ in British India12—and which still 
continues today. Together with Joan-Pau Rubiés, I organised a seminar on 
‘Cultural Encounters in the Early-Modern World’, a colonial history and 
European expansion seminar with a cultural/intellectual history focus. In 
doing so, we had the full support of Peter Burke, a fellow-Fellow of mine 
at Emmanuel College at the time.
You taught at Columbia University from 1993 until 2004. How diff erent 
was American academia from what you were used to back in Britain? Do you 
feel that it was a crucial step in your academic and professional career?
By extraordinary good fortune, a junior position in British history 
opened up at Columbia University just as I fi nished my junior research 
fellowship at Emmanuel College, Cambridge, a year later, in 1993. David 
Cannadine held the senior position in British History at Columbia. His 
extraordinary generosity, inspiration and camaraderie began when I went 
for my interview at Columbia University and continued throughout the 
time that I was there. He was an immensely supportive, energising fi gure, 
who was taking his own imperial turn in those years as well.13 
David and I very much saw eye to eye in terms of where British history 
was going. Th ere was a palpable sense among British historians, particularly 
in the US, that the fi eld was dwindling into insignifi cance, that the 
tweedy Anglophilia that had sustained it for decades was no longer viable, 
as America was becoming a more outward-looking and global society. If 
British history was to survive as a teaching and research subject, a subject 
in which major universities would continue to hire, we had to reconsider 
its position in the wider academic ecology in the US. In the late 1990s, 
the North American Conference on British Studies undertook a self-study 
of the fi eld. Its report concluded that a turn towards empire, towards 
Britain’s international connections, towards the global setting of British 
history was going be essential to save the fi eld, just as it was intellectually 
unignorable as a major aspect of the fi eld—it had been largely overlooked, 
except under the rubric of imperial history. I arrived at the right moment 
in the US, just when that move was taking place.
Th ere is one other big diff erence between the US and British academia: 
the breadth demanded in teaching, the fact that one has to teach British 
history to a non-British audience, in the context of a very diverse student 
body. When I started teaching at Columbia, I had to think from the 
bottom up about the larger stories, the larger narratives into which I 
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would put British history, which would be narratives intersecting with 
colonial American history, with Atlantic History, with imperial history, 
with global history. Just in the course of writing my fi rst series of lectures 
on British history for students at Columbia University, I was being pushed 
to think in my capacity as a teacher—even before I took this turn in 
my research—-to think outwards, to think imperially, to think globally. 
Th at was decisive for my career, as was a succession of brilliant graduate 
students at Columbia and now Harvard who have taught me more 
than I could ever have taught them about expanding the boundaries of 
established histories.14
I taught the Contemporary Civilization course at Columbia University, 
a 2,000-year text-based, seminar/discussion-based survey of (mainly) 
Euro-American intellectual history, Plato to Rawls and beyond. Th at was 
the most exciting teaching I have ever done. Its chronological breadth over 
the very longue durée was salutary. It was in some sense my education as an 
intellectual historian, inculcating an interest in questions over the longue 
durée that have become increasingly urgent in my current work. Half of 
my teaching at Columbia University was in the Core Curriculum, in fact, 
which was one of the great attractions for me. I was very committed to 
it, and chaired the Contemporary Civilization course at Columbia in 
2002–04. 
What about your research and publications at this time?
In the 1990s, I did research in the New York Public Library, Columbia 
University Library and the Folger Shakespeare Library in Washington 
DC, among other places. I went back to Britain in the summer time 
in order to do research in London and Edinburgh. I did quite a lot of 
Scottish history as part of the larger British project I was working on, 
to make sure that it was truly British, representing both the English and 
Scottish experiences.15
I published an edition of Bolingbroke’s political writings in 1997.16 
Bolingbroke played an important role in my Ideological Origins of the 
British Empire (2000).17 He was among the fi rst to theorise Britain as a 
blue-water empire in the 1730s. In the course of doing research on him, 
I discovered that there was no modern edition of his writings, and there 
deserved to be. So a left-hand project in the context of my other work was 
to bring Bolingbroke back to some prominence in the context of the blue 
book series, edited by Skinner, who had written the most important classic 
essay on Bolingbroke many years before. Skinner was very receptive to the 
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idea of publishing Bolingbroke’s writings in the Cambridge Texts in the 
History of Political Th ought series.
Th eories of Empire, published in 1998, was a collection of previously 
published essays.18 Th e hardest part of putting together that volume was to 
fi nd anything on the Dutch empire. I wrote to various Dutch historians, 
including Prof. Piet Emmer at the University of Leiden, to ask whether 
there was one classic essay on Dutch ideas about empire. Emmer replied: 
‘Sorry, the Dutch had no ideas; they just counted. Th ere is no secondary 
literature on the intellectual history of the Dutch empire.’ Consequently, 
I included in the volume the classic essay ‘Freitas versus Grotius’ by C. H. 
Alexandrowicz (1902–75). Th is led to an abiding interest in Alexandrowicz’s 
work as perhaps the fi rst post-colonial historian of international law, who 
anticipated by two decades the ‘Th ird World Approaches to International 
Law’ school, which has more recently transformed the fi eld of international 
legal studies. Together with Jennifer Pitts of the University of Chicago, I 
will shortly publish a collection of Alexandrowicz’s scattered but germinal 
essays.19
My doctoral dissertation was mostly a collection of case studies, 
which were published separately as articles or led to other projects, such 
as the edition of Bolingbroke’s political writings. Th e Ideological Origins 
of the British Empire, published by Cambridge University Press in 2000, 
contains just a chapter and a half or maybe two chapters of my doctoral 
dissertation. Th e rest was freshly researched. Much to the anxiety of my 
colleagues at Columbia University, the monograph appeared just weeks 
before the tenure-fi le went forward. It was a risky strategy for any junior 
scholar in the American tenure system. Do not try this at home! I was 
very, very lucky to have the extra time (i.e. a junior research fellowship at 
Emmanuel College and research support from Columbia University) to 
write the book the subject deserved.
Should we characterise the period 1993–2004 as the ‘Atlanticist’ decade of 
your career?
Yes and no: yes, in the sense that most of the work which I published 
during that period was either explicitly or implicitly Atlantic in focus, 
and no, in the sense that the transition to international/global history 
was already taking place in 1999–2000. Th ere was an obvious overlap 
between my Atlanticist and international/global interests. Th e focus on 
global history was fi rmly in place when I became Fellow at Harvard’s 
Charles Warren Center for American Studies in 2000–01, starting my 
project on the ‘Foundations of Modern International Th ought’. Out of 
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that project grew—some might say metastasised—a single chapter, which 
turned into a book entitled Th e Declaration of Independence: A Global 
History (2007).20 My year at the Charles Warren Center was fi lled with 
a series of very intense, very fertile conversations with international and 
global historians, led by the late Ernest May (1928–2009), Akira Iriye, and 
James Kloppenberg. I really began to discover that I was an international 
historian or had been one all along, like some sort of scholarly Monsieur 
Jourdain.21 I was thus becoming an international and increasingly global 
historian on top of being an Atlantic historian. Th at is when the conversion 
really began to take hold, during that year.
Th e British Atlantic World, 1500–1800 (2002) was workshopped at a 
meeting of the International Seminar on the History of the Atlantic World at 
Harvard University in September 2001. On that occasion, you presented your 
now classic essay ‘Th ree Concepts of Atlantic History,’ which has been rather 
extravagantly compared to Marx’s Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte 
for its quotable opening line, ‘We are all Atlanticists now’.22 But what was 
the connection with international/global history? Th is interviewer attended 
the workshop, but never felt the connection with her own work. As Bernard 
Bailyn once put it, ‘Martine insists on doing the East Indies.’23 
Th e boundaries have broken down more since. We can now recognise 
each other as being part of the same enterprise: l’ histoire des deux Indes, if 
you will. Th at was not always the case.24 
National boundaries seem to have been reintroduced in Atlantic History, 
which defi es the purpose. 
Absolutely, partly because of volumes like Th e British Atlantic World, 
1500–1800, insisting that there is something British about it. We had 
thought, perhaps naïvely, that it might generate a series of volumes on 
the French Atlantic World, the Portuguese Atlantic World, the Dutch 
Atlantic World, etc. Happily, none of those happened, otherwise it could 
have been even more entrenched than it is. In some ways the cynics may 
be partly correct in saying that Atlantic History was a way of rescuing 
diff erent national historiographies by putting them in broader contexts. 
Early American history became Atlantic History, parts of early modern 
British History became Atlantic History, and the same happened with 
the early modern histories of other European countries that had overseas 
connections or empires.
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To do proper Atlantic History requires the knowledge of so many languages 
that is very diffi  cult for anyone to do that.
Yes, perhaps it can only be done as a collaborative enterprise. 
Were you infl uenced by Prof. Bernard Bailyn’s conceptualisation of Atlantic 
History? Bailyn fi rst outlined his ideas for the International Seminar on the 
History of the Atlantic World in the Itinerario interview of March 1996.25 
Absolutely, yes. I presented a paper at the International Seminar on the 
History of the Atlantic World at Harvard University in August 1997, i.e. 
the second year that the August seminar ran. I continued to attend the 
annual seminars until 2005. Although I was already making the turn 
towards international history, I consider the Atlantic seminars among the 
most fertile forcing-houses for historiographical innovation that I have 
ever been part of. Bailyn’s vision, ever expanding, ever deepening, was 
extraordinary to see unfold in the early years of the seminar. I was very 
privileged to have had a ringside seat for that.
What is your position with regard to FEEGI discussions about hemispheric 
history versus world history and European expansion versus world history?
My answer is twofold: 1) Th is is perhaps a trivial point, but I have not 
been directly engaged in discussions, face-to-face, with groups like 
FEEGI, to thrash them out. 2) To make a more substantial point, I 
am a great believer in letting at least 1,000 fl owers bloom. One should 
not be exclusive about these things. It all depends on the question you 
want to answer. Turning that around, the framework that you choose 
to bring to bear on your materials will generate new kinds of questions 
as well. Th ere is a reciprocity, a back and forth, between the problems 
and the methodologies available to solve them. Prescriptivism is death in 
these matters. One should not legislate for one approach or another. All 
approaches should be in play in order to generate the questions to open 
up the archives and to create the discussions that are necessary to solve 
particular problems. Th at is the only reasonable answer to that question.
It is also sitting on the fence a bit.
Yes, I always remember what David Lloyd George said of an opponent 
in the British House of Commons: ‘he has been sitting on the fence so 
long that the iron has entered his soul.’ I feel very much that way myself: 
uncomfortable yet implacable. 
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You say that international and global history has been at the forefront of 
your mind since your year at the Charles Warren Center. At Harvard, you 
fi nd yourself in good company: Niall Ferguson, Charles Maier and Emma 
Rothschild, to name a few, are extremely distinguished historians of empire.26 
Has the Harvard History Department gone global? Are we all global historians 
now? 
Th ose are two separate questions, but connected. Yes, what I have found 
most hospitable about the Harvard History Department is precisely its 
long-running commitment to international and global approaches. Th e 
two great innovators of International History were Ernest May and Akira 
Iriye, with more than seventy years of teaching at Harvard between them. 
Th ey had laid the groundwork for this approach with their own students 
for the broader tenor of the Department long before any of the recent 
generation of imperial historians was appointed.
But both May and Iriye did/do modern history.
Yes, both published on modern history, but both were also deeply learned 
in earlier periods. Most of their Ph.D. students did topics in nineteenth- 
and twentieth-century history, and therefore the fi eld could be identifi ed 
with that era to some extent. But there was never any hostility to earlier 
periods. Part of the raising of awareness about international and global 
history has been a breaching of chronological boundaries. For example, 
if we conceive of international history in terms of the interaction of both 
national and non-national histories, then before the great age of nation-
states, before the cementing of a regime of nation-states, all history was 
ipso facto transnational or international history. I would insist upon that. 
My colleagues in medieval history do as well. Pre-modern history (i.e. 
history before the late eighteenth century) is ipso facto, by defi nition, by 
its construction, a trans-national historiography, although it has only 
very recently been conceived of in those terms. Possibilities for dialogue 
with more self-conscious international/transnational/global historians are 
opening up, across chronological as well as geographical barriers. Th at is 
something the History Department at Harvard is very hospitable to—as 
are larger swathes of the historical profession, at least in the US. And a 
good thing too! Th at is something I am quite evangelical about. I am not 
on the fence about that at all.
To answer the larger question, are we all global historians now? No, 
not in the sense that we are all doing global history. We certainly are in 
the sense that all historians now have a global audience, thanks to the 
Internet. But in one strong sense we could say that we all have to be global 
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historians now. By that I mean, if you are not doing…. this formulation 
will get me into trouble, but let me nevertheless put it in these strong 
terms: if you are not doing an explicitly transnational, international or 
global project, you now have to explain why you are not. Th ere is now 
suffi  cient evidence from a suffi  ciently wide range of historiographies that 
these trans-national connections have been determinative, infl uential and 
shaping throughout recorded human history, for about as long as we know 
about it. Th e hegemony of national historiography is over. It used to be 
the case until very recently, let’s say ten years ago, that if you did not 
do national historiography, you had to tell other people why you were 
not doing national historiography. I would like to say the boot is now on 
the other foot. We now have to ask the national historians: why are you 
doing US history without the history of the hemisphere, the American 
empire, America’s relations with the wider world, the history of American 
emigration, the transnational circulation of ideas, whatever it may be? I 
think it is time for us to put the national historians on the defensive, to 
justify their choice of particular local, regional or national frameworks. 
I am putting that a little aggressively, but I also hope that it might be 
productive for those who work on smaller units, to justify to themselves 
why it is they choose them—apart from the inertia of the historical 
profession, that it has always been the case that one would take a town, a 
region or a nation-state as a focus of historical study. We need to be more 
refl exive about exactly why we choose those things, rather than the path-
dependency of historiographical activity. 
Th e irony is that many historians born and/or living in newly independent 
countries in the so-called Th ird World are doing national history. 
Yes, it is essential for them do so; it is essential for the public purposes of 
their historiography, because of the former suppression. It is absolutely 
essential for them to go through that stage. Is it essential for US or British 
historians to continue doing national history for the same reasons? Th ere is 
no equivalence there. If historians fi nd themselves in a post-imperial, not a 
post-colonial, situation and if they continue to write national history, then 
we have to ask why. Th ey need to justify why they are doing what they are 
doing, when there is so much evidence that the nation-state is a container 
at once too small and too large to encompass everything that we want to 
learn about the past. 
Does it not also depend on the audience historians are writing for? Historians 
have a duty towards society, their own societies, hence the predominance of 
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the nation-state in historical narratives. It feeds into national identity, any 
identity. Th at is what people are interested in. As an ideal, we should do 
global history. But we are all rooted in our local communities.
I agree. History has a public, indeed a civic function in that sense. But to 
take the example of the US, we now know from the latest census analyses 
that white descendants of Europeans are already in the minority.27 Th at 
necessarily changes the public and civic focus of US historians. Th ey 
should not continue to tell the story of the nation-state as the advance of 
European immigrants and the embedding of their institutions, but tell the 
full story, the diversity of the US in its connections with the wider world—
oceanic, hemispheric and global. So, yes, there will be conservatives who 
say ‘the national story should continue to be the story that has been told 
by the New England historians since the beginning of the nineteenth 
century.’ However, that story will increasingly lose an audience because 
that audience is dying off , and being replaced by a much more diverse 
audience, with a much greater consciousness of transnational connections, 
not least through their own family lives. 
Th e general public is mainly interested in genealogy and local history. Th at is 
what you see all around you, especially in the Boston area—lots of historic sites 
associated with the American Revolution. In order to keep in contact with the 
larger public, university-trained historians should have a feel for that, while 
showing at the same time the larger implications.
One of the impetuses behind my book on the US Declaration of 
Independence was precisely to show that this most American of American 
documents was fundamentally international, even global: if one could 
globalise the Declaration, then there was no reason not to globalise the rest 
of American history—by which I mean, as most of its practitioners mean, 
United-States-ian history. Even in its physical make-up the Declaration 
was an international object, printed by an Irishman, using a printing 
press and type imported from England. Moreover, he printed it on Dutch 
paper. Th ere were no paper manufacturers in British North America in 
the 1770s. Th e US would not become self-suffi  cient in paper production 
until the early nineteenth century. Even the paper the Declaration was 
written on had to be imported. Th e inkstand used to sign the manuscript 
was made of silver, not from the mines of Virginia, but probably from the 
mines of Peru. So it does not take very much to show the international 
connections, even in the Declaration’s physical fabric. 
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Th e Declaration of Independence: A Global History (2007) is now available 
in paperback. More importantly, it has been translated into Italian, French, 
Portuguese, Spanish and Japanese. A Chinese translation is underway. Does 
this make you a public historian? Was it your intention to speak to a wider 
audience? Th at book grew out of your forthcoming Foundations of Modern 
International Th ought. Did you ask Harvard University Press to publish one 
chapter as a separate book?
Oddly enough, it was actually my editor at Harvard University Press, 
Kathleen McDermott, who suggested the idea to me of doing a separate 
book, as something that could reach a wider audience. I was very happy 
to do that. I was quite bullish about taking a broader, international and 
global approach to early American history in general. Harvard University 
Press very generously, very wisely saw the potential for a book on that 
subject, a relatively short book that would bring that perspective to a wider 
audience. One of my great satisfactions is the way in which the book has 
been read by non-academic readers, including high school students. I have 
done a lot of talks to high school teachers, in particular about how to teach 
the American Revolution in wider contexts. Th at seems to be an important 
shift in the teaching of American history in American high schools.28 
Teachers have realised the necessity of taking a broader, cosmopolitan 
perspective to educate their students about the wider world that they are 
part of. For civic purposes, the national narrative is no longer suffi  cient for 
them. I am very proud indeed to have made a small contribution to that. I 
have the satisfaction of seeing my research go very quickly into classrooms 
across the US. 
Were there any negative reactions to your interpretation of the Declaration of 
Independence? 
Yes, it was written as a polemical work. I deliberately downplayed the 
importance of the Declaration’s second paragraph (i.e.‘self-evident 
truths’ and ‘inalienable rights’) because historically it has been much less 
important to the global context than the opening and closing paragraphs 
regarding the rights of peoples and ‘Free and Independent States.’ But 
I did get some pushback from American historians and Americanists, 
who claimed the book was unbalanced in not giving due attention to 
the importance of the second paragraph for American history itself.29 
But that work—placing the second paragraph into its larger, historical 
context—has been done as well as it is likely to be done by Pauline Maier 
in American Scripture (1998).30 Her book was a great inspiration to me. 
So I said to myself: ‘my job now is to place the whole document into 
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its international context in 1776 and beyond, and see what the evidence 
turns up.’ And the evidence was very decisively against the importance of 
the second paragraph. Th at did get me into some kind of trouble. Th e way 
that I tend to teach that, especially when I work with high school teachers, 
is to say: ‘it is important to remind your students that the promises of the 
second paragraph, the promises of individual rights, the broader promises 
of human rights, are always contestable and reversible, not something you 
can absolutely rely upon.’ One of our jobs as teachers is to encourage our 
students to make arguments in favour of those rights, not to assume that 
these rights will always be available to them or to anybody else. Come 
up with good arguments why this conception of rights, natural rights, 
rights perhaps derived from a divine source, rights derived from major 
foundational documents like the Declaration of Independence or the Bill 
of Rights are substantive and can be actionable, can protect you. How do 
you gain protection from that? Only by protecting the rights themselves, 
by being able to argue for them. My sceptical view of the second paragraph 
is very much intended to push in that kind of civic direction: to say, well, 
justify these arguments. Th ere are plenty of philosophers who say that the 
assumptions underpinning the second paragraph of the Declaration of 
Independence are, to put it mildly, not very robust. We may need to come 
up with better arguments in their favour. So what might those better 
arguments be, instead of the shorthand assumptions that Jeff erson built 
into the document? 
Do Harvard historians have a duty to speak to the general public? Many of 
your colleagues are writing in the big American newspapers, weekly magazines 
etc. Is it valued by the Harvard administration?
Maybe not a responsibility, but certainly an opportunity. Th e Harvard 
name does open doors. Th e inspiration provided by colleagues who have a 
public presence encourages one to rethink how to couch one’s scholarship 
to reach a wider audience. On the part of the administration, there is an 
expectation that one should speak to the widest possible audience. Th e 
EdX initiative may become important in this regard as well. Instead of 
having at most 1,000 students in a physical classroom at Harvard, it will 
now be possible to have tens of thousands of listeners and learners all 
around then world.
What will be History’s contribution to the joint MIT–Harvard EdX initiative? 
I was at a meeting a few days ago to discuss Harvard’s entry into the 
world of ‘massive open online courses’ (MOOCs). Th e very fi rst on-line 
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Humanities course to be off ered through EdX will be a course on Chinese 
history taught by my colleagues Peter Bol and Bill Kirby. Th ey are working 
on it right now. Th ere is a potential audience of over a billion in China 
alone. 
But there would seem to be a problem if the History contribution to EdX were 
nothing more than a Harvard History professor pontifi cating in front of a 
camera, expecting the world to watch in breathless admiration. 
Th at is true. Th at turns out to be very unappealing to an on-line audience. 
Th at is where the really interesting questions begin. We had a two-and-half 
hour discussion about this. How do you do what we do as interpretative, 
evaluative, qualitative scholars in that kind of scaled-up, massive 
on-line environment? It is fi ne for introductory courses in mathematics 
or computer science: almost all on-line courses so far have been of that 
kind. Th ey are introductory; they can easily be accessed by non-human 
assessors, through multiple-choice questions and machine-marking, for 
example. It really is a matter of advancing stage by stage from simple to 
more complex information. It does not involve evaluation or analysis of 
the materials. So the really interesting questions are: ‘How do we do what 
we do in that kind of environment? Is it even possible for us to do what 
we do in that kind of environment?’. Th at is one reason why Harvard and 
MIT are investing a large amount of money in the EdX initiative. It is a 
very good programme in the sense that Harvard, in particular, has said: 
‘Th is will not just be for the sciences and engineering; this will also be for 
the Humanities and Social Sciences.’ Harvard has now turned it over to all 
of us, asking: ‘Well, how will it be?’ ‘What kind of resources can Harvard 
put your disposal to create on-line the kind of analytical experiences that 
we value in our classrooms?’. Th ere are various possibilities, of course. It 
could mean digitising texts and physical objects, in order for students to 
zoom in and view and rotate them in three-dimensional space. It could 
mean allowing various kinds of on-line discussion, perhaps with off -site 
but on-line teaching assistants. Or it could be done through various kinds 
of peer advising and peer teaching, i.e. more-experienced students help 
less-experienced students in on-line discussion groups. Students who take 
an on-line course for some kind of credit become teachers for that course in 
due course. It is creating a wholly diff erent kind of teaching environment, 
and on an international and global scale. A professor who teaches a course 
on leadership at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard told 
us at the meeting on Wednesday that he had to rethink the course in 
light of the cross-cultural, international conceptions of what leadership 
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means, which he got back from the 10,000 students who were taking 
the course on-line. Th ey were feeding back very diff erent conceptions of 
leadership. He brought along a student from Serbia who was a graduate of 
the on-line course, who had come to Harvard to take a Master’s degree at 
the Kennedy School and is now teaching on the course here. Contact with 
actual, living subjects changed the way this professor taught the course at 
Harvard. Another participant said: ‘We now have a huge survey group for 
testing pedagogical innovation.’ You can try a new technique or module, 
and get immediate feedback from10,000 students, whether it works or 
does not. Th at can take years in a normal classroom. A third participant 
mentioned the possibilities for crowdsourcing in research, such as the 
Transcribe Bentham project in London, which uses non-academics to 
crowdsource scholarship itself. 31 Th at could come through courses as well, 
i.e. to have certain core texts or materials that people can use for research. 
It is possible to begin to imagine ways in which we can build in research 
and analytical experiences in on-line courses that are unimaginable in a 
classroom of between twenty and 120 students, but become conceivable 
when you are scaling up to 10,000 students. It could create very diff erent, 
novel, previously unimaginable ways of teaching and doing collective 
research, which are not possible in a small, classroom setting.
Is EdX going to be one of your priorities as Chair of the History Department 
at Harvard?
It cannot be formally a priority, because for the moment EdX is something 
the faculty do in their spare time. It is a non-profi t organisation, 
independent from both universities. Th e members of the board are senior 
administrators, including the presidents, provost and deans of both 
Harvard and MIT, etc. Right now, Harvard faculty members are asked 
to contribute pro bono and pro fama—they can become famous and reach 
a larger audience. However, there is no salary recognition for it. It is like 
writing a textbook, which you also do in your own time. Crucially, there 
is no business model for it yet. Nobody has fi gured out how to generate 
a revenue stream out of this kind of higher education. Until somebody 
works out how to do that, EdX may continue to be something that you 
do out of a passion to reach a larger audience and that the universities 
like Harvard, MIT and Stanford will undertake to expand their brand. 
Part of the down-side of these on-line courses is the drop-out rate: at best 
90 per cent, at worst 97 per cent, of the people who signed up do not see 
out the course until the very end. Th is is no reason not to press ahead: 
even if such a huge proportion of students do not make it the end of the 
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course—or, in most cases, even get past the beginning—thousands still 
may. As the best recent analysis of MIT’s fi rst on-line course concludes, 
‘the message for MOOCs has to be: disregard the dropouts and celebrate 
giving huge numbers of people access to free, high-quality, education.’32 
To retain students, smaller modules are being developed for EdX, i.e. 
four- to fi ve-week modules, rather than the thirteen to fourteen weeks of 
the Harvard teaching semester. So that is the question: how do you keep 
people’s attention, when they do not have regular class assignments, when 
they are not doing it for credit? In some cases, you can get a certifi cate 
of completion, but that does not have any credibility for employers as 
an academic qualifi cation, unless you can fi nd a way to make it more 
robust and, essentially, to sell those kinds of accreditation. It is not clear 
how you monetise this kind of higher education. Th ere are all kinds 
of questions, very interesting, fundamental questions. What are the 
university’s responsibilities towards a wider audience beyond its gates? 
How can faculty members reach out, under what circumstances, with 
what kind of encouragements? It is all fascinatingly up in the air. But this 
is just a tiny corner of the much bigger digital revolution that is taking 
place now. I am absolutely certain that we are in the midst of the single 
most transformative moment in academic life since the modern research 
university was created at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning 
of the twentieth century. In fi ve years’ time, the landscape is going to 
be unrecognisable. It is already becoming unrecognisable in fundamental 
ways.
You mean new formats of publishing, secondary literature with direct links 
to primary sources and other secondary literature, possibilities to annotate 
e-books on-line, etc? 
Of course: six diff erent layers of annotation, books themselves becoming 
wikifi ed, through their interactions with past scholarship and later 
readers. Th is is already happening, it is already here. Th at is where I feel 
very strongly that we have an agenda to follow. Th at is an agenda that I am 
already putting into place for the History Department at Harvard. I have 
set up a Digital Working Group for the Department. We have more than 
ten faculty members who are actively engaged in rethinking pedagogy and 
research, using digital tools and materials. I take that to be our major issue 
now: to publicise which is already going on in the Department—there 
is a huge amount of innovation in this area which is not as well known 
as it should be—and to equip all of our students and as many faculty as 
want to be equipped with these digital capacities, because they are rapidly 
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becoming essential for everything that we do. Some familiarity with how 
they operate is going to be as basic as philology was to a classical historian, 
for instance. We need to realise that this has already happened, but we 
are lucky to have some of the fi eld’s great innovators here at Harvard to 
give advice and inspiration.33 What we are doing now is playing catch-up. 
As one of participants of the Wednesday meeting [about EdX] put it, 
‘Putting together these large on-line courses now is rather like driving a 
very rapidly moving train, when you have to construct both the engine 
and carriages behind you and lay the track in front of you, at the same 
time as the train is moving 100 miles an hour.’ Th at is the way it is going 
in all areas now. I am absolutely convinced of that.
But that is a Western phenomenon, is it not? In his essay ‘Codex in Crisis,’ 
Anthony Grafton recalls that he was sitting in a ‘tin-roofed, incandescently 
hot West African internet café’ in 2005, trying to answer e-mail questions 
from his graduate students in the US. He could fi nd ‘ little high-end material 
on the screen, and neither, by the look of things, could [his] Beninese fellow 
users.’34
Th ere are digital divides within the US as well. As with any valuable resource, 
very rapidly inequalities kick in. We have to be aware of that. Th ere is a lot 
of discussion within, for instance, the digital community in the US about 
these inequalities of access and how digital access can overcome them to 
create more connected forms of public history and community history, 
to have history literally from the bottom up. For example, local groups 
crowdsourcing materials from their own communities, feeding them into 
on-line archives, where these can be supplemented by historians, but in 
a non-hierarchical relationship between professional historians and non-
professional people interested in history and with access to historical 
materials. Th at is great, but you are absolutely right: the conversation has 
to be expanded outside the wealthy heartlands of the digital world. In 
terms of academic institutions, we have immense computing power—
large amounts of money are being put behind it here. But that is not 
true everywhere, even within the relatively well-funded higher education 
system in the US. Most students and scholars do not have access to the 
full range of databases that exist behind high and costly pay-walls. So, 
yes, what about Benin, what about India, what about many other parts 
of the world, even Latin America, for instance: how will they get access 
to these tools and techniques? Th at is a question that goes beyond the 
capacity of academics, but that is a one that we have to consider in so 
far as the promise of the digital revolution is universal access to things 
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that had so far been allowed only to the privileged and accredited few. 
Open-access journals, creative-commons licences and the various eff orts 
to digitise vast numbers of books through the Internet Archive, Google 
Books, the Digital Public Library of America, the Europeana project, as 
well as national projects in countries such as France and Germany, will 
in time all help to create that universal access to the world’s knowledge.
Do you consider your work to have moral implications? Th e reason I am 
asking this is your contribution to a recent symposium in the journal Political 
Th eory (2011) on the work of the Canadian political theorist, James Tully. In 
your contribution, you appear to criticise Tully, a major defender of the rights 
of indigenous peoples, for ignoring ‘the tens of millions of people [in the global 
South] who still lack some of the most basic forms of human security.’ Should 
historians leave it to philosophers to consider these moral issues?35
It was certainly meant as a friendly provocation to Tully, very much in 
his own critical spirit, to say we should not settle with the boundaries 
of moral and political philosophy as we have inherited them; we should 
always be seeking to expand them, if we believe that there is any 
transformative potential whatsoever in our use of historical knowledge 
to enlighten contemporary society and open up new questions. I was 
pushing the boundaries of what he had done. His work has been absolutely 
fundamental, not just in Canada or North America, but more broadly in 
bringing indigenous rights to the centre of discussion in political theory. 
Th at is a huge achievement in itself. I was just pushing the logic of that 
further by saying: ‘So what about those people who cannot make claims 
within the context of settled and constitutionalised societies like Canada, 
the US or Australia, those for whom the struggle might not be about 
recognition, but for simple, bare human survival?’. How can this be made 
relevant to them? How can we think about other kinds of inequalities on 
a global scale which are parallel to and to some extent intersect with the 
kinds of inequalities which Tully himself was mapping in the context of a 
very large and very important set of communities, but only one congeries 
of communities on that global scale?
Should historians consider these questions as well? 
How can we not? It depends on your choice of topic, of course. But the 
topic I am working on at the moment, competing conceptions of civil 
war,36 is something that aff ects hundreds of thousands of people around 
the world, not just in Asia and Africa, but now in the Middle East as well. 
To ask about the boundaries of humanitarian law and civil law, to ask how 
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external powers should react to confl icts called civil war, this can literally 
be a case of life and death for tens of thousands of people, perhaps even 
millions of people. If one encounters a topic like that, I think there is a 
moral responsibility to consider the wider ramifi cations of one’s academic 
work. Anything that one writes may be taken up in these contexts. One 
therefore has a duty to get it right, to consider the potential implications, 
what uses it might be deployed for.
Finally, how might you defi ne the future of Intellectual History?
My answer is three-fold: 1) International/Global, 2) Longue Durée, and 
3) Digital, which facilitates 1) and 2). I have been writing recently on all 
three of these futures.37 In regard to all of them, my preference is for short 
books on big topics. Th ey are more readable; they have more of an impact. 
One can move more rapidly. At some point, somebody has to digest the 
fi ndings of the big books, to put them into a bigger picture. And to do 
that within the compass of, let’s say, between 30,000 words and 150,000 
words for a wider audience is absolutely essential if we are going to have 
any kind of impact. And also to do that in other fora. We are still talking 
in terms of the physical dimensions of the codex. Again, the Digital 
Revolution means that we are now writing in diff erent genres and reading 
in diff erent genres. Now, much of the most exciting stuff  that I read is in 
blog-posts, it is not in journals, to some extent it is not in monographs. 
Very rapidly moving, suggestive, deeply researched scholarship is coming 
out in very diff erent formats now. I joined Twitter recently: the amount 
of information, fabulous information, one can get from that is absolutely 
mind-boggling. I have learned an incredible amount from the links that 
people have put up—there’s very serious material to be found there if you 
follow the right people.
Th e problem is that in Britain they have not caught up with this. 
Of course, they have. Many of the people I follow are in Britain. Th ey put 
up links to the Folger Shakespeare Library, to the Institute of Historical 
Research, to digital projects at the University of London, etc, etc—an 
incredible amount of stuff . And much of the most important digital 
work is being undertaken by scholars in Britain: King’s College, London, 
has a Department of Digital Humanities, Oxford has an increasingly 
prominent and integrated programme in the fi eld, and the world’s largest 
digital archive of subaltern sources, the Old Bailey Online, comes out of 
three British universities.
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But none of this counts for the Research Excellence Framework (the United 
Kingdom’s regular process of academic assessment)!
Th is is the problem, a really interesting and critical problem. How do 
we evaluate digital scholarship in non-traditional formats? Th e American 
Historical Association—following the Modern Languages Association—
has just set up a committee to create protocols for evaluating digital 
scholarship.38 Th at is at least a start. Th at is one of the things that I have 
asked our Digital Working Group in the Department to do, to create 
standards for the evaluation of digital work for junior faculty, graduate 
students and undergraduates—we are likely to get increasing numbers of 
undergraduate theses that involve digital work. And we have no standards 
for evaluating that at the moment. In a year’s time, we have got to have 
them. Th at is a real imperative.
According to Neil Jeff eries, the Bodleian Library in Oxford will soon make 
its entire catalogue open-source, thus allowing scholars to make changes in the 
catalogue.39 But there is an incentive for people to do this only if they are going 
to receive some sort of recognition for it.
Not necessarily. Go to any rare books library in the US or Britain and you 
will often fi nd a slip of paper in the front of a book—or people have made 
annotations—about where extracts have been published, about other 
manuscripts, attributions, and so on. We always have had an informal 
version of that sharing of scholarly knowledge in and alongside the physical 
objects. But the planned changes in the on-line catalogue of the Bodleian 
Library will massively increase that possibility. Harvard Libraries have 
made available the meta-data on 12 million—12 million!—objects in 
the Harvard collections—manuscripts, books, physical materials, etc.40 
If you can wait a couple of hours, you can download the whole ZIP fi le 
of, basically, two-thirds of the library collection. And then the kinds 
of searches you can run on that, the way that you can manipulate that 
material… the sky’s the limit. It is up to you. Th at is all open-source 
now, that is all there. Th at is like being able to see inside the whole card 
catalogue all at once, but on a ten-fold scale.
Is there anything you would like to add to conclude our interview?
I am sorry that I do not have the standard stories of how I spent six months 
on a banana boat, chatting to the Indonesian crew. I have read a few of 
these Itinerario interviews: I am sorry I do not have more glamorous or 
romantic stories for you!
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I would however like to mention the Cambridge University Press series, 
Ideas in Context which I co-edit and about which I feel very strongly. 
Speaking of the future of intellectual history, we are pushing the series 
very much in the direction of doing more on imperial ideologies and 
global intellectual history. We just published Chris Bayly’s recent book 
on Indian liberalism: the hundredth volume in the series, symbolically to 
show a new direction for the series and for the fi eld of intellectual history 
as a whole.41 Chris talked about the fi rst glimmerings of this project in an 
Itinerario interview a few years ago.42 I am happy to link up to that. 
I am also convinced the next frontier for oceanic history is Pacifi c 
History. We are very glad to convene the conference at Harvard in 
November 2012. I think this will be the fi rst conference ever to take a 
truly pan-Pacifi c perspective. It will include scholars who work on the 
indigenous Pacifi c, the histories of Australia and New Zealand, the 
history of Asia, including China and Japan, and also the North-Pacifi c, 
Russia as well as the Americas. Th e participants will see the Pacifi c whole 
for the fi rst time, on the models of Atlantic History. We will need to fi gure 
out whether the models forged for Atlantic History have any relevance to 
an arena that is so much bigger, i.e. one-third of the earth’s surface, one-
sixth of humanity within its borders. Th e Pacifi c is a sea of islands—in 
the way that the Atlantic by and large is not—as well as a sea of rims 
and borders and connections. It is very exciting to see how that comes 
together. A volume should emerge from that by 2014, designed after the 
British Atlantic World volume.43 Th e conference is the workshop for the 
volume. 
It is important in terms of my global trajectory to say that I feel in some 
ways that I am repaying a debt to the Pacifi c world, and even carrying on 
my father’s legacy. I hold an honorary professorship at the University of 
Sydney in Australia, where I like to visit as often as I can. Th ere one sees 
the world from a very diff erent perspective, a Pacifi c perspective. I have 
also been lucky enough to have two extended visits to Japan in recent 
years as well, where one gains another Pacifi c perspective. Putting together 
those perspectives and the conversations about Pacifi c history that I have 
had in both Japan and Australia over the years, it seemed to me that this 
was a topic whose future had very much come. 
You asked earlier about the future of Atlantic History. I think one of 
the futures of Atlantic History is precisely joining it to other oceanic and 
trans-regional histories. Th at is part of the logic of what we discovered 
about the limits of Atlantic History: it can be too broad to encompass 
things but also too narrow to deal with trade fl ows, migration fl ows 
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and fl ows of goods and ideas. We need to think about the interrelations 
between these oceanic arenas and how in some sense they add up to a 
global or proto-global history. And there I end! 
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Lessons from African History: between the 
deep and the shallow ends of social theory 
and historical empiricism. Interview with 
Frederick Cooper
In the fi rst week of December 2013, Fred Cooper was in Leiden to participate 
in the conference ‘South Asia and the long 1930s: appropriations and 
afterlives.’1 Iva Peša and Alicia Schrikker caught him on the day that he was 
giving a public lecture on his current work, entitled Beyond Empire: France 
and French Africa in the Post-World War II Context. Th e interview took 
place in the chilly mediaeval dungeons of Leiden, now one of the more fancy 
conference locations of the university in the historic city centre. Fred Cooper 
is well known for his work on African history and his studies of colonialism 
and empire. 
Your early work was on Eastern Africa. How did you become interested in 
the region?
Well, going back to the beginnings... I studied African history because 
of the Vietnam War, paradoxical as that may sound. Th is was in the late 
1960s when the Vietnam War was a hot topic and a source of mobilisation 
amongst the students, certainly at Stanford University in California where 
I was studying. I naïvely thought that Southeast Asia was becoming a 
total mess because of American imperialism. South America was a mess 
because of its class system, but Africa seemed open, with a future ahead of 
it. Young leaders there were taking the initiative on behalf of their nations 
who had come out from under the yoke of colonialism. By the time I got 
halfway through my fi rst course on African politics I learned that this was 
a very naïve perspective, that Africa was constrained like any other part of 
the world. But by then I was hooked. 
So that is how I started out as an undergraduate in the late 1960s, and 
my interest in Africa has not stopped ever since. Th e work I am doing 
now focuses on open political possibilities and the way these get narrowed 
down over the course of confl icts over the consolidation of power in certain 
regimes. But there is always the chance that these political possibilities 
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might open up again. Ever since the late 1960s, I have been interested 
in exploring these possibilities and constraints at diff erent historical 
moments in Africa.
So when did you fi rst travel to Africa? Was it while you were an undergraduate 
student? We read in one of your articles that you spent a year at the University 
in Nairobi in the late 1970s.
My fi rst trip to Africa was in 1970 after my fi rst year in graduate school, 
so I was committed to African history before I had seen the place. I went 
back for dissertation research a couple of years later and back again in 
the late 1970s. Th e fi rst time I was mostly on the Kenyan coast doing 
fi eldwork and archival research. Th e second time I was mostly in Nairobi 
working in the archives; but I also spent much time at the university.
Th e 1970s was an interesting time to be there. Th ere was a very lively 
academic community among historians, and in particular among political 
scientists. Th is was just after Jomo Kenyatta had died and people hoped 
vainly, as it turned out correctly, that there would be an opening in Kenyan 
politics. When I was there the writer Ngũgĩ wa Th iong’o2 was released 
from detention. I was there when he made his speech to the students and 
faculty at the university after he came out. Th ere was a sense of an opening 
occurring. Over the course of the early 1980s, the Moi regime3 cracked 
down on universities. Th is resulted in professors being detained and 
student demonstrations being broken up. Again, constraints outweighed 
possibilities. But in 1978–79, when I was there, that was an exciting time. 
What became known in Africanist circles as the Kenya debate began 
in that period.4 Left-wing political scientists and historians tried to 
conceptualisze the relationship of the Kenyan state to capitalism. Th ose 
were intellectually very stimulating times to be in Africa. 
But this did not lead to disappointment? You say you kept returning to the 
themes of openings and constraints.
I think these are continuous tensions. Kenyan politics has been in a diffi  cult 
situation pretty much ever since the late 1970s. Th ere have been periods 
of hope, certainly when Moi fi nally quit the presidency, and during some 
of the elections. But then the 2007 election was clearly rigged. Th ere was 
cheating going on and very few people had confi dence that the outcome 
represented the real choice of the Kenyan people. After the last elections, 
many people were disappointed with the results, given the involvement of 
the leading candidates with the confl ict and, as a result, violence ensued. 
On the other hand, people still try, and there are Kenyans who have been 
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trying to open up politics. Th ere have been people of strong will and good 
conscience, genuine democrats. So that is why one cannot give up.
Since the 1980s, I have been doing my research in Senegal. Senegal has 
had two elections in which the incumbent lost and accepted his defeat, in 
2000 and 2012. So politics and citizenship in Africa has not disappeared. 
What these governments have yet to demonstrate is what they can do 
with the mandate that they have gotten from the electoral process. Th at 
is what remains to be seen. But real citizenship mobilizations in African 
countries have never really stopped. Th ere have been periods during which 
they have been eclipsed, but they have never disappeared from the scene 
entirely.
You mention Senegal; this has become a second regional specialisation of yours. 
When and why did you become interested in Senegal? 
It came out of a sequence of historical projects. My earlier research was on 
slavery, slave emancipation and agriculture in coastal Kenya and Zanzibar. 
I wrote a couple of books coming out of that research.5 Th en the research 
I was doing in the late 1970s was on dockworkers in Mombasa, and after 
fi nishing that project, or really before I had fi nished writing that book,6 I 
came to the realization that even doing a micro history—there were only 
about 4,000 dock workers in Mombasa; it is a history of a small number of 
people—what shaped that history could not be limited to Mombasa. One 
important side of that history was the imperial actors, and for the people 
in London Mombasa was a very small part of a very big empire, and this 
infl uenced their perspective on how the colonial government should act 
and how to change its policy. 
Th at book was really about a considerable change in labour policy. 
But the overall perspective of one set of actors was very much at the 
level of empire, whereas another set of actors, people in Mombasa, had a 
very diff erent framework in which they were thinking—not necessarily 
confi ned to the local area, but quite a diff erent one. 
By the mid-1980s or even the early 1980s, when the book was still 
in gestation, I was thinking that the pendulum in African history had 
swung so far away from looking at anything colonial. It was so much 
focused on doing a history that was indigenous that one was actually not 
able to understand fundamental elements of how the history was actually 
unfolding and that one had to do both [indigenous and colonial history]. 
And having been very much part of a movement towards a very African 
approach to African history, I increasingly came to see that this had to 
be complemented by studying the shifting nature of colonialism in more 
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complexity and not to see it just as a background, a force against which 
people were pushing, but as something that is itself historically shaped 
and changing.
And that is how I started thinking about African responses to 
colonialism and colonial responses to African mobilization. When I tried 
to fi gure out how to go further in that kind of a project I did not want to 
get stuck in assuming that the British colonial thinking could stand in for 
colonial thinking in general. I did not have the linguistic capacity to do 
everything, but I did have a good knowledge of French, and France and 
Britain were the two biggest colonial powers in Africa, so the next phase 
of what I wanted to do was to do a comparative study. 
I wanted to study labour and development together and I pretty much 
did that. In the end the focus became more on the labour side, so I ended 
up writing a comparative study of labour and decolonization in French 
and British Africa, which was published in 1996.7 I had done a lot of 
research in British Africa—in Kenya—and sources in Great Britain, so 
what I had to do was to bring my work on French Africa to a comparable 
level and so I spent a lot of time doing research in France and Senegal. 
And since then, that has been the axis of my research. I have continued 
to work on this and what I have done recently is specifi cally on French 
Africa.
Can you enlighten us more about the art of doing comparative history? Did 
you fi nd it problematic to work with such diff erent sets of written sources, oral 
traditions, and memories? How did you approach your material? For instance, 
we imagine that your ideas and questions had been shaped already by what 
you had read in the British archives or in Kenya.
At the most abstract level of methodology the problem is quite simple. 
It is similar for historians all over the world. It comes down to a critical 
analysis of your sources. Both oral and written sources have to be read in 
the context in which they were produced, read in a way that is sensitive 
not only to what one’s line is at the time, but to what arguments were in 
their own time, to see the framework in which people were operating. Th e 
big danger is always to follow one thread as if it were the only possible 
course of history and not to deal with alternatives that people tried to 
pursue. So at that level of abstraction the methodology is similar, whether 
you do British or French or Asian history.
But there are a lot of specifi cs; there is a lot of detail. You have to fi nd 
out how archives are organized, and that varies not only by colonizing 
party, but it varies according to individual archives. And in some archives 
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it is very hard to get to what you want. Archives are not necessarily obvious 
in the way you have to get through to the material you need. And so I had 
to learn again. But I got a lot of help; lots of people were there before 
me and people were generous in providing advice, and I got quite early 
several Senegalese historians who tutored me in the nature of historical 
scholarship in Senegal, particularly Mamadou Diouf,8 Mohammed 
Mbodj,9 and Babacar Fall,10 all of whom I saw a great deal of when I was 
in Dakar for the fi rst time in 1986. And I have been in touch with them 
ever since.
Do you think that there are certain topics that lend themselves better to 
parallels, perhaps across space or time, than others?
Of course, it is important to realize that not all topics lend themselves 
to parallels. But I think that it is important to have a certain empirical 
openness to it. If you suspect connections, do they exist? Are people 
talking to each other; are they reading each other’s work? Which places 
are connected to which? 
You do not want to start with assumptions that some topics produce 
parallels and others do not, because then you can fi nd parallels only where 
you are looking for them. Th ese types of questions certainly come up 
when you are studying political movements that take place at the same 
time in diff erent parts of the globe: are they connected or are they not? I 
think that one needs to be open to look for connections, but not presume 
them. At the same time, one should not presume that particular politics 
are self-contained, because they might turn out not to be.
You have been successful in linking these specifi c empirical case studies to a 
broader theoretical framework. What you have been telling us just now, about 
issues of capitalism, citizenship, seeing these through the micro case of perhaps 
the 4,000 workers in Mombasa, how do you link the specifi c to the more 
general?
Well, I think there is an interplay between issues of theory and issues of 
historical practice, and I have always been interested in social theory. I 
started doing bits and pieces of it as an undergraduate, and one of the 
virtues of the American undergraduate education system is that you do 
not just do one subject. So as a history major I did a fair bit of political 
science and anthropology. I continued to do some of that in graduate 
school as well. I then started to read more and more, in particular Marx. 
So as an undergraduate, I was not just taking African history, but I 
was also taking European and US history. I was particularly infl uenced 
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by a course I took on the history of the American South. Th is was in the 
late 1960s, when scholarship on slavery in the US got really interesting. 
People like Eugene Genovese,11 whose early work was published at the 
time, and Professor David Potter had us read this kind of work and read 
C. Vann Woodward’s brilliant book about reconstruction after the war—
about slave emancipation and what happened after that.12 So eventually, 
after a couple of years in graduate school, I started my Ph.D. dissertation 
about slavery. I already knew some of the literature on slavery in other 
parts of the world and at that time the slavery topic—the study of slavery 
in Africa—barely existed. A whole bunch of work came out in the 1970s, 
but when I started there was very little. 
So, I was very much infl uenced by the study of a topic, slavery, in a 
completely diff erent context, that of the cotton-growing South and the 
sugar-growing Caribbean islands. So right from the start, my thesis was 
comparative, and that was really the result of the kind of education I had, 
and particularly that the system in which I was educated encouraged us to 
study more than one thing. What I did was to keep pursuing that in one 
way or another, and I spent a lot of years working in the slavery fi eld and 
keeping in touch with the literature in diff erent parts of the world, and 
with more theoretical material that kept coming out and which eventually 
I was contributing to. 
Once I got on to a diff erent topic, I repeated, in a way, what I had done 
as a younger student, and I tried to read about that topic in other parts of 
the world. When I did that project on dockworkers in Mombasa, I read 
everything I could at the time on dockworkers in other parts of the world, 
which was actually not very much. It has since been quite a lot. In fact, a 
number of years ago I went to a conference at the International Institute 
for Social History (IISH) in Amsterdam about the comparative history of 
dockworkers, which has since produced two quite fat volumes.13 
But that also got me into theoretical work—or this was even earlier, 
when I was doing work on post-emancipation and agriculture in Zanzibar 
and coastal Kenya. Th at is when I got very interested in the Marxist 
analysis of agricultural transformation, partly because there was a lot of 
implicit Marxism in the British colonial offi  ce of people who understood 
something about what it took to make a wage labour economy and they 
could not get their way. Th ey could not do what they wanted to do, and 
that poses the questions in a very interesting way—in the way that we 
cannot write the history of capitalism by studying England or Germany or 
even more recently Japan, where we see the transformation going forward 
quite radically. 
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We have to see what happens when people try to push the economy 
in a capitalist direction but it does not get there. We have to have the 
negative side or otherwise the positive side does not mean a whole lot. 
So the theoretical approach seems to me important as a two-way street 
both in getting insight into a certain body of empirical material I was 
generating through research in archives and interviews, but also in using 
empirical research to interrogate the theory and see how one can think 
in richer terms theoretically. So that was the work I was doing from my 
second book, which was on post-emancipation agriculture in East Africa, 
through to the dockworkers book, and the comparative study of labour 
in French and British Africa. All were very much infl ected by theoretical 
work on the nature of capitalism.14 
How does your work with Ann Stoler fi t in this picture?
Th at project in turn developed into a more specifi c engagement with 
colonialism. I was not trying to reduce colonialism to a narrative about 
capitalism, because I do not think that reduction works. But I was trying 
to think of colonial societies as an object of analysis in and of themselves. 
Both Marxist and other approaches and recent theoretical models coming 
out of South Asian scholarship are all relevant to such a view. It was at 
that time that I met Ann Stoler, an anthropologist whose fi rst work was 
on Sumatra and who worked on agriculture as well.15 And we realized that 
we had written very similarly-framed books, with mine on East African 
agriculture and Ann’s on plantations in Sumatra, and both of us had 
moved in the same direction. 
Th e puzzle we were left with was the colonial side of the picture. So that is 
when we started to compare notes, to develop a project and to have these 
conferences about history and anthropology. It took years to organize and 
it took years to digest. Eventually we fi rst published some of the papers in 
the American Ethnologist,16 and then we decided to put together a rather 
diff erent collection of essays, and that became Tensions of Empire.17 But 
what we were doing later was trying to develop a research agenda and ways 
of posing problems about the history and anthropology of colonialism. 
We were doing this while I was simultaneously working on the book 
on the comparative study of labour and decolonization, which became 
Decolonization and African Society. So, I was doing this project with Ann 
Stoler, which was very much oriented towards theory and conceptual 
issues, and I was doing my empirical work at the same time. And this was 
producing two very diff erent kinds of writing, diff erent kinds of books. 
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Doing these two at the same time was mutually informative; it fed 
both ways, and certainly the fact that both Ann and I have a commitment 
to doing empirical work kept us from going off  the theoretical deep end. 
We wanted to deal with concepts that were useful and not to write about 
abstractions in relationship to other abstractions. On the other hand, 
you can go off  an empirical shallow end and pretend that facts speak for 
themselves, which they of course do not. So, the interplay of the two I 
found very fruitful. 
Th is reminds us of your introduction to your Colonialism in Question, where 
you discuss the problem of concepts starting to live a life of their own. When we 
were preparing this interview, we were thinking, where should we place Fred 
Cooper, if we were to label him? Of course, we know that this is something 
that you are very much against, but still… How should we label you? Where 
do you fi t in? 
I think you are right, as regards labelling. Th ere is no purpose to be served 
by labelling me. I am certainly infl uenced by Marxist theory, but it is a 
particular thread of Marx, very diff erent from what other people who 
consider themselves Marxists would do. And I was very much infl uenced 
by a lot of people besides Marx. But I haven’t given up on the relevance 
of the Marxist analysis and capitalism. I think it is still highly useful as a 
start of investigation.
I think one of the important lessons that you see when doing the history 
of diff erent parts of the world is that people push back. And that invoking 
capitalism doesn’t mean you’ve got it. Th ere may be some mechanisms 
that operate with some human understanding, but go beyond it—beyond 
an understanding of what is going on. But identifying their importance 
is not the same as seeing them as the truth. And going in that direction 
leaves room for empirical analysis, but that kind of thought does not leave 
you with empiricism that is empty of other kinds of considerations. 
So one of the diffi  cult questions is, then, the scale on which you analyse 
phenomena. On the one hand you have very good reasons to follow what 
European historians have called microhistoire, but on the other hand you 
have people who talk about global history, whereas most history occurs 
somewhere in between the two. Th e microhistorians are more likely to 
recognize that, but a lot of the talk about global history actually misses 
that point, that connection. Th e more interesting and more diffi  cult task 
is to fi nd ways to deal with historical processes that are big but fi nite, to 
see how the actions operate in diff erent parts of the world. Th at is a study 
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of the limitations of the exercise of power, as much as it is a study of the 
extent of the deployment of that power.
Does this mean that you would rather not call yourself a global historian? 
Would you rather opt for historian of Africa? 
I think in one sense we are all global historians; but then to say that we 
are all global historians doesn’t mean very much. Th e term is used in two 
senses. One is that the framework of history is global, and that that is the 
only framework and everything is on a global level. And that is basically 
not true. Th e other one is true, which is that most histories connect two 
or more places. And it is in that sense that everybody is a global historian. 
But you can also say that everybody is a historian. So I would not identify 
myself as a global historian, but I am certainly interested in being a 
historian of connections, connections across space among others. And I 
am interested in both the limits and the extent of these connections. 
As far as being an African historian, I remain true to that endeavor. 
I am perfectly well aware that Africa, America, Europe and Asia are all 
problematic constructs, but they are constructs that people live with 
and that are important for people’s lives. I think one can be aware of the 
constructed and problematic nature of these concepts, whilst still sharing 
the use of them. Th e area concept, whether it is African, South Asian, East 
Asian or whatever, remains very useful. It is important to know something 
about some place. Th e way I think about the history of other parts of 
the world outside Africa is very much shaped by my being a historian of 
Africa. 
I have worked with Jane Burbank, who is a historian of Russia who 
thinks about empire in a quite diff erent way than I do, coming from 
a diff erent place, and I think that makes collaboration particularly 
interesting.18 An important thing for people at the earlier stages of their 
career to consider is that it really helps to start with your feet on the ground. 
It is very hard to do research that covers long distances. Certain research 
has to, but you can actually use micro-historical methods to study macro-
historical processes. But what is important is to know something about 
some place. Th at place may be in motion and there may be problems in 
doing research that traces the motion, because the researcher has to move 
too. But the best argument for area studies is the one that goes back to 
its early days, namely that one has to know something about some place. 
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For you, the level of empire has proven a fruitful unit of study, more than the 
nation state or globalization or the microstudy?
Yes, empire works better for me than any of the ones which you just named, 
but still it poses a limited set of questions. One should not pretend that 
it is a new framework that is going to replace other frameworks. I came 
to the study of empire with a couple of new perspectives in mind. One of 
them quite directly was that I found the analysis of colonialism, colonial 
studies, very interesting, but it had reached its limits. Th e colonial unit of 
study, which posits a strong dichotomy between metropole and colony, has 
limitations within itself (and this is one of the themes of Empires in World 
History). But it has further limitations in that the spectrum of imperial 
power itself is much wider than the colonial form. 
Th e construction of colonial empires at the end of the nineteenth 
century existed in parallel with other forms of empire, such as the 
Ottoman Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, etc. All of these were 
coexisting in the nineteenth century and some of them had very long 
histories. Th e Ottoman Empire goes back to the fourteenth century, etc. 
And one doesn’t want to narrow the spectrum from the start. And a great 
deal of very interesting work that has been done is limited in focus on the 
Western European empires of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
Now I think in the last ten years this has changed. Th ere has been a 
great deal of scholarly interest in diff erent empires. Jane Burbank draws 
on a lot of this scholarship. One of the very specifi c moves we made was 
to emphasize that broader category of empire, broader than the Western 
European colonial empire, and emphasizing the fact that they coexist. 
Th ere is an interplay between them; it is not that one is a successor of the 
other. And there are new forms of empire too, the Nazi, Soviet, and the 
Japanese, these are all diff erent forms of imperial power. So all of these 
need to be analysed in relationship to each other. 
Th at said, one has to talk about limitations. Now some argument about 
the nature of limitations is internal to the discussion on empires. Empires 
are big but they are fi nite. Th ey exist in relation to the places that empires 
try to incorporate, but these push back; and they exist in relationship to 
other empires, which prevents infi nite expansion. And they have all sorts 
of complications in how you run an enterprise that is big but spread out 
and has all kinds of counterforces and people who resist in very diff erent 
ways. So, the logic of empire is about expansion and it is about power, it 
is about long-distance reach. But it is also about the limitations to all of 
those. 
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Th en the topic is limited in another sense, in that empire should not be 
seen as determinate of all long-distance relations. A trading relationship 
may develop in the context of empire, but it cannot be reduced to the 
study of empire. Ideas may have imperial circuits, through acculturation 
or through the movement of people in an imperial context, but ideas also 
cross imperial lines and some of them may long outlive the empire. Just 
to take one example, early Islam is very much an imperial project, the 
caliphates were very much an imperial structure, but you cannot talk of 
the history of Islam as the history of empire. It transcends that, although 
it is very much connected to it. Even within the context of the caliphates 
and the Ottoman Empire, one cannot reduce the history of Islam to the 
history of empire. Each has to be studied in its own way. 
And I think you can say that, too, about a lot of networks. Th ere is 
a real tension in the way in which you write history between how you 
write the history of world economic relations and the history of empire. 
You cannot reduce one to the other, and that goes in both directions. You 
don’t want to subordinate the history of empires to the history of global 
economy. Th at doesn’t work, and it certainly doesn’t work in the opposite 
direction. 
If you are going to have a comprehensive history of processes that 
connect the world, you have to do this along diff erent lines. One line 
might tell you a lot, but it is not going to tell you everything that you need 
to know. I think the empire perspective has told us a lot, but I don’t think 
that one should be under the illusion that this is the law of all historical 
practice.
Going back to African history and global parallels and connections—you told 
us at the beginning that you were inspired by historiography of the American 
South to study slavery in Eastern Africa. What does African history have to 
off er for historical practice elsewhere?
Well, you cannot understand capitalism if you don’t understand capitalism 
in relation to Africa. Th at is true in relation to all the obstacles that people 
encounter in relation to capitalist action in Africa, and it is also true in 
relation to the rise of the slave trade in relation to the rise of the Atlantic 
economy. So you can’t study that without studying Africa. Th ere are a 
number of other ways in which it comes into diff erent kinds of history. 
Can you understand the twentieth-century world without understanding 
the diff erent kinds of politics in colonial situations, of which Africa is an 
important example, but so, too, are India and Indonesia? 
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One can come back to an argument which was very important to 
Leopold Senghor, both in his earlier writings about negritude and in his 
political writings from the 1950s. If you want to consider the way the 
world is, you have to consider multiple civilizations, and none of these 
civilizations exists in isolation.19 Now, the word civilization is in some 
ways problematic. But what is not problematic is that history is not the 
history of isolated populations; it’s an interactive history throughout, and 
all parts of the world are important in that. Nothing is determined by the 
course of a particular history. In that sense there is no European history, 
there is no African history; there are Euro-African histories and there 
are Afro-Asian histories. And if you are going to take that perspective 
seriously, then one has to study all parts of the world. We can’t do original 
research in all parts of the world, but one has to be sensitive to the fact that 
history is interactive in all parts of the world. Th ere is no pristine history; 
one should not see history as something that one possesses. And certainly, 
the study of Africa helps remind people of that.
I like your idea that studying capitalism in places that are not considered as 
being at the centre of capitalism can teach us more about capitalism itself than 
studying investors in Manhattan. Joan Robinson said that ‘the only thing 
worse than being exploited by capitalism is not being exploited at all.’
Well, that tells you a lot about African history.
What stands out from what you have been telling us so far is that you are very 
good at choosing unfashionable topics, such as colonialism in the 1980s. But 
another thing that strikes from your Colonialism in Question is that you 
dislike research that is led by historical ‘schools’—for example, people who say 
that ‘we are now all “cultural turn” and we are turning that way.’
I don’t like choosing what I am going to do based on the fact of going against 
the grain—or following it for that matter. I certainly have been infl uenced 
by trends in historical scholarship. I started out very much infl uenced by 
scholarship on slavery. Particularly people like Eugene Genovese,20 David 
Brion Davis,21 Emilia Viotti da Costa22—people who were very much at 
the centre of a historical trend when I started out. So being infl uenced 
by what other people are doing is perfectly fi ne, the question is what one 
does next—whether you want to jump on a bandwagon because it’s a 
bandwagon, or to see where it takes you and to jump off  when the time 
has come to jump off  it. 
And that’s why I don’t like the concept of ‘cultural turn,’ or even 
‘imperial turn,’ although in a way one could easily classify my work as 
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‘imperial turn,’ because I work on empire. And I think Ann Stoler and I 
started to write about colonialism a little before other people started to do 
it, but other people were doing it for reasons that had absolutely nothing 
to do with Ann and me. Th ey were doing it because it was interesting. 
But the idea that everybody should be moving in one direction I fi nd 
rather frightening.23 And people complain that the only topics students 
want to do with regard to French history or British history have to do with 
empire. Th ere are a lot of interesting topics with regards to French and 
British history, and if one wants to interrogate what ‘French’ and ‘British’ 
actually mean, that is quite useful. But one can do that in all sorts of ways. 
It is certainly not a good idea for everybody to do everything 
simultaneously. Because, for example, the notion of a ‘cultural turn’ was a 
reaction to people going into excess in seeing social and economic history 
as the type of history everybody should be doing. And then some people 
said, let’s go beyond the cultural turn. In some ways people were saying, 
well let’s go back to do the kinds of things that used to be done to excess, 
but let’s do them again. 
Well, let’s do good history, and whether that is cultural, social, 
economic, or intellectual, those are not particularly interesting categories. 
Th ere are no reasons to keep turning from one to the other. Th e only 
reason why one turns in one direction is because one previously turned in 
another direction, I think. And this is particularly striking to a scholar of 
Africa, where our colleagues have worked under considerable constraint 
both material and political.
Here we are in Western Europe or the United States, where we have 
an incredible amount of freedom to say what we want to say and do the 
kinds of research we want to do. We should take advantage of that, and we 
shouldn’t impose conformity on ourselves as academics. Yet I think that 
there is a very strong tendency in academia towards conformity, despite 
the fact that we are not constrained to conform.
So far we have spoken about your research and writing, but part of your work 
also involves teaching, in New York and presumably in Africa?
I’ve done some short teaching in Africa. I have given talks and lectures in 
Africa, but I have never taught a course. Th e kind of job I have had was 
typical of American professors; it involved both researching and teaching, 
and it did not involve a sharp separation between the two. It is, in a way, 
a very privileged position, in that it is very fruitful. Being a teacher forces 
you to think about how you can explain something to people who don’t 
know anything about the topic. As a researcher you might write things for 
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the ten people who are closest to what you do in terms of research; as a 
teacher you can’t do that. 
Th e book that Jane Burbank and I did on empires came out of 
teaching. Th e course was not a consequence of the book project; the book 
was a consequence of the course. It is a two-way street and I think that 
is a fruitful connection. In fact, I like ideas to come from the students. I 
do not like to lean on students to do particular kinds of projects. When 
teaching I like to react to what they propose. Th e structures that exist in 
some countries of separating the research track from the teaching track is 
not a very good idea in my opinion. 
In relation to African academia, you were mentioning that the 1970s was 
an exciting period and you have been going back since, giving talks, etc. Do 
you think that digitization and globalization of scholarship impacts African 
academia in a positive way?
Th e heyday in the fi eld of African history was certainly in the 1960s and 
1970s. Th ere are real strong eff orts to bring this back. Th e organization 
CODESRIA [Council for the Development of Social Science Research in 
Africa] has been trying since the 1980s to do that. It is a diffi  cult struggle, 
because of funding reasons and also politics. South African universities 
have become strong and have attracted faculty members from other 
African countries, but it’s an on-going struggle. 
Digitization has potential. After all, it is very hard to duplicate a 
library, while it is not so hard to set up a computer with access to digital 
resources from elsewhere. It requires the right equipment, but also 
involves intellectual property rights. Th e technical side is feasible; the big 
obstacle is the copyright. Also the owners of the rights of dissemination of 
publications insist that they get their cut and that others do not get them. 
It is a real problem that most African libraries have few means. It is for this 
reason that I support Open Access. 
What are your plans for the future?
Well I have had two books coming out in 2014. One is this one I have 
been working on for twelve or thirteen years on citizenship in France and 
French Africa from 1945 to 1960, and then another one that is a series of 
lectures that are basically a refl ection on Africa and the world. Th at is the 
title of the book and also the title of the lectures that I gave at Harvard a 
few years ago.24 After that, the next big project I think I will do is a book 
about the end of empires, with a question mark. 
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‘Being speculative is better than to not do it 
at all’: Interview with Natalie Zemon Davis
Jessica Roitman and Karwan Fatah-Black meet Natalie Zemon Davis outside 
the University Library in Leiden for lunch and an interview. Although Davis 
is eager to study a Sranan-German dictionary she retrieved from the library 
the three of them sit down for an engaging conversation on the historian’s craft, 
its societal relevance and the future of early modern studies. Jessica laments 
that she discovered what she thought was an incredibly original idea for her 
dissertation—Sephardic intercultural trade—was already being done by Yale 
historian Francesca Trivellato.1
Th at happened to me, too. Some fi fty years ago, I wrote an essay on 
the French charivari. At the time I did it, as far as I knew, there was no 
literature on it. Th is was partly because charivari seemed very folkloric, 
and to the French, folklore was still associated with the Vichy regime. It 
seemed to them like a fascist topic, so historians stayed away from it for 
quite a while after the war. In fact, I found out much later that one of the 
only articles discussing charivari was in a Vichy-sponsored publication 
called Études agricoles. It was actually a good article on rural folklore—
ethnographic rather than historical. Anyway, I sent my charivari essay to 
Past & Present. Th is was around 1970, right after 1968, when I had been 
in Berkeley during all the student uprisings and political action. I got a 
letter back from E.P. Th ompson, whom I had not yet met, but whose work 
of course I knew, saying: ‘I was absolutely delighted to receive your paper 
on the Reasons of Misrule. I have myself been working for some time on 
a short study of “rough music” (our version of charivari.).’ I didn’t mind. 
I thought, ‘Th at’s great!’ And he was doing it in England and I was doing 
it in France and we had diff erent takes on the subject. But these things 
happen because there’s something in the air . . . 
Th e Zeitgeist?
Yes, if you will. Political events, cultural problems at the time, current 
styles of action along with the issues being raised in one’s scholarly fi eld—
these lead attentive people like yourself and Francesca, or like me and 
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Th ompson to ask the same questions. In our case, you can sort of see the 
political trajectories at work—the world was being turned upside down 
around us—though I was maybe more into the New Left than he. But 
this kind of mutual discovery happens and it’s even a good sign. 
When I joined the Renaissance Society of America (RSA) in the 1950s, 
we were a little bitty group. Now there are 4,000 members. Th ey come 
from all over to the meetings—three thousand people just attended the 
most recent one in New York. I think it’s really important for Renaissance 
scholars to situate themselves in a non-European space some of the time. 
Some of the young people are doing this: I went to some very exciting 
sessions on Christian-Muslim relations—looking at both Latin and Arabic 
texts and exchanges. And though I didn’t get to hear them, the papers on 
Jewish–Christian relations also seemed to be expanding the very concept 
of the Renaissance world. But many sessions were on traditional themes 
being discussed for decades—say, Florentine poetry. Fine—do Florentine 
poetry! I’m sure these papers were excellent. But at this juncture, don’t 
think about the world as if it were only Florence or only Italy. Young 
people are doing this now—working on, say, Italy and Africa. But even 
if you don’t do Italy and Africa, you can bring a wider mentality to your 
poetry—and who knows what surprises you might fi nd, even while you’re 
reading the very same texts. 
In 2001 I was planning a book with a chapter on the Muslim Leo 
Africanus, a chapter on Stedman and the slave Joanna, and a chapter on 
the Suriname Jew David Nassy, all of them examples of people between 
worlds. Th en 9/11 happens. I said to myself: ‘I’m just going to do this book 
on Leo Africanus.’ I didn’t publish it until 2006 because I had a huge 
amount of research to do. I did a lot more work with Arabic. I didn’t learn 
to read it, but I learned to recognize the letters and to identify words with 
a dictionary. I travelled to European libraries. I found manuscripts by him 
I didn’t know existed. Th at was the fi rst time I had really taken time to 
work on a non-European. I’m sorry I still have to call it my ‘Leo Africanus 
book.’2 I tried to recreate him as he was, reinvigorate him as an Arab and 
a Muslim, give him back his Arab name. But people who don’t know 
Arabic can’t say the name al-Wazzan. I probably don’t even pronounce it 
right. Or they won’t say it. Th ey just keep calling him ‘Leo Africanus’. Th e 
purpose of the book was to say, ‘No. Th at’s not how he looked at himself. 
Th at’s how the Christians remade him.’ Anyway, people are reading it—
the Turkish translation has come out—and I have a couple of wonderful 
spinoff s from the book that are really quite exciting. 
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So we met you outside the University Library on the Leiden University 
campus. Why were you there? What were you reading?
Well today I was reading the Sranan–German dictionary created with 
great care in the late eighteenth century by the missionary Moravian 
brother Christian Ludwig Schumann. A Dutch doctoral student named 
André Kramp did a really excellent edition, and I have been waiting to 
see it. As I said to you when I came out of the library, over the years 
I have been profi ting from Schumann’s Saramacan–German dictionary, 
which was published almost a century ago. Schumann did this fi rst one 
with help from the great Saramacan Maroon chief Alabi, who became 
a Christian under the name Johannes. Language is an avenue into the 
mental world of the past. Schumann, with Alabi’s help, gave context 
for the words—words like kangra, which is an ordeal Africans used to 
establish guilt or innocence after someone had been accused of a crime.3 
And now I’ve got Schumann’s Sranan–German dictionary for the other 
main Creole spoken—with lots more words. Schumann had six or seven 
Blacks serving as his informants. He doesn’t give their names but he 
quotes directly from them all the time. ‘We black people say…’ It’s like 
listening to an eighteenth-century conversation. I’m so happy to have this 
book—I can’t tell you. I’m going to use it for a talk I’m giving next week 
on language in Trondheim, Norway. Th e talk is called ‘Dealing with 
strangeness: Language and information fl ow in colonial Suriname.’ I want 
to look more closely at the creation of these dictionaries—Schumann’s 
and others. Dictionaries usually come out under one person’s name. But 
there’s no way that a man like Schumann could fi nd out about these 
Creole languages without collaborators who speak them. Th ere is a fl ow of 
information about language and life, despite the situation of asymmetrical 
power between them. I mean, some of Schumann’s informants were slaves.
In preparation for your lecture at the Norwegian Institute of Science and 
Technology at Trondheim, you started investigating the Sami. 
It turns out that eighteenth century Trondheim was a really important 
scholarly and religious center, and being so far north, some of the priests 
got the idea of converting the Sami to Christianity. Th e fi rst book on the 
Sami language was written by a missionary from Trondheim—not too 
diff erent in time from when Schumann was working on his dictionaries 
in Suriname. And so I’ve added a little section to my lecture on these Sami 
dictionaries and ethnographies to show where you can see input from the 
Sami themselves—sometimes even their own names are there. When I’m 
in Trondheim, I’ll go to the Academy library there, which was founded 
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in the eighteenth century. I’ve already ordered some books, including by 
the fi rst Sami to become a priest. He wrote about the language, too. He 
converted, but always stayed loyal to his language. 
Is it fair to say that boundary-crossers are a recurring theme in your work?
I’m working on this manuscript on the four generations of a family in 
Suriname. I am hoping to have a draft by the end of the year, but as I work 
I see new issues, new problems I’d like to resolve. It’s so hard, to get evidence 
about individual slaves, about how they thought and felt and made choices 
when and if they had a chance. It’s hard, but I’m stubborn and quite 
committed to my decision to write about an individual family, rather do 
a general social study of masters and slaves. A general study is important, 
for sure… but I want to capture the slave experience in its complexity up 
close. Th e struggle for direct evidence has come up occasionally in my 
earlier books—in Martin Guerre and also in the Leo Africanus book.4 For 
al-Wazzan—that’s the real Arabic name of ‘Leo Africanus’—I was able to 
fi nd several manuscripts. But even there were aspects of his life he didn’t 
talk about. He didn’t say anything about whether he had a wife or not, 
or whether he ever had more than one. Just because he was silent, am I 
not going to broach the subject of marriage? How could I do that? I write 
about the history of women and gender—it’s against my principles not to 
pose such a question. So you take what clues you have from his writing 
and collateral evidence from others around him and you make a ‘thought 
experiment.’ You speculate and you make it clear you’re speculating. But 
even if you can’t resolve the matter, it’s important to venture it. Resorting 
to speculation is better than not asking the question at all. 
How do you tell the individual biography of enslaved persons when 
you don’t have a self- narrative? How do you do it? How do you try to 
construct a life? I’m enjoying it. But, you know, sometimes it’s like trying 
to squeeze water out of a stone. 
Th ere are things that I’ve been looking for years for my history of 
the Suriname family, such as deeds of manumission. I have an ironic 
experience, when I turn to the white people in my story—it’s really a 
braided history—since three of the slave women have long intimacies with 
white men. Th e minute I start working on these white men, a world of 
archives and source materials opens up on them individually and their 
families. Th e diff erence between slave and free is so refl ected in this 
disparity in direct sources. It’s an experience I should be used to by now. 
But every time it happens, I chafe at the diff erence. I say to myself that the 
extra work I’m doing for the enslaved persons is a rightful act of reparation. 
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I also have a modern project going on a Jewish Romanian linguist—a 
man named Lazare Sainéan. Another crosser of boundaries. I fi rst knew 
his name because he wrote a big book on the language of Rabelais back in 
the 1920s—still a classic. But then I started working on Glikl, and I was 
trying to get background in Yiddish, because that’s the language in which 
she wrote her autobiography.5 So I’m reading a collection of essays by a 
Yiddish specialist and I suddenly see an essay entitled ‘Lazare Sainéan’s 
contribution to Yiddish.’ ‘What?’ I said. ‘What’s he doing here?’ And sure 
enough, Sainéan had a whole other life as pioneering in the Yiddish and 
Romanian languages and folklore before he came to France and ended up 
writing about Rabelais. 
Th ough it may not seem like it, the Leo Africanus book, the Suriname 
project I’m working on, and the project about the Jewish Romanian 
linguist have a lot in common. Th e thematic concern has been to look 
at what happens when people fi nd themselves in unusual places or are 
crossing some kind of boundary—a linguistic boundary, or a religious 
boundary. What happens? Sometimes this is very transgressive. I’m very 
interested in both the maintaining of separate identities in separate spaces 
but also in crossovers. Th at’s a common theme. 
I think we’ve all had wonderful accidents where we’ve come across things 
that have surprised us, startled us, but also inspired us. What was the most 
serendipitous discovery that you’ve had? 
Serendipitous? I’ve certainly had that happen, including early along, when 
I was working on my doctoral thesis on ‘Protestantism and the Printing 
Workers of Lyon’—a social history approach to the Reformation. Th is 
was during the Red Hunt of the 1950s, and my passport had been taken 
away. So instead of getting to the archives in France, I was working 
in the rare book libraries in New York and using books published in 
sixteenth-century Lyon. At the Columbia University Library I came upon 
a fabulous collection of early modern books on commercial arithmetic 
and accounting. Looking at the catalogue, I came across a name I knew—
during my six months in Lyon before I lost my passport, I had found this 
man on a list of Protestants. I decided to take a quick look at the book, 
even though it wasn’t on religion. Sure enough, it turned out be written 
by the man who had been described as a modest ‘reckonmaster’ on a list 
of heretical Protestants drawn up by the Catholic authorities of Lyon. But 
here in a book published only a few years later, he was presenting himself 
as a ‘noble,’ with a fancy author portrait and Latin poems—and this in a 
book designed to teach commercial arithmetic to merchants and traders. 
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Now this may not seem so surprising today, but in the sixteenth century in 
France, nobles were not supposed to be involved in business, buying and 
selling. Some of them actually were, but it was considered lowering, and 
they could lose their status. And here was their teacher presenting himself 
as a noble. And the book also had unapologetic sections teaching how to 
calculate interest on loans, even though that was condemned by canon 
law as ‘usury.’ I thought, ‘this is a surprising text.’
So I put aside my thesis research on the Protestant printers for a while 
to do a study. Since we were far away from my university at that point, I 
didn’t have a thesis director to so say ‘Don’t do it.’ I published an essay, 
one of my earliest, called ‘Sixteenth-Century French Arithmetics on the 
Business Life.’ I took the whole genre and related it to both the history of 
business and its validation and to the history and teaching of arithmetic. 
It was quite interesting and is still useful to people in the fi eld. I’m married 
to a mathematician and so I had extra fun in writing it. 
Th e Martin Guerre story certainly came as a surprise—a total surprise. 
I heard about it in 1976 from a wonderful graduate student in Chinese 
history, who decided to take my seminar at the University of California 
at Berkeley on ‘Family, kin, and social structure in early modern France.’ 
She was going to do her dissertation on the history of adoption in China. 
I said: ‘Why don’t you do your term paper on adoption in early modern 
France? It’ll give you some ideas for your thesis.’ I sent her to the rare 
books at the law library, and she came back and said: ‘I came across a 
book on a criminal case you’ll fi nd very interesting.’ It was Jean de Coras’s 
book about the Martin Guerre case!6 She had used it for one sentence 
on adoption. I read the book and thought, ‘Th is has got to be a movie!’ 
I had two interests at that point: one was anthropology, the other was 
outreach to a larger public through fi lm. And here was this book that fell 
into my lap—I could use it to make an ethnographic study of peasants 
and it could be the basis for a great movie. Th en when I was trying to 
contact a fi lm director in France, by good luck I heard about Jean-Claude 
Carrière and Daniel Vigne, who coincidentally wanted to make a movie 
on the Martin Guerre story. Th ey asked me to work with them from the 
start. I helped them with the scenario and tried to make it as plausible 
as possible—a wonderful experience, I learned so much. But when I saw 
some of the directions the fi lm was going to take, I realized I had to do a 
history book as well. Th is whole thing was serendipity. Completely. Other 
examples… I got interested in Stedman because I was working on Maria 
Sibylla Merian in Suriname.7 
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Th at was one of our questions. How did you get into Suriname? Or just outside 
Europe? 
Well… outside Europe. In a way it grew out of the course I had been 
teaching since 1971 on the history of women in early modern Europe. 
Right from the start, I knew I was not going to do only European 
Christian women. A literary friend of mine told me about Glikl, a 
seventeenth-century Jewish merchant woman, who left us the fi rst 
major autobiography we have from a Jewish woman, besides being a very 
important text in the history of Western Yiddish. So I had the students 
read an English translation of Glikl’s autobiography from the beginning. 
And then I was living in Canada in 1971. I wanted to bring in a person 
who could connect the students with the Canadian world of women. I 
came upon Marie de l’Incarnation, who started off  as a French artisan, 
and then became a nun and founded the Ursuline house in Québec to try 
to convert the aboriginal women to Christianity. She left letters and an 
autobiography, and I translated some of this into English for the students. 
Meanwhile feminist scholars were just beginning to produce books on 
women artists, and I came across Maria Sibylla Merian. She was an artist 
and an entomologist and she used her skills to represent the world of 
insects and the plants they ate. And her most important book was on 
the insects and plants of Suriname. She was a natural for me, and I loved 
telling the students about her.
I lectured on these women for years in my courses. Th en around 
1990, I decided to put them together in a book.8 Up to then, women 
had had a role in my books—especially, Bertrande, the wife of Martin 
Guerre—but now I wanted to do a book where women were at the center 
of the narrative. I wanted to show how varied women’s lives could be. 
Th e three were all seventeenth-century city women, but they had diff erent 
occupations and religions. Glikl Hamel, a Jewish merchant who lived 
in Hamburg and Metz; the Ursuline Marie de l’Incarnation, who went 
from Tours to Québec—and by the way, my husband has told me she 
has just been declared a saint—too late for my book! And the German 
Maria Sibylla Merian, who started off  as a Lutheran in Frankfurt, became 
a radical Labadist for at time in the Netherlands, and then spent two years 
in Suriname before coming back to Amsterdam. I loved writing about 
them, and yet, as I was doing it, I began to think about the non-European 
women in their lives. Glikl told a moralizing story about a cannibalistic 
‘savage’ woman and her intimacy with a pious shipwrecked Jewish man. 
And what about those Algonquian and Iroquoian girls and young women 
whom Marie de l’Incarnation was trying to convert to Christianity? How 
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were they reacting to her eff orts? And what about the Amerindian and 
African slave women who went into the rainforest to fi nd insects and 
plants for Merian? Was I going to write a book celebrating the adventures 
of European women and simply glide over the others? I did what I could 
to give these other women a voice. So I tried to imagine how the African 
slave women, with their story-telling Anansi the spider would have looked 
at Merian’s picture of tarantulas in a guava tree. 
Th at book really changed me. It was published in 1995, just before I 
retired and had more time to go in a new direction. I was already crossing 
boundaries with those three women. Now I wanted to try to write a book 
that would be located in a non-European space. I wasn’t going to pretend 
to an expertise I didn’t have, but I wanted to situate myself mentally in a 
place that wasn’t just Europe. From then on, even when I’m doing a totally 
European topic, I try to look at it from a wider point of view—to turn it 
around, ask what a non-European would make of it. 
You have an abiding interest in people on the margins—women, Jews, 
Muslims, Protestants in Catholic France—was that a conscious choice? 
It just happens. Th at’s what I get interested in.
Th ey fi nd you?
Yes, they fi nd me! Th ey jump at me out of the sources. Th at’s what 
happened with al-Wazzan. I knew he was a character. I knew he was 
unusual, in some ways like Martin Guerre, a sort of impostor. Al-Wazzan 
had been kidnapped from North Africa by Christian pirates in 1518 and 
taken to Italy. After a time, he converts and spends the next seven years 
as a seeming Christian. He learns Italian and Latin well and to write 
from left to write, and then composes all these books to tell Europeans 
about the lands and religion he’s supposedly left behind. And then he goes 
back to them. I called the book Trickster travels: a sixteenth-century Muslim 
between worlds. I did not start out thinking of al-Wazzan as a trickster, but 
I was trying to fi gure out what patterns of legitimation he had for the role 
he played for seven years—performing as a Christian while planning one 
day to go back to Africa and Islam. How did he justify this dissimulation, 
I was asking myself. And I found out that there’s an Arabic genre like the 
European picaresque and its medieval equivalent called the maqâma. It’s 
always written in a characteristic form called ‘rhymed prose.’ Th e story is 
always about a vagabond poet who disguises himself in diff erent ways. A 
storyteller meets him in all these diff erent places and ends up recognizing 
him when he starts to recite poems. Th e vagabond poet gets into scrapes, 
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but he uses his wits and his tricks to land on his feet. Th e storyteller 
recounts all this to his friends. It’s a beloved Arabic genre, copied and 
recopied, and I knew that al-Wazzan had read one of the most famous 
examples because he refers to it in his writing. Th ere are also fool fi gures 
in the North African tradition, and, like the vagabond poet, they use 
their tricks to truth tell. So I decided to use them to help me to interpret 
al-Wazzan.
You asked about people on the margins. Al-Wazzan is a kind of 
marginal fi gure. He was on the margins of Roman elite life, and he 
had relations with two learned Jews, who were as marginal as he was. I 
didn’t know anything about this before I started doing research on him. 
To start off  with, I just knew he’d been kidnapped and had written a 
big book about Africa. But only when I started the research and found 
other manuscripts did I discover that he had collaborated on an Arabic–
Hebrew–Latin dictionary with the physician Jacob Mantino. And then I 
also found out that in the household of al-Wazzan’s Christian godfather, 
to whom he was teaching Arabic, there was also a Hebrew teacher, who 
turned out to be a fabulously interesting man. So, given 9/11 and all the 
Palestine–Israel issues, I was delighted to discover these relationships. Of 
Jewish background as I am myself, I ran with it. I felt like it was a gift. 
Th ank you! Th ank you, al-Wazzan!
Your new book will be about Joanna?
Not just Joanna. Four generations in her family. 
But Joanna was the starting point? 
Initially, Joanna and Stedman were the starting point. And I was planning 
to do something on the son they had together. But then I started reading 
about Joanna’s mother and her twenty-year relationship with Joanna’s 
white father. Th ey had fi ve children together. So I’ve devoted long 
chapters to them. Ah… but what about the African generation? Th e ones 
who were kidnapped and came to Suriname on a slave boat? Already back 
in 1996, when I had just started thinking about Joanna, the wonderful 
Africanist Paul Lovejoy asked me: ‘Where was Joanna born?’ ‘She was 
born in Suriname,’ I answered fi rmly. But his question remained in the 
back of my mind in the years when I turned to al-Wazzan and learned so 
much about the Land of the Blacks (as they called sub-Saharan Africa) 
during the sixteenth century. Th en a few years ago, when I was back to 
Joanna’s family, some young colleagues at Toronto—of course, everyone 
is young to me—asked me to do a paper for them on the Suriname slaves’ 
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experience of crime and punishment. And to do that, I realized I had to 
look at the memories of African crime and punishment that the slaves had 
brought over with them across the Atlantic. Once I saw how important 
those memories were in shaping Suriname ways of living, I realized I really 
must try to do it for Joanna’s family, no matter how hard it was, fi gure who 
her grandparents were and where in Africa they came from—what gods 
and customs they brought with them. I was able to get strong evidence for 
Joanna’s African grandfather. I’m OK there. It’s much more speculative 
for Joanna’s grandmother. But I think I’ve got the right person. A very 
interesting woman—another gift from the past. 
Th e narrative of the book is hard to construct because I’m trying to 
show lots of cultural entanglements, especially in relations between black 
and white, slave and free. It turns out that three of the slave women 
had relations of some duration with white men. Th ese are delicate to 
interpret. Today, some people simply condemn them, seeing the women 
as either forced into these relations or as ‘sell-outs.’ But if you look into 
the eighteenth-century evidence, it’s more complicated, more interesting, 
even more poignant than that. I’m trying to tell the story the way Joanna 
and her family saw it. 
In the Slaves on Screen, you talk about movies and how they’re able to reach 
a far larger audience than historians mostly reach.9
In Slaves on Screen, I concentrated on fi lms about forms of slave 
resistance—Spartacus, Burn and Th e Last Supper (both great fi lms about 
the Caribbean), and Amistad and Beloved. Today there are important new 
movies which are bringing the story of slavery to even larger audiences, 
fi lms like Twelve Years a Slave. Many people have said they never realized 
how brutal a slave regime could be until they saw that movie. I went 
to the premiere at the Toronto International Film Festival with Henry 
Louis Gates, who heads the W. E. B. Dubois Center at Harvard and was 
one of the historians who read the script for director Steve McQueen. It 
was packed, really exciting. I wrote two reviews of the fi lm, one for the 
African-American online daily Th e Root and the other for a round table 
in Civil War History, where I was the only Caribbeanist and the only 
one who had ever actually worked on a fi lm. Some of the historians were 
critical because McQueen had done nothing with slave resistance. All you 
see in the movie is Solomon Northup’s individual struggle to get back 
his liberty and Patsey’s desire to get away from the horrid sexual abuse 
of her master by suicide—though she doesn’t end up doing it. It’s true 
that there are accounts of slave uprisings in the book Northup published 
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after he was restored to freedom, though he himself did not participate 
in them. But that’s not the kind of movie McQueen wanted to make. He 
wanted to follow in a slave context the themes from his earlier fi lms—on 
the individual, his body, his moral struggles. So the movie focuses on 
Northup, how he reacts to punishment and how he gradually realizes that, 
free-born though he was, he was not that diff erent from those around him 
born into slavery. Th is is so beautifully shown in the acting of Chiwetel 
Ejiofor. I thought McQueen missed a few points from Northup’s books 
that would have strengthened his own focus on the individual’s moral 
struggle. I mean Northup was actually black driver on his plantation for 
eight years. Some of the ways he and the other slaves devised to get around 
his whip would have made great scenes. But still, it’s a powerful fi lm. I 
felt that one of the reasons McQueen decided to use Northup’s book for 
a movie was not only that he was descended from West Indian slaves, but 
also that he lives in Th e Netherlands, where much public attention was 
fi nally—belatedly—being given to the history of slavery in the Dutch 
colonies.
It seems to be a commonplace among historians that we should stay away from 
community debates and the opinions of the public about what history is. How 
do you feel about that?
What would be an example of staying away from a debate? 
Well, for example, in the Netherlands, the reparations debate and the debate 
about slavery and how it connects to the present. 
OK. I’m glad you mentioned that. I mentioned this question at the end 
of my review of the movie in Th e Root. Th e historian has to understand 
the period he or she is dealing with. You have to work within it; you look 
at the judgments within the frame of the time—what were the people 
who lived then accepting or rejecting? What were their voices of criticism? 
But that doesn’t mean you’re inattentive to the issues in your own time, 
and how the past may help you understand contemporary struggles. 
Wherever you come down on the question, the subject of reparations is a 
great one for debate—it really opens up a lot of important perspectives. 
In the eighteenth century, the vast majority of people in many parts of 
the globe accepted and practiced forms of enslavement. Th e kidnapping 
of Africans and the Atlantic slave boats, including those of the Dutch 
West India Company, were particularly ghastly—with huge loss of life—
but, as the Martinique movie Passage du Milieu and other African movies 
and African historians have pointed out, African rulers and traders were 
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complicit with and benefi tted from the dreadful European trade. What 
kind of reparations can the twenty-fi rst century best make for these 
cruelties and set-backs of the past? And how would you fi gure out whom 
to compensate and how much to give? On the economic side, the wealthy 
countries should simply give to African countries—and forgive their 
existing debts—not only because of the damage wrought by imperialism, 
but because of inequities and racism in our own day. And the aid should 
not be benefi tting already rich African elites. For reparations specifi cally 
for slavery, I like the approach of Ruth Simmons, the recent president of 
Brown University and the descendant of American slaves. It turns out 
that Brown University was founded in the eighteenth century partly with 
money from the slave trade. So Simmons founded an Institute for the 
study of slavery and the history of abolition at Brown University, and set 
up fellowships for young people from the Caribbean to come to Brown. 
Historians can certainly be helpful in the current debates.
One of the staple Itinerario questions is how did you become a historian? What 
attracted you to history? We wanted to know what attracted you to the early 
modern period? 
I was already attracted to it an undergraduate at Smith. I thought it was 
a wonderful period. I think it had to do with the origins of modernity, 
which was so interesting to me. Now I have a diff erent take on it, because 
‘modernity’ gets you into stage theory—which brings so many problems. 
But I was making these decisions in the late 1940s early 1950s. I was 
engaged in politics and so I wanted to think about the origins of modern 
capitalism and the modern ethos, modern values. And also it was the 
sixteenth century and I thought it was such a wonderful century. It was 
such an inventive period. Shakespeare and Rabelais lived then. I would 
read about these printing workers and their strikes in the sixteenth 
century and at the same time I’m caring about strikers in the twentieth 
century—handing out pamphlets for them and such. I was so interested. I 
came across these fabulous cases concerning them. Many of the Protestant 
printing workers fl ed from Lyon to Geneva, where they got into huge 
amounts of trouble for the clandestine trade union they were organizing. 
Th ey were carrying this on from their days in France, and it wasn’t going 
to be allowed. Th e trial records revealed the secrets they had—their rules, 
their secret ceremony, their secret nicknames, their passwords. I think 
if I met one today I could get into their union. I could do the secret 
handshake. So I published one of my earliest articles about that—I called 
it ‘A trade union in sixteenth-century France.’ Th ey didn’t use that term—
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they called it a ‘Company’—the French called it a compagnonnage. But 
it was the origin of modern trade unions. So I guess it was the sense of 
origins that got me excited about the early modern period—I thought 
of it as the beginning of so many modern things. It was also a period 
of much violence, but it wasn’t till later that I turned to the violence 
of the Reformation. At the start, I was caught by the excitement of the 
new movement. At the time, back in the 1950s, I would have called it 
‘progressive’. Th is wasn’t just because of my political leanings, it was also 
the language of the time, even though the Protestants thought they were 
restoring the church to what Christ had wanted in the beginning. I have 
long since stopped using that as a descriptive term, but even though I’m 
now working on the eighteenth century and afterward, I still think of the 
sixteenth century as endlessly interesting. Just endlessly interesting. 
You’ve mentioned that your outlook on the early modern period has changed. 
Where do you think this fi eld of early modern studies is going? It’s not looking 
for the origins of the modern world. It’s not looking for change. 
By the mid-1960s, I became dissatisfi ed with the term ‘early modern’ 
because it went along with the theories of ‘modernization’ that emerged 
after World War II. And these carried with them a picture of stages of 
development by a western model, and other parts of the world had to 
catch up and follow it. ‘First the West, then the rest.’ Already when I 
was studying working people and artisans, I had wondered about this—
the Reformation did not quite give them their due, and early capitalism 
had its costs for them. And then when I started to work on women, I 
realized that the stages of change were very irregular. Catholicism and 
Protestantism couldn’t just be put on some simple ladder of improvement 
or backwardness. Th ey had diff erent meanings and problems for women; 
and there were changes in both religions. Th ere was no single ‘right path’ 
to the future. No single defi nition of ‘modernity.’ Another thing about a 
Western-defi ned ‘early modern’ as a category or chronology—it doesn’t fi t 
with the world of Islam, it doesn’t fi t with the chronologies or periods in 
Asia. If we want to think of history in diff erent parts of the world, either 
we need a new terminology or we have to redefi ne our terms so they can 
apply much more widely. And the best way to do that is in collaboration 
with historians from other parts of the world. What do you all think?
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One scholar I know in America uses ‘First global age,’ but, of course, that has 
problems as well. It can be clunky.
I have questions about that, too. And global is becoming a publisher’s 
cliché. It makes it sound as though ‘global connection’ is the most 
important thing, but much of life in the past is carried on locally. To me, 
being conscious of the larger world historically does not mean you’re just 
looking at trade connections or travel or diasporas or encounters or maps 
and the like, important though they are. It means you think of diff erent 
ways that people live and change in diff erent places during the same time 
period. You don’t assume that only one place is important. You think 
comparatively. I tried an experiment in a paper I wrote in the wake of 
publishing about Marie de l’Incarnation. I called it ‘European women, 
Iroquoian women.’ I tried to think of interesting parallels between certain 
processes of a cultural kind that aff ected women and that were operating in 
both the Canadian forest and the European city at the same time. Oratory 
was a male preserve in Europe—public speech. Among the indigenous 
people along the St. Lawrence River, oratory was a male preserve as well. 
Women were very active in these tribes, but not in public speaking and 
treaty making. Th ey prepared the wampum belts for the treaties, but didn’t 
voice them. I wondered whether the interest of a few of these women in 
Catholicism was to have a public voice. Marie de l’Incarnation describes 
one of them as a woman preaching in her long house. And Katherine 
Tekakwitha did the same thing. You see something similar with European 
women in Catholic and Protestant movements. Of course, in both places 
the men tried to shut them up. You can also do diplomatic history which 
shows parallels in treaty formation. Th e Iroquoian league is created in 
treaties at the same time as certain European formations are made. Th e 
Maroons in Suriname and Jamaica. Th ese should be looked at as equivalent 
forms of diplomatic history. I think you can talk about these processes 
comparatively, extend the same respect to them as historical events as you 
would to those going on in Europe. I think that there are ways in our 
historical practice that we can make it expansive and inclusive. Even if we 
don’t have the chronological terminology that quite fi ts, we are making 
ourselves be part of the same world. 
Without reducing it to a word game. 
Yes. 
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Map-Making in World History: Interview 
with Kären Wigen
Th is interview took place at Harvard University, where Kären Wigen, the 
Frances and Charles Field Professor in History of Stanford University, gave 
the 2015 Reischauer Lectures. Th is year’s theme was ‘Where in the World? 
Map-Making at the Asia-Pacifi c Margin, 1600–1900.’ Carolien Stolte and 
Rachel Koroloff  interviewed Professor Wigen to the tunes of Persian music at 
the Kolbeh of Kabob restaurant on Cambridge Street.
How did you come to work on Japan?
I grew up in the Midwest, in Ohio, so it was certainly not an automatic 
thing. No one in my environment knew much about East Asia, or went 
to East Asia. But my father was a physicist and when I was 13, he got an 
invitation to spend half a year in Japan, and decided that we were going. 
So he took his wife and three daughters and spent six months on the 
outskirts of Kobe. My sisters and I went to a Canadian school where we 
studied Japanese, and that was the beginning of my introduction to Japan. 
I turned 14 the day we arrived. It was so romantic in my mind—some 
strange Japanese man walked up to me in the train station and handed me 
a fl ower. Somehow Japan just resonated with me. You two will know what 
I mean—we have all chosen places to study through various processes. It 
is still somewhat mysterious to me how that happens exactly. I think that 
in my case the sober, melancholy aesthetic of Japan is what pulled me in. It 
is a very quiet, refl ective mood that is celebrated and condoned, and which 
has matured within Japanese poetry, arts, tea ceremony, gardens and so 
on. I think that Americans generally do appreciate these things in middle 
age, but in the teenage American culture of the 1970s there was no space 
for that. It was brash and loud: we were supposed to wear smiley faces and 
fl uorescent colors. So it was a revelation that there was a place in the world 
where you can be quiet and even sad, and that this mood was considered 
to be the wellspring of Japanese poetry. 
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How did this move beyond your teenage years?
I started studying Japanese seriously, and it never really let go of me. I went 
back to Japan in my senior year of high school. I was only 16—I lived with 
a Japanese family and went to a Japanese high school. I was quite in over 
my head, but the one subject for which I needed credits in order to graduate 
from my high school in time back home, aside from PE, was history! So 
that became the subject I studied, even though I did not particularly care 
about history at the time. I loved math, I loved chemistry, and I  loved 
music. I had never paid any attention to social studies at all. But I took this 
class with a very gifted young teacher. He was from a particular generation 
of pacifi st social activists, and he instilled an appreciation of the hardships 
of the Japanese peasantry. He made history come alive for me. 
How was history taught in Japan at the time?
Th ey had just started on the Tokugawa period when I got there. I had 
no idea what ‘Tokugawa’ meant—I didn’t know the Japanese equivalent 
of George Washington. I sat in the heat of July in Osaka, poring over 
dictionaries, trying to make sense of the fi rst pages of the textbook that 
we were to start reading in school that fall. In hindsight, it would have 
been smarter to ask for a children’s history book with glosses and pictures 
and simple stories. My fellow students had of course had years with such 
books before they hit the one we were using. But it just didn’t occur to 
me, or to my host family, that it might have been helpful. So it took me a 
long time to get oriented, but there was something about that experience 
of slow reading that… who knows?
Is that the adventurous approach to history that you took back with you to the 
US?
I came back to the States, and became an undergraduate at the University 
of Michigan. I majored in Japanese, but soon discovered that Japanese 
language becomes Japanese literature at some point, after you have taken 
a number of years of instruction in it. But literature never felt quite right 
to me, so I kept veering towards history classes. And then, towards the 
end of my undergraduate years, I discovered geography. Michigan was one 
of those universities that still had a vibrant geography department at the 
time. It closed a few years later.
What did a geography perspective contribute to your training?
We were shown—and I will never forget this—an aerial photograph of a 
suburban cul-de-sac. It was presented to us as an analogy to the capillaries 
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in the human body. Th e cul-de-sac was the endpoint of the circulatory 
system: it was where the oxygen was being delivered. Th e heart was 
driving and bringing people their supplies. On the map, it was all laid 
out—this is where people rest, this is where they eat, and this is where the 
trash comes out. It was an aerial view of how our society is put together. 
I found it so compelling at the time. Without even really knowing it, you 
are following a muse, seeing pieces of a puzzle that is not yet put together. 
Th is was one of those pieces. So I graduated from college with a degree in 
Japanese language and literature, an advanced understanding of Japanese, 
a beginning exposure to geography, a real interest in history, and no idea 
what to do.
So what was the next step?
I worked in the original Borders Bookstore before it franchised. I saved 
up just enough money to go hitchhiking in Japan the following summer. 
I had received a small translation prize for my honors thesis, which was 
a translation of a Japanese novella. Th e prize was 1,000 dollars, and I 
basically lived off  that for a whole summer. It was embarrassing, really. 
I mooched shamelessly, slept on people’s fl oors, hitched rides, and rode 
night trains. But I had a great time. I worked at an organic dairy farm, and 
I talked to all kinds of activists trying to fi gure out the biggest question 
I had at the time: if you are a moral person in this polluted capitalist-
industrialist environment, what can you do? How do you contribute? 
What could an outsider, an American, possibly do? But by the end of the 
summer this question had shifted. It had turned into: where can I go to 
really, fully master Japanese and learn something useful? Otherwise, it 
just didn’t make any sense to me to try and plug into the Japanese world. I 
knew I had to be able to read and understand more than I did. So I started 
looking for graduate schools. I came back from Japan somehow convinced 
that this was the next step. 
And you ended up applying to geography programs.
I liked geography because it was earthy in the most literal way. I had 
taken a course in economics as an undergraduate. I don’t know if either 
of you ever did that, but I found it an eye-opening experience, although 
perhaps not in the way you would expect. I walked up to the professor 
about halfway through the course, because I was concerned about the 
energy crisis. I mean, just imagine the Detroit environment of the late 
1970s. Th ere had been oil shocks, serious competition from Japan, and 
the auto industry was starting to collapse. So I asked him how one deals 
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with the energy shortage as an economist. And he looked at me with great 
surprise and said, well, as long as the supply curve and the demand curve 
are allowed to meet at the natural price, there is no shortage. I more or 
less just turned around and walked away, and decided that economics 
had nothing to off er me. I thought, if that is the limit of our horizon and 
vision—the price as it is today—you take the future out of the equation. 
Burn it up, burn through it, it doesn’t matter. Geography, by contrast, 
was a very diff erent world. It tackled similar questions but approached 
them diff erently, and approached them in a way I had not encountered 
elsewhere. And the people were fascinating—telling stories of walking 
through the jungle on fi eldwork, of learning new languages, but mostly of 
having a holistic view of how the world is put together. 
Is there perhaps also something about the perspective of geography that allows 
for a ‘ larger,’ or at least a transnational, approach to history? You were given 
diff erent tools than most. Did it help you to develop a perspective that was not 
confi ned to particular areas or timeframes?
Th at is a really good question, and one I have not thought about in quite 
those terms. Th e one thing that was consistent for me through my very 
eclectic training was Japanese—all the way from the age of 13, all the 
way through college, and into graduate school. It stayed with me through 
shifts from literature into geography, and eventually into history. Japanese 
was my language. But I do think you are onto something. Historians 
are anchored by their archives. And archives, for better or worse, are 
often national. Th ey were created by states, and are preserved by states. 
Th ey are traditional institutions. But the geographers I trained with at 
Berkeley included men like Jim Parsons, the last of an earlier generation 
with an old-school fi eld orientation. In their view, your working materials 
include not only texts and interviews, but everything you can see with 
your eyes. Parsons, the senior professor who taught the fi eld methodology 
course, had a background in journalism. He and his friends occasionally 
challenged each other: to pick a spot on the map, fl y there for one weekend 
and come home with a story, with material for an article. We used to 
jokingly call it ‘lunch-stop geography.’ But there was something to it. Th ey 
pressed us to realize how much we could learn by being really attuned to 
the environment around us, by asking sharp questions about the economy, 
and by being fearless about driving down dirt paths if that is where we 
needed to go … it was really quite an experience. Mr. Parsons’ philosophy 
was, go in with your camera, smile at whoever you see, and retreat if you 
are unwelcome. Th ere was a sense that the archive extends outdoors, that it 
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includes material artifacts, living plants, built environments and patterns 
that you can study at many diff erent scales. You can walk through them, 
drive through them, study them on aerial photos and maps, or talk to the 
people living in them. As long as you have one key: the relevant language. 
As long as you have the right language for where you are going, the fi eld 
geographer’s archive is open and public in the most fundamental sense. 
Th at must have helped to move your scholarship in a broader, more 
encompassing direction. 
In that sense you are right—I could not have skipped that formative 
period. And my timing was very fortunate. I had a historian of the fi rst 
order on my Ph.D. committee at Berkeley, Th omas Smith, who had 
written a brilliant book on the agrarian origins of modern Japan.1 He was 
of the generation who had been trained to work in Japan during the Allied 
Occupation. Having someone like that vouch for me when I entered the 
job market was invaluable. But also, I fi nished my dissertation in 1990 
right as Japan was peaking. Th e Japanese real estate bubble had actually 
burst in 1989, but I don’t think people knew that when they were funding 
academic positions. Interest in Japan was at an all-time high in the United 
States—it was probably similar to being a Russian historian entering the 
fi eld in the 1950s, with the Cold War just starting, leading to a voracious 
academic interest in this powerful and potentially dangerous country. 
I still have notes in a folder somewhere of my fi rst lecture in modern 
Japanese history. It includes a graph showing that if the Japanese economy 
would continue growing at its current rate, it would surpass the United 
States’ in another ten years or so. Th at is what it looked like at the time. 
What really happened, of course, was that Japan plunged into a recession 
that it still has not come out of. 
But meanwhile you had a job. What was Duke University like at that time?
Th e timing was fortuitous in more ways than one. Around the time I 
started at Duke, the spatial turn was taking hold. I was a young professional 
in the fi rst years of my career, and Duke was a hotbed of social theory 
and cultural studies. It exposed me in a very bracing way to a lot of new 
questions about epistemology. Critiquing metageography was a project 
that was conceived there for good reason, because people were very boldly 
tackling other big received notions—they were confronting orientalism, 
‘mediterraneanising’ the academy by connecting disciplines and areas… 
it generally was a time of excitedly unpacking inherited wisdom in a 
cultural and spatial vein. Spatial thinking started to be appealing to a lot 
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of people—and I had just come out of a geography department! So really, 
I had been reading spatial theory just a few years ahead of other people. I 
was in a perfect position to jump on that train.
Was this the start of the Myth of Continents?2
Th at is hard to say, but it was certainly a great environment in which to 
continue the conversation about metageography. Right after we published 
the Myth of Continents, there was a call issued by the Ford Foundation 
for innovative proposals to ‘revitalize area studies.’ Th e Ford Foundation, 
analysts now say, was suff ering from donor fatigue after funding foreign 
languages and regional concentrations for many years through the Cold 
War. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin Wall, 
it was less compelling to channel grants toward centers designed to teach 
about world regions that had been constructed along Cold War lines. Area 
studies centers had turned into impressive institutions of higher learning 
that had an amazing ability to produce scholars who knew a great deal 
about some place in the world, but they were very expensive to run. All 
that language training is resource-intensive, and the Ford Foundation in 
particular had provided a lot of funding to make it happen. So under the 
rhetorical umbrella of looking for new ideas and innovative approaches 
for redesigning area studies, they put out a call for proposals.3 Only one 
proposal was allowed to go forward from each campus, so there had to be 
a campus selection committee. All campuses in the United States could 
apply, and they were going to fund around thirty proposals for two years, 
and that pool could reapply for an additional three years. Martin [Lewis] 
and I submitted a proposal at Duke that managed to survive through all 
those hoops. Our idea was simple: oceans connect. As I metaphorically 
put it, area studies is like a dinner party, and most of us we have been 
sitting at the same table for decades, talking to other people over our 
shared interest in some continentally based region. But what if we all 
turned our chairs the other way? What if, for instance, a Japan scholar 
like me started talking to the Latin Americanists, who know something 
about the Pacifi c? Like them, I also knew something about the Pacifi c. 
Th ere was this large body of water between us, but what if we rearranged 
the map so we could talk across that ocean? It did not take massive new 
resources to start those conversations—all we needed in the short run, 
really, was what our administrators liked to call ‘tea and cookies’ money, 
enough to pay for some dinners and speakers. It worked; people did come 
together around novel zones like the Mediterranean, the Pacifi c basin, or 
the inland seas of Eurasia. In the last case, we had a group of politically 
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minded people interested in questions around the Aral and Caspian seas. 
We also had a very vibrant group working on the Atlantic. Th is was a 
fascinating experience and interesting training ground for me in a lot of 
ways. 
Is this project what made you into a world historian?
Over the course of this fi ve-year project, I learned that who shows up 
when you off er tea and cookies, as well as who among the faculty are on 
board with the initiative, determines what kind of conversation you have. 
For the Atlantic, there were a lot of anthropologists and people from the 
English department who were interested in circum-Atlantic performance, 
the black Atlantic, and the history of slavery. Th at monstrous event, the 
slave trade, set in motion a massive migration across the Atlantic that truly 
tied all the continents together. Th e forced movement of Africans out of 
their homeland, and their subsequent contributions to music and food and 
art and the economy, had reverberations all the way around the region. 
Th e legacy of their presence is as vast as the crimes committed against 
them. Th is has left incredibly rich material for the anthropologist, the 
student of literature and the historian, so what happened in the Atlantic 
group was really interesting to me. Th eir cultural history approach was 
very substantive. Th e Mediterranean group brought together a subtly 
diff erent group, including classicists and literary people with a strong 
postmodern bent. Th ey read poetry and critical theory, and talked about 
mediterraneanizing knowledge, so that group kind of spun out in a 
diff erent direction. Th e Pacifi c, interestingly, was in some ways the hardest 
group to keep together. And it was only then that I realized that while 
we may work on countries around the Pacifi c Rim, few of us at that time 
really faced outward across the Pacifi c in our thinking or our research. 
And it is not easy to do so, either.
You said in your Reischauer lectures that the Pacifi c is still in the process of 
being discovered.
Yes! One of the things I suggested that the Pacifi c group read in the fi rst 
year was a then new historical atlas of the Pacifi c by Colin McEvedy.4 Do 
you know his atlases? Th ey are a little dated now, but there is nothing like 
them. McEvedy traced the migrations of peoples and the rise and fall of 
states in very clear, simple color schemes. He made four atlases for Europe 
and the Mediterranean region, focusing on ancient, medieval, early 
modern and modern history, all in great detail and very fi ne time slices. 
After fi nishing this series centered on the Mediterranean, he decided to 
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try his hand at a historical atlas centered on the Pacifi c. It was one of 
the few works out there at the time. But some of the people in the group 
rightly pointed out that nobody who lived there in the 1500s or 1600s 
had that Pacifi c orientation. To them, the Pacifi c did not exist except as an 
imposed framework. Th ey considered it imperial knowledge construction, 
an imposed history. And I thought, yes, you are right—but we also need to 
try on that framework, as historians, if we want to know what was going 
on! We do need to plot the migration of peoples from East Asia. If you 
look at McEvedy’s population distribution map for 1500, on the eve of the 
Pacifi c region being knitted together, 90 percent of the people are on the 
Asian side. Th e imbalance is so dramatic. Th at side has peopled the Pacifi c 
Rim. So reading McEvedy and others exposed me to empirical material I 
had never been exposed to. But learning the reactions of this critical group 
of scholars, hearing why they thought that was an inadequate framework, 
was likewise unforgettable. And I think all of that represented a kind of 
working-out of some of the ideas we had posed in the Myth of Continents.
Did you write the book in order to get more regional specialists to ‘turn their 
chairs’?
Part of what we were saying with the book, was: ‘Look, let’s treat 
geographical constructs as critically as anything else. As academics, we 
have all been trained to subject our texts to critical analysis. Interrogating 
social concepts has become ingrained in the DNA of the social sciences. In 
history, we teach students to think critically about the veracity, the truth-
claims, and the diff erent interests behind our documents. We know how 
to do these kinds of operations. Now we need to do that with our mental 
maps as well.’ Maps are the tools with which we think about the world, 
but we do not often focus on their categories. Th ey are so readily at hand 
that we simply do not turn that lens onto them. I think Martin was really 
writing a manifesto in the fi rst chapter when he said that big geography 
is not taken seriously as a scholarly endeavor. On many campuses, the 
teaching of world geography is an assignment nobody wants—it is 
generally the course given to the most junior faculty member, because 
‘Geography 101’ is considered rudimentary. But if you interrogate the 
canon as you teach it, really pertinent questions arise: why do we teach the 
world in these regional categories? Do they cohere? How did these regions 
(the areas of area studies) come into being? Basically, we wanted to open a 
new terrain for this kind of critical project—one that was already familiar 
to people in history, among other fi elds. Interestingly, the response to the 
book has been warmer from historians than it was from geographers. It 
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still gets assigned a lot—people use chapters from the book in their history 
courses because it still strikes a chord, creates a teaching moment. 
What about the reception from critical geographers or historical geographers? 
One would imagine that they would be more comfortable with this sort of 
critique.
I imagine so, and they may well have been. But Martin and I were 
institutionally separated from geography by then. Partly for social and 
institutional reasons, and partly for intellectual reasons, Th e Myth of 
Continents primarily opened doors to further conversations with historians. 
I was invited to participate in Jerry Bentley’s and Renate Bridenthal’s 
AHA Conference, ‘Interactions: Regional Studies, Global Processes, and 
Historical Analysis,’ held at the Library of Congress in Washington, DC, 
in March 2001, which in turn opened the door to a subsequent workshop 
on Seascapes.5 And then they asked me to co-edit the volume that came 
out of the Seascapes project, which I felt was an amazing opportunity.6 All 
those things were a direct result of writing Th e Myth of Continents. 
Is this also how the AHR Forum Oceans of History came into being?
Well, when I served on the editorial board of the American Historical 
Review, the editor encouraged all of us to brainstorm for issues the 
AHR could run a forum on. And I off ered that oceans were emerging 
as an interesting new locus for history, and that we should do a forum 
on ocean history. It took a few years to pull it together, but we ended 
up with ambitious essays surveying and commenting on quite diff erent 
developments in the fi elds of Mediterranean, Atlantic and Pacifi c history, 
as well as a thoughtful response.7 I am still very proud of that issue, and it 
came at a great time.
We fi nd that young scholars in the humanities are often warned against 
doing collaborative work as something that can hurt one’s career track. Your 
experience seems to have been quite diff erent.
For me it has been very valuable. Martin had built up an empirical 
understanding of world history that is somewhat unusual in the American 
academy. As scholars, we are usually not generalists—we are trained to 
specialize, and we are rewarded for specializing. But Martin wanted to 
do something diff erent. He came to me one day and said: ‘Let’s write this 
book. Let’s be daring enough to do a critique of metageography.’ My initial 
reaction was: you must be kidding—you want to write a history of the 
universe? I mean, how much bigger can you get? And I was a geographer 
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of Japan who had recently started teaching at a history department 
and had a new baby. But we were operating in a larger environment of 
postmodernism, which may have emboldened us. I had area knowledge 
and an interest in maps, and Martin had world history knowledge and 
vision. And had we not worked together on this, a lot of other things 
might not have happened. I have since done a fair amount of collaborative 
work with other people and I really value it. You learn so much. In 
conversation, but also in writing together—you have to grapple with other 
people’s epistemologies, training and style. It really is demanding, and 
for the same reasons it can be deeply rewarding intellectually. But you 
are right that the profession (at least in the humanities) does not reward 
collaborative work in the same way that it does single-author scholarship. I 
am well aware that encouraging young people who do not have tenure yet 
to do collaborative work is risky, because we do not yet have the metrics 
and mechanisms for recognizing it. But as more and more young scholars 
do fascinating collaborative work, even more conservative institutions will 
have to acknowledge this at some point, or they are going to lose a lot of 
dynamism. It is true that many universities will not promote you on the 
basis of a co-authored book. But you know what? Th e Myth of Continents 
has had ten times the readership and twenty times the impact of anything 
else I have done.
Could you tell us a little more about your last book, A Malleable Map?
Th e subtitle is ‘Geographies of Restoration in Central Japan, 1600–1912.’8 
It explores some of the ways in which all kinds of people across Japan, fi rst 
under the Tokugawa and then during the Meiji period, began to restore 
the provinces as meaningful units of local identity and, ultimately, of top-
down administration. Th e provinces were created in the seventh century 
as part of a central government that Japan tried to build on the model of 
the Chinese state—which was at that point already a massive and long-
lived imperium. Th ey had tried to import that blueprint and overlay it on 
what was basically a clan-driven society, and it never really quite took hold. 
Diff erent warrior clans colonized the remains of this central government 
for centuries in shifting confi gurations. But the idea of a unifi ed state—and 
the map of its sixty provinces—persisted. Beginning with the unifi ers of 
the early modern era, and accelerating in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, rural thinkers and policy makers turned back that old model. 
Th e term ‘restoration’ has gone out of favor, but I try to rehabilitate it 
because it captures an important dimension of people’s thinking at the 
time. Not everyone, but some really looked back to the Tang dynasty 
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ideal. Th ey even restored Chinese titles and wore Chinese robes for a brief 
period in early Meiji. As the new regime progressed, much of this was 
discarded pretty quickly, but just as European empires styled themselves 
after the Roman Empire, so the Japanese at the dawn of the Meiji era 
styled themselves after the classic empires of East Asia. In that connection, 
I have become curious about the reception of European classics in Asia, 
wondering whether an awareness of the extent to which Americans and 
Europeans modeled themselves after the Roman Empire in the nineteenth 
century played any role in Meiji Japan. I mean, look at the neo-classical 
revival in architecture, in fashionable clothing, in statuary … Europeans 
and Americans alike took their classical models pretty seriously. Th ere is 
a wonderful book called Imperial San Francisco, which chronicles how the 
founding families of San Francisco imagined their city as the new Rome.9 
Rome had silver mines, they had gold mines. Rome had aqueducts, they 
had aqueducts. Rome had the Mediterranean, they had the Pacifi c. Th is 
was deeply ingrained in their world-view, and it shaped their actions on 
the world stage. I guess I saw traces of a similar spirit in Japan, so Th e 
Malleable Map tackles a long history of rehabilitating an ancient map for 
modern purposes.
And what about the forthcoming project, Cartographic Japan?10
I’m so glad you asked. Th is is a co-edited collection, modeled on a 
wonderful recent book entitled Mapping Latin America.11 Mapping Latin 
America is a collection of short essays aimed at students and the general 
public. Each essay, basically, is a close reading of one map. Th e editors 
had the idea of reproducing the chosen maps on a pretty big scale—it is 
an eight by eleven inch book—and then calling upon a variety of experts 
from all kinds of fi elds who have an interest in maps. Th e essays are great. 
Th ey make old maps, which may be beautiful but puzzling, accessible 
and legible. As soon as I saw it, I thought: the Japan fi eld needs this. But 
the challenge for making Japanese maps legible is very high. First of all, 
we cannot expect to have a readership that reads Japanese, whereas with 
Spanish you can expect at least some. But we have a treasure trove of 
material. And there are a lot of talented scholars who write about maps 
for specialized journals. We wanted to bring these people together and ask 
them each to explain one favorite map. Th ese turned out to run the gamut 
from the 1580s all the way to the recent tsunami of 2011—there is a lot 
of interest in disaster mapping. We have fi fty contributors and fi fty-eight 
maps. Maybe I am overly enthusiastic about this project—we will see what 
the reception is next year—but I am very excited about this book. Many 
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people my age, at this stage of their careers, are writing textbooks, so there 
are great textbooks out there. I thought it would be good to have a map 
reader to go with them. Teachers in the fi eld know that there are many 
digital maps available, but they don’t always know what to do with them. 
It takes concerted eff ort to puzzle out these images. So the short essays 
in Cartographic Japan may be quick to read, but they were not simple 
to write—people have really taken time to fi gure out the back-story of a 
particular map, and it has been great to harvest that eff ort. Our Japanese 
co-editor, Fumiko Sugimoto, is a spectacular and learned reader of maps, 
and was able to bring her network of Japanese scholars into the project. 
Th ey make up about a third of the book. Th en there is myself, based on 
the West Coast, with a Tokugawa-centered history network. Th e third 
co-editor, Cary Karacas, is a young geographer based on the East Coast 
who works on wartime mapping. And the fourth member of the team 
was our research assistant, Sayoko Sakakibara, a recent Ph.D. whose deep 
knowledge, technical wizardry, and fl uency in English and Japanese was 
critical to making this kind of transnational project possible. Not a few of 
the insights I have shared in the Reischauer lectures over the last few days 
have come out of this project. 
We can imagine that a work like that would be useful regardless of national 
or regional focus, because it can be hard to fully read a map. Many historians 
lack a cartographical lexicon. You have to know what to look for, and it is 
hard to do that responsibly. To have a volume of fi fty scholars, with fi fty 
diff erent voices explaining their way of reading maps, their visual and spatial 
analysis, would be interesting on that level alone.
Part of reading maps is learning how to put them into context. And 
because we are historians, we bring knowledge to a map and have an idea 
of which questions to ask. We have an idea of what a map might have 
meant to the people who made it, and the people who read it. But I think 
in metaphors, so I will leave you with one. Th ere are people whose job it is 
to detect ingredients in liqueurs and perfumes, whose job it is to fi gure out 
what particular blend it is, what secret ingredients make up a particular 
taste or smell—professional sniff ers. Th ey say they do this by having a 
checklist in their minds of things to smell for. You go through once, 
looking for clove. And then you clear your nose and go through another 
time, looking for nutmeg, or something else. Something analogous to that 
is a good basic strategy for reading maps. It wasn’t until I started creating 
a checklist of things to look for that it occurred to me that not all map-
makers put labels on the oceans. Th at is where a large part of my ‘Picturing 
interview with kären wigen 381
the Pacifi c’ lecture came from in the Reischauer series—the diff erent ways 
in which mapmakers in East Asia confi gured sea-space. I tried something 
similar to fi gure out how diff erent mapmaking traditions grappled with 
the European continental scheme, and the most challenging one of all 
has been to come up with a list of things to ‘sniff ’ for with historical 
cartography. In all these projects, as well as in teaching, it turns out you 
can discover fresh things in familiar maps, just by approaching them with 
new questions in mind. I don’t know about you, but I fi nd it irresistible. I 
hope I can keep doing this for a long, long time.
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‘My favourite source is the landscape’: 
Interview with Robert Ross
Emeritus professor Robert Ross is one of the leading historians of African 
history. Friends and colleagues know him as an amiable person, a fervent 
birdwatcher and Morris dancer. It is a year after his retirement when Jan 
Bart Gewald and Alicia Schrikker meet Robert Ross in a homely setting in 
Leiden and ask him to look back at his career and ahead to South Africa’s 
future.
When preparing this interview we thought we could go one of two ways. One 
would be: ‘Robert, tell us about your life.’ Th e other one would be to take a 
look at your books and follow through from there. We did not really decide 
which approach we were going to take. But one of the things we think is 
extremely important is your experience as a 17–year-old in Botswana in the 
1960s. And one of the things that surprises us now is why you did not take on 
board the racist sentiments which were prevalent at that time in Great Britain 
and in South Africa?
Why did I not do that? Well I suppose, in the fi rst instance, I was the son 
of a biologist, which helps not to be racist in some senses. Secondly, I was 
the nephew of a missionary, who worked in Nigeria, which probably also 
helps to some extent. And, when I arrived in Botswana, I was dumped 
in an environment in which the most interesting people around were 
black South Africans, which made it perfectly obvious [that racism was 
not an option]. Th e students at Moeding College (Otse Botswana) who 
were mainly older than me and whom I attempted to teach something—
teaching is a slight euphemism—made it impossible to take it on board. 
In addition it was not only a black South African group, but also a LMS 
(London Missionary Society) missionary school and so racism just was 
not one of the possibilities.1 And also growing up in London, I was not 
growing up in the parts of London in which racism was highly prevalent, 
I grew up a long way from Notting Hill or Brixton or such places—there 
was certainly no black ghetto in Sidcup.2 So in that sense that sort of 
racism did not arise.
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When you travelled to Botswana did you already have an idea about what you 
were going to study?
I knew I was going to study history. I do not know why, I have always 
been fascinated by history. I seem to remember winning a school prize 
for history when I was 9. Th at should not mean very much, I also won 
a school prize for scripture at the same time. Th ey are both history, I 
suppose. So in that sense I knew I was going to study history when I got 
back from Botswana. My choice for African history was made essentially 
in my third year as an undergraduate [at Cambridge University]. I had had 
a relatively unsuccessful career until then doing European and English 
history, slightly more doing the Expansion of Europe paper, slightly less 
doing the history of political thought. And so in my third year, when I had 
to take two papers and a special subject, there was one paper of African 
history and one of Indian history. And so it was quite obvious that I would 
do African history. It was at the time one of the larger papers; it had about 
sixty people doing it. It was taught by Ivor Wilks, John Lonsdale and 
Sydney Kanya-Forstner. I was supervised by Sydney who was Canadian 
and had written a book on the Western Sudan. He was at that time 
research fellow, in his mid to late twenties.3
And the others all had a colonial background?
Wilks had just come back from Ghana and taught in Cambridge for 
three or four years till he got a job in Northwestern. And Lonsdale had 
come back from Dar es Salaam. And so they and Kanya-Forstner gave the 
lectures and you would not have been able to fi nd a better team anywhere. 
I started a Ph.D. after that year on the basis of a research proposal that I 
still know off  by heart: ‘Th e social economic history of an African tribe,’ 
full stop. I convinced them over the telephone. Th e faculty in those days 
had a number of Ph.D. places to distribute and I got one of them. It was 
£850 a year, that was 1970. It was not a lot, but enough to survive and 
I began my Ph.D. under Ronald Robinson who had been away on leave 
in the year that I did my undergraduate in African history. So I worked 
under him for a year, and in the beginning of my second year, just before I 
went to Africa, Robbie went to Oxford, Ivor Wilks went to Northwestern 
and John Iliff e came back from Tanzania to take over and I was moved 
to work under him. And so I met him briefl y before I went to Africa for 
nine months, and I only really got to know him when I got back to write 
the thesis. 
I went to South Africa largely at the suggestion of Ronald Robinson. 
When I was still thinking about which African tribe I was going to write 
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that socio-economic history of, he said: ‘Why don’t you take a look at the 
Griquas, they look interesting and come back in two weeks’ time and 
tell me everything there is to know about the Griquas.’ So I really did 
and went down to Sussex where Martin Legassick was teaching. He had 
written a thick thesis on the Griquas.4 I talked with him for a while and 
thought they were indeed rather interesting and decided I would work on 
them. Initially I thought it would be something on the Tswana, but the 
Griquas seemed more interesting, and I wouldn’t have to learn a language. 
Well I had to learn some amount of Dutch and Afrikaans, but that wasn’t 
so diffi  cult. And so I fi rst spent two or three months in the archives of the 
London Missionary Society in London, commuting up to central London. 
I spent nearly a year in South Africa, mainly in the archives, and having 
one beautiful fi eld trip from Cape Town to Kimberley and then through 
Philippolis to and through Lesotho via Ongeluks Nek down to Kokstad.
Th at is interesting: in contrast to many Ph.D.s at the time, you actually went 
to look at the various places that you were writing about?
Well I certainly went to look at them, but I am not sure whether that is 
in contrast to many Ph.D. theses—I mean Shula’s [Marks, who taught at 
SOAS, University of London] students like William Beinart, Pat Harries, 
Phil Bonner, Peter Delius, Jeff  Guy. Th ey, all that lot, went to see places 
they were writing about and did quite a lot of oral history, which I never 
did or hardly any.
Why didn’t you?
I could have spent more time in Kokstad and I might have learned 
something, but part of it was scepticism and part being chased by the 
South African Special Branch. Which was our own fault. I was travelling 
with a man called Jeff  Lewenbery, an anthropologist who worked on the 
Le Fleur Griquas, and we arrived in Kokstad when the Kokstad Advertiser 
was asking for suggestions as to how to celebrate the 100th anniversary of 
the foundation of the town, and we wrote a letter to the Kokstad Advertiser 
which went more or less like this: ‘Dear madam, on the occasion of 
the 50th anniversary of the foundation of Kokstad, the son of the fi rst 
missionary, a man called Dower, gave a sermon in the Griqua church 
with the text: “Th e wells that were delved by your fathers have been fi lled 
in by the philistines.” In view of the recent expulsion of the Griquas in 
the centre of Kokstad under the Group Areas Act, might we suggest that 
a similar service is held and might we suggest with the text: “and is this 
place, which was built in my name become a den of robbers.”’ Th e South 
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African police did not actually appreciate this and followed us around 
East Griqualand for two or three days. Th is was 1972, at the end of high 
apartheid.
You refer to various historians whom you consider to be your contemporaries: 
Beinart, Harries, Guy…. You are the only one who is not South African. 
Phil Bonner was brought up in Kenya, Kevin Shillington is not South 
African—but, yes Colin Bundy, Charles van Onselen, slightly later Saul 
Dubow, Deborah Posel, Susie Newton King and Bill Nasson are all South 
Africans. Indeed very few of us were not South Africans, and most of the 
ones who were not went to live there. I reckon that in 1994 I was one of 
about two or three serious South African historians who weren’t eligible 
to vote one way or the other.
So going back in time, you completed your Ph.D. in 1974?
Yes just before my 25th birthday.
How did you end up in Leiden?
When I got my Ph.D., probably because I was not very effi  cient at those 
sort of things, I did not manage to organise myself a research fellowship 
in Cambridge or in Oxford. Th ere were not that many postdocs around 
anyway. I was at that stage keeping myself in beer money by working in 
the Harrods perfume and cosmetics department (moving boxes around; 
I did not sell the stuff ). I decided that this was not a good thing to do 
in the long term, and thought I might as well do the same in Holland 
and learn Dutch in the meantime. So I did. I moved fl owers around in 
the Aalsmeer fl ower auction when I needed money and said hello to the 
people in Leiden, and after a while got some sort of job translating into 
English and slowly worked my way in, I think it took me 19 years to get a 
vaste aanstelling [permanent position], something like that anyway.
So, in 1975 you got your fi rst job at the history department?
Yes by the end of 1975 I started editing and translating. Th e Series—
Comparative Studies in Overseas History—were publications of the 
werkgroep [seminar group] History of European Expansion and Reactions, 
later called IGEER.5 Th e ‘reactions’ were included in the title but not 
taken too seriously. 
Th at means that you were present at the birth of Itinerario.
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Yes! And I edited for two or three years, mainly with George Winius, 
and I did some of these interviews. I did Mathieu Schoff eleers, Dharma 
Kumar, Cliff ord Geertz among others. Th ere is little to say about it. We 
sat in a room in the history department and chatted for one and a half 
hours as one does with interviews.
Geertz interests us, because we wanted to work out what or why you take the 
approaches you do take to history. We think of you as an eclecticist, but others 
might say other things. And you have just spoken about Cliff ord Geertz, who 
has an interesting approach to history. Looking at your own career, would you 
say there is a constant and what would that constant be?
Th e virtual constant is that I have been trying to understand colonial 
Cape Colony and people who left it and were in connection with it—take 
the Griqua book, the thesis, is just outside the Cape Colony, but it was 
completely dominated by the Cape colony—the problem with the book is 
that it had a whole set of hypotheses which depended on knowing about 
the Cape colony, which I didn’t, so I decided I needed to fi nd out more 
about it.6 Th en within that, I have looked at the Cape in a whole variety 
of diff erent ways—economic, demographic, religious, various forms of 
social, but not a lot of politics. Th at is the constant—eclecticism—I don’t 
know—most of what I have been doing until the 1990s, after the thesis, 
was based on very short visits to South Africa, very short archival bursts 
in the Cape archives. Status and Respectability7 was written, if you look 
carefully, on hardly any archival basis at all, and a lot of the mission stuff  
was based on published material, because many of the French and German 
mission journals were at that stage available in Oegstgeest8—and thus 
even closer to home than the Archives in Th e Hague—and the archives in 
Th e Hague formed the basis for the slavery book, Cape of Torments,9 and 
also the economic history with Pieter van Duin.10
Indeed, I have gone off  in a whole variety of diff erent directions, 
but within a geographical and temporal unity—I do not know why, it 
is just what seemed to make sense. And a lot of it, certainly Status and 
Respectability, has a lot of anthropology, but not Geertz. Also not Adam 
Kuper,11 though I was close to him when he was here. I would say that 
a lot of the stuff  I have done has been about fi nding individual stories 
which fi t to illustrate a particular pattern. Certainly the slave book is full 
of individual stories. Status and Respectability is about individual stories, 
to some extent Adam Kok’s Griquas is at the beginning,12 and certainly 
the Kat River book.13 On the other hand I can add up and so I am quite 
happy with numbers and am very happy with maps. It is the relationship 
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between individual stories and the world of social events which very often 
interests me. And then the more general books, the Concise History of 
South Africa and the History of Clothing came basically because people 
asked me to do them.14
So your excursion into global history was on assignment?
Yes I got this letter from Polity [press] saying ‘Dear Dr. Ross, we have 
this series with books about various things and we would very much like 
you to write a history of clothing.’ I am not quite sure why they asked 
me; it was fairly soon after Status and Respectability, and once I stopped 
laughing—for those who remember how I was dressed in the 1990s and 
1980s will understand—I began to think yes, one can do something really 
quite interesting about that. So I did.
When I [JBG] was an undergraduate I remember you once talking about 
clothing in class and sort of saying ‘clothing is a conscious choice and signals 
who you are.’
It does not signal who you are as much as it signals who you want other 
people to think you are.
One of the things that strikes—when you read Cape of torments, there is an 
incredible anger in the writing, an anger, which is right there on the surface, 
at the top, and which disappears from your later work.
Kat River was not quite as angry? I don’t know, if it is how you read it, it 
is how it is. 
Kat river is subtle.
Yes Cape of Torments is not subtle. I am just trying to remember the 
details as to when Cape of Torments got written—how much of that is 
in a personal thing, how much of that is from spending several months 
reading court cases with people getting put to death for whatever they did, 
which is not likely to make one happy about the thing, and how much is 
my experiences of living for short periods of time in South Africa, though 
I never lived there for more than nine months at a time. But, then, it is 
probably a consequence of maturation. Cape of Torments was published 
when I was 33.
A totally diff erent question: how did you manage to steer clear of the back-
biting and incredible feuding that existed among South African historians in 
the 1980s and 1990s?
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Well that is because I was not a South African historian. It makes a lot of 
diff erence.
And yet you are the most respected of the historians of South Africa.
Maybe… well, as I said, I did not have to refi ght the rugby matches 
between Bishops [Bishops Diocesan College] and SACS [South African 
College Schools]. Th ese are two major secondary schools in Cape Town 
to which a number of my colleagues went, and that competition is still 
there. It is that we know who went to Bishops and who went to SACS. 
But I did not have the fi ght going back to my youth, and the colonial 
Cape work that I was doing was somewhat away from others. Also, I am 
not a particularly combative sort of type, and I mean those debates were 
a lot about politics by some other name, continuation of politics by other 
means, the Cambridge History of South Africa describes its history—I 
know because I wrote it—and in that sense I did not participate. I did not 
need in the same way to demonstrate that clearly who I was and where I 
came from.
But that doesn’t mean that the type of history that you wrote was apolitical.
You can’t get a more political book than Cape of Torments. No, I was not 
apolitical, but I was not part of any given sect and that was the sort of way 
I worked. I was not a theoretician either, which made life easier, in the 
sense of the way some of them were theoreticians. I did not enter into the 
massive Marxist debates, mainly because I could not understand them, 
not sure if all participants could … 
Whereas your work is very much informed by theory, anthropological theory 
mostly.
Yes I suppose so, such as symbolism. But that anthropological theory 
varies and that gets absorbed by osmosis. I got slightly more theoretical 
as I got older.
You are undoubtedly the most productive historian of South Africa of your 
generation. Why is that?
I think, I have three things which mean that I work very effi  ciently as a 
historian. First, I read at the speed of light—I once found one of these 
books saying ‘read better read faster’ and I did the test at the end and 
discovered I read twice as fast as the best possible result they suggested. 
Secondly, I have a very good memory. Th irdly, I somehow learned to write 
in a draft and a half, most of the time. I don’t know how that happened, 
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but I think a lot of that had to do with being brought up listening to good 
English prose at least once a week. Anyone who has been brought up in 
the old days of the Anglican Church recalls saying general confession once 
a week, with the classic sentences ‘we have done those things which we 
ought not to have done and we have left undone those things which we 
ought to have done.’ It does not matter about the message, it is a wonderful 
sentence with one word of more than one syllable—‘and there is no health 
in us’—it goes on. You cannot be a postmodernist if you have done that, 
or a theoretical Marxist. Well, you probably can, but then you were not 
listening.
So you are basically saying it is because of your background, because of your 
parents, you are a Bildungsbürger. 
I was brought up with my sisters in an academic family, and that with 
as good an academic education as you can get. I went to a high-class 
academic English public school and then to Cambridge. Th at made it a lot 
easier and, as I said, learning what an English sentence sounds like helps. 
Since the 1970s you have been returning to South Africa regularly in a 
turbulent period. How did you experience that and how is that refl ected in 
your work?
How one experiences such changes? It is obviously a much less tense place 
than it was when I fi rst arrived. Th e fi rst weekend I arrived in Cape Town, 
on a Sunday morning all the lefties of Cape Town were woken up at fi ve in 
the morning and house searched; nothing more than that, I don’t think. 
Th ese were academics, Ph.D.s and researchers, basically UCT [University 
of Cape Town] left.
So, I mean South Africa is a much easier place to live in than it used to 
be. You still have a reasonable chance of getting murdered or being wiped 
out in a car crash. I must admit that I have never experienced violence in 
South Africa ever; you must know where not to go, and possibly I have 
been naïve. And the amount of change at the top, the political top, is 
considerable, but if you are not racist the change is very little, because 
the society has not changed very much. It has just got a lot of black faces 
at the top, which were not there earlier, if you don’t notice it. Well of 
course you have to notice, but if you ignore that, you wonder what has 
changed: Bishops and SACS still exist; there are still people who make 
money from tenders for the telephone books as Verwoerd’s cousins did. 
Th at the National Party got subsumed into the ANC shows that there is 
absolutely no diff erence…which it really did.15
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We looked at your thesis and thought of your latest book, Th e Borders of Race 
and noticed parallels between the books. But, the circumstances under which 
you could do research there were diff erent. You weren’t chased by the police 
this time.
I wasn’t chased by the police around Kat River, but we were certainly 
involved in political competition. It is a very tense place still. I mean we 
never quite worked out whether it was the mayor who dropped his main 
opponent off  the Seymour Dam or whether it was the mayor who got 
dropped, but there was an enormous amount of communal tension in 
the valley between the Xhosa and the descendants of the settlers. Th at is 
what we were pulled into. Th e place is tense and highly politicised because 
there is competition for scarce fertile irrigable land, and that still goes on. 
Obviously the relationship between Adam Kok’s Griquas and Th e Borders 
of Race is considerable in some ways it is practised and the theme is very 
much the same and a number of characters appear in both, so even at that 
level the connection is there.
Historians are not supposed to predict the future, but they always do.
Probably better than others. What is going to happen in Southern Africa—
probably more of the same in the coming ten years, and I cannot see 
any serious shift in the political dispensation in the relatively near future. 
Part of that means that the current political dispensation backs up and 
profi ts from the current economic dispensation even though people who 
run the economy are not the people who run the politics. Some of them 
may be, there are clearly people who form the bridges, Ramaphosa and 
Sexwale, but the people who run the politics are suffi  ciently dependent 
on the people who run the economy not to cock up the economy in the 
way it has happened in Zimbabwe. At least that is my probably unduly 
optimistic view.
Would you attribute that to the rapid growth of the African middle class?
Yes. Th e black middle class has an enormous stake in its future. Th e black 
middle class is at least twice as large as the white middle class. Th ose 
are the people for whom the ANC in government works, which is what 
pisses off  people who vote for the Economic Freedom Front of Julius 
Malema. But I think that they want their own part of the pie; they are 
not going to let the pie disappear. And there is this incredibly complicated 
relationship between the black middle class and the ANC top which, as 
I see it, is basically because the ANC cannot say they are supporting the 
middle class, and have to keep their relationship with the unions and the 
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communist party running, but nevertheless that is the—it is good for 
the ANC to have people like Malema around; when they were still in the 
ANC it was a lot easier for them, because he could shoot his mouth off  and 
pretend, and everyone thought that the ANC was being radical whilst it 
was just getting on with its business. 
Yet it has delivered over the past twenty years rather more than could 
be expected of it: quite a lot, in terms of electrifi cation, social grants have 
been enormous and boomed many poor communities. Th ere has been a 
form of redistribution towards the bottom of society, which perhaps does 
not show up in income or inequality measures, but there are other things 
like health care and education. Th ese are unquantifi able forms of income 
which probably have improved the lot of South Africans substantially. 
Th ere are obviously many very poor South Africans still and there will 
continue to be so in the foreseeable future. But I do not think it will 
explode—famous last words.
One of the other extremely important things is the end of formal racial 
discrimination
Th at makes an enormous diff erence. I think there is a lot more social 
mobility than people realise.
In the introduction to Beyond the Pale16 you refl ect on questions of continuity 
and change as you did just now. In the same text you passionately declare your 
love for South Africa—so what is it that you love about South Africa?
I love the countryside, I love the country—I love landscapes anyway, the 
South African landscape has always got me—and I love trying to work 
out how society works. Th ere is also the sense in which South Africa is a 
place of incredible social complications, and I said nothing has changed. 
Obviously that is not really true, but there are an enormous amount of 
social complications and fascinating people around them. Understand 
them and make sense of them, that is what I love. 
You retired last year, but did not stop working of course. We know you are 
working on three projects at the moment. Can you elaborate?
One of them is a spin off  to the Kat River book. It is an anthology of Khoi 
political thought, which is to see what there is when putting it together. 
I have collected 85,000 words of text so it will get cut down. Not that 
I have written it myself. Th ese are various texts which together give a 
running commentary on how the lower class saw colonial South African 
racists from about the 1820s to the 1870s, and I will have to contextualise 
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it and write little essays on why it is that they were objecting to Cape 
separatism and such. And the second one, which I should have fi nished 
long ago, is not a Cape book. It is on black material culture: it is about 
tables and chairs, knives and forks and those sorts of things, and how they 
have been adopted in black homes, which is not easy to fi nd literature on. 
A lot is going to be based on market research from the 1970s onwards, 
and before that just picking things up in various places. Th e third, which 
I haven’t done much on yet apart from collecting a certain amount of 
information, is an ecological history of a single valley in the Eastern Cape, 
the Gamtoos. Th is is about the work of the developmental state and about 
solving ecological problems, but also it is about missions and such like.… 
I shall have to go and do some interviews and fi nd someone to work for 
me in the deeds offi  ce in Cape Town. It is about an area which since the 
1970s has become a very fl ourishing agricultural district. Before that, for 
a number of reasons, it was rather run down, poor white. Since the 1970s 
it has become very rich on the basis of Afrikaner economic empowerment. 
After 1994 it benefi tted enormously from the end of sanctions. Th ese are 
citrus producers, and it is an island of high productivity and a certain 
amount of wealth and prosperity certainly at the farms and substantial 
employment.
Moving from South Africa to the Netherlands, to Leiden where you spent 
quite a large part of your life. You entered academia there through the history 
department. But you managed to put African Studies on the agenda in Leiden.
I have lived in Leiden longer than anywhere else. Yes, I set up an African 
studies degree course—in fact I think I set up fi ve degree courses in my 
life at various levels. I have never quite worked out why African Studies as 
a degree course never attracted many students. Th ere are diffi  culties about 
area studies, which include African studies, Southeast Asian studies and 
South Asian studies alike, slightly less for China and Japanese now, slightly 
less for Latin America as well. Somehow they do not attract very many 
students, at the top end in the research Master’s we get ten students a year, 
which is not enough. But over the last years Africa has been given a larger 
place within the history department, which is a good development. For 
most of my career, the history department did not look for cooperation. 
When I was working for African Studies, they had to make use of me 
from time to time, but they tried to discourage that because of the way 
fi nances worked. It is cynical, but that is how it was. Th e credits of students 
who came to me were not counted towards the history department; that 
changed about fi ve years ago. But it is still ridiculous that Africa is now 
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within history and China is not, but that also has to do with how the 
Sinologists think about these things. Th ey do not see themselves in the 
fi rst place as historians, but as Sinologists.
Do you feel that academia has changed much over time? You have revealed 
yourself as someone who emphasises continuities over change but…
Leiden has changed since I arrived in 1975; it has got better. It got much 
more professional, which in general is a good thing. I suspect that the 
power of what a friend of mine calls the crows—because they walk about in 
black gowns—has decreased somewhat. Th is is a good thing. Th ere were 
few people who, when I fi rst arrived, were too powerful. I benefi tted from 
one of them enormously, but that is another matter, not that I approved 
of it. Th ere are those whom I hated and those whom I enormously 
appreciated, though I did not get anything out of them. Overall Leiden 
has become much more professional and much more productive, in part 
because there are some brownie points to be gained by being productive 
in terms of writing, which in the past there were not. And now slowly 
Leiden is beginning to realise that the university has the broadest selection 
of historians probably outside North America, and they bloody well ought 
to make use of it and they do not, not enough. Th e only places which 
probably have a wider geographical range of historians are UCLA and 
Wisconsin, and that’s about it and this is not exploited enough.
Is it policy that creates institutional boundaries?
It is not so much policy; the boundaries are internal too. But on the other 
hand, if you look objectively at what the potential strength is of Leiden or 
of our institutions, it is in the breadth that could and should be exploited. 
Th e linguists managed to do so in a way that the historians never did. Th e 
original IGEER [Institute for the History of European Expansion and 
Reaction] idea might have worked, but in the end it was too Eurocentric 
to get everyone on board. Henk Wesseling had the right idea, but in 
the end there were some historians within the history department who 
rubbed some who were outside the department up the wrong way. Which 
meant that the symbiosis which was possible never happened. Part of it 
was personality, part of it was the institutional question. But whatever the 
linguists or the sinologists thought they were doing, they did not realise 
that what they were doing was so close to what was being done in the 
history department. Th at has to some extent changed, but probably not 
enough. Th ere was a potential there that was not exploited. 
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In relation to your last remark on Eurocentrism among historians we have 
one more question. Looking at your work, you have experimented with a great 
range of sources, through a variety of approaches. We have already spoken 
about your eclecticism. Now African history, and of course this counts for other 
regions too, is a diffi  cult history to write. Often one has to depend, maybe not 
exclusively but to a large extent, on European primary sources. Do you feel 
that you have developed a way to tackle this problem? And, on a lighter note, 
what then is your favourite source?
No I have not. I have worked almost entirely on a colonial society, and 
you have then to think about how collections of written sources, which are 
fi ltered, which came into existence through the colonial society, through 
the colonial government, can tell you things about what is going on among 
non-colonial people, basically Africans and slaves, and that is essentially 
what nineteenth- and twentieth-century African history is about, in a 
technical sense. And the idea that you can’t actually say something about 
the subaltern classes of colonial society because the sources are colonial is 
of course a mistake. It is one-sided, but I have not found any better way 
out of it than anyone else. And I have always been a historian of colonial 
societies rather than of Africa, rather than someone who deals with Africa 
as before colonial times. 
My favourite source is the landscape. Th e most enjoyable bits of being 
a historian I have had are walking and driving about various bits of 
southern Africa and working out how they came to be, to look the way 
they do. Trying to reconstruct the irrigation system and such like. Th e 
W.G. Hoskins type of history is wonderful.17 I don’t manage to do enough 
of it now. I spent more time reading archives and books and newspapers 
than I do walking around the countryside, but that does not mean to say 
I prefer doing it. 
Notes
1 Moeding College was established in Botswana by South African exiles after 
the Bantu Education Act of the apartheid government eff ectively scuttled 
academic teaching for black students.
2 Sidcup is a suburban district of south-east London, England, in the London 
Borough of Bexley.
3 S. Kanya-Forstner, Th e conquest of the Western Sudan: a study in French 
military imperialism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969).
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4 Th e thesis was completed in 1969 and published in 2010. It is accompanied 
by a Preface by Ciraj Rassool, and an Introduction by Robert Ross: ‘Martin 
Legassick, the Griqua and South Africa’s Historiographical Revival: An 
Appreciation.’ M. Legassick, Th e politics of a South African frontier: the 
Griqua, the Sotho-Tswana, and the missionaries, 1780–1840 (Basler Afrika 
Bibliographien, Basel, 2010).
5 IGEER stands for Instituut voor de Geschiedenis van de Europese expansie en 
reacties daarop (Centre for the history of European Expansion and reaction.)
6 R. Ross, Adam Kok’s Griquas: a study in the development of stratifi cation in 
South Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976).
7 R. Ross, Status and respectability 1750–1870: 1750–1870: a tragedy of manners 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
8 Th e archives of the Dutch protestant mission were then located in Oegstgeest. 
Th ey have since moved to the Utrecht provincial and town archives (Het 
Utrechts archief ). 
9 R. Ross, Cape of Torments: slavery and resistance in South Africa (London: 
Routledge and Kegan, 1983).
10 Duin, P. van, and Robert Ross. Th e Economy of the Cape Colony in the 
Eighteenth Century. Intercontinenta, no. 7 (Leiden: Center for the History of 
European Expansion, 1987).
11 Adam Kuper was professor of Anthropology in Leiden between 1976 and 
1985, after which he moved to Brunel University. He has worked mainly on 
Southern Africa.
12 Ross, Adam Kok’s Griquas.
13 R. Ross, Th e Borders of Race in Colonial South Africa: the Kat River Settlement, 
1829–1856 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
14 Ross, Clothing: a Global History; or the Imperialists’ New Clothes; Ross, A 
Concise History of South Africa.
15 National Party founded in 1915, in power from 1948 to 1994, and the 
party that implemented apartheid in South Africa. ANC (African National 
Congress) founded in 1912, in power following the holding of the fi rst non-
racial democratic elections in South Africa in 1994.
16 R. Ross, Beyond the Pale: essays on the history of colonial South Africa (Hanover 
etc.: University Press of New England for Wesleyan University Press, 1993).
17 W.G. Hoskins, Th e Making of the English Landscape (London: Hudder and 
Stoughton, 1955).
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History as Renegade Politics: Interview with 
Ann Laura Stoler
In May 2016, Professor Ann Laura Stoler visited Leiden University as the 
Spring 2016 Global Asia Scholar. On the last day of her stay, Amrit Dev 
and Sanne Ravensbergen—historians affi  liated with the Leiden Humanities 
Faculty—met Stoler on a sunny terrace situated alongside one of the canals 
for a conversation about the developments in her scholarly work, career 
choices, sources of inspiration, and the motivations for doing history. Professor 
Ann Laura Stoler is Willy Brandt Distinguished University Professor of 
Anthropology and Historical Studies at Th e New School for Social Research in 
New York. She has published extensively on the colonial history of Indonesia 
and the sexual and racial epistemologies of imperial politics. Her recent 
research addresses how colonial histories matter and manifest in the world 
today.
We would like to go back to the year when you started your studies as a student. 
What were your plans and dreams for the future back then?
I’m not really sure that I ever thought in terms of plans and dreams. As for 
so many of my generation, what dominated the air around us was the war 
in Vietnam. Th e war saturated our imagination, and even if one wasn’t 
hugely political we were all in this place where we agreed that we shouldn’t 
be in Vietnam long before a large majority of the country turned against 
it. We marched, we attended rallies, we had study groups, we got arrested, 
and we marched again, not really sure where to go. Th e war changed my 
reading habits from the poetry of T. S. Eliot and Robinson Jeff ers to Lenin, 
Marx and Rosa Luxemburg—all seemed so relevant to the imperial order 
of things, though I wasn’t quite sure what to do with what they said. Unlike 
our teachers, whose Marxism had to be tempered, we wore our strident 
Marxism and political protest as a badge of honour—McCarthyism of the 
1950s was far away. Within that environment, pursuing a ‘profession’ was 
never really on my radar. I imagined that there were things I had to study, 
needed to do, and being an anthropologist seemed to off er the most license 
and fewest restrictions. In fact it seemed implicitly to endorse, while not 
itself subscribing to, what I thought mattered—some incipient critique of 
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a politics of knowledge that was animated by what I was then learning 
about US counterinsurgency and ‘strategic hamlet’ studies in Th ailand, 
project Camelot, USAID1 programs that promoted themselves as reaching 
‘the poorest of the poor’ and that invariably—with respect to the Green 
Revolution in Java—not surprisingly, advantaged the rich.
It was feminist politics and Marxist categories that seemed to guide 
my way. From my junior year as an undergraduate at Barnard, taking grad 
seminars at Columbia, the subjects of my papers ranged from class politics 
in the history of Ireland to the rural roots of the Chinese revolution for my 
undergrad thesis. In winter 1972 I went to Java, imagining I would study 
the eff ects of the ‘green revolution’ on rural women (however absurd that 
seems in retrospect, since I couldn’t speak Javanese and had only the most 
rudimentary market Indonesian to go on) and to visit my then partner, 
Ben White,2 for what I thought was a brief interlude before starting 
graduate school at Berkeley in Chinese studies. I was taken with Java, 
put off  grad school, married Ben in Singapore, and studied everything 
and anything—gleaning and rice harvesting, the meagre items women 
exchanged in small-scale trade, house gardens, arduous palm sugar 
production, cassava consumption in homes where rice was a luxury they 
could not aff ord—about how landless families in the central Javanese 
village where we lived survived during those years. It was ethnography 
and the making of inequalities I was after, and jointly Ben and I sought 
to dispel Cliff ord Geertz’s distorted fi ction of ‘shared poverty’ as the 
prevailing condition of the rural poor.3
When I fi nally returned to New York and to Columbia University’s 
Anthropology Department in 1974, I read more political economy and 
history than anthropology and knew I wanted to study what colonial 
capitalism had carved out on the ground—which is how I ended up living 
with Javanese plantation workers in North Sumatra between 1977 and 
1978. I didn’t yet know how much of that ‘village’ land had been seized 
from the estates by those in the squatter movement in the 1950s. What 
I did know is that alleged communist labor union members of Sarbupri 
were killed by the thousands. Over a decade after 1965, fear was still 
palpably in the air. 
How did you go from your work on the labour movement and the political 
economy to the colonial system?
Doing history always seemed to me to be a subversive act and a renegade 
politics in a discipline once so committed to the ‘ethnographic present.’ 
I learned Dutch by avidly reading about the colonial history of Deli 
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before I arrived and it didn’t take long for me to realize how much of the 
topography, the system of labor recruitment, the very infrastructure and 
administrative apparatus were deeply embedded in colonial systems of 
coercion, persuasion and control. Recruitment was gendered, as were the 
pay scales, and in the history of plantation ‘development’ sexual politics 
was key. Th e contemporary social ecology of North Sumatra was saturated 
with colonial relations, multinational monocrop priorities, and gendered 
labor policies that were not mere leftovers. As we’ve learned since in the 
ever-expanding and destructive palm oil industry, gendered pay scales 
and policies that condoned or condemned family labor recruitment—
depending on the moment—were fundamental to agribusiness strategies 
and have not gone away.
After fi eldwork, I ended up in Amsterdam with my partner Larry 
Hirschfeld (Ben and I had decided that conjugality wasn’t for us), whom 
Claude Levi-Strauss invited to work with him in Paris. Maurice Godelier, 
a prominent Marxist anthropologist, invited me to join his seminar and I 
settled in Paris to agonize through my dissertation with migraines, despair 
and bursts of excitement.4 It was a pretty arid place for someone studying 
Indonesia and multinationals, but help came from unexpected quarters: I 
met Jacques Leclerc, probably one of the most knowledgeable researchers 
on Indonesia’s left and labor movements,5 and through him a circle of 
Indonesian leftists who themselves, or their parents, had been in China 
in 1965 and were stuck there until some made their way to Europe. Both 
they and Jacques taught me so much, and it was they who procured an 
invitation for me to visit and interview the score of Indonesian activists—
women and men—who were still exiled in China about the early years of 
the labor movement they helped to forge.
Th ere were already two trajectories to my work: one was about ‘subaltern’ 
politics and our knowledge practices; the other one, deeply historical, 
that kept me traveling back and forth to Th e Hague and Amsterdam and 
Leiden from Paris to work at the KIT,6 to the KITLV in Leiden, and to the 
archives in Th e Hague. I was frustrated by what I couldn’t fi nd, but utterly 
taken by what was there, and more than ever amazed by what Dutch 
historians seemed to so assiduously circumvent and dismiss—but could 
not have missed. I was just starting to read Foucault then. Th e History of 
Sexuality came out in 1976, and in 1978 Edward Said’s Orientalism. Both 
hit like bolts of recognition, making sense of what I was already writing! 
Feminist friends in England looked askance at—and questioned—my 
referencing Foucault. I remember responding defi antly (and probably 
defensively) that gender was diff erent than the history of sexuality, and 
400 world history – a genealogy
as feminists we had better know it. I realized I had probably stayed away 
from the US too long when I was cycling in Amsterdam to the KIT one 
day in the opposite direction of a protest march and didn’t know what it 
was about. I stayed in Paris until 1983 and then took my fi rst job at the 
University of Wisconsin, my fi rst encounter with teaching, the politics of 
scholarship and the great Midwest. 
From how you describe this, it seems that the course of your career was merely 
decided by the people you met. Were they that infl uential? 
It’s interesting that you say that. To have ‘infl uence’ is a word that Foucault 
reminds us hides, and I would argue steals, meaning from the practices 
that make it up. I’d say that those places where I hadn’t expected to go 
were provocations that compelled me to do something in a way I might 
not have otherwise, caught me productively off  precarious balance, and 
exposed me to the vulnerabilities of operating on unfamiliar terrain. When 
I fi rst arrived in Paris in 1979, I was terrifi ed to buy a tomato: now I love 
lecturing in French because something diff erent happens that is beyond 
mere translation. I actually fi nd myself saying things in ways that I think 
I could not have quite said with the same force in English. So it is true in 
a sense that people who have entered my life have graced and shaped its 
course: my sister fi rst and foremost.7 When I was in graduate school one of 
my fellow students was married to a historian whose Marxism was in his 
bones. I would plant myself in the grim hallway of their apartment reading 
Marx until they politely kicked me out. Sure, I would have and could have 
read those books elsewhere but there was something about being utterly 
surrounded by so much literature on labor history and political economy 
and talking with someone who cared so much about it that probably held 
me diff erently than it would have otherwise and elsewhere. 
Th e interviews I did in China with such vibrant former Indonesian 
political activists stayed with me as well. One of the fi rst questions they 
asked me (I was 32 at the time) was about my children, which I didn’t 
yet have. But how can you be part of a revolution without children? I 
was baffl  ed and retorted that you can’t have time for children if you’re 
doing political work. Th ey laughed at my stubbornness and naïveté. I was 
starting my fi rst job in Madison, Wisconsin, several months later and had 
my fi rst child on the fi rst day of classes the following year and my second, 
the year after! 
Choices were to be made. As I realized I couldn’t write about the 
people I interviewed (many with close family still in Indonesia), I set aside 
those days and hours of interviews among an underground Indonesian 
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old left and those still in China. We still don’t have an account of that 
rich history of left labor activism and cultural creativity in ‘postcolonial’ 
Indonesia of the 1950s . . . Many thought Ruth McVey would write it—or 
was writing it.8 Maybe we were all just hoping she would. I don’t know. It’s 
a history that waits to be done, not to be written as part of an inevitable 
teleology leading to 1965 but as it was lived during those Bandung years of 
imagined possibilities. Ideally, this should be written by some collective of 
young Indonesian historians and artists and fi lmmakers who can imagine 
what something like LEKRA was, as it infuses their own creative and 
political energies today.9
When you were in this sort of developing stage of your career, did you still 
consider yourself an anthropologist? Was that important to you? 
I never identifi ed with the discipline, but it off ered a pass that allowed 
room for Marx as much as Foucault. I got my fi rst job in Madison (1983) 
despite doing ‘too much’ history. Seven years later, I was courted at the 
University of Michigan precisely because this was one consolidating 
moment in which the synergy between history and anthropology took 
hold. A group of us hybrids fashioned one of the most exciting joint 
Ph.D. programs in the two disciplines, recruited fabulous students, and 
produced a new generation of wondrous young scholars. 
I left Ann Arbor in 2003 for the New School for Social Research in 
New York, where I imagined a philosophically infl ected critical scholarship 
with a diff erent bite and edge. My work has been nourished by being 
in New York (where I was born) and by the environment that the New 
School faculty and its eclectic graduate student body off er.
Your story is very much about being open to people, but also to disciplines. You 
would never stick to one discipline; you prefer history but in fact you were not 
choosing. 
I care about disciplined, careful work, but not about disciplines in any way. 
My most enabling interlocutors are philosophers, students of literature, 
law, geography, architecture and political theory. Historians would say: 
fascinating study you did of the archives . . . for an anthropologist. 
Anthropologists would say: fascinating history you’re doing but it’s not 
anthropology. Neither thought I was doing what they were. I probably 
cultivated that stance more than I realized at the time, knowing then 
that if certain rules were ignored, I had better do what I was doing with 
suffi  cient breadth and depth, with transparency, with vigilance—and well. 
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To me it seems a very brave thing to do, to not be part of something, but it 
seems you were feeling comfortable in not fi tting in. I get the feeling, the word 
‘renegade’ is a very good word.
I think it was probably more brazen than brave. Th ose connections were 
energizing, especially those that were counter-intuitive and not considered 
the proper ‘cases’ for comparison. Virginia Dominquez, a thoughtful 
and now eminent anthropologist, once called an essay of mine on racial 
regimes of truth ‘gutsy’—and I’ve often wondered what that actually 
meant and what about the venture seemed so. I think there was something 
disturbing to me (and to my readers in turn) about the ways in which 
the racialized domains of knowledge production in which I was working 
crumpled in my hands—the historiography on racism was folded through 
the meanings given to race; discrete categories of scholarship and social 
practice collapsed into one another, recursively producing racial fi ctions 
and mythologies of racism’s origins. I love the kind of work that resists 
one’s intrusions, and almost invites one to rough up smooth ground and 
smooth passage. 
Th at’s obvious from every text you’ve written. You’re kind of part of it. You’re 
so in the text. I have never read anything that’s written the way you write. You 
developed your own language. I wonder how that developed?
I love the writing, not only what you say but how you say it. I write for 
content and clarity, but for tone and timbre as well. I want the writing 
to be so compelling that you have to attend to it even if it’s not what you 
wanted to hear. 
Do you still feel that way?
More than ever and in ways I might not have dared to do as a younger 
scholar. Th e politics of knowledge remains one of my bottom lines: how 
you teach, what you teach, what you write, what counts as a ‘source’, what 
is deemed credible and trustworthy or not. Relations of power course 
through the presences and absences in what we write and how it matters. 
Have you ever considered fi ghting for your causes outside of academia? Why is 
academia the right channel for you to disseminate your thoughts?
You have to do what compels you, stirs you into sleepless nights, then gets 
you—however reluctantly—there to your desk the next day. When I was 
writing Race and the Education of Desire in 1993, I would get dressed in 
the morning and put on my boots before sitting at my desk: one day I sat 
down and inadvertently started searching for something behind me, my 
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arms hitting up against the back of my chair. Do you know what I was 
doing? Looking for my seat belt, to hear the click that it was secure, before 
I took off ! Th ere’s not much more to say on that score—or so much. It was 
lift off  and I was excited. 
But you were asking about other channels. I’ve taught in a maximum-
security prison, loved it and would do that again. I’ve participated in 
art installations at museums and found that wanting. I’ve marched in 
Washington, been tear-gassed in Palestine, put in jail (overnight) in 
New York. I’m not sure these are any more eff ective ways of speaking 
out. I suppose it depends on how one thinks about action and practice. I 
don’t like meetings. I would not be up to the day-to-day endurance that 
organizing entails. 
You don’t like the environment of being an activist. But still you want your 
political message to be heard. Do you remember the fi rst time or the times 
when you were receiving the most resistance to your work? When did your 
work provoke people and how did you deal with that?
It was probably in 1976 when I published my fi rst article as a grad student 
in the feminist journal Signs.10 It opened with a provocation that ‘class was 
analytically prior to gender’ with respect to agrarian reforms in Java. I was 
responding to what I saw as a pernicious focus of development agencies on 
‘the role of women in X’ that seemed to me at the time to defl ect attention 
from the broader pacifying politics of development aid. But there wasn’t 
really ‘resistance’ to the work so much as surprise, and from others a 
resounding affi  rmation.
For in fact I’m not of the feminist generation that bore the worst 
brunt of exclusion and attack. Th at was more forcefully the case for a 
generation earlier. I had no trouble publishing. When I was in Madison, a 
stolid World Bank consultant on the faculty criticized my work for being 
‘political’ and not ‘scholarly,’ and with avuncular largesse counselled me 
to cease the former if I wanted tenure. Cliff ord Geertz was to agree as 
he wrote in my tenure promotion letter: ‘It is not that she should not 
get tenure now, she should never get it.’ His letter was dismissed as ad 
feminem, but it certainly said something about Geertz’s willingness to 
skewer a young woman academic on the grounds that the work was again 
‘political,’ not ‘serious’ and not ‘scholarly’. I’m sure there are many other 
instances about which I don’t know; in the Netherlands, the silence was 
sometimes deafening. 
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For me Carnal Knowledge and also Race and the Education of Desire 
were total eye-openers as a young student.11 But here in Th e Netherlands it 
was considered so out of the box. Would ignoring someone’s work also count 
as a way to resist it? I sometimes feel that is what happens to your work in Th e 
Netherlands.
Th ere is rumour that Leiden’s colonial historians would prefer that Stoler’s 
work not be followed, barely cited, and better not mentioned at all. Race 
and the Education of Desire, a book very much about Dutch colonial 
history, has never been reviewed in the Netherlands, nor has Carnal 
Knowledge and Imperial Power as far as I know . . . strange when both have 
been reviewed in so many other places and translated into other languages 
across the globe.
How do you look at Race and the Education of Desire yourself? 
It was a project that took me on a journey I had not thought to go on. . . 
It grew out of a new seminar I was teaching in 1991, began as an essay but 
was more than anything a puzzle that I was compelled to fi gure out: how 
Foucault could write about sexuality and not about race, and then race 
but only loosely tied to sexuality, and how could he write about both with 
colonialism and empire so utterly eff aced? His 1976 lectures at the Collège 
de France were startling to me, and the project of tracking his insights and 
those moves he chose not to make . . . It was with a passion that I tracked 
the appearance of race on the scratchy recordings at the Saulchoir Library 
where his archive and recordings were stashed.12
But there was also something uncanny in that venture: that twisted 
helix of race and sexuality was already emerging from the Dutch colonial 
archives, and my own treatment of those occlusions in historiography, 
Race and the Education of Desire, traced those convergences, opening the 
possibility of thinking and writing diff erently about practices that were 
seen to be so utterly distinct in metropole and colony—and where the 
political had no place. Fred Cooper and I were simultaneously fi nishing 
up Tensions of Empire (1997) and I had already done the archival work 
for and written ‘In Cold Blood’ on hierarchies of credibility in colonial 
Sumatra13 that in a later rendition was one of the fi nal chapters of Along 
the Archival Grain (2009). I suppose it’s superfl uous to say that there has 
never been anything linear about my writing. Problematics reappear 
at new moments; ‘knowledge things’ emerge at new sites to be worked 
though diff erently again.
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Why specifi cally do you think Race and the Education of Desire is so barely 
acknowledged in the Netherlands? 
It was dismissed as ‘about Foucault’ for those who neither read nor cared 
to read him. Homo academicus as we know is homo hierarchus in the 
Netherlands, and perhaps it is not surprising that junior scholars who 
might have thought to engage the actual substance of the work did not, or 
did not acknowledge doing so. It was only when Along the Archival Grain 
came out that my decades of work on the Netherlands Indies as a racial 
formation was marginally engaged. But then I don’t write for a Dutch 
academic audience of a certain generation. I write across connections that 
seem not to be made because they puzzle me and I want to fi gure out what 
impasses make some ways of thinking more accessible than others.
You refuse to be part of one single group or discipline. On the other hand, you 
called yourself a Foucauldian yesterday during the lecture you gave. 
I rarely do that and laughed (at myself) when I did yesterday. I still read 
Foucault avidly, as I do so many other philosophers, historians of science 
and literary scholars, but it is Foucault who confi rms my own sense that 
philosophy needs history, that ‘fi eldwork in philosophy’ is a political and 
historical project, and that writing history is a political act. Foucault, 
Gaston Bachelard, Merleau-Ponty, Judith Butler scramble what I thought 
and think I know over and again.14 I read for those striking moments of 
eruption, disruption and disintegration. 
Is this the reason you decided to establish the Institute for Critical Social 
Inquiry (ICSI) at the New School for Social Research in New York? 
Th e ICSI is more than a labour of love: I wanted to create a space where 
it was possible to learn about what you felt you should already have 
known—whether that be the work of Fanon, Hegel or Marx—and to 
learn about how to think with those thinkers today and to do so with 
‘masters’ who had taught and studied those thinkers for years, and then to 
come together with fellows from all over the world to think those thinkers 
diff erently again. It’s been a wondrous set of occasions the last two years 
and I imagine that the third—with David Harvey, Anthony Appiah and 
Michael Taussig—will be as well.
You’ve told us how you see history as your political act, and this seems to be your 
focus now. But if you had, say, three months right now without obligations 
and you were given the choice to go to an archive, which archive would you 
go to and why?
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Th at’s a hard question since I rarely know in advance where I want to get or 
go. I know that I want to write about the politics of sentiment in a diff erent 
register, that I want to explore what it would mean to pursue what I set out 
as a challenge at the end of Along the Archival Grain, writing history in a 
‘minor key,’ or what Ralph Ellison saw as ‘the lower frequencies’ of human 
experience . . . My new book, Duress,15 takes its measure from that, but I 
still have a long way to go.
Where do you get your awareness for language from? Does it have anything to 
do with your early study of Japanese? Or with the way your family interacts 
with language? How does this develop in a person?
Insecurity, perhaps, doubting what I know and how to know it. My sister 
was a terrifying presence and inspiration. She often shared with me her 
translations from Sanskrit when I was still a small girl and made me alert 
and attentive to the multiple senses and sounds of words. I tend to write 
aloud, I want to hear the lilt of a sentence, the cadence of a word. Th ese 
are not distractions or embellishments; there is analytic content not only 
in form, as Hayden White would have it, but in writerly style.16 Th is is no 
screen of deception as those who condemned the sophists would have it, 
rather an eff ort to capture the very ambiguities, brutalities and pleasures 
that language aff ords. I’m taken with George Steiner’s notion that 
philosophy is the poetry of thought,17 and that concepts are the potential 
poetry of philosophy, as Giorgio Agamben has put it.18 Th ere is conceptual 
labor in the language, the images, the metaphoric weight we can bring to 
questions that matter—in our prose.
How does the writing itself interact with the development of your thinking 
into book projects? 
Writing is not for me putting something down that has already gelled. 
Outlines have always paralyzed me. Writing is an exercise in limits and 
extensions, of small victories and failures to touch, to get close to what you 
think you want to say—and then, in the writing, something kaleidoscopic 
can happen: the affi  rmative turns into a question, the assertion into its 
opposite, the fi gure and ground are suddenly inverted and you are 
humbled, and lose any sense of total control. 
All of my books loop back on one another. As I said earlier, there 
is nothing linear, no trajectory outlined in advance. My points of entry 
are usually very small, puzzling moments, jarring turns of phrase, minor 
incisions that stand out as what Roland Barthes would refer to as a 
‘punctum’ with respect to photography, but that I try to remain alert to 
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on an archival page. Abstractions off er no inspiration. Th ey are limpid, 
produce pallid insights and pallid prose.
Do you know what lies ahead for you? Do you have one or two big issues left 
that you feel you want to be working with in the next years? Do you have a 
plan or is it completely open?
Yes, in some minor way. No, in the grand scheme of life choices. I fear 
becoming soft around the edges, slipping from the quest for an ‘ethics of 
discomfort’ unknowingly, fearless speech receding as a goal. Each of these 
has probably pushed my work to more explicitly engage the present and 
the confounding temporalities of it: colonialism in the raw in Palestine, 
a politics of sentiment that pervades the assessment of remorse, death 
penalties and the recesses of the law today, the ‘taste’ (and distaste) of 
racisms colluding and in collision with what it means to be French in 
France today.
To return one last time to what you are doing at the moment, why is it now 
law that you are working on?
In many ways, it is where I began: I was intrigued nearly thirty years ago 
by how much mixed-marriage regulations needed and butted up against 
international law, intergentiel recht,19 and how deeply international law 
was entwined with the making and securing of imperial concerns and the 
distinctions that were their supports and on which they would depend. 
Dutch colonial legal texts contain more ‘ethnographic’ detail that most 
colonial texts designed to do so. But more striking is how much ‘feeling’ 
and ‘sentiments’ (inappropriately directed or properly displayed) permeate 
those legal documents. Law is where sentiment harbors a commanding 
force. Not in the histrionics of trial soliloquys or in the theatrics of Law 
and Order reruns, but deeply in a moral economy of retribution and 
remorse, repentance and vengeance, the aff ective scaff olding on which 
the law’s claims to dispassion, rules and rigid non-partisan rulings operate 
so inequitably, securing the resilience of racial formations today. Foucault 
did not turn away from law as a site of rule as is so often thought to be, but 
rather sought to show its powerful diff usion. What he did not do is off er 
what seemed to be a promise when he argued in 1972 that every sentiment 
has a history. Whether there is an aff ective analytics, or the potentiality 
for one, in Foucault’s treatment of subjugation, subjectivity, the care of 
the self and the coercion of the other is a subject I’m grappling with in my 
work today.
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1 Th e United States Agency for International Development is a government 
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3 Cliff ord Geertz, Agricultural Involution: Th e Process of Ecological Change in 
Indonesia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966). 
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1983; Ann Laura Stoler, Capitalism and Confrontation in Sumatra’s Plantation 
Belt, 1870–1979 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985). 
5 See, for example, Jacques Leclerc, La pensée des communistes indonésiens: 
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1965): essai d’approche et d’ interpretation (Paris, 1969). 
6 Library of the Royal Tropical Institute (KIT) in Amsterdam. In 2013, the 
library was closed and its colonial collections transferred to the Leiden 
University Library. 
7 Barbara Stoler Miller (1940–1993) was a professor of Sanskrit literature at 
Barnard College, New York City.
8 Ruth McVey (1930– ) was a founder of the journal Indonesia at Cornell 
University’s Southeast Asia Program and taught Southeast Asian politics and 
government at London University’s School of Oriental and African Studies.
9 LEKRA (Lembaga Kebudajaan Rakjat or Institute for the People’s Culture) 
was a left-wing literary and social movement founded in 1950 and banned in 
1965 along with the Indonesian Communist Party.
10 Ann Laura Stoler, ‘Class Structure and Female Autonomy in Rural Java,’ 
Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 3:1 (1977): 74–89.
11 Ann Laura Stoler, Race and the Education of Desire: Foucault’s History of 
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Intimate in Colonial Rule (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).
12 Th e lectures have been published based on the audio recordings. See, for 
instance, M. Foucault, Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de 
France, 1975–76, translated by David Macey (New York: Picador, 2003).
13 Ann Laura Stoler, ‘“In Cold Blood”: Hierarchies of Credibility and the Politics 
of Colonial Narratives,’ Representations, Special Issue: Imperial Fantasies and 
Postcolonial Histories 37 (1992): 151–89.
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Phénoménologie de la perception (Paris: Gallimard, 1945); Judith Butler, 
Giving an Account of Oneself (New York: Fordham Press, 2005).
15 Ann Laura Stoler, Duress: Imperial Durabilities in Our Times (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2016). 
16 Hayden White, Th e Content of Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical 
Representation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987).
17 George Steiner, Th e Poetry of Th ought: From Hellenism to Celan (New York: 
New Directions, 2011);
18 Qu’est-ce qu’un dispositif? (Paris: Payot, 2007). 
19 Th e study of the application of (international) law within one state in which 
each population group lives according to its own laws and normative orders. 
Th e term was introduced by adat law professor Cornelis van Vollenhoven. 
For recent literature on this subject, see, for example, Ratno Lukito, Legal 
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